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June 1941: Hitler and Stalin
A masterful account, culminating in the fateful days before the most decisive event of World War Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union
This brilliant new work by the author of the best-selling Five Days in London, May 1940 is an unparalleled drama of two great leaders confronting each other in June 1941. It describes Hitler and Stalin’s strange, calculating, and miscalculating relationship before the German invasion of Soviet Russia, with its gigantic (and unintended) consequences. John Lukacs questions many long-held beliefs; he suggests, for example, that among other things Hitler’s first purpose involved if Stalin’s Communist Russia were to be defeated, Hitler’s Third Reich would be well-nigh invincible, and the British and American peoples would be forced to rethink the war against Hitler. The book offers penetrating insights and a new portrait of Hitler and Stalin, moved by their long-lasting inclinations. Yet among other things, Lukacs presents evidence that Hitler (rather than his generals) had moments of dark foreboding before the invasion. Stalin could not, because he wished not, believe that Hitler would choose the risk of a two-front war by attacking him; he was stunned and shocked and came close to a breakdown. But he recovered, grew into a statesman, and eventually became a prime victor of the Second World War. Such are the ironies of history; John Lukacs paints them with a shining narrative skill.
This brilliant new work by the author of the best-selling Five Days in London, May 1940 is an unparalleled drama of two great leaders confronting each other in June 1941. It describes Hitler and Stalin’s strange, calculating, and miscalculating relationship before the German invasion of Soviet Russia, with its gigantic (and unintended) consequences. John Lukacs questions many long-held beliefs; he suggests, for example, that among other things Hitler’s first purpose involved if Stalin’s Communist Russia were to be defeated, Hitler’s Third Reich would be well-nigh invincible, and the British and American peoples would be forced to rethink the war against Hitler. The book offers penetrating insights and a new portrait of Hitler and Stalin, moved by their long-lasting inclinations. Yet among other things, Lukacs presents evidence that Hitler (rather than his generals) had moments of dark foreboding before the invasion. Stalin could not, because he wished not, believe that Hitler would choose the risk of a two-front war by attacking him; he was stunned and shocked and came close to a breakdown. But he recovered, grew into a statesman, and eventually became a prime victor of the Second World War. Such are the ironies of history; John Lukacs paints them with a shining narrative skill.
169 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2006
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203 people want to read
About the author
John Lukacs
63 books116 followersLukacs was born in Budapest to a Roman Catholic father and Jewish mother. His parents divorced before the Second World War. During the Second World War he was forced to serve in a Hungarian labour battalion for Jews. During the German occupation of Hungary in 1944-45 he evaded deportation to the death camps, and survived the siege of Budapest. In 1946, as it became clear that Hungary was going to be a repressive Communist regime, he fled to the United States. In the early 1950s however, Lukacs wrote several articles in Commonweal criticizing the approach taken by Senator Joseph McCarthy, whom he described as a vulgar demagogue.[1]
Lukacs sees populism as the greatest threat to civilization. By his own description, he considers himself to be a reactionary. He claims that populism is the essence of both National Socialism and Communism. He denies that there is such a thing as generic fascism, noting for example that the differences between the political regimes of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are greater than their similarities.[2]
A major theme in Lukacs's writing is his agreement with the assertion by the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville that aristocratic elites have been replaced by democratic elites, which obtain power via an appeal to the masses. In his 2002 book, At the End of an Age, Lukacs argued that the modern/bourgeois age, which began around the time of the Renaissance, is coming to an end.[3] The rise of populism and the decline of elitism is the theme of his experimental work, A Thread of Years (1998), a series of vignettes set in each year of the 20th century from 1900 to 1998, tracing the abandonment of gentlemanly conduct and the rise of vulgarity in American culture. Lukacs defends traditional Western civilization against what he sees as the leveling and debasing effects of mass culture.
By his own admission a dedicated Anglophile, Lukacs’s favorite historical figure is Winston Churchill, whom he considers to be the greatest statesman of the 20th century, and the savior of not only Great Britain, but also of Western civilization. A recurring theme in his writing is the duel between Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler for mastery of the world. The struggle between them, whom Lukacs sees as the archetypical reactionary and the archetypical revolutionary, is the major theme of The Last European War (1976), The Duel (1991), Five Days in London (1999) and 2008's Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat, a book about Churchill’s first major speech as Prime Minister. Lukacs argues that Great Britain (and by extension the British Empire) could not defeat Germany by itself, winning required the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union, but he contends that Churchill, by ensuring that Germany failed to win the war in 1940, laid the groundwork for an Allied victory.
Lukacs holds strong isolationist beliefs, and unusually for an anti-Communist émigré, "airs surprisingly critical views of the Cold War from a unique conservative perspective."[4] Lukacs claims that the Soviet Union was a feeble power on the verge of collapse, and contended that the Cold War was an unnecessary waste of American treasure and life. Likewise, Lukacs has also condemned the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In his 1997 book, George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946, a collection of letters between Lukacs and his close friend George F. Kennan exchanged in 1994-1995, Lukacs and Kennan criticized the New Left claim that the Cold War was caused by the United States. Lukacs argued however that although it was Joseph Stalin who was largely responsible for the beginning of the Cold War, the administration of Dwight Eisenhower missed a chance for ending the Cold War in 1953 after Stalin's death, and as a consequence the Cold War went on for many more decades.
Lukacs sees populism as the greatest threat to civilization. By his own description, he considers himself to be a reactionary. He claims that populism is the essence of both National Socialism and Communism. He denies that there is such a thing as generic fascism, noting for example that the differences between the political regimes of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are greater than their similarities.[2]
A major theme in Lukacs's writing is his agreement with the assertion by the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville that aristocratic elites have been replaced by democratic elites, which obtain power via an appeal to the masses. In his 2002 book, At the End of an Age, Lukacs argued that the modern/bourgeois age, which began around the time of the Renaissance, is coming to an end.[3] The rise of populism and the decline of elitism is the theme of his experimental work, A Thread of Years (1998), a series of vignettes set in each year of the 20th century from 1900 to 1998, tracing the abandonment of gentlemanly conduct and the rise of vulgarity in American culture. Lukacs defends traditional Western civilization against what he sees as the leveling and debasing effects of mass culture.
By his own admission a dedicated Anglophile, Lukacs’s favorite historical figure is Winston Churchill, whom he considers to be the greatest statesman of the 20th century, and the savior of not only Great Britain, but also of Western civilization. A recurring theme in his writing is the duel between Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler for mastery of the world. The struggle between them, whom Lukacs sees as the archetypical reactionary and the archetypical revolutionary, is the major theme of The Last European War (1976), The Duel (1991), Five Days in London (1999) and 2008's Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat, a book about Churchill’s first major speech as Prime Minister. Lukacs argues that Great Britain (and by extension the British Empire) could not defeat Germany by itself, winning required the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union, but he contends that Churchill, by ensuring that Germany failed to win the war in 1940, laid the groundwork for an Allied victory.
Lukacs holds strong isolationist beliefs, and unusually for an anti-Communist émigré, "airs surprisingly critical views of the Cold War from a unique conservative perspective."[4] Lukacs claims that the Soviet Union was a feeble power on the verge of collapse, and contended that the Cold War was an unnecessary waste of American treasure and life. Likewise, Lukacs has also condemned the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In his 1997 book, George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946, a collection of letters between Lukacs and his close friend George F. Kennan exchanged in 1994-1995, Lukacs and Kennan criticized the New Left claim that the Cold War was caused by the United States. Lukacs argued however that although it was Joseph Stalin who was largely responsible for the beginning of the Cold War, the administration of Dwight Eisenhower missed a chance for ending the Cold War in 1953 after Stalin's death, and as a consequence the Cold War went on for many more decades.
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
September 11, 2024
Very short, an essay really, on the relationship between two powerful dictators, Hitler and Stalin, and their going to war with each other. For me, Lukacs is attempting to answer two key questions concerning World War Ii--why did Hitler attack Stalin when he did in June, 1941 and why was Stalin caught completely by surprise?
The first question is answered by stating that it was about England. Hitler had been unable to invade England or defeat the island nation from the air with his Luftwaffe. It was particularly frustrating because Hitler wanted to negotiate with England, allowing the English to keep their empire in exchange for accepting Hitler's domination of the continent of Europe. Churchill felt England could not afford to do that and he had to hope that the United States would enter the war sooner or later on his side...So Hitler launched his massive invasion of the Soviet Union believing he could defeat Stalin by the winter--and then also bring England to the negotiating table. In retrospect, it seems ridiculous to think that Russia would be so easy to defeat. But Lukacs points out that the Germans were looking at the Soviet Army's poor performance in their attack on Finland in the Winter War of 1939-40. It would be very different when the Soviets were fighting to defend the Motherland!
The second question is answered by understanding that Stalin believed that Hitler would not attack him while he was still involved in fighting England. He refused to believe reports that Hitler was planning to invade the USSR, thinking that Churchill was trying to provoke him to act against Hitler and thus have the Nazi and Communist dictators fight each other.
Stalin nearly had a complete nervous breakdown when the Germans began pushing past the Soviet borders. However, he rallied and called upon the Soviet people to defend their motherland-- and not Communism. Appealing to his people's nationalism was a critical decision by the "Red czar." And Hitler would go down to total defeat, having made his greatest mistake, by attacking the Soviet Union.
The first question is answered by stating that it was about England. Hitler had been unable to invade England or defeat the island nation from the air with his Luftwaffe. It was particularly frustrating because Hitler wanted to negotiate with England, allowing the English to keep their empire in exchange for accepting Hitler's domination of the continent of Europe. Churchill felt England could not afford to do that and he had to hope that the United States would enter the war sooner or later on his side...So Hitler launched his massive invasion of the Soviet Union believing he could defeat Stalin by the winter--and then also bring England to the negotiating table. In retrospect, it seems ridiculous to think that Russia would be so easy to defeat. But Lukacs points out that the Germans were looking at the Soviet Army's poor performance in their attack on Finland in the Winter War of 1939-40. It would be very different when the Soviets were fighting to defend the Motherland!
The second question is answered by understanding that Stalin believed that Hitler would not attack him while he was still involved in fighting England. He refused to believe reports that Hitler was planning to invade the USSR, thinking that Churchill was trying to provoke him to act against Hitler and thus have the Nazi and Communist dictators fight each other.
Stalin nearly had a complete nervous breakdown when the Germans began pushing past the Soviet borders. However, he rallied and called upon the Soviet people to defend their motherland-- and not Communism. Appealing to his people's nationalism was a critical decision by the "Red czar." And Hitler would go down to total defeat, having made his greatest mistake, by attacking the Soviet Union.
January 28, 2013
There is not a great deal that is new in this – but the focus on the German invasion of the Soviet Union is definitely an enthralling topic. Mr. Lukacs does well to emphasize the two main protagonists; this should come as no surprise as Mr.Lukacs believes that history is predominantly the making of individuals, not movements or causes. He also emphasizes the center points of Moscow, Berlin, London and Washington (and Tokyo as the Germans had spies there). He examines how these points shifted over the course of time leading up to the attack and how this affected the power structures that evolved after these momentous events.
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August 2, 2011History is subject to interpretation, ideological persuasion, the passage of time and sources [plus other variables]. The history of WWII and the Great Powers relations during the 20th Century are shrouded in multiple interpretations and reinterpretations to suit a range of goals. I've read a number of books dealing with this period including Stalin's Folly [which I thought seemed pretty good but which Lukacs makes disparaging remarks about without being specific] and found them interesting yet often lacking decisive material. Lukacs presents a clearly written and to the point historical essay that convincingly presents a picture of the Hitler / Stalin relationship up to June 1941 that makes sense pretty convincingly to me of the apparant contradictions the relationship presents when viewed from traditional positions. Lukacs avoids stereotypes of dictatorial leaders and looks at what each had to gain, or hope for from cooperation and suggests that both men respected each other irrespective of the public ideological differences that one might think should have made them impacable enemies. While a little more footnoting might have been good it might have slowed the read of this short and thought provoking work. Highly recommended.
August 6, 2011
A short book on what Hitler and Stalin might have thought before the invasion of Soviet Union. I agree with other reviewers that there are more questions than answers given in this book. However, I do think it is difficult to give answers when most of the facts were classified or had been destroyed. Moreover, as said by the author, the given 'fact' may even be forgery. He had pointed out some information given in other books which he believed was not true. Although he has some standing point, the way he 'attacked' other author may sometimes make the reader uncomfortable.
The best part in reading this book is that it reminds me to have critical thinking while reading historical book - it is not the authors who want or intend to give incorrect information, it is a limitation for them to authenticate the information at hand. I think the author of this book had reminded us on this many times throughout the book by saying the following phrase:
"It is true, but is not true enough."
The best part in reading this book is that it reminds me to have critical thinking while reading historical book - it is not the authors who want or intend to give incorrect information, it is a limitation for them to authenticate the information at hand. I think the author of this book had reminded us on this many times throughout the book by saying the following phrase:
"It is true, but is not true enough."
October 31, 2020
This is one of the worst histories I have ever read. So blindly, blisteringly jingoistic it’s almost funny. It sometimes reaches the sublime idiocy of some of Dostoevsky’s idiots - Lebedev, or Verkhovensky. Did either of them ghostwrite it?
Let’s examine some bumbling highlights:
Great British exceptionalism: “Unlike Russia in 1941, Britain could have received an offer of peace from Hitler.”
A style labouring under the weight of its own pomp: “We need not parse these ugly words from this peasant tsar.”
An accidental Alan Partridge: “The collectivisation and the purges, two pale words that mean nothing unless we know what they involved.”
Straw men: “all of the recent and fashionable intellectual comparisons of Hitler and Stalin miss the mark, indeed are senseless.”
And some cracking racism: “There is really no rational explanation of the terror of the purges. They were inseparable from the brutality and suspiciousness of Stalin’s Caucasian character (many of his cruelest executioners were also Caucasians)”
I suppose dreadful histories have to be written to keep real historians in business. One can hardly advocate for burning a book like this, given the context; I would instead advise dropping it off a boat, thereby drowning any copy you find, instead.
Let’s examine some bumbling highlights:
Great British exceptionalism: “Unlike Russia in 1941, Britain could have received an offer of peace from Hitler.”
A style labouring under the weight of its own pomp: “We need not parse these ugly words from this peasant tsar.”
An accidental Alan Partridge: “The collectivisation and the purges, two pale words that mean nothing unless we know what they involved.”
Straw men: “all of the recent and fashionable intellectual comparisons of Hitler and Stalin miss the mark, indeed are senseless.”
And some cracking racism: “There is really no rational explanation of the terror of the purges. They were inseparable from the brutality and suspiciousness of Stalin’s Caucasian character (many of his cruelest executioners were also Caucasians)”
I suppose dreadful histories have to be written to keep real historians in business. One can hardly advocate for burning a book like this, given the context; I would instead advise dropping it off a boat, thereby drowning any copy you find, instead.
November 7, 2020
An easy read, almost more of a long essay than a book, with various arguments, including a pretty clear assault on the “Preventive War theory.” Argument that maim enemy at moment of Barbarossa launch was truly Britain is interesting and this forma a good complement to 5 Days in London (a better book). Lukacs’s funny habit of going from generalizing big picture history (something he does well) to incredible detail on sometimes somewhat irrelevant diplomatic back channeling and other issues, sometimes leaves talk a bit befuddled. Still, I like Lukacs succinct, opinionated style and will likely read more of his books.
July 1, 2025
My June month in the title book. Interesting although too much detail reciting lots of German and Russian names I didn’t know, as well as day by day updates on Hitler and Stalin, their personalities, their strategizing how to get an advantage. Cold blooded sons of bitches.
I learned I didn’t really know much about Hitler other than his screaming and ranting oratory style and that he was an evil megalomaniac mass murderer. Most of the book is the back and forth relationship between Hitler and Stalin, with Stalin refusing to believe Germany was going to attack the USSR until June 22, 1941, after the attack had started. Hitler believed they would fairly easily defeat the USSR, as apparently did most observers on both sides of the Atlantic, then England would stand alone and could much more easily be taken.
So, there was a lot of back and forth, alliances forming and alliances dissolving, promises made and promise is broken. And of course Japan and Italy were yapping Chihuahua-like around the edges.
I learned I didn’t really know much about Hitler other than his screaming and ranting oratory style and that he was an evil megalomaniac mass murderer. Most of the book is the back and forth relationship between Hitler and Stalin, with Stalin refusing to believe Germany was going to attack the USSR until June 22, 1941, after the attack had started. Hitler believed they would fairly easily defeat the USSR, as apparently did most observers on both sides of the Atlantic, then England would stand alone and could much more easily be taken.
So, there was a lot of back and forth, alliances forming and alliances dissolving, promises made and promise is broken. And of course Japan and Italy were yapping Chihuahua-like around the edges.
February 22, 2023
Crónica y análisis de la relación de los dos personajes del título en una época y momento cruciales de la II Guerra Mundial en conexión con el contexto histórico de la misma. Apasionante, muy ameno y magníficamente documentado. Otra pequeña joya histórica del autor.
October 15, 2012
Mmmmmmmmm.....this book is quite an enigma, a very short enigma. Somehow I expected a little more from it, but got to the end (within 24 hours) and found it either hard to believe the evidence presented, or the just plain boring. Actually it was in the middle, and ended up to being as critical as I thinking could have been when I first started out. I know the book was meant to cover just one date in history, but I would have liked it to be a little more gutsy.
December 26, 2009
A brief, readable essay on the prelude to and first days of the German invasion of Russia. Lukacs, an adherent of the "great man" theory of history, concentrates on Hitler and Stalin's views and attitudes.
Quite readable and interesting as a popular summary of the episode.
Quite readable and interesting as a popular summary of the episode.
March 25, 2018
Un libro corto pero muy interesante. Aborda el tema de la alianza fáctica entre Hitler y Stalin antes de la segunda guerra mundial.
Los intercambios que tuvieron, tanto diplomáticos, como epistolares; donde nos acerca a esta faceta que no conocíamos entre ambos líderes de sus países.
Los intercambios que tuvieron, tanto diplomáticos, como epistolares; donde nos acerca a esta faceta que no conocíamos entre ambos líderes de sus países.
April 13, 2022
June 1941: Hitler and Stalin follows the development of thought and the relationship between Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin in the months leading up to Nazi-Germany's invasion of the Soviet-Union. Despite the limitations of its rather brief length (consisting of a mere 160 pages or so), Lukacs' character study is nonetheless highly insightful, functioning both as a solid introductory overview of the subject in question, as well providing a clear correction to certain prevailing misconceptions about why Hitler ultimately decided to go to war against the Soviet Union. The latter seems to be this essay's principal raison d'être. Although Five Days in London and The Last European War are arguaby superior - in overall quality and in scope respectively - June 1941 is unlikely to disappoint those who enjoyed those earlier books (and it should be noted that it is not merely a regurgitation of insights already provided in Lukacs' earlier work). I will however stick with 4 stars due to the brevity of the work, which at times causes its author to race through various perspectives somewhat haphazardly and leave some sections/arguments sadly underdeveloped. Some events are also repeated almost word for word throughout the book, which (although perhaps somewhat unavoidable considering the structure of the work) could have mitigated in editing, and certainly for a short book like that. Regardless, these are but minor complaints. As always, Lukacs is a treat.
January 12, 2024
Solid but very brief account of the relationship between two of the 20th century's most influential people. The beginning was a little dry, but after that, I was captivated by how these foes had a mutual respect for one another. Though their dreams of conquest would die with them or shortly thereafter, Lukacs displayed some of their intricate plans and follies. There is so much more upon which Lukacs could have elaborated, but what he did cover, he did well. This book would serve as a great addition to anyone's WWII history collection.
June 10, 2020
Re-lectura de este interesante ensayo acerca de los acontecimientos entre Hitler y Stalin, y por tanto las relaciones entre la URSS y el Tercer Reich que desembocaron en la invasión alemana el 22 de junio de 1941. Sin embargo hubiera sido mas enriquecedor que el autor se explaye un poco mas, y de hecho se auto limita cada vez que quiere entrar en otro tema. Aun así, muy recomendado.
March 21, 2021
This was a quick read but packed with good information. There was plenty of emphasis on the things that mattered, and I definitely appreciate the quick jabs Lukacs took at some of the major players in this event.
December 13, 2022
Interesting, but it reads like a collection of notes left over after he finished a more substantial history.
October 20, 2024
I like the idea of this book however the writing was terrible!
April 24, 2016
I enjoyed this book; while many books about war and strategy focus on collective or national policy making processes, we sometimes forget how important strong willed individuals are to national level decisions that impact countries, regions, and history. This book focused on the personal relationship between Hitler and Stalin (with some Churchill on the side...) in the lead up to Germany's attack on Russia during World War II. It examined their methods of communications, their respect/disrespect for each other, their use of trusted advisors, and the complexities introduced by stakeholders in each country's formal state mechanisms like the military or foreign ministries. It was interesting to learn how direct they were with each other, above the formal diplomatic channels, and yet how they could never uniformly verify the meaning or intent of the words they selected in their agreements (like "sphere of influence" or "non-aggression"). This lack of communication, and ultimately foolish trust, largely influenced how the world functioned from WWII through the Cold War and beyond.
May 30, 2016
Se trata de un trabajo academico. Milimetrico. Analiza un periodo corto de tiempo (poco antes, durante, y poco despues del inicio de Barbarroja) Lo hace de forma estrictamente documentada, minuto a minuto, a ambos lados. Indispensable para comprender muchas cosas.
August 12, 2016
A stunning account of the titanic clash between former uneasy allies, culminating in the horrific war on the Eastern Front. Compelling and utterly gripping from the start, this should be considered essential reading for those seeking to advance their understanding of this monumental conflict.
June 19, 2008
A little light, by Lukacs' standards.
May 26, 2011
Brief concise examination of the month of the start of Barbarossa concentrating on Hitler and Stalin. Very enjoyable.
July 29, 2011
This was easy to digest history, but evidenced based. Lukacs has a flip attitude, is free with his adverbs and adjectives. But, I learned some thing new.
June 16, 2007
This book isn't worth paper it's printed on.
Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews