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Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method
Many philosophers these days consider themselves naturalists, but it's doubtful any two of them intend the same position by the term. In this book, Penelope Maddy describes and practices a particularly austere form of naturalism called Second Philosophy. Without a definitive criterion for what counts as science and what doesn't, Second Philosophy can't be specified directly - trust only the methods of science! or some such thing - so Maddy proceeds instead by illustrating the behaviors of an idealized inquirer she calls the Second Philosopher. This Second Philosopher begins from perceptual common sense and progresses from there to systematic observation, active experimentation, theory formation and testing, working all the while to assess, correct and improve her methods as she goes. Second Philosophy is then the result of the Second Philosopher's investigations.
Maddy delineates the Second Philosopher's approach by tracing her reactions to various familiar skeptical and transcendental views (Descartes, Kant, Carnap, late Putnam, van Fraassen), comparing her methods to those of other self-described naturalists (especially Quine), and examining a prominent contemporary debate (between disquotationalists and correspondence theorists in the theory of truth) to extract a properly second-philosophical line of thought. She then undertakes to practise Second Philosophy in her reflections on the ground of logical truth, the methodology, ontology and epistemology of mathematics, and the general prospects for metaphysics naturalized.
Maddy delineates the Second Philosopher's approach by tracing her reactions to various familiar skeptical and transcendental views (Descartes, Kant, Carnap, late Putnam, van Fraassen), comparing her methods to those of other self-described naturalists (especially Quine), and examining a prominent contemporary debate (between disquotationalists and correspondence theorists in the theory of truth) to extract a properly second-philosophical line of thought. She then undertakes to practise Second Philosophy in her reflections on the ground of logical truth, the methodology, ontology and epistemology of mathematics, and the general prospects for metaphysics naturalized.
448 pages, Paperback
First published April 19, 2007
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About the author
Penelope Maddy
11 books21 followersPenelope Maddy is a UCI Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science and of Mathematics at the University of California, Irvine. She is well-known for her influential work in the philosophy of mathematics where she has worked on realism and naturalism.
Maddy received her Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1979.
Her early work, culminating in Realism in Mathematics, tried to defend Kurt Gödel's position that mathematics is a true description of a mind-independent realm that we can access through our intuition. However, she suggested that some mathematical entities are in fact concrete, unlike, notably, Gödel, who assumed all mathematical objects are abstract. She suggested that sets can be causally efficacious, and in fact share all the causal and spatiotemporal properties of their elements. Thus, when I see the three cups on the table in front of me, I also see the set as well. She used recent work in cognitive science and psychology to support this position, pointing out that just as at a certain age we begin to see objects rather than mere sense perceptions, there is also a certain age at which we begin to see sets rather than just objects.
In the 1990s, she moved away from this position, towards a position described in Naturalism in Mathematics. Her "naturalist" position, like Quine's, suggests that since science is our most successful project so far for knowing about the world, philosophers should adopt the methods of science in their own discipline, and especially when discussing science. However, rather than a unified picture of the sciences like Quine's, she has a picture on which mathematics is separate. This way, mathematics is neither supported nor undermined by the needs and goals of science, but is allowed to obey its own criteria. This means that traditional metaphysical and epistemological concerns of the philosophy of mathematics are misplaced. Like Wittgenstein, she suggests that many of these puzzles arise merely because of the application of language outside its proper domain of significance.
Throughout her career, she has been dedicated to understanding and explaining the methods that set theorists use in agreeing on axioms, especially those that go beyond ZFC.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penelope...
Maddy received her Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1979.
Her early work, culminating in Realism in Mathematics, tried to defend Kurt Gödel's position that mathematics is a true description of a mind-independent realm that we can access through our intuition. However, she suggested that some mathematical entities are in fact concrete, unlike, notably, Gödel, who assumed all mathematical objects are abstract. She suggested that sets can be causally efficacious, and in fact share all the causal and spatiotemporal properties of their elements. Thus, when I see the three cups on the table in front of me, I also see the set as well. She used recent work in cognitive science and psychology to support this position, pointing out that just as at a certain age we begin to see objects rather than mere sense perceptions, there is also a certain age at which we begin to see sets rather than just objects.
In the 1990s, she moved away from this position, towards a position described in Naturalism in Mathematics. Her "naturalist" position, like Quine's, suggests that since science is our most successful project so far for knowing about the world, philosophers should adopt the methods of science in their own discipline, and especially when discussing science. However, rather than a unified picture of the sciences like Quine's, she has a picture on which mathematics is separate. This way, mathematics is neither supported nor undermined by the needs and goals of science, but is allowed to obey its own criteria. This means that traditional metaphysical and epistemological concerns of the philosophy of mathematics are misplaced. Like Wittgenstein, she suggests that many of these puzzles arise merely because of the application of language outside its proper domain of significance.
Throughout her career, she has been dedicated to understanding and explaining the methods that set theorists use in agreeing on axioms, especially those that go beyond ZFC.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penelope...
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October 8, 2008The first part of this book is great, and very no-BS. Quite refreshing for a scientist such as myself, who has always looked a bit askance at philosophy. However, the next section, on meaning and representation... gah! Disquotationalism? This sounds like a joke, a parody of philosophical BS. Even the mathematician in me got fed up with it.
Maddy herself, however, makes a lot of sense. I skimmed the last two sections, and they seemed moderately interesting. She's definitely much more sensible than many of the famous philosophers past - I mean, some of the things Descartes or Kant say sound insane.
Maddy herself, however, makes a lot of sense. I skimmed the last two sections, and they seemed moderately interesting. She's definitely much more sensible than many of the famous philosophers past - I mean, some of the things Descartes or Kant say sound insane.
Displaying 1 of 1 review