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Barbarossa Derailed #1
Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk 10 July-10 September 1941 - Volume 1: The German Advance, The Encirclement Battle And The First And Second Soviet Counteroffensives, 10 July-24 August 1941
At dawn on 10 July 1941, massed tanks and motorized infantry of German Army Group Center's Second and Third Panzer Groups crossed the Dnepr and Western Dvina Rivers, beginning what Adolf Hitler, the Fuhrer of Germany's Third Reich, and most German officers and soldiers believed would be a triumphal march on Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. Less than three weeks before, on 22 June Hitler had unleashed his Wehrmacht's [Armed Forces] massive invasion of the Soviet Union code-named Operation Barbarossa, which sought to defeat the Soviet Union's Red Army, conquer the country, and unseat its Communist ruler, Josef Stalin. Between 22 June and 10 July, the Wehrmacht advanced up to 500 kilometers into Soviet territory, killed or captured up to one million Red Army soldiers, and reached the western banks of the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, by doing so satisfying the premier assumption of Plan Barbarossa that the Third Reich would emerge victorious if it could defeat and destroy the bulk of the Red Army before it withdrew to safely behind those two rivers. With the Red Army now shattered, Hitler and most Germans expected total victory in a matter of weeks. The ensuing battles in the Smolensk region frustrated German hopes for quick victory. Once across the Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, a surprised Wehrmacht encountered five fresh Soviet armies. Despite destroying two of these armies outright, severely damaging two others, and encircling the remnants of three of these armies in the Smolensk region, quick victory eluded the Germans. Instead, Soviet forces encircled in Mogilev and Smolensk stubbornly refused to surrender, and while they fought on, during July, August, and into early September, first five and then a total of seven newly-mobilized Soviet armies struck back viciously at the advancing Germans, conducting multiple counterattacks and counterstrokes, capped by two major counteroffensives that sapped German strength and will. Despite immense losses in men and materiel, these desperate Soviet actions derailed Operation Barbarossa. Smarting from countless wounds inflicted on his vaunted Wehrmacht, even before the fighting ended in the Smolensk region, Hitler postponed his march on Moscow and instead turned his forces southward to engage "softer targets" in the Kiev region. The 'derailment" of the Wehrmacht at Smolensk ultimately became the crucial turning point in Operation Barbarossa. This groundbreaking new study, now significantly expanded, exploits a wealth of Soviet and German archival materials, including the combat orders and operational of the German OKW, OKH, army groups, and armies and of the Soviet Stavka, the Red Army General Staff, the Western Main Direction Command, the Western, Central, Reserve, and Briansk Fronts, and their subordinate armies to present a detailed mosaic and definitive account of what took place, why, and how during the prolonged and complex battles in the Smolensk region from 10 July through 10 September 1941. The structure of the study is designed specifically to appeal to both general readers and specialists by a detailed two-volume chronological narrative of the course of operations, accompanied by a third volume, and perhaps a fourth, containing archival maps and an extensive collection of specific orders and reports translated verbatim from Russian. The maps, archival and archival-based, detail every stage of the battle. Within the context of a fresh appreciation of Hitler's Plan Barbarossa, this volume reviews the first two weeks of Operation Barbarossa and then describes in unprecedented detail Plan Barbarossa, Opposing Forces, and the Border Battles, 22 June-1 July 1941; Army Group Center's Advance to the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers and the Western Front's Counterstroke at Lepel' 2-9 July 1941; Army Group Center's Advance to Smolensk and the Timoshenko "Counteroffensive," 13-15 July 1941; Army Group Center's Encirclement Battle at Smolensk, 16 July-6 August 1941; The First Soviet Counteroffensive, 23-31 July 1941; The Battles on the Flanks (Velikie Luki and Rogachev-Zhlobin), 16-31 July 1941; The Siege of Mogilev, 16-28 July 1941; Armeegruppe Guderian's Destruction of Group Kachalov, 31 July-6 August 1941; Armeegruppe Guderian's and Second Army's Southward March and the Fall of Gomel', 8-21 August 1941; The Second Soviet Counteroffensive: The Western Front's Dukhovshchina Offensive, 6-24 August 1941 and the Reserve Front's El'nia Offensive, 8-24 August 1941; The Struggle for Velikie Luki, 8-24 August 1941. Based on the analysis of the vast mass of documentary materials exploited by this study, David Glantz presents a number of important new findings, notably: Soviet resistance to Army Group Center's advance into the Smolensk region was far stronger and more active than the Germans anticipated and historians have previously described; The military strategy Stalin, the Stavka, and Western Main Direction Command pursued was far more sophisticated than previously believed; Stalin, the Stavka, and Timoshenko's Western Main Direction Command employed a strategy of attrition designed to weaken advancing German forces; This attrition strategy inflicted far greater damage on Army Group Center than previously thought and, ultimately, contributed significantly to the Western and Kalinin Fronts' victories over Army Group Center in December 1941. Quite simply, this series breaks new ground in World War II Eastern Front and Soviet military studies.
656 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 2010
10 people are currently reading
210 people want to read
About the author
David M. Glantz
102 books220 followersDavid M. Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.
In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.
Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.
Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.
He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.
In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.
Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.
Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.
He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
November 13, 2024
This was a dense, super-detailed, and highly informative read into the opening campaign of the Eastern Front of World War II. Honestly, the density and information overload made it hard to read. This was a not a narrative but an in-depth (almost forensic analysis) of the Battle of Smolensk. The author loaded detailed daily accounts, listed numerous German & Russian tables of organization & equipment, and offensives & counterstrokes during the time frame of 10 July to 10 September 1941. This was the first major engagement once Operation Barbarossa commenced on 22 June 1941.
My only gripe was the maps were hard to read, almost all of them. But other than that, it was a too detailed and kinda boring. It was definitely tailored as a war studies resource instead of leisurely reading. Recommended if you are able to get your hands on a physical copy. Thanks!
My only gripe was the maps were hard to read, almost all of them. But other than that, it was a too detailed and kinda boring. It was definitely tailored as a war studies resource instead of leisurely reading. Recommended if you are able to get your hands on a physical copy. Thanks!
January 7, 2013
This book covers 2 months of heavy fighting around (using term "around" loosely) Smolensk during summer of 1941. Having said that I think a warning is in place. This is very detailed book, even by Glantz's standards. You can trace movement of units almost down to regiment/brigade levels almost hourly.
This book is built around one idea, that is that fighting around Smolensk was far more crucial for outcome of Barbarossa that previously credited. Glantz argues that by the time Germans reached the area fast (armored, mechanised and motorised) forces outpaced foot infantry forces. This in turn prevented Germans from effectively encircling Soviets as they simply lacked infantry to do it properly.
Rather than Smolensk being a mere bump in the road Glantz argues that this was in fact crucial point in Barbarossa. The heavy fighting in the region convinced Hitler (and some generals) that direct drive on Moscow with intent to win the war that way was not feasible. This in turn of course set stage for (in)famous turn south, Kiev encirclement and debate that rages to this day whether that was right decission.
Battle for Smolensk could easily be described as battle of misinterpretations. On one side Germans kept telling themselves that Red Army is on the verge of collapse and that one more massive encirclement is all it will take to push them over. This of course set them for repeated shocks when Soviets kept producing and fielding army after army out of, what looked like, thin air and throwing them in German path. On the other side Soviet high command convinced itself that Germans, Army Group Centre in this case, was so overextended one big offensive will collpse them. Both sides were partially right, Red Army of august 1941 was not the Red Army of June 1941. With million+ casualties it couldn't be and Germans were able to inflict painful defeat after painful defeat on them. And while Germans were overextended and their logistics were strained they were nowhere near breaking point and local success was just that, local.
What this book also shows is that Red army was slowly "getting it". List of commanders around Smolensk includes several names that would later win fame and recognition leading their Fronts to victory while smashing German armies and eventually assaulting Berlin.
Overall, this is not an easy read. It relies heavily on documents while detailed nature of the study requires attntive reading. But if you are interested in this episode it's unlikely you'll find anything better.
This book is built around one idea, that is that fighting around Smolensk was far more crucial for outcome of Barbarossa that previously credited. Glantz argues that by the time Germans reached the area fast (armored, mechanised and motorised) forces outpaced foot infantry forces. This in turn prevented Germans from effectively encircling Soviets as they simply lacked infantry to do it properly.
Rather than Smolensk being a mere bump in the road Glantz argues that this was in fact crucial point in Barbarossa. The heavy fighting in the region convinced Hitler (and some generals) that direct drive on Moscow with intent to win the war that way was not feasible. This in turn of course set stage for (in)famous turn south, Kiev encirclement and debate that rages to this day whether that was right decission.
Battle for Smolensk could easily be described as battle of misinterpretations. On one side Germans kept telling themselves that Red Army is on the verge of collapse and that one more massive encirclement is all it will take to push them over. This of course set them for repeated shocks when Soviets kept producing and fielding army after army out of, what looked like, thin air and throwing them in German path. On the other side Soviet high command convinced itself that Germans, Army Group Centre in this case, was so overextended one big offensive will collpse them. Both sides were partially right, Red Army of august 1941 was not the Red Army of June 1941. With million+ casualties it couldn't be and Germans were able to inflict painful defeat after painful defeat on them. And while Germans were overextended and their logistics were strained they were nowhere near breaking point and local success was just that, local.
What this book also shows is that Red army was slowly "getting it". List of commanders around Smolensk includes several names that would later win fame and recognition leading their Fronts to victory while smashing German armies and eventually assaulting Berlin.
Overall, this is not an easy read. It relies heavily on documents while detailed nature of the study requires attntive reading. But if you are interested in this episode it's unlikely you'll find anything better.
April 26, 2020
Good book overall on the first battle of Smolensk, but a bit of a slog. Glantz reports Soviet official reports before and after each day. These got to be quite tedious after awhile. I loved the last chapter on Conclusions as it's called. Very good.
Philip Kuhn
Philip Kuhn
January 17, 2017
The book has a lot of information about the covered topic. Unfortunately the information is so dense that is not an easy read. One should create notes to follow all the descriptions. In a generic paragraph there are more names (division, regiment, commander, location, etc.. ) than description of events. So unfortunately is not a style that I can digest.
August 21, 2016
Very informative and understandable history of the Battle of Smolensk. Only issue is the maps, which are sometimes terrible and hard to read.
June 18, 2024
This hovers between 3 and 4 stars, but ultimately gets the benefit of the doubt. Unparalleled detail and a compelling thesis, but often feels like a shotgun blast of information that was not tied together. It reads at times more as an excuse to present source material than as an argument supported by sources.
Each chapter begins with a general discussion of the strategic and operational problems at a certain phase or sector of the campaign. But from there, it plunges into a firehose of fine-grained information that is hard to piece together. Operational reports and orders constitute at least half the text, but these pose two major problems:
1.) An excess of detail. Actions are detailed down to the division level, occasionally even regiment or battalion. It's very laborious to follow along with what's happening, especially since many of the place-names are only located on single maps which are not always easy to find (there are a lot of maps at many different scales over a 2-month period).
2.) Insufficient framing information. What were the tactical reasons for these individual actions? How were operations planned? How did logistics, troop strength, and maintenance affect the outcomes? These details are only occasionally provided, making most of the fine-grained detail superfluous. Given that Volume 3 of the series is a sourcebook of all orders and reports, it would have made much more sense to summarize them here while providing greater context and analysis. Nonetheless, some sections are better than others, and the last few chapters on the second Soviet counteroffensive are exceptional.
In sum, the level of analysis did not match the level of detail. It would have been a much better book if it either 1.) stuck to a more general narrative to support its thesis, or 2.) went all-in with the analysis of day-to-day actions. Nevertheless, I'm glad I read this book and strongly recommend it to anyone with a serious interest in the Battle of Smolensk or Barbarossa more generally. It's quite an achievement despite its drawbacks.
Each chapter begins with a general discussion of the strategic and operational problems at a certain phase or sector of the campaign. But from there, it plunges into a firehose of fine-grained information that is hard to piece together. Operational reports and orders constitute at least half the text, but these pose two major problems:
1.) An excess of detail. Actions are detailed down to the division level, occasionally even regiment or battalion. It's very laborious to follow along with what's happening, especially since many of the place-names are only located on single maps which are not always easy to find (there are a lot of maps at many different scales over a 2-month period).
2.) Insufficient framing information. What were the tactical reasons for these individual actions? How were operations planned? How did logistics, troop strength, and maintenance affect the outcomes? These details are only occasionally provided, making most of the fine-grained detail superfluous. Given that Volume 3 of the series is a sourcebook of all orders and reports, it would have made much more sense to summarize them here while providing greater context and analysis. Nonetheless, some sections are better than others, and the last few chapters on the second Soviet counteroffensive are exceptional.
In sum, the level of analysis did not match the level of detail. It would have been a much better book if it either 1.) stuck to a more general narrative to support its thesis, or 2.) went all-in with the analysis of day-to-day actions. Nevertheless, I'm glad I read this book and strongly recommend it to anyone with a serious interest in the Battle of Smolensk or Barbarossa more generally. It's quite an achievement despite its drawbacks.
November 29, 2022
What was supposed to be a cakewalk for Hitler's Operation Barbarossa stalled around Smolensk in July August 1941.
Stalin stalled the offensive by calling up his seemingly endless reserves and raising armies when all seemed lost.
This was the first time the Wehrmacht saw the Soviets powers of recovery and ability to launch counter-offensives when they appeared beat.
At this point all it did is change Hitler's immediate plans to conquer Moscow by pivoting to the south and the Kiev area.
A good read.
Stalin stalled the offensive by calling up his seemingly endless reserves and raising armies when all seemed lost.
This was the first time the Wehrmacht saw the Soviets powers of recovery and ability to launch counter-offensives when they appeared beat.
At this point all it did is change Hitler's immediate plans to conquer Moscow by pivoting to the south and the Kiev area.
A good read.
April 11, 2022
More of a reference book than anything.
March 15, 2017
Американский полковник в деталях, шаг за шагом, излагает первый период Великой Отечественной Войны. Объясняя читателю, как фашисты недооценили мощь и волю Красной Армии и каким образом сталинским генералам удалось притормозить блицкриг от лучшей армии в мире.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews