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Ockham Explained: From Razor to Rebellion
Ockham Explained is an important and much-needed resource on William of Ockham, one of the most important philosophers of the Middle Ages. His eventful and controversial life was marked by sharp career moves and academic and ecclesiastical battles. At 28, Ockham was a conservative English theologian focused obsessively on the nature of language, but by 40, he had transformed into a fugitive friar, accused of heresy, and finally protected by the German emperor as he composed incendiary treatises calling for strong limits on papal authority. This book provides a thorough grounding in Ockham’s life and his many contributions to philosophy. It begins with an overview of the philosopher's youth and the Aristotelian philosophy he studied as a boy. Subsequent chapters cover his ideas on language and logic; his metaphysics and vaunted "razor," as well as his opponents’ "anti-razor" theories; his invention of the church-state separation; and much more. The concluding chapter sums up Ockham's compelling philosophical personality and explains his modern appeal.
- GenresPhilosophyTheology
190 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
June 23, 2024
A good reconstruction of Ockham’s philosophy. If you have prior knowledge of Aristotle and/or logic, it may seem a bit crude (eg. lists) and/or gimmicky (eg. quiz).
July 11, 2019
Very well explained.
Having almost no background in medieval philosophy, I managed to understand the main issues of Ockham's philosophy through Keele's clear and accessible book.
Reading this has made me want to read Ockham's actual works!
Having almost no background in medieval philosophy, I managed to understand the main issues of Ockham's philosophy through Keele's clear and accessible book.
Reading this has made me want to read Ockham's actual works!
September 27, 2016
Clear and engaging.
Excellent!
Excellent!
September 9, 2026
Keele (2008) comprehensively, critically and concisely explains the background, metaphysics (linguistics, ontology, epistemology and ethics) and biography of Ockham, an English philosopher and friar ex-communicated by the Pope in the 14th century. In practice this devolves into explanations of Aristotelian philosophy and the modifications on it, thankfully the writting is clear.
Ockham is largely a modified Aristotelian who is casting off the Plotinan realism of the Scholastics (primarily his main philosophical opponent Walter Chatton) via his reductionist philosophy of language. He was eventually ex-communicated, not for his weird beliefs about ontology, but for basically flaming the pope for being too rich and ostentatious. As a person Ockham is admirable for his conviction against orthodoxy and his honesty about his beliefs.
Summary
Aristotle ontologically believes in the existence of 'primary individual substances'. These are things which are neither said-of or said-in. Which is to say, entities which are not utilised to refer to multiple things (i.e. 'red' refers to multiple instances of redness), and which can exist apart from other entities. Primary individual substances have forms which are there essences (i.e. properties without which it would not be it). Their form is defined by predicates, and each successive predicate is a lower 'species' of a 'genus' (p. 15-17).
Primary substances also have accidental features. These are features which are inessential to a thing's 'being' (e.g. my hair colour) (p. 15-17). The types of accidental predicates which exist are called the 'categories' (p. 16). The ten fundamental categories are "substance, quantity, quality, relation, space, time, place, possession, action, being-affected".
Change (motion) for Aristotle involves the loss or generation of these predicates. It is the realisation of a potential predicate within a constant substrate (p. 114).
Critically, Ockham believes that the categories, besides substance and quality, do not exist as real entities. Constratingly for the realists, statements such as "a dog is in motion" is true because the word 'motion' corresponds to a real entity in the universe. Ockham believes that this is a confusion of language. Particularly, realists believe that all categorematic terms (terms which refer to the same concept everytime it's used) are absolute (refer to external objects).
Ockham believes this violates his epistemological principal, his famous Ockham's razor. Ockham's Razor basically states that “no plurality should be assumed unless it can be proved (a) by reason, or (b) by experience, or (c) by some infallible authority” (p. 95). A plurality is an extramental distinction. So rather than posit the existence of a 'motion' object to explain motion, Ockham suggests that motion merely means an object successively coexists in different places without intervening rest continuously (p. 118). Rondo explicates how this implies Ockham rejects calculus (since it rejects the possiblity of measuring velocities at instances).
Apart from physics, Ockham utilises his razor to also intervene on epistemological questions. For Aristotle, consciousness involves a dual process, by which the 'emanations of forms' stamp themselves onto sense organs, creating fantasms (sense-experience) which are collected, abstracted and then retrieved as abstract universals in the intellect (p. 139-141). Ockham eliminates the second step entirely, holding that thought, rather than the product of the some sort of substance molding the soul, is merely the quality of intellecting itself.
On the topic of ethics, Ockham largely borrows Aristotle's analysis. Aristotelian ethics centers around the capacity “freely to regulate one’s own life in accord with complete virtue over the long term”. It is the exercise of virtues. Virtues are excellences at characteristic functions which needed to be trained. They are a “golden mean … a middle path between two vices”.
To surmise then, Ockham believes largely in Aristotelian orthodoxy, in the existence of primary substances and the possiblity of their rational comprehension. What he rejects is any suggestion of the existence of non-mind dependent universals.
Ockham is largely a modified Aristotelian who is casting off the Plotinan realism of the Scholastics (primarily his main philosophical opponent Walter Chatton) via his reductionist philosophy of language. He was eventually ex-communicated, not for his weird beliefs about ontology, but for basically flaming the pope for being too rich and ostentatious. As a person Ockham is admirable for his conviction against orthodoxy and his honesty about his beliefs.
Summary
Aristotle ontologically believes in the existence of 'primary individual substances'. These are things which are neither said-of or said-in. Which is to say, entities which are not utilised to refer to multiple things (i.e. 'red' refers to multiple instances of redness), and which can exist apart from other entities. Primary individual substances have forms which are there essences (i.e. properties without which it would not be it). Their form is defined by predicates, and each successive predicate is a lower 'species' of a 'genus' (p. 15-17).
Primary substances also have accidental features. These are features which are inessential to a thing's 'being' (e.g. my hair colour) (p. 15-17). The types of accidental predicates which exist are called the 'categories' (p. 16). The ten fundamental categories are "substance, quantity, quality, relation, space, time, place, possession, action, being-affected".
Change (motion) for Aristotle involves the loss or generation of these predicates. It is the realisation of a potential predicate within a constant substrate (p. 114).
Critically, Ockham believes that the categories, besides substance and quality, do not exist as real entities. Constratingly for the realists, statements such as "a dog is in motion" is true because the word 'motion' corresponds to a real entity in the universe. Ockham believes that this is a confusion of language. Particularly, realists believe that all categorematic terms (terms which refer to the same concept everytime it's used) are absolute (refer to external objects).
Ockham believes this violates his epistemological principal, his famous Ockham's razor. Ockham's Razor basically states that “no plurality should be assumed unless it can be proved (a) by reason, or (b) by experience, or (c) by some infallible authority” (p. 95). A plurality is an extramental distinction. So rather than posit the existence of a 'motion' object to explain motion, Ockham suggests that motion merely means an object successively coexists in different places without intervening rest continuously (p. 118). Rondo explicates how this implies Ockham rejects calculus (since it rejects the possiblity of measuring velocities at instances).
Apart from physics, Ockham utilises his razor to also intervene on epistemological questions. For Aristotle, consciousness involves a dual process, by which the 'emanations of forms' stamp themselves onto sense organs, creating fantasms (sense-experience) which are collected, abstracted and then retrieved as abstract universals in the intellect (p. 139-141). Ockham eliminates the second step entirely, holding that thought, rather than the product of the some sort of substance molding the soul, is merely the quality of intellecting itself.
On the topic of ethics, Ockham largely borrows Aristotle's analysis. Aristotelian ethics centers around the capacity “freely to regulate one’s own life in accord with complete virtue over the long term”. It is the exercise of virtues. Virtues are excellences at characteristic functions which needed to be trained. They are a “golden mean … a middle path between two vices”.
To surmise then, Ockham believes largely in Aristotelian orthodoxy, in the existence of primary substances and the possiblity of their rational comprehension. What he rejects is any suggestion of the existence of non-mind dependent universals.
March 23, 2024
I give this 5 stars not because it couldn't be improved or added to, nor because it didn't belabour any points (chapter 5 on Ockham's radical physics and theory of motion felt slightly repetitive or tedious at times). No, I feel it deserves the full monty because of the difficulty of the source material and because Rondo Keele did not skirt the challenge by giving a mere noddy's version of the easy bits. He only went and bit off some of the chunkiest pieces of medieval meat out there and served it up fresh and delicious. So in addition to such tidbits as explaining the difference between reportatio vs ordinatio in medieval universities, the book includes a superb breakdown of high-to-late medieval semantics, logic and Porphyry’s tree of being, before applying it to nominalism about universals. Particularly interesting was the section on God's absolute vs ordained power, Ockham's writings on which sent him to the Avignon papacy on charges of heresy, and has sent me down a rabbit hole of further research.
One particularly strong feature is Keele's own judicious evaluations of Ockham's arguments and positions throughout, unafraid to show the reader how and why Ockham sometimes got into a hot mess. So despite clearly being very sympathetic to Ockham, our guide ranges from highlighting why Ockham abandoned his early fictum theory of cognition for his intellectio model, to showing how his theory of motion renders it impossible for an object to be moving in this present moment (rather than merely having moved). That's a fail. But Keele is right to point out the power of his connotation theory, his searing critique of metaphysical extravagance everywhere, plus the challenge that Ockham's intuitive vs abstractive cognition distinction poses to traditional Aristotelian psychology.
The author isn't so careful on Ockham's big separation of church and state, giving his political theory a practically free pass.
But definitely recommended for anyone interested in Ockham or medieval philosophy.
One particularly strong feature is Keele's own judicious evaluations of Ockham's arguments and positions throughout, unafraid to show the reader how and why Ockham sometimes got into a hot mess. So despite clearly being very sympathetic to Ockham, our guide ranges from highlighting why Ockham abandoned his early fictum theory of cognition for his intellectio model, to showing how his theory of motion renders it impossible for an object to be moving in this present moment (rather than merely having moved). That's a fail. But Keele is right to point out the power of his connotation theory, his searing critique of metaphysical extravagance everywhere, plus the challenge that Ockham's intuitive vs abstractive cognition distinction poses to traditional Aristotelian psychology.
The author isn't so careful on Ockham's big separation of church and state, giving his political theory a practically free pass.
But definitely recommended for anyone interested in Ockham or medieval philosophy.
December 31, 2022
This book gives a summary of Ockham's life and his philosophy. It is a pretty reasonable read, but the reader will probably need to take notes, as it is hard to remember the terms, which end up being used chapters after they are introduced. I really enjoyed learning more about Ockham's philosophy, which is absolutely not what we think it is.
January 26, 2017
Fantastic!
October 1, 2024
Boring, apologetic, arcane.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews