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Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory
The Allied victory at Omaha Beach was a costly one. A direct infantry assault against a defense that was years in the making, undertaken in daylight following a mere thirty-minute bombardment, the attack had neither the advantage of tactical surprise nor that of overwhelming firepower. American forces were forced to improvise under enemy fire, and although they were ultimately victorious, they suffered devastating casualties.
Why did the Allies embark on an attack with so many disadvantages? Making extensive use of primary sources, Adrian Lewis traces the development of the doctrine behind the plan for the invasion of Normandy to explain why the battles for the beaches were fought as they were.
Although blame for the Omaha Beach disaster has traditionally been placed on tactical leaders at the battle site, Lewis argues that the real responsibility lay at the higher levels of operations and strategy planning. Ignoring lessons learned in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, British and American military leaders employed a hybrid doctrine of amphibious warfare at Normandy, one that failed to maximize the advantages of either British or U.S. doctrine. Had Allied forces at the other landing sites faced German forces of the quality and quantity of those at Omaha Beach, Lewis says, they too would have suffered heavy casualties and faced the prospect of defeat.
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"The fullest study of the planning for the cross-channel invasion we have. . . . No future student of Omaha Beach . . . will be able to ignore this book.-- Naval History
"This clearly written, carefully argued and well-researched account offers a still-valid lesson in the importance of communication up and down the chain of command, and on bravery.-- Publishers Weekly
"A major contribution to our understanding of the assault on Omaha Beach.-- Journal of Military History
Tracing the development of the doctrine behind the plan for the invasion of Normandy, Adrian Lewis reveals why the battles for the beaches were fought as they were. He examines the decisions made at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels as well as the personalities of and relationships between key decision makers to explain how the plan for swift victory at Omaha Beach went terribly wrong and turned into the bloodiest of the Allied invasions.
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Why did the Allies embark on an attack with so many disadvantages? Making extensive use of primary sources, Adrian Lewis traces the development of the doctrine behind the plan for the invasion of Normandy to explain why the battles for the beaches were fought as they were.
Although blame for the Omaha Beach disaster has traditionally been placed on tactical leaders at the battle site, Lewis argues that the real responsibility lay at the higher levels of operations and strategy planning. Ignoring lessons learned in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, British and American military leaders employed a hybrid doctrine of amphibious warfare at Normandy, one that failed to maximize the advantages of either British or U.S. doctrine. Had Allied forces at the other landing sites faced German forces of the quality and quantity of those at Omaha Beach, Lewis says, they too would have suffered heavy casualties and faced the prospect of defeat.
<!--copy for pb
"The fullest study of the planning for the cross-channel invasion we have. . . . No future student of Omaha Beach . . . will be able to ignore this book.-- Naval History
"This clearly written, carefully argued and well-researched account offers a still-valid lesson in the importance of communication up and down the chain of command, and on bravery.-- Publishers Weekly
"A major contribution to our understanding of the assault on Omaha Beach.-- Journal of Military History
Tracing the development of the doctrine behind the plan for the invasion of Normandy, Adrian Lewis reveals why the battles for the beaches were fought as they were. He examines the decisions made at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels as well as the personalities of and relationships between key decision makers to explain how the plan for swift victory at Omaha Beach went terribly wrong and turned into the bloodiest of the Allied invasions.
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400 pages, Paperback
First published April 9, 2001
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
March 9, 2009
A bit too thoroughly tactical for my tastes but Lewis was my professor at UNT and he is an amazing teacher and extremely well-versed in his subject matter.
July 14, 2021
Not a book about the Omaha Beach landing, but one that addresses the faulty planning process that lead to its near failure. Lewis addresses the differences between British and US Army amphibious doctrines and the compromises that lead to a bad plan. The horrible decision to try strategic bombing of the German defenses; the lack of extensive naval gunfire bombardment; and the ill-fated duplex drive tanks. The ultimate irony to me is that while the Army adapted the Navy/Marine Corps doctrinal manuals of their own, they totally ignored all the lessons learned by the Marine Corps in the Pacific. Why didn’t they use amtracks - the Army actually had more of them than the Marines did! Why the use of “boat teams” instead of standard tactical organization? Despite what Lewis says, I believe the Marine assaults on Tarawa, Saipan, Peleliu, and Iwo Jima were all worse than Omaha Beach.
July 6, 2014
4 1/2 stars. In looking at the other reviews, people missed the point of the book, in most cases. This was an evaluation and examination of the operational (not tactical) aspects of the planning, and the subsequent execution of the landings on Omaha. It's important to realize that this particular aspect of Overlord posed several unique challenges not found on Utah, Gold, Juno or Sword. The primary challenge was the terrain and defensive array of the German army. Lewis' book examines the effort made to meet those challenges. This was very well written and well organized, and Lewis used an incredible array of primary sources to support his thesis, which was that the plan was flawed. The operation could have failed, but did not, and Lewis clearly articulates the chain of actions and decisions that prevented failure.
Some important points: Lewis clearly articulates the blending of British and American doctrine in the ETO and shows how this blending affected operations in Sicily and why, and the effect this had in planning and executing the Omaha portion of Overlord. He also examines why proven doctrine from the Pacific theater was not used, and barely considered by planners. Airpower cannot win wars, and in most cases, cannot be operationally decisive. Airpower proved virtually ineffective for operations on Omaha. Lewis makes this case repeatedly throughout the book. Naval gunfire was shown to be effective in the Pacific, but the influence of British doctrine nullified Allied naval gunfire support. The famous names associated with Allied operations are fallible human beings and that is a very important point. Joint operations were in their infancy during WW II, however, this operation displays an amazing amount of cooperation between services and nations, despite disfunctions, and Lewis is careful to point this out.
This is clearly not a simple book for the generalist. Lewis' intent is to essentially conduct an AAR (After Action Review) which is institutional scab-picking and esseential for organizational improvement. No plan is perfect, and it ultimately falls to men in individual units to carry out their missions to the best of their ability, no matter the circumstances. The landing at Omaha Beach demonstrates this point.
Some important points: Lewis clearly articulates the blending of British and American doctrine in the ETO and shows how this blending affected operations in Sicily and why, and the effect this had in planning and executing the Omaha portion of Overlord. He also examines why proven doctrine from the Pacific theater was not used, and barely considered by planners. Airpower cannot win wars, and in most cases, cannot be operationally decisive. Airpower proved virtually ineffective for operations on Omaha. Lewis makes this case repeatedly throughout the book. Naval gunfire was shown to be effective in the Pacific, but the influence of British doctrine nullified Allied naval gunfire support. The famous names associated with Allied operations are fallible human beings and that is a very important point. Joint operations were in their infancy during WW II, however, this operation displays an amazing amount of cooperation between services and nations, despite disfunctions, and Lewis is careful to point this out.
This is clearly not a simple book for the generalist. Lewis' intent is to essentially conduct an AAR (After Action Review) which is institutional scab-picking and esseential for organizational improvement. No plan is perfect, and it ultimately falls to men in individual units to carry out their missions to the best of their ability, no matter the circumstances. The landing at Omaha Beach demonstrates this point.
June 9, 2018
Adrian R. Lewis traces the D-Day events at Omaha Beach back to the beginning of the planning stages. Though the invasion was ultimately a success and signaled the beginning of the end of World War II, it was costly, with high casualties.
Like many, I tend to focus in the D-Day events as a gateway to victory, but this work chronicles the planning, the decision making and the flawed assumptions leading up to that day. It is interesting to read the words of those involved in the planning and execution of the invasion, as well as soldiers and participants. Allied victory was far from certain, and it could have gone the other way.
Like many, I tend to focus in the D-Day events as a gateway to victory, but this work chronicles the planning, the decision making and the flawed assumptions leading up to that day. It is interesting to read the words of those involved in the planning and execution of the invasion, as well as soldiers and participants. Allied victory was far from certain, and it could have gone the other way.
June 23, 2023
Well done analysis of the Omaha beach landing focusing in on the bad planning which resulted in large casualties. Lewis shows that Bradley and the USA planners gambled on the US Airforce to destroy the beach defenses instead of using Naval gunfire. Landings at Salerno, Sicily, and Anzio had all been successful with minimal naval gunfire and the American planners had assumed the same would be true at Omaha Beach. Which turned out to be not the case.
For those interested in detailed, almost technical, military history.
For those interested in detailed, almost technical, military history.
September 5, 2024
Not a story about the Omaha Beach landings, rather a history of the planning leading up to the landings, with emphasis on the US Army 1st Infantry Division. Compares and contrasts the British and American history and doctrine regarding amphibious assaults, and roles played by the senior planners and leaders.
This is the published doctoral thesis of the author. In my opinion, this is a difficult read for anyone other than serious historians or persons with extensive knowledge of military operations.
This is the published doctoral thesis of the author. In my opinion, this is a difficult read for anyone other than serious historians or persons with extensive knowledge of military operations.
March 21, 2018
The thesis of the book is simple: Omaha Beach was so costly because the Allies had neither tactical surprise nor devastating bombardment. He blames coalition warfare, and the book details the runup to the invasion that resulted in a flawed plan.
July 2, 2015
This book showed why the strategic plan was so poor. It was only through tactical units coming together on the fly that the mission wasn't a total loss.
As a planner, it made me ill to see exercises that failed incorporated into the plan and a lack of branches and squeals in the ultimate plan. Branches and squeals account for things not going as planned. The old planning adage is "a plan never survives first contact with the enemy" but a better strategic plan leading to a better tactical plan could have saved many lives.
As a planner, it made me ill to see exercises that failed incorporated into the plan and a lack of branches and squeals in the ultimate plan. Branches and squeals account for things not going as planned. The old planning adage is "a plan never survives first contact with the enemy" but a better strategic plan leading to a better tactical plan could have saved many lives.
November 2, 2008
OK, but not great. I think he spent a little too much time & effort among the primary sources. I got the feeling that his theme was a little buried. Or else his themes weren't the ones I expected?
Still, a very god job of research, a lot of primary sources used to analyse the near-defeat of the Allies on Omaha Beach.
Still, a very god job of research, a lot of primary sources used to analyse the near-defeat of the Allies on Omaha Beach.
January 3, 2014
While an interesting treatment of the famous battle, this book suffered from a lack of attentive editing. A potential good read was marred by repetition of its main points, repeatedly! Some unusual insights into the famous generals involved (Eisenhower, Bradley,Montgomery) made for interesting reading.
January 7, 2013
This book documents how so many things can go wrong when people with no amphibious operations experience are assigned the task of planning one. Read how the eighth Air Force bombed French farm yards instead of German beach defense simply because they approached the target from the English Channel!
September 19, 2008
A flawed academic treatment of a well reported battle. Author includes very detailed planning documents with no explanatory captioning or discussion in the text.
November 28, 2012
A bit too analytic for my taste and preferences. Maybe some other day, at a pool side down south during a summer vacation with too much time at hand ;-)
December 19, 2013
A professional criticism of the planning for Omaha Beach on D Day in Normandy. Hard reading but better than the popularized books.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews