How Free Are You?: The Determinism Problem

by Ted Honderich

In this fully revised and up-to-date edition of Ted Honderich's modern classic, he offers a concise and lively introduction to free will and the problem of determinism, advancing the debate on this key area of moral philosophy. Honderich sets out a determinist philosophy of mind, in response to the question, "Is there a really clear, consistent and complete version of determinism?" and asks instead if there is such a clear version of free will. He goes on to address the question of whether determinism is true and finally asks, "What can we conclude about our lives if determinism is true?"

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

184 pages, Paperback

First published October 7, 1993

About the author

Edgar Dawn Ross "Ted" Honderich was a Canadian-born British philosopher, who was Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College London.

Reviews

[Alan Johnson · Rating 1 out of 5]

Ted Honderich, a British philosophy professor, is the leading proponent in our time of the doctrine known as determinism (sometimes, and perhaps more accurately, called “predeterminism”). His most elaborate treatment of this issue was in his 1988 tome, A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life (Oxford University Press). But, as he explains in this second edition (2002) of his book How Free Are You?: The Determinism Problem, “I’ve had some second thoughts,” and this second edition “goes further than its large predecessor and also than the first edition of itself” (7). Accordingly, the present review focuses on this second edition of How Free Are You?, and the page numbers cited in textual parentheses refer to that edition.

Honderich defines “determinism” as “a theory that all our mental events, including choices and decisions, and also our actions, are effects of certain things and therefore have to happen or are necessitated, and cannot be owed to origination” (155). He defines “free will” as “a kind or part of freedom that is or rests on our supposed personal power to originate choices and thus actions—i.e. origination as a power; sometimes used more generally” (156). Accordingly, if determinism, as defined by Honderich, exists, free will does not. Indeed, the premise of his book is that free will does not exist.

Honderich concludes that “taking in account everything, determinism is very strongly supported, and that certainly it has not been shown to be false. It will be no news to you that I myself do think determinism is true, but that thought does seem even to me to go a bit beyond the evidence” (90 [italics in the original]). “Furthermore, . . . it does not matter if determinism is true or false, since there is no serious idea with which it conflicts. The question of its truth does not need looking into. That was time wasted” (103 [citation omitted]).

This is an astonishing position for a philosophy professor to take. He feels no need to demonstrate the truth of determinism, because the advocates of free will cannot, in his view, absolutely and scientifically prove the case for free will. As with so many determinist opponents of free will, he attempts to place the burden of proof on the advocates of free will, notwithstanding the fact that a belief in some kind of free will is consistent with human experience whereas a belief in (pre)determinism with regard to human choices and decisions is counterintuitive.

Honderich teaches that all “events” (including all mental operations) are strictly a matter of physical cause and effect. Ergo, all our thoughts are caused by other physical events—ultimately events outside of ourselves going back to the beginning of time. Everything is predetermined. Determinism is “the question of whether your choosing this book and your reading this sentence now, or your deciding to move in with someone or get divorced, is just a matter of cause and effect” (1). He believes that the answer to this question is in the affirmative.

Honderich is aware that quantum physics claims to have discovered a world governed by indeterministic rather than deterministic principles, but he denies that such indeterminism is ontologically real (74–75). In any event, he argues, like many determinists, that any such phenomena would be of no account at the level of human choices and decisions:

The same question of consequences, by the way, is raised by something perhaps more widely accepted than determinism. That is near-determinism. Maybe it should have been called determinism-where-it-matters. It allows that there is or may be some indeterminism but only at what is called the micro-level of our existence, the level of the small particles of our bodies, particles of the kind studied by physics. At the ordinary level of choices and actions, and even ordinary electrochemical activity in our brains, causal laws govern what happens. It's all cause and effect in what you might call real life. (5 [italics in the original])

Honderich’s view that quantum mechanics applies only to the microworld is a standard trope among determinists. In contrast, quantum physicist Henry P. Stapp states: “The oft-heard claim that ‘quantum mechanics is not relevant to the mind-brain problem because quantum theory is only about tiny things’, is absolutely contrary to the basic quantum principles” (Henry P. Stapp, Quantum Theory and Free Will: How Mental Intentions Translate into Bodily Actions [Cham, SZ: Springer, 2017], 13). In this and other writings Stapp challenges the central premises of determinism, especially the notion that the entire universe, including life, is governed solely by physical cause and effect.

Additionally, Honderich and other determinists wrote their major works before the publication of relevant books by neuroscientists William R. (W. R.) Klemm and Peter Ulric Tse and philosopher-scientist Bob Doyle. These and other authors present alternatives to the determinist/predeterminist assumptions of Honderich and his intellectual kin—alternatives that are based on science, evidence, and reason and not on religious presuppositions.

Chapter 11 of Honderich’s book evinces, among other things, his hatred of retribution as a basis for criminal punishment. In this and other writings, he is passionately opposed to any notion of retribution as a legitimate consideration in criminal or social matters. To consign retribution to oblivion, he proposes to replace any notion of free will with the doctrine of determinism: if the criminal was predetermined to commit the crime, he/she cannot be responsible for it. This is the equivalent of killing a fly with a hydrogen bomb. There are several approaches to criminal punishment: retribution, deterrence, societal protection, and rehabilitation. Some criminal law theorists oppose retribution as a basis for criminal law without any reference to determinism (see Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott Jr., Criminal Law [St. Paul, MN: West, 1972], 24). Although good arguments can be made against retribution, it must also be kept in mind that the social contract involves the assumption by government of the formerly private right of retribution/retaliation. See John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government. Expelling retribution from the criminal law might result in a return to private retaliation—the kind of private justice still accepted in some societies. Honderich’s project of eliminating retribution by means of indoctrination in determinist lore is a fool’s errand. People are less likely to accept determinism than to rethink the wisdom vel non of retribution. Moreover, if (pre)determinism is true, both crime and punishment are inevitable: it’s all a matter of cause and effect, don’t you know.

Alan E. Johnson
(revised November 27 and 30, 2019)

8/11/2021 NOTE: See also the discussion of Honderich in my book Free Will and Human Life.

[J_BlueFlower · Rating 2 out of 5]

A review of arguments for and against determinism, and a discussion of the consequences. Much the same conclusion I already had come to myself, but in greater detail.

It was a bit of a struggle to read. A difficult subject, but Ted Honderich does not help the reader with his style of writing with many long, knotted sentences. Typically I read 30-50 pages in one sitting. Here it was more like 10 pages before I felt tired and not concentrating.

[Barry · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not an easy read

[Michalis · Rating 2 out of 5]

Δεν ξέρω αν φταίει η ελληνική μετάφραση, το ότι δεν έχω πανεπιστημιακό υπόβαθρο στη φιλοσοφία ή ότι ο συγγραφέας υστερεί σε συγγραφική συνοχή και συνέχεια, αλλά δεν κατάφερα να τελειώσω ούτε το δεύτερο κεφάλαιο. Εκεί που διαβάζεις μια πρόταση και περιμένεις να οδηγηθείς σε ένα αποτέλεσμα ή μία μετάβαση, έρχεται η επόμενη πρόταση και ξαφνικά αναρωτιέσαι αν δεν διάβασες προσεκτικά. Ξαναδιαβάζεις τις προηγούμενες προτάσεις αλλα τίποτα. Ένιωσα σ να διάβαζα συγκεχυμένες σκέψεις του συγγραφέα, σε πλαίσιο που μόνο ο ίδιος μπορεί να πλοηγηθεί όπως θα ήθελε.

[Sophie]

Incredibly convoluted and it was difficult to read, it got the job done for my assignments but it’s not something I’m thanking my lecturers for putting on our reading list that’s for sure.