Colonel Worden relies on oral histories, personal interviews, military and social histories, quantitative data, and sociological research to show how fighter generals rose to domination in the Air Force. From its inception through the 1960s, the Air Force was dominated by bomber pilots. Embracing an absolutist perspective, bomber pilots struggled to maintain their dominance. In the 1960s, however, they saw their positions of leadership slowly yielding to the experience, broader education, and pragmatism of fighter pilots. This study terminates in 1982 when the leadership changes with the selection of a string of generals with fighter backgrounds as Air Force chiefs of staff.
It might be a decent insight into the general mentality of Air Force leadership in the post-WW2 era, but Worden's study could've used another pass by the editor to come to a more well-rounded book overall. As for the supporting evidence - quotations, statistics, graphs - it can really be a mix. Of course, there is some use in them, but it still feels bloated overall. Lastly, being written by an officer of the USAF, Worden is highly biased toward aggressive use of warfare, dismissing civilian control and restraint of military authorities during the Vietnam War as short-sighted and how they wouldve won the war if Johnson had only listened. A short-sightest statement that would've not changed the outcome with the exception of more death, pain, and suffering.