Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism

by D.M. Armstrong

This is a study, in two volumes, of one of the longest-standing philosophical problems: the problem of universals. In volume I David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the main approaches and solutions to the problems that have been canvassed, rejecting the various forms of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In volume II he develops an important theory of his own, an objective theory of universals based not on linguistic conventions, but on the actual and potential findings of natural science. He thus reconciles a realism about qualities and relations with an empiricist epistemology. The theory allows, too, for a convincing explanation of natural laws as relations between these universals.

Genres: Philosophy, Metaphysics

168 pages, Paperback

First published June 15, 1978

About the author

David Malet Armstrong (born 8 July 1926), often D. M. Armstrong, is an Australian philosopher. He is well-known for his work on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and for his defence of a factualist ontology, a functionalist theory of the mind, an externalist epistemology, and a necessitarian conception of the laws of nature. He was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2008.

Reviews

[Greg Gauthier · Rating 3 out of 5]

Armstrong's systematic and meticulous summarization and refutation of each of the various forms of nominalism (as he sees them), was an indispensable contribution to my study of metaphysics this year. He really helped to add depth to the numerous "overviews" I'd read, on realism, anti-realism, and nominalism. He also provided a nice bridge between the "realism" of metaphysics, and the "realism" of science, with this volume.

However, I'm not going to mince words. His writing is at times obtuse and confused, and this volume was written with the target objective of defending his own Universalist thesis which he doesn't lay out until volume II (a work I just didn't have the time to start, this year). So, it has a bias, which might not be easily recognizable, if you're coming into the subject fresh. What's more, his refutation of Platonic Idealism was oversimplified, in my view. At one point, it was just a rank mischaracterization. I wonder if this is the case with all scientifically-oriented philosophers. Either so frightened of being seen as sympathetic to platonism, or so contemptuous of Plato's mystical idealism, that they can't seem to get it quite right.

Either way, if you're a serious student of metaphysics, this book is well worth the effort.