The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I

by Mark Ethan Grotelueschen

This book provides the most comprehensive examination of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) combat doctrine and methods ever published. It shows how AEF combat units actually fought on the Western Front in World War I. It describes how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. General John Pershing and other AEF leaders promulgated an inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas that retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on the modern battlefield. However, many AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine and operational methods as they fought, preparing more comprehensive attack plans, employing flexible infantry formations, and maximizing firepower to seize limited objectives.

Genres: History, War, World War I, Military History, Military Fiction, Nonfiction

398 pages, Hardcover

First published November 1, 2006

Reviews

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I by Mark Ethan Grotelueschen
This fine book is a comprehensive and surprisingly readable survey of how the US Army's American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) trained and fought in the First World War. Considered worthy of inclusion in the Army Chief of Staff's recommended reading list, Dr. Grotelueschen describes the process the Army underwent to prepare for a type of combat it had no experience with, how it trained and how it fought. Much ink has been spilled discussing and even denigrating the combat performance of the AEF and, indeed, the first battles fought by the Americans exposed both their inexperience and their unsuitable combat doctrine. As the war progressed, and the American soldiers (plus a Marine Brigade) learned both from their allies and their own experiences to as adept as their British and French partners, as well as the Germans. After describing the doctrinal disputes, the author thoroughly examines the training and fighting done by four divisions: the !st, 2nd, 26th and 77th, to more closely analyze how they coped.

The pre-WWI American Army was tiny: less than 200,000 men. During most of its recent history it had fought Indians, Filipino guerrillas and Mexican bandits. It's battle doctrine (how it intended and prepared to fight) was human-centered, touting the rifle and bayonet-armed infantryman as the vital component of victory, based on the supposed American proclivity for rapid maneuver and "national talent" for shooting rifles, like Davy Crockett or Kit Carson. Pershing, who was a strong believer in this stuff, thought the Europeans had settled into trench warfare and stalemate because they were shy. But the Yanks would somehow be above all that. Groups of rifle armed infantry would used rapid movement to outflank and somehow overwhelm their heavily dug-in and armed-to-the-teeth opponents with massed rifle fire and finish them off with a bayonet charge. Very little supporting firepower would be used.

At first, the Americans tried fighting this way and found out what their French and British allies had discovered 2 1/2 years before. They had also originally intended to fight this way, only to massacre their own infantry, and that the war was a war of machines. World War I on the Western Front was essentially an artillery war, and even Pershing realized that his units would have to adapt, or at least, master trench warfare before they could force the Germans into the open. The changes were carried out from the bottom-up, with help from the allies, especially the French, who trained and equipped the American's artillery. The American infantry also adapted by acquiring additional organic firepower as in machine guns, automatic rifles, grenade launchers, light support artillery, trench mortars and hand grenades, though Pershing would dismissively refer to such weapons as "auxiliaries." The better units, like the 1st and 2nd Divisions became adept at the vital art of coordinating infantry and artillery to carry out attack that didn't kill off their soldiers. Artillery tactics mattered; no successful attack was carried out in the latter part of the war without a rolling barrage, combined high-explosive and gas attacks to suppress enemy artillery, and long-range destruction of the opponent's rear installations.

The units depicted in the narrative reflect the mixed historical roots of the US Army. 1st and 2nd Divisions were “Regular Army” and, as such had long-standing regiments, even if the vast majority of the soldiers had served less than a year. The 2nd was probably the best and most experienced outfit in Pershing’s army and was unique in the inclusion of a Marine Brigade and that the division CO would eventually be Lejeune, a USMC general (and eventual Commandant). The 26th was a National Guard outfit, built around units from New England (some of which dated back to the Civil War), but the CO was controversial and would eventually be relieved, while the division itself was probably the victim of anti-Guard bias on the part of the Regulars, who suspected (not always unjustifiably) that rank and positions in the Guard were based on political connections. The 77th was National Army, a hostilities-only outfit, recruited mostly from the various neighborhoods of New York City; it was common in the division to refer to platoons as ‘gangs.’ Some bright soul at Pershing’s HQ assigned the most densely wooded section of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive to the 77th, and it suffered accordingly.

Dr. Grotelueschen’s well-written narrative, after examining the Army’s pre-war doctrines, takes us through the training and combat experiences of those divisions in turn. What becomes apparent is that the units did as well as could be expected for green troops in what was essentially a green army. It is also clear that, had the war continued into 1919 as almost everyone thought it would, the American contribution would have been massive, but their very presence on the battlefield in 1918 helped end the war when lit did. If the role of the AEF or WWI tactics and training interest you, you’ll find much to enjoy here.

[William]

If the New Military History is oriented around trajectories of inquiry shared with social, gender, and cultural history (among others), Grotelueschen’s work is perhaps something of a throwback to an earlier or more traditional style of military history, one more concerned with leaders and ideas on the operational level than the corps of actors on the tactical level. The result is a book which closely examines the particular development of American ground warfare doctrine in the early twentieth century. This focus is interesting in itself, given the author’s occupation; Grotelueschen is a career United States Air Force officer, and currently serves as associate professor of military history at the United States Air Force Academy. The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I is a further refinement of his doctoral dissertation, completed at Texas A&M University in 2003.

Following an introduction and a chapter establishing Pershing’s underdeveloped “Open Warfare” doctrine and inadequate training of the pre-war United States Army, Grotelueschen organizes his inquiry by examining four different infantry divisions - the 1st, 26th, 2nd, and 77th. While Stephen Bourque helpfully notes that these divisions represent the full spectrum of the Army’s manpower – the two best divisions in the Army, one National Guard division, and one division of draftees, respectively – he finds the variety of evidence a bit lacking, remarking that “[t]o use only these four units as a sampling of the adaptation style of the twenty-nine divisions that saw combat is a bit of a stretch.“

Grotelueschen intends the chapters to show “how the combat divisions, learned, more or less, to turn their attacks into [British or French-style] set-piece battles.” Grotelueschen goes to great length to describe an upward flow of knowledge, the slow transmission of hard-won battlefield learning “from the divisions, to the corps, to the army, and finally to the GHQ.” Each division is allocated two chapters, with a final chapter reserved for Grotelueschen’s conclusions.

These, as Grotelueschen articulates them, revolve around the centrality of combined arms – specifically the harmonization of organic, modern artillery with infantry – to sustained American success. The pre-war doctrine of the ground military leadership was outmoded by advances in technology and doctrine in Europe. “Open Warfare” was poorly suited to the conditions the American Expeditionary Force soon found on the Western front, and the only way the men of the AEF were to succeed was to learn through fighting. This they did, transforming their divisions into capable fighting forces, though sometimes through disregard for the demands of higher headquarters, and nearly always at a very high casualty rate.

In his review for the Journal of Military History, Douglas Johnson observed that Grotelueschen’s book is the first extensive engagement of World War I in nearly a decade, specifically since the publication of Edward M. Coffman’s The War to End All Wars. Grotelueschen is primarily concerned with the development and evolution of United States Army doctrine during World War I. In a separate review for Parameters, the United States Army War College’s academic journal, Johnson remarks that this focus, not on the tactical level, but the operational, is a relatively new development in World War I historiography. Grotelueschen’s focus may lack the boots-on-the-ground fidelity of Richard Slotkin’s Lost Battalions, but it helpfully illuminates the way the American Expeditionary Force initiated the development of the United States Army and United States Marine Corps into modern ground warfare forces in possession of a modern ground warfare doctrine.

[Stanley Turner · Rating 4 out of 5]

After many starts and stops due to work schedule and other distractions I finally finished this work. Grotelueshchen does an excellent job reviewing the actions of the various AEF divisions in World War I. At times the book was very readable and at other times it was a slow slog through the material. I did enjoy learning about the reported way of combat and the actual way combat was fought in order to lower causalities and win the war.

[Charlie Spearman]

Author has these that American tactical doctrine encouraged open warfare with rifles and bayonets rather that massive firepower from artillery in set piece attacks. He examines four front line divisions and their actions in World War I and demonstrates how they adopted form a dysfunctional attack plan to a more feasible one using close coordination with artillery and other weapons.

Author focuses on staff and reports with no personal account by soldiers in the field other that officers in charge. Plenty of maps, but not as helpful as I thought they could be.

[JerryDeanHalleck · Rating 3 out of 5]

Excellent, serious, review of the A.E.F's tactics during the 1918 campaign. The author looks at 4 US divisions and describes how they adjusted US Battle doctrine to meet the challenges of modern warfare. The book is quite critical of Pershing's "Cult of the Rifleman" and obsession with "Open warfare" since it bore no relationship to battlefield reality. I was surprised to learn that US infantry were often ordered to attack with little or no artillery support and take out machine guns with nothing more than rifles and hand grenades.

This is a scholarly piece of military history written by a professional solider. Its not "Gott in Himmel a bayonet in the gut" pop history. I found it fascinating, and a keen analysis of the US Army's performance in WW I.