In a deeply unequal world, our economic status shapes our pursuit of virtue whether we have enough resources to live comfortably or struggle to survive
Our understanding of inequality as a moral problem is incomplete. It is not enough to say that inequality is caused by moral failing. We must also see that influence runs in both directions. Inequality harms people's moral development.
In Wealth, Virtue, and Moral Luck , Kate Ward addresses the issue of inequality from the perspective of Christian virtue ethics, arguing that moral luck ― our individual life circumstances ― affects our ability to pursue virtue. Economic status functions as moral luck and impedes the ability of both the wealthy and the poor to pursue virtues such as prudence, justice, and temperance, and extreme inequality exacerbates the impact of wealth and poverty on virtue.
With these realities in mind, Ward shows how Christians and Christian communities should respond to the challenges inequality poses to virtue. Through working to change the structures that perpetuate extreme inequality ― and through spiritual practices, including contentment, conversion, encountering others, and reminding ourselves of our ultimate dependence on God ― Ward believes that we can create a world where all people can pursue and achieve virtue.
Virtue ethics is often criticized as a pietistic hangover and a generally unwelcome ethical model. Some of the popular criticisms are warranted, and some virtue ethicists do a poor job of articulating how this model encourages social action. Kate Ward’s very good book works to take some of those criticisms on the chin and push through to the other (virtuous) side of this trenchant criticism and work towards a solution by examining how virtue ethics has much to say about inequality. For Ward, wealth and poverty importantly affect our virtuous development. While we may readily acknowledge that poverty makes human flourishing difficult, the opposite is often not examined: that wealth makes ethical growth difficult. Indeed, one of the best parts of the book is chapter 5, Ward’s discussion on the phenomenon of “hyperagency” (when a moral agent has a disproportionate amount of social power and choice with respect to other moral agents, those in poverty for Ward) and how wealth (having/spending more than you need) short circuits an ethical agent’s ability to grow in virtue is one of the best in the book. Similarly, chapter 1, entitled “Groundwork,” is a very clear and helpful look at the rampant inequality in the world, especially economic inequality in America. The moral language she relies upon to look at how virtue relates to wealth/poverty is built around the philosophical concept of “moral luck,” a concept that examines how circumstances out of one’s control impacts their virtuous development. It’s a very useful concept that Ward puts to important work throughout the book. The upshot of this concept is that it acknowledges that though moral agents are susceptible to circumstances out of their control, they retain moral freedom, and, thus, moral responsibility. Ward regularly appeals to liberation theologians who dignify the impoverished and acknowledged that though their plight is grave and must be rectified, they are still morally important, valuable, and responsible.
The book is truly very good, though I do have a few criticisms. Ward will often make totalizing claims like “The whole Christian tradition says this” after she’s cited only a few sentences from only a few theologians in the Christian tradition. I think she’s often right, but I think the book would have benefitted from a far more robust examination of virtue ethics in the Christian tradition. Moreover, as she rightly points out, virtue ethics and narrative go hand in hand (an insight she pulls from Hauerwas and Pinches). However, she does not do the biblical and textual work to clarify exactly what the Christian narrative is that legitimates a Christian virtue ethics. She says, “Christian virtue ethics are Christian, not because the virtues pursued lack meaning for non-Christians but because Christians pursue these virtues in Christian communities and in light of Christian Scripture and tradition” (52). This is true—and yet, “Christian Scripture” does not figure in near as much as it should and, as I just mentioned, the tradition, though appealed to, is not sufficiently mined for all its worth. Finally, the final chapter, something of a call to action, is a bit thin. A great section would have been on how this phenomenon should impact Christian preaching. In the end, I think 50-60 more pages would’ve made this book slightly better.
As will be true for those who disagree with many of Ward’s arguments, they will not like her definition of wealth because it’s difficult to determine what constitutes “need.” This is fair, but Ward does a good bit of economic work in the book to justify how she understands “need.” Detractors will need to reckon with a work that is well-researched, impressive, and well worth your time.
Brilliant and convicting. My worry with virtue ethics is that privilege is so easily disguised as virtue and afforded spiritual authority. This works as an intro to and argument for a virtue ethic that works against injustice rather than with the grain of it.