In this follow-up to his seminal work, The Defense of the Faith, Cornelius Van Til continues to explore “in greater detail the nature and implications of our commitment to Scriptural authority,” articulating a Reformed apologetic harmonious with the Christian faith. Through a dazzling survey of perspectives―the church fathers, Thomas Aquinas, Herman Bavinck, B. B. Warfield, Oliver Buswell, and others―Van Til expresses a vibrantly Reformed epistemology founded on the Word of God. A Christian Theory of Knowledge ranks among Van Til’s foremost works, critical to grasping a Reformed covenantal apologetic. Long out of print, this edition has been completely retypeset and furnished with an introduction and helpful annotations by K. Scott Oliphint.
Cornelius Van Til, was a Christian philosopher, Reformed theologian, and presuppositional apologist.
Biographical sketch
Born on May 3, 1895, in Grootegast, The Netherlands he was the sixth son of Ite and Klazina Van Til, who emigrated to the United States when "Kees," as he was known to friends, was 10. He grew up helping on the family farm in Highland, Indiana.
Van Til graduated from Calvin College in 1922, receiving a ThM from Princeton Theological Seminary in 1925 and his PhD from Princeton University in 1927. He began teaching at Princeton, but shortly went with the conservative group who founded Westminster Theological Seminary, where he taught for forty-three years of his life as a professor of apologetics.
He was also a minister in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church from the 1930s until his death in 1987, and in that denomination, he was embroiled in a bitter dispute with Gordon Clark over God's incomprehensibility known as the Clark-Van Til Controversy in which, according to John Frame, neither man was at his best and neither quite understood the other's position.
Van Til's thought
Van Til is perhaps best known for the development of a fresh approach to the task of defending the Christian faith. Although trained in traditional methods he drew on the insights of fellow Calvinistic philosophers Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd to formulate what he viewed as a more consistently Christian methodology. His apologetic focused on the role of presuppositions, the point of contact between believers and unbelievers, and the antithesis between Christian and non-Christian worldviews.
This book is philosophically and theologically very rich.
But it is often denser than necessary. This helped me understand why John Frame, a former student of Van Til’s said that he wished Van Til would have written in his native Dutch allowing for his writing to flow more naturally and then for it to be translated by a native speaker.
A COMPREHENSIVE PRESENTATION OF VAN TIL’S VERSION OF A ‘REFORMED’ APOLOGETICS
Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987) was a Calvinist philosopher and theologian, and perhaps the leading Christian exponent of "presuppositional" apologetics. He taught at Westminster Theological Seminary for more than 40 years, and was one of the leaders in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1969 book, “This work is to a large extent an expansion of and supplement to my ‘The Defense of the Faith’… In the present volume I attempt to work out in greater detail the nature and implications of our commitment to Scriptural authority in relation to our activity as Christian theologians and philosophers today.”
He states in the Introduction, “This work seeks to present a Christian and, more especially, a Reformed theory of knowledge. The present writer holds … that the Reformed Faith is the most consistent expression of Christianity; CHRISTIAN apologetics is therefore considered identical with REFORMED apologetics. No depreciation of non-Reformed views of Protestantism is implied. On the contrary, it is the writer’s conviction that the cause of evangelical… Protestantism is bound to profit from a defense of the Reformed Faith, for a defense of the Reformed Faith is not primarily a defense of the ‘five points of Calvinism.' A defense of the Reformed Faith is a Reformed method of the defense of Christianity and this should be to the profit even of Roman Catholic Christianity.” (Pg. 5)
He continues, “The present work seeks specifically to show the relevance of Christianity to modern thought. Its main contention is that Christianity has the answer that modern thought seeks in vain. Modern thought in general is largely controlled by the basic principles of modern philosophy. To evaluate these basic principles from the point of view of Christianity is therefore of paramount importance. Much help has been received… from the writings of D.H. Th. Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd… It is the writer’s hope that something in the way of a beginning may herewith be made in the utilization of all the wealth of Reformed scriptural exegesis, theological research, and philosophy that has appeared in recent times for purpose of a Reformed or consistently Christian theory of knowledge and a consistently Christian apologetics.” (Pg. 5-6)
He asserts, “The difference between a Christian system that seeks to be consistently analogical and one, like that of Romanism, that does not, is that only in the former is the false ideal of knowledge of the nonbeliever rejected. If one does not make human knowledge wholly dependent upon the original self-knowledge and consequent revelation of God to man, then man will have to seek knowledge within himself as the final reference point. Then he will have to seek an exhaustive understanding of reality. Then he will have to hold that if he cannot attain to such an exhaustive understanding of reality, he has no TRUE knowledge of anything at all. Either man must then know everything or he knows nothing. This is the dilemma that confronts every form of non-Christian epistemology.” (Pg. 17)
He notes, “intellectual argument will not, as such, convince and convert the non-Christian. It takes the regenerative power of the Holy Spirit to do that. But as in the case of preaching, so in the case of apologetical reasoning, the Holy Spirit may use a MEDIATE approach to the minds and hearts of men. The natural man is quite able to intellectually follow the argument that the Christian offers for the truth of his position. He can therefore see that the wisdom of this world has been made foolishness by God. Christianity can be shown to be, not ‘just as good as’ or ever ‘better than’ the non-Christian position, but the ONLY position that does not make nonsense of human experience.” (Pg. 19)
He asks, “Is it fair for us to take the picture of man from Scripture alone and to ignore what the fallen man says about himself?… the Christian apologist should, to be sure, look sympathetically into the efforts of men in general when they seek to analyze themselves and their problems. There will be no doubt ‘elements of truth’ in such an analysis; even so, ultimately, the idea of a standard of truth is involved in any ‘system of truth... The Bible is the ultimate standard of truth. And therefore the analysis of man’s sin and evil must be made by means of Scripture, as the ‘medicine book’ by which men are to be judged.” (Pg. 43)
He observes, “the god of the autonomous man is frequently spoken of as if he had attributes similar to those of the God of Christianity. But the attributes of the god of the autonomous man are projections of his own ideals. He speaks AS IF such a god exists. He speaks AS IF such a god were revealing himself and giving commandments to man. In reality no such god exists.” (Pg. 168)
Discussing Roman Catholicism, he asks, “We ask now whether the situation has changed because of the decisions of Vatican II. Through the official decisions of Vatican II, Mother church is again calling the present writer, together with all Protestants, back to its bosom… Through Vatican II Mother church speaks with a soft and pleading voice. The present writer is now one of the ‘departed brethren.’ [NOTE: the Vatican II term is actually ‘separated brethren.’] … the present writer will give his reasons why, even now, he cannot return to Mother church. He appreciates greatly the difference in the tone of voice used in Vatican II as over against that used at Trent… The theology of Trent was basically unacceptable to the Reformers. The theology of Vatican II is basically unacceptable to the sons of the Reformers.” (Pg. 175-176)
He argues, “the idea why Christian apologists approach the unbeliever with this idea of the essential trustworthiness of the gospels as historical documents rather than as the infallible word of God is to make the acceptance of what they teach easier for the natural man. But how could the natural man consistently allow that what the Scriptures say about the idea of human autonomy… and what is said about Christ and his work is even possible?” (Pg. 227)
He continues, “If the natural man is allowed the right to take the documents of the gospels as merely historically trustworthy witnesses to the Christ and his work, he will… consistently claim to also be the judge of the Christ himself. For it is only if the Christ be taken as the Son of God that he can be said legitimately to identify himself. If he is not presupposed as such, his words have no power. Then they too are absorbed in what is a hopeless relativity of history.” (Pg. 234)
Perhaps surprisingly, he contends that in apologetics, “It is impossible to follow both [Abraham] Kuyper and B.B. Warfield… It was only an inconsistency on Warfield’s part to advocate a method of apologetics that is out of accord with the foundation concepts of his own Reformed theology… Kuyper too was inconsistent when, after rejecting such a method of apologetics, he yet sometimes employed it.” (Pg. 253)
He explains, “Theo ‘presuppositionalist’ does not… deny that there is common ground between the believer and the unbeliever… The question pertains to the NATURE of the common ground. The present writer has repeatedly asserted that metaphysically believers and unbelievers have ALL REALITY IN COMMON. [They] are, alike, image-bearers of God… It is, therefore, because all men are image-bearers of God … that the natural man remains accessible to God. No man can escape the call of God which confronts him in his own constitution… It is therefore the idea of a common ground of INTERPRETATION that the ‘presuppositionalist’ rejects… Can one intelligently assume that he is both … a sinner and not a sinner?” (Pg. 258-259)
He asserts, “It is an insult to … God to argue for his ‘possible’ existence. An argument for his possible existence PRESUPPOSES the idea that he may possibly not exist. But the God of Scripture tells us that he cannot possibly not exist. He presents himself as the self-referential source of all that exists in the universe.” (Pg. 263)
He summarizes, “Roman Catholicism and Arminianism fail to present men with the full significance of the gospel because they do not challenge the starting point and the methodology of the unbeliever. Those who hold the Reformed Faith in theology can be of inestimable blessing to the unbeliever if, instead of following the Romanist and Arminian, they apply the principles of their theology to the method of their apologetics.” (Pg. 272)
He outlines, “The first and most basic point on which my approach differs from the traditional one is therefore that: (a) I start more frankly from the Bible as the source from which as an absolutely authoritative revelation I take my whole interpretation of life… (b) I stress the OBJECTIVE CLARITY of God’s revelation of himself wherever it appears.” (Pg. 291)
He asserts, “Every fact in the universe is what it is by virtue of the place that it has in the plan of God. Man cannot comprehensively know that plan. He must therefore present the facts of theism and of Christianity, of Christian theism, as proving Christian theism because they are intelligible as facts in terms of it … alone.” (Pg. 298)
He also observes, “The new quest for the historical Jesus has, therefore, if [James M.] Robinson’s picture of it is accurate, once more and more clearly than ever, shows that the wisdom of man has been made foolishness with God.” (Pg. 347)
This book is Van Til’s most detailed and comprehensive presentation of his apologetic approach, and will be of great interest to anyone studying him.
In general, a very helpful book for grasping Van Til's theology by his examination of the theology of others. As most say, it is a dense book and not without its flaws. The recently added notes by K. Scott Oliphint are of abundant help.
I found Van Til's "Christianity in Conflict" a helpful companion. However, my lack of education in late 19th and 20th century liberal theology handicapped me in the final two chapters.
Again, be sure to read the copy with Oliphint's notes.
Lots of valuable material, but much of the book went way over my head. I'd likely need to earn a doctorate in philosophy before I come back to the book so I can grasp the parts that were filled to the brim with jargon. Van Til is amazing, but he is still way beyond me. Still, happy with the book so five stars.
Some of this will be my own reflections on CvT's A Christian Theory of Knowledge and the rest will be towards a construction of anti-scale of being philosophy. I am not reviewing the whole book because it's unnecessary. Why do a review of any CvT work after Bahnsen's magnum opus? Further, the last 150 pages of CTK could have been left off and the book would have been better.
While CvT's critique of Romanism was good, he didn't integrate his earlier (and fine) critique of Plotinus, Augustine, and being/non-being into his larger critique of Romanism, which likely could have buried Romanism. Instead, he got sidetracked on showing how Karl Barth is secretly in line with the nouvelle theologie of post-Vatican II theology. That simply doesn't wash. For all of Barth's problems, he rejected the analogia entis and the substance metaphysics upon which Rome is built.
CvT gives a fairly good summary and critique of the early church fathers. There is some difficulty in this, since no one, even anchoretic traditions, are entirely clear on who constitutes (and when!) the ECFs. Even admitting Tertullian is a heretic, I don't think you will find many exceptions in the ancient world to the epistemology CvT is summarizing. The later Palamite epistemology is simply a refinement (and perhaps bungling) of some neo-Platonic themes, so to the degree that CvT accurately summarizes and critiques the being theologies of Augustine, Plotinus, and Eurigena, the criticism applies to Palamas (and Palamas and Augustine are closer than one might suspect).
CvT writes that the early church could not find a Christian view of freedom to coalesce with a Christian view of necessity, with the result the fathers opted for a nonbiblical view of free will.
Non-Christian Continuity and Discontinuity
A non-Christian view of continuity sees an identification of God and man, as seen below:
The higher on the scale, the more real and "true" the thing is. Van Til notes that Tertullian sees sin as "the opposite of good." This sounds correct until we realize that means sin is "lower" on the scale of good. Sin has "slenderness of being."
On the principle of continuity it is hard to see how Tertullian (and Justin)'s view of God is different from the Stoics'. But when he argues against Marcion, he says the Christian God is "Other" than man (107).
Later Platonisms
Moving to the fathers (Origen and Clement) we see the scale of being hardened in place. CvT quotes Plotinus to the effect, "thought is motion" and this is inferior to ecstasy. (Rowan Williams has a helpful summary on this point).
Here our chart is modified. God is now seen as hyper-ousia, above ousia. How does one then get from the highest point on the scale of being to "above being?" Mysticism, ecstasy. Van Til can then make the critique that many of these fathers employed both rationalism (scale of being, continuity principle) and irrationalism (ecstasy, mysticism). In fact, rationalism and irrationalism on this gloss are dialectically correlative.
If man is on the scale of being and participates in good, then consistently we must say he also participates in non-being.
Is Finitude Evil?
This is the key point: on metaphysical accounts (and yes, I used the word "metaphysical") man is defective because he is finite (he participates lower on the scale of being, even to participating in non-being. Biblical religion, by contrast, sees man's problem as ethical: he is in rebellion to God. CvT then gives a helpful discussion on "total depravity." We are not saying that man's noetic capacity is ruined. It is in rebellion.
A Metaphysical Fall from Oneness
Augustine is very clear (City of God section on the Platonists) that One = Truth = Being. The further away from the One we get, the more irrational we get. The problem is that historical facts are in the realm of the many (further, since history is contingent). This is similar to Plato's problem of learning by experience. Van Til writes,
When Plato took his line and divided it sharply between eternal being of which there was genuine knowledge or science, and non-being of which there was no knowledge, he was faced with the question of how learning by experience is possible (129).
Back to Augustine: Eternal Truth and History are dialectical opposites. If Christ is the Eternal Word (and true) then how could he be historical? If historical, then not eternal, and thus not true, and thus unknown. This is where one's onto-epistemology leads. As Van Til says, "The first option leads to truth without content."
Van Til has a nice phrase to summarize all of this: slenderness of being. (And that is where these traditions find man's free will).
Other notes:
Rejecting the Augstino-Platonic view of Time: sheer timeless (moving image of eternity) would swallow up all distinctions.
Problems:
I almost understand what CvT means when he says pure rationality and pure irrationality demand one another (144). I wish he would have clarified it.
I understand his criticisms of Barth and some of them are valid. I don't think he fully showed how Barth's actualist ontology is at odds with Rome's analogia entis.
I am greatly indebted to Cornelius Van Til and thank God for the insights he had into Scripture. However, for all his insight, his writing is far more opaque than the Scriptures he champions. In A Christian Theory of Knowledge, Van Til expands upon his work in The Defense of the Faith. He walks through the early Greek philosophers to the modern existentialists and their children, attempting to show how each of theem succumb to a dialectic of rationalism and irrationalism. Each view at some level incorporates pure rationalism, believing that autonomous man can interpret the world with reference to himself, and pure irrationalism, believing that the world outside of the self is completely contingent—pure chance. This approach is profound, yet Van Til assumes a level of familiarity with the thinkers he addresses that most readers will not share. To make matters worse, he uses terms in ways that will be unfamiliar to most readers and often states his conclusions without walking the reader through the steps by which he arrived there. Chapters 8-10 are probably the most clear and helpful, laying out Van Til's presuppositional approach in a (relatively) clear manner. I owe a great debt to Van Til and found much that was helpful in this book, but I would direct the reader to the much more cogent writing of John Frame. For the topic matter of this book, the Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, A History of Western Philosophy and Theology, and Apologetics: A Justification of Christian Belief.