Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited

by Ted Honderich

-- A classic book transformed by a philosopher at his strongest -- Reviews of the first 'Painstaking, comprehensive and unimpassioned.' Anthony Kenny, New Statesman 'Bold, tough, direct style . . . a pleasure to read.' Mary Warnock, Times Literary

Genres: Philosophy, Politics

264 pages, Paperback

First published January 15, 1991

About the author

Edgar Dawn Ross "Ted" Honderich was a Canadian-born British philosopher, who was Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College London.

Reviews

[Patricia Wood · Rating 2 out of 5]

Before reading this book, one should know it is based on the premise that causal determinism is false. The argument henceforth is not very strong. However, this book is obviously dated and other sources arguing for punishment should be sought.

[Left_coast_reads · Rating 3 out of 5]

When are we morally justified in punishing someone? What does it mean to say a person deserves punishment? Ted Honderich tackles these questions in Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited.

Moral justifications for punishment can be separated into 3 categories:
Retributive
Preventive
Rehabilitative

Retributive theories argue that there is some inherent good in causing an offender to suffer. They make no reference to deterrence or behavioral reform. Some justify punishment by saying it is proportional to the crime. Others use the framework of "moral rights," claiming that offenders forfeit theirs.

These arguments fail to explain what actually justifies the punishment. They are circular. "Punishment is morally justified because the offender deserves to be punished." But what does "deserves" mean other than it would be morally justified to punish them?

Preventive theories rely on a utilitarian framework to argue that punishment is justified when it would bring about maximum total satisfaction. The issue here is that this seems to allow for situations in which an innocent person could be punished if it results in greater total happiness.

He doesn't explicitly reject the rehabilitative argument, but lists possible issues with effectiveness, implementation, and questions of moral indoctrination of offenders or those with reduced mental faculties.

Ultimately talk of punishment is incomplete without talk of what sort of society we want to create. He argues for what he calls the Principle of Humanity, essentially that we should take rational actions to keep people out of lives which lack key goods like nourishment, freedom, respect, community, etc.

This reads to me as a more sophisticated version of utilitarianism. It justifies actions (including punishments) based on their consequences, but does not seek to maximize happiness or satisfaction in a simplistic mathematical way. I'm not convinced that Honderich completely avoids the aforementioned issue of punishing innocents, but his framing of it seems to make it less likely.

The book is rigorous and plodding. Honderich's prose is sometimes difficult. But the book is thorough and once in a while it's actually funny.

[Daniel Barrows · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reviews at
* Jonathan Glover. (June 1970). Inquiry. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/PunRev...
* John Williams. (21 November 2006). Metapsychology. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/PunRev...
* Páll S. Árdal. (9 June 2010). Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review. https://doi.org/10.1017/S001221730002...

Full book online at https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183q5s8

[DaN McKee · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very long walk to get to a worthwhile destination. I can’t help but think if all the pedantic analytic hand-wringing were edited out we’d have got to the conclusion in half the time and many readers would have stuck with it who maybe gave up after the first hundred pages.