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Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960
Science of Coercion provides the first thorough examination of the role of the CIA, the Pentagon, and other U.S. security agencies in the evolution of modern communication research, a field in the social sciences which crystallized into a distinct discipline in the early 1950s.
Government-funded psychological warfare programs underwrote the academic triumph of preconceptions about communication that persist today in communication studies, advertising research, and in counterinsurgency operations.
Christopher Simpson contends that it is unlikely that communication research could have emerged into its present form without regular transfusions of money from U.S military, intelligence, and propaganda agencies during the Cold War. These agencies saw mass communication as an instrument for
persuading or dominating targeted groups in the United States and abroad; as a tool for improving military operations; and perhaps most fundamentally, as a means to extend the U.S. influence more widely than ever before at a relatively modest cost. Communication research, in turn, became for a time
the preferred method for testing and developing such techniques. Science of Coercion uses long-classified documents to probe the contributions made by prominent mass communication researchers such as Wilbur Schramm, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and others, then details the impact of psychological warfare
projects on widely held preconceptions about social science and the nature of communication itself.
A fascinating case study in the history of science and the sociology of knowledge, Science of Coercion offers valuable insights into the dynamics of ideology and the social psychology of communication.
Government-funded psychological warfare programs underwrote the academic triumph of preconceptions about communication that persist today in communication studies, advertising research, and in counterinsurgency operations.
Christopher Simpson contends that it is unlikely that communication research could have emerged into its present form without regular transfusions of money from U.S military, intelligence, and propaganda agencies during the Cold War. These agencies saw mass communication as an instrument for
persuading or dominating targeted groups in the United States and abroad; as a tool for improving military operations; and perhaps most fundamentally, as a means to extend the U.S. influence more widely than ever before at a relatively modest cost. Communication research, in turn, became for a time
the preferred method for testing and developing such techniques. Science of Coercion uses long-classified documents to probe the contributions made by prominent mass communication researchers such as Wilbur Schramm, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and others, then details the impact of psychological warfare
projects on widely held preconceptions about social science and the nature of communication itself.
A fascinating case study in the history of science and the sociology of knowledge, Science of Coercion offers valuable insights into the dynamics of ideology and the social psychology of communication.
224 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1994
85 people are currently reading
1072 people want to read
About the author
Christopher Simpson
67 books44 followersChristopher Simpson is a veteran reporter, historian, and analyst who teaches at American University's School of Communication in Washington, DC. His work has won national awards for investigative journalism, history, and literature, and has been published in more than a dozen languages. Current study includes technology, democracy, revolution, and peer learning.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
December 13, 2021
This book lays out very clearly the history and refinement of psychological operations used by the DoD and CIA. Probably don’t read this if you want to enjoy anything
October 22, 2016
A welcome exercise in showing how untrustworthy academia can be.
This is a study of how the academic field of communications and communication research was overwhelmingly funded and supported and staffed by people involved with the shady development of psych warfare. Seen as a cheaper and more effective, not to mention, easier to deny, way of dominating populations--and not just overseas--psychological warfare programs were the bread and butter of early academic communications scholars who, without issue or scruple, easily moved between dubious and harmful research projects for covert government agencies and the university. This allowed scholars to pooh-pooh any questionable moral grounds for their work (which involved indoctrination, propaganda against one's own population, and terrorism) and turn it into "purely instrumental studies" devoid of any ethical quandaries. Oh yes, and get funding, too.
Simpson looks at the evolution of covert psych warfare groups and projects, showing how generations of academics, whose research was funded by and their views determined by the sources of their money. University venues became outposts of government thought, utterly lacking in morality and steeped in notions of paradigms of domination.
This is a study of how the academic field of communications and communication research was overwhelmingly funded and supported and staffed by people involved with the shady development of psych warfare. Seen as a cheaper and more effective, not to mention, easier to deny, way of dominating populations--and not just overseas--psychological warfare programs were the bread and butter of early academic communications scholars who, without issue or scruple, easily moved between dubious and harmful research projects for covert government agencies and the university. This allowed scholars to pooh-pooh any questionable moral grounds for their work (which involved indoctrination, propaganda against one's own population, and terrorism) and turn it into "purely instrumental studies" devoid of any ethical quandaries. Oh yes, and get funding, too.
Simpson looks at the evolution of covert psych warfare groups and projects, showing how generations of academics, whose research was funded by and their views determined by the sources of their money. University venues became outposts of government thought, utterly lacking in morality and steeped in notions of paradigms of domination.
September 20, 2024
First published in 1994, only a few years after the end of the Cold War, this academic study examines the close relationship that developed between the social sciences, particularly the field of communication studies, and the US government during the early Cold War years (1945–1960) and how this early symbiotic relationship still affects communications research today. Specifically, he shows how funding by the US military and intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, led early researchers to be more concerned with how communication can be mobilized to manipulate and dominate, populations, rather than on communication is, that is, an "inherently communal social process" of human interactions (61).
This understanding of communication as a tool of propaganda and of psychological warfare, the author makes clear, was not the product of any conspiratorial plot. Instead, it was the product of a convergence of interests that led many academics to collaborate with the government to defeat Nazism. Once Nazism was defeated, academics who had wartime experience in "black," "grey," and "white" propaganda operations returned to civilian life, and some founded communication research centers; their contacts with military and intelligence officials placed them in an ideal position to secure needed funding for their nascent organizations. Like any applicant seeking funding, they needed to demonstrate that their research would be useful to the client, that is, the US military and intelligence agencies. Against the backdrop of the emerging Cold War and the belief that Stalinism posed an imminent threat to democracies everywhere, this meant they needed to show that communication research could prevent another "hot" war as well as keep the so-called dominoes from falling. Hence the "communication-as-dominance" paradigm emerged victorious.
Consequently, even though many founders of communication research institutes at prominent universities, such as at Yale, Harvard, Columbia University, and MIT, had leftist political views, they developed research projects that would underpin violent clandestine actions undertaken by the US government to weaken communism. Although the need to secure funding played a significant role in this at-first-glance unlikely alliance between progressives and ardent Cold Warriors, it was not the only factor that contributed to academic complicity in US covert operations that targeted domestic and foreign opponents. Another factor was the rise of McCarthyism; using a communication paradigm other than the dominant one could place one's career and economic survival in jeopardy, as numerous academics discovered when they were blackballed after being called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Taking part in government-sponsored psychological warfare research was one way to defend oneself against the anti-communist witch-hunt--especially if at any time in the distant past one had been affiliated with a communist organization.
Advancing positions that did not adhere to the dominant paradigm also could result in professional ridicule or non-publication. For example, Public Opinion Quarterly, the leading communication studies journal of the era, published a scathing review of George Seldes's monograph, The People don't Know: The American Press and the Cold War, in which he contended that the mass media in the United States gave Americans an "ideologically charged" version of political realities. The journal also refused to publish anything works by the German theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, because their understanding of communication did not align with the official narrative. Trapped in a situation that required ideological conformity to survive politically and professionally, many academics became adept at insulating themselves from the violent applications of their research findings by the US military.
Although the findings of this 1994 study are no longer anything new, its detailed and well-documented presentation of how this relationship came about, the evolution of it, and its long-term impact on academic research make this study well worth reading even today.
This understanding of communication as a tool of propaganda and of psychological warfare, the author makes clear, was not the product of any conspiratorial plot. Instead, it was the product of a convergence of interests that led many academics to collaborate with the government to defeat Nazism. Once Nazism was defeated, academics who had wartime experience in "black," "grey," and "white" propaganda operations returned to civilian life, and some founded communication research centers; their contacts with military and intelligence officials placed them in an ideal position to secure needed funding for their nascent organizations. Like any applicant seeking funding, they needed to demonstrate that their research would be useful to the client, that is, the US military and intelligence agencies. Against the backdrop of the emerging Cold War and the belief that Stalinism posed an imminent threat to democracies everywhere, this meant they needed to show that communication research could prevent another "hot" war as well as keep the so-called dominoes from falling. Hence the "communication-as-dominance" paradigm emerged victorious.
Consequently, even though many founders of communication research institutes at prominent universities, such as at Yale, Harvard, Columbia University, and MIT, had leftist political views, they developed research projects that would underpin violent clandestine actions undertaken by the US government to weaken communism. Although the need to secure funding played a significant role in this at-first-glance unlikely alliance between progressives and ardent Cold Warriors, it was not the only factor that contributed to academic complicity in US covert operations that targeted domestic and foreign opponents. Another factor was the rise of McCarthyism; using a communication paradigm other than the dominant one could place one's career and economic survival in jeopardy, as numerous academics discovered when they were blackballed after being called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Taking part in government-sponsored psychological warfare research was one way to defend oneself against the anti-communist witch-hunt--especially if at any time in the distant past one had been affiliated with a communist organization.
Advancing positions that did not adhere to the dominant paradigm also could result in professional ridicule or non-publication. For example, Public Opinion Quarterly, the leading communication studies journal of the era, published a scathing review of George Seldes's monograph, The People don't Know: The American Press and the Cold War, in which he contended that the mass media in the United States gave Americans an "ideologically charged" version of political realities. The journal also refused to publish anything works by the German theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, because their understanding of communication did not align with the official narrative. Trapped in a situation that required ideological conformity to survive politically and professionally, many academics became adept at insulating themselves from the violent applications of their research findings by the US military.
Although the findings of this 1994 study are no longer anything new, its detailed and well-documented presentation of how this relationship came about, the evolution of it, and its long-term impact on academic research make this study well worth reading even today.
November 27, 2017
I've offered to buy a copy of this for any friend or family member who will read it. I believe it is that important to understanding the world of deception lying before us today. I got my copy as part of the "Forbidden Bookshelf" and want to also give a shout out to their valuable work.
December 19, 2015
Thorough and well-documented.
July 24, 2022
Definitely an academic piece. Despite the massive amount of sources and notes in this book it was still written in a strictly generalized way. Kind of like reading a term paper. Very few specific references to “covert operations” taking place with respect to “psychological warfare” and propaganda. In the extensive essay and notes a few other interesting reads were revealed, but this one was much too general and academic as to almost being boring and uninformative. Vague references to the government using propaganda and psychological warfare on its own citizens. But overall, being my first foray into The Forbidden Bookshelf, I was expecting more explosive revelations.
January 10, 2021
Although surprisingly readable given its academic format, the constraints of rigorously developing and documenting each chapter make it a difficult read in a few passages. Other than that, the clarity, methodology, and unique focus are deserving of 5-stars. Simpson is a perceptive writer who thoughtfully announces his conceits and limitations. It was a pleasure to flip between two PDFs of the book for the reference notes because, "The secrecy that surrounds any CIA operation makes complete documentation impossible...". Despite these limitations, this book does a great job tracing how United States military interests influenced early trends in communications research, its major players, institutions, and funding methods. In rough summary,
Many of those "authoritative" figures came from the psychological warfare cohorts of WWII, leaving an inheritance of "opinion questionnaires, algorithms employed to derive useful data from them..., and contributions to 'motivation' research and similar maintenance-of-morale techniques widely employed in commercial public relations." While many innovations originated in private firms and from researchers "outside" the establishment, it is critical to deny that mainstream communications research is "neutral, objective, or even held at arm's length from the political and economic powers of the day."
While it is not Simpson's focus to extrapolate the legacy of this research through American culture, this period was instrumental to the development of the algorithmic, data-driven, persuasive technology culture so deeply saturating the early 21st century. For a shorter and more colorful reflection on the political legacy of a few major players featured in Science of Coercion, consider checking out this New Yorker article, How the Simulmatics Corporation Invented the Future.
"The path of scientific discovery in U.S. communication research was not decided in advance by the government or anyone else, of course. Although government funding did not determine what could be said by social scientists, it did play a major role in determining who would do the "authoritative" talking about communication and an indirect role in determining who would enjoy access to the academic media necessary to be heard by others in the field."
Many of those "authoritative" figures came from the psychological warfare cohorts of WWII, leaving an inheritance of "opinion questionnaires, algorithms employed to derive useful data from them..., and contributions to 'motivation' research and similar maintenance-of-morale techniques widely employed in commercial public relations." While many innovations originated in private firms and from researchers "outside" the establishment, it is critical to deny that mainstream communications research is "neutral, objective, or even held at arm's length from the political and economic powers of the day."
Instead, communication studies entwined themselves with the existing institutions of power, just as have, say, the mainstream study of economics or atomic physics, whose inbreeding with the political and military establishment are so extensive as to have become common knowledge.
While it is not Simpson's focus to extrapolate the legacy of this research through American culture, this period was instrumental to the development of the algorithmic, data-driven, persuasive technology culture so deeply saturating the early 21st century. For a shorter and more colorful reflection on the political legacy of a few major players featured in Science of Coercion, consider checking out this New Yorker article, How the Simulmatics Corporation Invented the Future.
May 14, 2009
Ever hear of "Gray Propaganda"?
February 6, 2020
Extremely interesting and very well-researched book, but I'm not sure the title is particularly accurate - or perhaps it's just me. I picked it up, thinking that it would be an explanation of how psychology is used to create various levels of effective propaganda. Thinking, too, that a book which purports to be about psychological warfare would actually, you know, go into examples of this. It doesn't really do either, and it took me a while to stop being frustrated with what the book said it was and what it actually was.
What it actually is can be summed up in short quote from chapter 5, wherein America's National Science Foundation, in 1952, found that "over 96% of all reported federal funding for social science at that time was drawn from the U.S. military". I don't know whether I was more shocked at the parlous state of mid-century research funding in general, or that fact that so much of that funding was military in nature... and this was just the beginning. This book is about what happens to an academic and research environment when funding is so monolithic. Researchers want to please the funders - because they're pretty much the only source of money - and so they begin to focus more on things that please the funders, who then think "What useful information, we must encourage more research here" and then people who take a different approach don't get their articles published, and don't get teaching positions, and it all becomes very incestuous and chronically, chronically limited. Yet as Simpson points out, most of these researchers didn't think of themselves as bought... but there was an unconscious move, almost en masse, to a central set of opinions, and how depressing for science that such naivete is present in those who are supposed to be trained in scepticism (and who apparently had no such training in ethics). Because, as Simpson points out, the psychological warfare and propaganda designed to be used against other nations, designed to limit casualties and help bring about what the researchers and their government considered to be positive change... actually helped to worsen pretty much every country it was used in.
Sadly, there's no much indication that this ever occurred, even after the fact, to those researchers who essentially created the theories of mass communication to begin with. After all, professionally at least, they were rewarded very well for it.
What it actually is can be summed up in short quote from chapter 5, wherein America's National Science Foundation, in 1952, found that "over 96% of all reported federal funding for social science at that time was drawn from the U.S. military". I don't know whether I was more shocked at the parlous state of mid-century research funding in general, or that fact that so much of that funding was military in nature... and this was just the beginning. This book is about what happens to an academic and research environment when funding is so monolithic. Researchers want to please the funders - because they're pretty much the only source of money - and so they begin to focus more on things that please the funders, who then think "What useful information, we must encourage more research here" and then people who take a different approach don't get their articles published, and don't get teaching positions, and it all becomes very incestuous and chronically, chronically limited. Yet as Simpson points out, most of these researchers didn't think of themselves as bought... but there was an unconscious move, almost en masse, to a central set of opinions, and how depressing for science that such naivete is present in those who are supposed to be trained in scepticism (and who apparently had no such training in ethics). Because, as Simpson points out, the psychological warfare and propaganda designed to be used against other nations, designed to limit casualties and help bring about what the researchers and their government considered to be positive change... actually helped to worsen pretty much every country it was used in.
Sadly, there's no much indication that this ever occurred, even after the fact, to those researchers who essentially created the theories of mass communication to begin with. After all, professionally at least, they were rewarded very well for it.
June 4, 2020
Woah, after reading through you really can understand why books like these are not ordered for college or public libraries. When you see the secretive interaction between college psychologists and the military you can for a picture that this continues today.
November 29, 2018
در دسته کتاب های باید خوند
January 9, 2019
Connects the development of the social sciences and mass communication with funding from psychological warfare.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews