What is to be understood by 'rational legal argument'? To what extent can legal reasoning be rational? Is the demand for rationality in legal affairs justified? And what are the criteria of rationality in legal reasoning? The answer to these questions is not only of interest to legal theorists and philosophers of law. They are pressing issues for practicing lawyers, and a matter of concern for every citizen active in the public arena. Not only the standing of academic law as a scientific discipline, but also the legitimacy of judicial decisions depends on the possibility of rational legal argumentation.
A theory of legal reasoning which tries to answer these questions pre-supposes a theory of general practical reasoning. This theory is the subject matter of the first two parts of the book. The result is a theory of general practical discourse which rests on insights of both Anglo-Saxon and German philosophy. It forms the basis of the theory of rational legal discourse, which is developed in the third part of this book.
Teoría de la argumentación jurídica de Alexy no es un manual para aprender a litigar ni una guía práctica para construir argumentos jurídicos; es, como su propio título anuncia, una teoría sobre las condiciones de racionalidad del razonamiento jurídico. Quien espere encontrar un método infalible para resolver asuntos probablemente saldrá decepcionado. El verdadero aporte de Robert Alexy consiste en ofrecer un sólido marco filosófico para comprender por qué y hasta dónde puede justificarse racionalmente una decisión jurídica, reconociendo al mismo tiempo los límites inevitables del propio discurso jurídico: la tensión entre derecho y moral, la discrecionalidad residual, la imposibilidad de garantizar una única respuesta correcta y el carácter regulativo (más que absoluto) de la racionalidad. Es una obra profundamente teórica y de enorme influencia, cuyo valor no reside en enseñar qué argumentar, sino en explicar qué hace racionalmente defendible una argumentación jurídica y cuáles son los límites de esa pretensión.
The blurb said this is meant to be useful to practicers of law. This is a lie, it's really only useful to legal theorists who are already deeply familiar with theory of discourse in contemporary and modern analytical philosophy.
Faz uma análise interessante de diversas correntes de argumentação filosófica, apesar de deixar o direito um pouco de segundo plano. Careceu de didática, ao meu ver, sobretudo na explanação sobre Wittgenstein, mas creio que o autor tenha feito bem o trabalho que se propôs a fazer. No entanto, encontrei mais valor como um compêndio de diferentes correntes, encontrando valor tão somente na primeira parte e no apêndice.
The blurb said this is meant to be useful to practicers of law. This is a lie, it's really only useful to legal theorists who are already deeply familiar with theory of discourse in contemporary and modern analytical philosophy.
It just goes in circles about the limitations of legal argumentation and how persuasion works instead of helping the reader/student, I have read other theorists who summarize and better explain Alexy's ideas.
Livro importante no debate da Teoria da Argumentação Jurídica, ainda que não seja tão razoável concordar com algumas das premissas do discurso propostas pelo autor.