A rich, well-written and mostly well-researched work, if quirky. It feels very journalistic for a book from an academic publisher.
Hamilton-Merritt covers the sacrifices the Hmong made in the war, and the suffering they endured after the communists won. She definitely has a passion and sympathy for their story, and identifies strongly with them; the book is certainly not always written in a detached, scholarly tone, if that’s what you’re looking for. Also, Hamilton-Merritt played a role in the charge that the communists used chemical weapons in Laos. This claim came under scrutiny when she made it, and much of the book is a defense of her allegations. She ably covers how other Lao peoples often viewed the Hmong as collaborators with the French and then with the Americans. The narrative transitions smoothly from setting to setting.
The latter half of the book, however, seems a little unorganized and gives you the impression that Hamilton-Merritt lost some of her interest toward the end. The level of detail sometimes seems excessive. The research seems mostly based on interviews. There also could have been some more analysis of why the Hmong joined the American side (or why some Hmong joined the communists, a topic that she almost completely ignores), and how it complicated America’s alliance with the Lao government, and on the Hmong’s relations with other groups in Laos. Her portrait of the Hmong people often feels like caricature. Hamilton-Merritt also blames the Americans for betraying the Hmong, but doesn’t provide a lot of coverage of specific actions by America’s wartime leaders. She often repeats what US embassy officials said at the time, but doesn’t really analyze these statements. She seems to style herself as the Hmong’s leading advocate, but you don’t really learn that much about the group.
Much of the book deals with Vang Pao. Hamilton-Merritt’s coverage of him verges on hero worship, and in this version of history the general never makes any mistakes. She insists that Vang Pao wasn’t complicit in the regional drug trade, and mostly ignores the role played by opium in the Hmong economy and society. When she covers Vang Pao’s life in the US, she skips over his shady financial dealings. She also seems supportive of the postwar Hmong resistance movements in Laos, but doesn’t cover how they affected life there (or how Vang Pao funded them by basically demanding money from other Hmong refugees in America)
Sometimes Hamilton-Merritt includes lengthy conversations, even though she wasn’t present during them. She also tries to get into the minds and emotional states of the many of the people involved in the story一一even when they’re people she didn’t interview. When describing the origins of the CIA’s alliance with the Hmong, Hamilton-Merritt refers to a “Colonel Billy.” From reading the book’s description of him, you can tell this is Bill Lair, but for some reason he’s never named.
Other parts could have been explained better. Harry Aderholt is introduced in the narrative as “the officer in charge of the Tibetan airlift.” Some readers may be familiar with this operation, but Hamilton-Merritt never bothers describing it. On the lack of American armed intervention at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, she writes “Perhaps the US decided it could not undertake such a mission without the approval of its major ally, Britain, which refused to change its policy of nonintervention in Indochina.” There is no discussion of the debate on US intervention at this stage of the war, or the documentary record that explains some of this.
There’s a few errors as well. At one point she writes that the CIA was successful in their paramilitary operations until Laos. Apparently, she hasn’t looked much at previous examples of abortive Agency projects like Tibet, Indonesia, or Cuba. Clarence Abadie is called “Aberdee” at one point. Harry Aderholt’s unit is called the “1095th Operational Evaluation Training Group,” even though it was the 1045 Operations, Evaluation and Training Group. Hamilton-Merritt writes that during the Geneva Conference of 1962, Kennedy “created the Green Berets” (they were formed in 1952) She also repeats the story that the North Vietnamese walked out of the Paris talks because they balked at Thieu’s demand for changes, and that Nixon then bombed them to bring them back to the table. These bombing plans, however, were discussed before these snags developed, and were executed because Nixon wanted to convince Thieu of his sincerity so that South Vietnam would agree to an armistice.
The book is valuable for the Hmong perspective, for sure, and the narrative is engaging, but as an actual history it has its shortcomings. You should definitely supplement this with other books on the topic.