This book deals with problems raised in Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding that remain of interest to contemporary philosophers. The main topics discussed are primary and secondary qualities, representative theories of perception, substance, real and nominal essence, abstraction and universals, identity and diversity, personal identity, and innate ideas and empiricism.
John Leslie Mackie was an Australian philosopher, originally from Sydney. He is perhaps best known for his views on meta-ethics, especially his defence of moral skepticism. However, he has also made significant contributions to philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and philosophy of language.
I happened upon this book in the Strand while in New York City one day on vacation. I had never heard of it until that moment, but having read Mackie’s magisterial The Miracle of Theism last year, I couldn’t resist picking it up.
As the title suggests, this is a work dealing largely with philosophical problems raised in Locke’s great An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Mackie notes in the introduction that he had originally intended the work to be merely “a series of pegs on which to hang” his arguments, and though the final form of the book by and large adheres to topics in the Essay, the occasional tangents betray the original intent of the book. This is not a criticism so much as a warning that this work is not meant as a dedicated commentary on the Essay. It is, however, an excellent companion piece. It’s densely written and often quite difficult, but worth the effort.
It’s not terrible but (and I don’t care if it sounds arrogant) having already given the topics Mackie approaches some thought and being familiar with early English empiricists, I literally didn’t take away one single new thought. Most of the time it’s nothing but a paraphrase of Locke or Berkeley and coming out of Husserl’s second logical investigation I really felt like I had gone from the roof to the basement of the philosophical house before I even had the time to say jeez
Mackie discusses elements of Locke’s philosophy, derived mainly from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which are of interest to modern readers. Among these are questions about primary and secondary qualities, representationalism, substance and essence, abstract ideas and universals, personal identity, and innate notions.
Because modern terminology differs from Locke’s, the author takes care to explain what Locke was thinking about when he used such terms as “substance,” a term the philosopher deployed, as it turns out, in reaction the the Scholastics and their emphasis on the a priori. The author adds to our modern understanding of Locke, pointing out, as an example, two separate kinds of identity implicit in Locke’s writing.
In many cases, Locke’s views are more defensible than we assume. Mackie suggests ways in which Locke can be read more charitably than critics allow, such as where he, Mackie, links representionalism with a presumably co-extensive realism. Other propositions require further treatment: Can there really be “innate” ideas without empirical verification?
This book is relatively easy to read and understand. I’ve read Locke before, but even someone who hasn’t can handle the concepts Mackie deals with, complex as they may be. Locke wrote in a discursive style, so this author adds in a lot of the logical structure needed to reinforce some of Locke’s arguments. I recommend this book to anyone interested in philosophy, including those just starting out.
Rather well done attempt to reconcile Lockean theses with contemporary scientific realism and the problems associated with Lockean theses in general. The biggest problem with the book is Mackie's style of writing with excessively long and structurally confusing sentences. I found myself re-reading several different passages from the book to make sure I got what Mackie was trying to convey (I hope!).
The last chapter on innate ideas and their role in realism is a rather good read on its own, and provides an excellent closer to Mackie's attempt at reconciling empiricism with scientific realism.
As per my instructions, Nat has promised to shoot me if I become a Lockean, so one shouldn't think that my interest in this book was inspired by an interest in Locke himself. It was more inspired by an interest in Mackie's views on secondary qualities. I think he (Mackie) really did believe that Locke was right about secondary qualities.