1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians

by Benny Morris

These essays by a leading Israeli historian focus on Israeli decisions and the reasons behind the mass Arab exile from Palestine in 1948. Benny Morris addresses the transfer of Majdal's Arabs to Gaza in 1950, the initial absorption of the Palestinian refugees in Arab host countries in 1948-9, and why some Arabs remained in their villages. He then explores attitudes toward the Palestinian Arabs from the 1948 war to the differing perspectives of Israel's two main parties. By examining past and present Israeli historiography, Morris identifies and analyzes the major points of controversy between the "old" official Israeli histories and the "new" histories of the 1980s and beyond.

Genres: Israel, History, Nonfiction

382 pages, Paperback

First published October 1, 2008

About the author

Benny Morris is professor of history in the Middle East Studies department of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in the city of Be'er Sheva, Israel. He is a key member of the group of Israeli historians known as the "New Historians".

Reviews

[Iker Zufiaurre · Rating 4 out of 5]

This collection of essays, written by the most prominent among Israel's "new historians", Benny Morris, is intended to serve as a complement to the author's groundbreaking study The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Relevant documentary materials that were left out of Birth are included in this volume. With this work, the author aims to "contribute to an understanding of the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem and on the early history of Israel's Arab minority." (viii)

The book's initial essay constitutes a handy, succinct summary of the main material findings of the "new" historiography. A number of points regarding the founding of the state of Israel, which for many decades, enjoyed the status of virtually unquestioned dogma have been more or less shattered by the new generation of historians through their analysis of a rich array of recently declassified archival material. Among the claims that have been undermined are the idea that the Zionists really accepted the partition resolution, that the Arabs of Palestine were dedicated to total war against the very idea of partition, that all the Arab states constituted one monolithic bloc singularly bent on the destruction of Israel, and that the Palestinian refugees had "voluntarily" fled the land on the orders of Arab commanders. The mythology has been accurately summarized by Israeli left-wing historian Simha Flapan, to whose work Morris refers although with disparagement. According to Morris, Flapan's work lacks credibility since it is driven by a political agenda rather than a strict concern with historical truth. Morris is not "sure that writing history serves any purpose or should serve any purpose that strays beyond the covers of each book and beyond the desire of practitioners and readers to penetrate the murk of the past" (27) I reserve myself against Morris's derision of Flapan, since he fails to provide any concrete example of its supposed failings. I for one find that author's work quite convincing. That caveat aside, the gist of Flapan's findings have in any event been confirmed in the "new" historiography, as Morris reviews with eloquence.

At the time of the 1947-49 war in Palestine, the two dominant political forces were the two socialist coalitions: Mapai, led by David Ben-Gurion; and the left-wing Mapam. The attitude of these two factions towards the Yishuv's Arab policy is explored in depth by Morris. Inside the Mapai organization, debate was largely muted, and there was a consensus of leaving policy to the generals. Inside Mapam, debate was more vigorous. There were fundamental differences between the party's two constituent elements: Ahdut Ha'avodah, which basically favored the "transfer" approach to the indigenous Arab population, and Hashomer Hatza'ir, which generally opposed this policy except in instances when it was warranted by "military necessity". Several Mapam officials expressed dissent over some of the rougher methods of dealing with the Arabs as well as the looting and pillage of the emptied Arab villages. They were, however, unable to influence these policies, despite the fact that Mapam members constituted a large part of the army leadership. As Morris puts it, "[W]hile the [Mapam] party officially repudiated a policy of expulsion, 'its' generals had helped implement it, and Ahdut Ha'avodah's leaders and some Hashomer Hatza'ir figures had sanctioned it." (63) Many of the kibbutzim were affiliated with Mapam. The kibbutzim were quite eager to establish Jewish settlement on expropriated Arab land and were not much deterred by their party's officially expressed qualms of conscience. After the war, Mapam officially endorsed the right of the refugees to return (even though they were rather vague on implementation). After the first general election in the state of Israel, the hardline Mapai, which strenuously opposed any notion of Arab refugee return, emerged dominant and Mapam's position in the country's political landscape became marginal.

Morris discusses the findings of an internal investigative report produced by the Military Intelligence branch of the IDF in June 1948, when a cease-fire was in force between the two warring sides. The document contains a meticulous analysis of the causes behind the Arab refugee flight in the period from December 1947 to June 1948. During this stage, about 300,000 Arabs fled. The report concluded that military operations by the Haganah as well as attacks by the dissident organizations Irgun and LHI as well as the "effects" of these operations were the main factor causing the refugee flight. In a minority of cases, flight was caused by evacuation orders issued by the Arab leadership for strategic reasons. A small fraction of the flight was caused by direct expulsion orders coming from the Jews. Morris concludes that the document is generally credible and that it constitutes an important bit of evidence to undermine both the Arab claim that the Jews carried out a premeditated, systematic ethnic cleansing campaign as well as the claim in Israeli propaganda that the Arabs left because their leaders ordered them to. It is notable that outright expulsions were relatively rare at this initial stage of the war, i.e. the period that preceded the invasion by the Arab states after the Israeli declaration of statehood in May 1948 (Morris does, however, point out that there is a considerable grey area surrounding what is to be labeled an "expulsion"). As Morris sums up the conclusion that this document serves to reinforce, "Jewish military operations indeed accounted for 70 per cent of the Arab exodus; but the depopulation of the villages in most cases was an incidental, if favourably regarded, side-effect of these operations, not their aim." (87)

During the 1948 war, the Yishuv set up an official "Transfer Committee" headed by Yosef Weitz. Weitz's activities are reviewed in depth by Morris. The task of the committee was to act to prevent a return of the Arab refugees. Ben-Gurion lent his approval to these endeavors, but in a way aimed at concealing his involvement. As Morris puts it, "Ben-Gurion wanted Weitz to implement the 'Transfer Committee' scheme, but without his name being involved or cited as the source of the committee's authority. It were best that 'things' happened as if of their own -- villages razed, cultivators barred from their fields, refugees barred from returning and, indeed, villagers expelled -- without his personal imprimatur." (107) The activities of the Transfer Committee itself were rather limited, but it had a great symbolic importance in establishing the "transfer" cause as a prime strategic objective for the newborn State of Israel.

The ethnic cleansing of the Arab inhabitants of Haifa, who prior to the war had made up about half of that city's population, are described in some detail. The vast majority of Haifa's Arabs fled during the spring of 1948. A few thousand of them remained in July that year. A decision was made by the Israeli military to "concentrate" and "Ghettoize" Haifa's remaining Arab population in a designated part of the town. The Arabs themselves objected to such an involuntary "transfer", but this factor was deemed irrelevant. The forced population removal operation was carried out, followed by the systematic destruction of the buildings that had previously been inhabited by these Arabs. No compensation was offered to the Arabs for the destruction of their property. In the course of these operations, the Israeli military leadership consistently overrode the authority of the civilian bodies that were nominally in charge of government. Some of these government officials claimed that the house demolitions were illegal, but this, too, was deemed irrelevant. As Morris points out, "[Member of Haifa's Arab Affairs Committee Naftali] Lifshitz's protests [that the demolitions were illegal] were ineffectual. The operation, carried out by the IDF on Ben-Gurion's orders, had neatly and cheaply 'rearranged' Haifa, exploiting the background of war, a cowed Arab population unable to protest effectively, and the absence of most of the property owners." (169) The alleged pretext for these policies was "security"; the Arabs being seen as a potential "fifth column" who could be better kept under control if they were concentrated. The operations also had the very convenient effect of making plenty of space available for Jewish immigrants to take possession of.

Burning of the enemy's crops was a tactic deployed by both sides during the war. A decision based primarily on political considerations was made by the Jewish side during the truce period in the summer of 1948, to prevent the Arab farmers who had fled from returning to their fields in order to reap their crops. Instead, abandoned Arab farmland, and the crops thereto accruing, was taken possession of by the Jewish side. That which the Jews could not harvest they destroyed. Arab farmers who "infiltrated" back to Israel in order to tend to their crops were shot at. The decision by the Jews to expropriate abandoned Arab farmland was one crucial factor that made it impracticable for the refugees to return. It is noteworthy that the refugee "problem" thus was in large part self-consciously inflicted by the Jews for their own strategic reasons. As Morris sums it up, "...Jewish cultivation of Arab fields and the prevention of Arab harvesting continued through 1948 and early 1949, consolidating both the Jewish hold on the newly acquired lands and the refugeedom of Palestine's Arabs." (174)

The book features an elaborate discussion of four Arab villages whose inhabitants were allowed by the Jews to stay in the country. One of these villages had a history of collaboration with the Yishuv's forces. Another provided laborers for Jewish farm enterprises. These were factors that ultimately prevented the expulsion of the villages' inhabitants. The army was certainly eager to expel, but in these rare cases, political factors overrode the army's wishes (eventually -- one of the villages' inhabitants were indeed instructed by the army to leave. They did leave, but were later allowed to return). From this case study, Morris draws the following generalized conclusion: "...when Arab communities in 1948 did not flee and/or were not expelled before or during their conquest, and the issue came up for debate in civilian bodies ... then ideology, morality, and embarrassment coalesced to stymie the army's desire to expel (where that existed)." (215)

Morris reviews the miserable situation resulting for the Palestinian refugees living in camps primarily in Gaza and Transjordan, and to a lesser extent in Lebanon, Syria, end elsewhere. Largely neglected by their new host countries as well as by the world generally, dire humanitarian conditions prevailed among them, until some relief efforts finally materialized. Morris points out that having won the war, Israel staunchly refused to allow the refugees to be repatriated. It might have been in order for him to add that Israel was granted UN membership on the strict condition that it would accept the right of the refugees to return, a promise which they did make but subsequently failed to live up to. The Arab states were as unwilling to accept a resettlement scheme as Israel was to grant repatriation. In this refusal, the Arab states, "had good economic, social-demographic, and internal political reasons [.] ... But also --- there was a need ... to use the refugees as a weapon against the Jewish state." (255) It might have been appropriate to add that the Syrian government in fact did offer to resettle a substantial number of Palestinian refugees in 1949, an offer which was met with the refusal by David Ben-Gurion even to meet for discussions with the Syrian government. It is thus not quite accurate to claim that the Arab states uniformly rejected resettlement.

What is now the Israeli city of Ashkelon was, prior to the 1947-49 war known as Al Majdal, a town populated by many Arabs. Most of these fled during the war. Some, however, remained at the war's end. In 1950, Majdal's remaining Arabs left for Gaza. The government of Egypt as well as the "transferees" themselves later alleged that they had fallen victims to an Israeli act of "expulsion". For this, Israel was condemned in the UN Security Council and ordered to accept the return of these Arabs. Israel refused, contending that no "expulsion" had taken place. The question of whether or not Majdal's remaining Arabs had been "expelled" is dealt with by Morris as follows: "What is clear is that Israel wanted [Majdal's] Arabs ... to leave and engineered their departure [through] Well-tried measures of pressure, falling short of outright expulsion" (268) "Expulsion light", one might call this. The incident is one of several illustrations of the fact that Israel was quite intent on "transfering" Arabs out of its territory even after the end of the war. It is thus not just "military necessity" that impels Israel to ethnically cleanse, as its apologists would have it.

This volume makes for fasinating reading. Morris is a highly lucid scholar who treats the important documentary materials that he has uncovered, in a commendably responsible and judicious manner. He does generally live up to his professed commitment of being free of ideological bias, and describes the historical events with refreshing candor. This, along with Morris's work generally, makes for an indispensible contribution to the understanding of the Palestinian tragedy.

[Francesca · Rating 3 out of 5]

La lettura è stata lunga e lenta perché lungo e di una lentezza spaventosa è questo conflitto in corso da più di 70 anni. Sembra un voler mettere “a posto” le cose mostrando che le colpe sono come al solito da entrambe le parti e che con un briciolo in più di impegno da ogni parte si potrebbe arrivare perlomeno alla fine di questa guerra continua: la convivenza? Dura da mettere in pratica perché l’odio tra i due popoli è ormai viscerale e di così lunga data e perché sono troppo poche le persone coinvolte che davvero vorrebbero la pace.

[Finrod · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interessante antologia raccolta di saggi scritti dal celebre storico israeliano Benny Morris nell'arco di una quindicina d'anni, e che non riguardano solamente “singoli episodi accaduti fra il 1948 e il 1949” come scritto nella fuorviante sinossi, ma che spaziano su un po' tutta la questione israelo-palestinese. Libro importante ed interessante anche solo perché l'autore, spesso impropriamente portato ad esempio in Italia di quegli ebrei “buoni” da opporre ai “cattivi” che ad es. votano Likud, quando parla della dirigenza palestinese non usa toni e parole molto diverse da quelle di un Netanyahu o qualsiasi altro “falco” della politica israeliana.
Ma è da leggere anche da chi crede che gli israeliani durante o immediatamente dopo la guerra del '48 si siano sempre e in ogni caso comportati in maniera impeccabile e al di sopra di ogni critica umanitaria.
1948 inizia col diario “dal carcere” dell'autore, carcere militare a cui era stato condannato per il suo rifiuto di servire come riservista in Cisgiordania per concludersi con una lunga intervista a Ehud Barak sul “fiasco” dei negoziati di Camp David, quando Arafat rifiutò qualsiasi proposta israeliana e immediatamente dopo iniziò la durissima e sanguinosa Seconda Intifada. La parte centrale e più importante del libro è composta da alcuni saggi sulla situazione, l'esodo (più o meno forzato) o al contrario i motivi della sopravvivenza di comunità arabe rimaste all'interno della linea verde, nei territori controllati dallo stato ebraico, al termine della guerra del '48.