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Who's Afraid of Human Cloning?
Human cloning raises the most profound questions about human nature, our faith in ourselves, and our ability to make decisions that could significantly alter the character of humanity. In this exciting and accessible book, Gregory Pence offers a candid and sometimes humorous look at the arguments for and against human cloning. Originating a human being by cloning, Pence boldly argues, should not strike fear in our hearts but should be examined as a reasonable reproductive option for couples. Pence considers how popular culture has influenced the way we think about cloning, and he presents a lucid and non-technical examination of the scientific research and relevant moral issues in the cloning debate. This book is a must-read for anyone who is concerned about the impact of technology on human life and for those with interests in medical ethics, sociology, and public policy.
- GenresScience
200 pages, Paperback
First published December 18, 1997
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December 2, 2024
A PHILOSOPHICAL REJECTION OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST HUMAN CLONING
Philosophy professor Gregory Pence wrote in the Preface to this 1998 book, “[In 1997] I had the opportunity to meet the man who cloned Dolly.. and to discuss with him some of the issues discussed in this book… at the first major conference on human cloning after the announcement of Dolly… What was disappointing to me about the conference was that none of the speakers was willing to defend human cloning in any way. It seems that a consensus had developed … that this was a side not to be defended… how can a ‘consensus’ develop when the arguments are never made?... I left disappointed… this book is unabashedly philosophical and one-sided. I am making the case for human cloning first because there is a terrible one-sidedness to the ‘discussion’ so far and … because I believe that my position is true.”
He states in the first chapter, “This book discusses the ethics of human cloning. It attempts to think through the questions that cloning humans raises at different levels… Human cloning raises some important questions about our ability to choose wisely, about our view of human nature, about our capacities, about our faith in ourselves, and about the direction we choose for future humanity.” (Pg. 2)
He points out, “there is … a profoundly important role for women in this debate… For a cloned human embryo to become a person, a real flesh-and-blood women must gestate such an embryo for nine months and raise it as her child. More important, she must choose to do so. In this book, we are going to contrast two large ways of looking at these issues. On one side lies defeat and fatalism … accepting whatever lethal genes slam into our families… Or we can begin to take a more assertive stance toward the future of humanity and begin to answer questions that have never been really asked before… I opt for [an]… attitude … of open-mindedness to the possibility of originating a child by cloning.” (Pg. 7)
He explains, “A person originated by cloning would not be an exact copy of an adult human being in many senses. At the molecular level there would be differences, even though the gene structure would be very similar. Atoms combine to form molecules that in turn compose enzymes and proteins. At that point, two embryos starting out the same anatomically reveal minor variations… The brain, the… human organ … most essential to the continuity of ourself, cannot be cloned or duplicated from a DNA blueprint. More importantly, the unique development of my brain that is the basis of my experiences can’t be replicated in any sense by cloning. This should comfort some people who worry that individuality is threatened by cloning.” (Pg. 14-15)
He reports, “In 1978, David M. Rorvik wrote a sensationalist book, ‘In His Image: The Cloning of a Man.’ … In 1982 in a Federal District Court … a judge ruled that the book was ‘a fraud and hoax,’ quite an embarrassment to [the publisher]… The hoax set off a furor of ethical condemnations… Because of this fraud … as well as some other hoaxes claiming to have produced an IVF baby before 1978, it is easy to understand why, when Louise Brown was born in 1978, many people did not believe she had been created by IVF.” (Pg. 30-31)
He comments on the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC): “For reasons unknown, the Commission invited many people from religion to testify… [many of whom] predictably opposed all human cloning… This bias was reflected in the huge section of the NBAC Report on ‘religious perspectives.' What is odd about so much emphasis on religious views… since most of these views were against human cloning for the usual vague reasons, is that scientific policy is usually not based on such considerations…” (Pg. 34-35)
He argues, “Cloned humans would be people. It is a widely-accepted, general principle of modern philosophical ethics that people should be treated equally as moral agents unless there is a morally relevant reason to treat them otherwise…. acceptance of this principle means that treating people unequally requires passing a test of justification. The onus of proof in on anyone who would treat a cloned human unequally… This very strong moral principle entails a sub-principle that society should not discriminate against people according to their origins.” (Pg. 45-46)
He notes, “Human cloning separates sex from reproduction, and hence, symbolizes… this break. As such, it resonates in our culture in more emotional ways than simply as a new way of making babies or as a new way of helping infertile couples. It appears that the separation of sex from reproduction strikes some deep fears in the human breast, making theological pundits predict we are fast approaching Armageddon.” (Pg. 82)
He suggests, “The point is that we won’t know until we try and we can’t try unless we are allowed to do so. Everything important can’t be done on embryos of sheep or frogs. Human embryos are different and we won’t know exactly what goes on with them until we are allowed to try. But to pursue medically useful research with embryos, society must agree that such research is not the same as murdering humans.” (Pg. 87)
He states, “The rich will have better and better kids, who will be smarter, stronger, and more beautiful, while kids of the poor will get dumber, weaker, uglier and carry genetic diseases. The poor and politically powerless have nothing to gain from allowing human NST [nuclear somatic transfer] and perhaps, a lot to lose. So the critic of our class-divided society asserts. Originating a child by NST could conceivably be a status symbol among the wealthy… All that is true, but so what? Class injustice is not changed by preventing the wealthy from buying X rather than Y; it is prevented by not having some people… have wealth. If there are wealthy people, and if having wealthy people is bad, then it does not follow that what the wealthy can buy is bad.” (Pg. 143-144)
He summarizes the ‘con’ arguments: “The first kind of argument revolves around fatalism and the idea that it is dangerous for humans to make new kinds of choices… The second kind of argument revolves around various possible harms to a child originated by NST… Should a decade of mammalian studies on babies produced asexually show no greater rate of birth defects, we will be ripe to try to originate a NST baby. By far the most widely-believed objection is that such asexual reproduction will damage the child in some social way. Here it is important to emphasize the similarly incorrect claims made twenty years ago about in vitro fertilization… Slippery slope arguments in bioethics are usually just claims that people use who don’t want to change, and their use in opposing human NST is no different.” (Pg. 148)
He acknowledges, “Regulation of human reproduction by NST is justified in an experimental phase where protocols are conducted to determine how to make it safe for subsequent children, to limit multiples, to allow public understanding to grow, and to have some national standards of good research. Once a record of safety has been achieved, and once the public accepts NST babies, regulation is no longer justified and human NST should be left to private clinics. Reluctantly, I accept that this means that some IVF clinics must now fall under regulation. However, my guess is that very few such clinics would want to try NST, and as such, most could continue to be unregulated,” (Pg. 160-161)
He concludes, “the time will come soon when the safety issue diminishes and the only thing stopping trials of NST is, essentially, the expectations argument. When that time comes, I hope we find the courage to try originating a child by nuclear somatic transfer. If we let such a weak argument tie the hands of prospective parents and researchers, we will be doing so only for the flimsiest of reasons, i.e., because of the general unease of traditionalists. To me, the expectations arguments would then be insufficient to limit human reproductive liberty.” (Pg. 174-175)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying the issues relating to human cloning.
Philosophy professor Gregory Pence wrote in the Preface to this 1998 book, “[In 1997] I had the opportunity to meet the man who cloned Dolly.. and to discuss with him some of the issues discussed in this book… at the first major conference on human cloning after the announcement of Dolly… What was disappointing to me about the conference was that none of the speakers was willing to defend human cloning in any way. It seems that a consensus had developed … that this was a side not to be defended… how can a ‘consensus’ develop when the arguments are never made?... I left disappointed… this book is unabashedly philosophical and one-sided. I am making the case for human cloning first because there is a terrible one-sidedness to the ‘discussion’ so far and … because I believe that my position is true.”
He states in the first chapter, “This book discusses the ethics of human cloning. It attempts to think through the questions that cloning humans raises at different levels… Human cloning raises some important questions about our ability to choose wisely, about our view of human nature, about our capacities, about our faith in ourselves, and about the direction we choose for future humanity.” (Pg. 2)
He points out, “there is … a profoundly important role for women in this debate… For a cloned human embryo to become a person, a real flesh-and-blood women must gestate such an embryo for nine months and raise it as her child. More important, she must choose to do so. In this book, we are going to contrast two large ways of looking at these issues. On one side lies defeat and fatalism … accepting whatever lethal genes slam into our families… Or we can begin to take a more assertive stance toward the future of humanity and begin to answer questions that have never been really asked before… I opt for [an]… attitude … of open-mindedness to the possibility of originating a child by cloning.” (Pg. 7)
He explains, “A person originated by cloning would not be an exact copy of an adult human being in many senses. At the molecular level there would be differences, even though the gene structure would be very similar. Atoms combine to form molecules that in turn compose enzymes and proteins. At that point, two embryos starting out the same anatomically reveal minor variations… The brain, the… human organ … most essential to the continuity of ourself, cannot be cloned or duplicated from a DNA blueprint. More importantly, the unique development of my brain that is the basis of my experiences can’t be replicated in any sense by cloning. This should comfort some people who worry that individuality is threatened by cloning.” (Pg. 14-15)
He reports, “In 1978, David M. Rorvik wrote a sensationalist book, ‘In His Image: The Cloning of a Man.’ … In 1982 in a Federal District Court … a judge ruled that the book was ‘a fraud and hoax,’ quite an embarrassment to [the publisher]… The hoax set off a furor of ethical condemnations… Because of this fraud … as well as some other hoaxes claiming to have produced an IVF baby before 1978, it is easy to understand why, when Louise Brown was born in 1978, many people did not believe she had been created by IVF.” (Pg. 30-31)
He comments on the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC): “For reasons unknown, the Commission invited many people from religion to testify… [many of whom] predictably opposed all human cloning… This bias was reflected in the huge section of the NBAC Report on ‘religious perspectives.' What is odd about so much emphasis on religious views… since most of these views were against human cloning for the usual vague reasons, is that scientific policy is usually not based on such considerations…” (Pg. 34-35)
He argues, “Cloned humans would be people. It is a widely-accepted, general principle of modern philosophical ethics that people should be treated equally as moral agents unless there is a morally relevant reason to treat them otherwise…. acceptance of this principle means that treating people unequally requires passing a test of justification. The onus of proof in on anyone who would treat a cloned human unequally… This very strong moral principle entails a sub-principle that society should not discriminate against people according to their origins.” (Pg. 45-46)
He notes, “Human cloning separates sex from reproduction, and hence, symbolizes… this break. As such, it resonates in our culture in more emotional ways than simply as a new way of making babies or as a new way of helping infertile couples. It appears that the separation of sex from reproduction strikes some deep fears in the human breast, making theological pundits predict we are fast approaching Armageddon.” (Pg. 82)
He suggests, “The point is that we won’t know until we try and we can’t try unless we are allowed to do so. Everything important can’t be done on embryos of sheep or frogs. Human embryos are different and we won’t know exactly what goes on with them until we are allowed to try. But to pursue medically useful research with embryos, society must agree that such research is not the same as murdering humans.” (Pg. 87)
He states, “The rich will have better and better kids, who will be smarter, stronger, and more beautiful, while kids of the poor will get dumber, weaker, uglier and carry genetic diseases. The poor and politically powerless have nothing to gain from allowing human NST [nuclear somatic transfer] and perhaps, a lot to lose. So the critic of our class-divided society asserts. Originating a child by NST could conceivably be a status symbol among the wealthy… All that is true, but so what? Class injustice is not changed by preventing the wealthy from buying X rather than Y; it is prevented by not having some people… have wealth. If there are wealthy people, and if having wealthy people is bad, then it does not follow that what the wealthy can buy is bad.” (Pg. 143-144)
He summarizes the ‘con’ arguments: “The first kind of argument revolves around fatalism and the idea that it is dangerous for humans to make new kinds of choices… The second kind of argument revolves around various possible harms to a child originated by NST… Should a decade of mammalian studies on babies produced asexually show no greater rate of birth defects, we will be ripe to try to originate a NST baby. By far the most widely-believed objection is that such asexual reproduction will damage the child in some social way. Here it is important to emphasize the similarly incorrect claims made twenty years ago about in vitro fertilization… Slippery slope arguments in bioethics are usually just claims that people use who don’t want to change, and their use in opposing human NST is no different.” (Pg. 148)
He acknowledges, “Regulation of human reproduction by NST is justified in an experimental phase where protocols are conducted to determine how to make it safe for subsequent children, to limit multiples, to allow public understanding to grow, and to have some national standards of good research. Once a record of safety has been achieved, and once the public accepts NST babies, regulation is no longer justified and human NST should be left to private clinics. Reluctantly, I accept that this means that some IVF clinics must now fall under regulation. However, my guess is that very few such clinics would want to try NST, and as such, most could continue to be unregulated,” (Pg. 160-161)
He concludes, “the time will come soon when the safety issue diminishes and the only thing stopping trials of NST is, essentially, the expectations argument. When that time comes, I hope we find the courage to try originating a child by nuclear somatic transfer. If we let such a weak argument tie the hands of prospective parents and researchers, we will be doing so only for the flimsiest of reasons, i.e., because of the general unease of traditionalists. To me, the expectations arguments would then be insufficient to limit human reproductive liberty.” (Pg. 174-175)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying the issues relating to human cloning.
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