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Skinner Primer: Behind Freedom and Dignity
Outlines and evaluates the behaviorist's theories, defines the three psychological freedoms, and discusses their practical applications in a pluralistic society.
224 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1985
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October 4, 2025
A CRITIQUE OF SKINNER’S ‘BEYOND’ BOOK, AND HIS GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Author Finley Carpenter wrote in the Preface to this 1974 book, “Is Skinner correct in claiming that the popular beliefs about freedom are fictitious and misleading? Do humans actually need freedom? If freedom is a basic need, how can that fact be demonstrated? What is the nature or freedom---is it more than just a state of mind? Those and allied questions stimulated the writing of this book.”
He continues, “I have come to the conclusion that our future will be somewhat determined by the decisions we adopt about freedom and the actions we take thereby. If we cling to the fictions, we shall play into the hands of power seekers who aspire to establish a totalitarian system. But if we learn to value a realistic freedom and to promote its growth and distribution, the gloomy predictions of science fiction writers may be avoided. I believe that education can play a key role in promoting the important freedoms. But it cannot do the job without support of the larger society. It seems most important to modify the popular notions of freedom and to show that the value we place in freedom need not rest on untenable assumptions.”
In the Introduction, he suggests, “Whether we like the Skinnerian position or not, it may be risky to ignore it. To label Skinner a fraud as a means of evading his thesis, as some critics have done, is to give it unwitting support. The angry reactions simply demonstrate… to the pro-Skinnerians, that people behave mechanically… Skinner actually controlled the behavior of his critics by tossing them a bitter morsel. It seems likely that Skinner knew all along what reaction his book [‘Beyond Freedom and Dignity’] would cause….” (Pg. xiii-xiv)
He outlines, “All organisms, including humans, are greatly influenced by the consequences produced by their own behavior---that is the basic notion of Skinnerian psychology. Its meaning embraces the following simpler statements: (1) All animals and humans are behaving creatures. (2) A given act is followed by an experience that is a consequence of the act. (3) The quality of the consequence influences further action… the consequence arises in the outer environment. Therefore the environment holds the key to most of the changes that occur in the way a person behaves.” (Pg. 5)
He argues, “In theory, Skinner’s psychology supports religion, regardless of whatever religious beliefs that Skinner himself may have. Insofar as a religion helps to sensitize a person to useful contingencies, it is good despite whatever theological weaknesses it may have… it makes no practical difference whether or not a doctrine is fundamentally true… The final assessment of any religion must, for a Skinnerian, be based on its behavioral influence.” (Pg. 14)
He explains, “It is impossible to determine exactly what stimulus or set of stimuli gives rise to each and every act. Therefore, a great deal of behavior occurs without an observer’s being able to determine just what stimuli predispose it. Operant behavior, then, is that which is roughly, but not technically, equivalent to voluntary behavior… The main thrust of his psychology is to study operant behavior and to describe its systematic changes as certain environmental conditions are changed.” (Pg. 18-19)
He notes, “Skinner claims that the desire to lose weight, though it seems to originate in the mind of the person, is actually determined by the social environment… So the desire to lose or gain weight does not arise from a perfectly free decision of the person, but is conditioned by the social community.” (Pg. 26)
He points out, “Skinner concedes that an adequate psychology of rats is insufficient to cover all human action. But he is silent about what kind of principle should be added to those he has developed from the study of lower animals.” (Pg. 39)
He states, “Skinner’s system is deterministic, but it is also less mechanistic than classical behaviorism because it leaves room for doubt about causation, particularly about the SPECIFIC cause of the original act... If the organism can initiate action without any identifiable stimulus source that can be isolated as such, it cannot be accepted as a part of a purely mechanistic scheme.” (Pg. 50)
He notes, “[Skinner] finds little value in explanations that are immune to verification. He has expressed that spirit admirably in dealing with the behavior of rats and pigeons. But when it comes to certain human behaviors of a complex sort, his verbal analyses appear to go beyond the kinds of experimental tests to which he subscribes… while Skinner may be theoretically correct in analyzing all sorts of human behavior, he reaches a point where it does not seem possible to demonstrate the validity of his verbal account by experimental means.” (Pg. 52)
He asserts, “It is … difficult to use the Skinnerian model to condition thinking and other covert responses, because covert behavior is outside the realm of observation. Since an observable response and an observable consequence are conditions central to operant conditioning, the whole area of covert behavior can be handled only by speculation, which is not … compatible with the Skinnerian spirit.” (Pg. 55)
He points out, “Skinner … admits that the science of human behavior is not complete, that it needs further development. He also admits that rats and pigeons are not perfect models of humans. It would appear, therefore, that we need some psychological principles in addition to those developed from animal data. Yet Skinner also seems to think that the foundation of a science of human behavior has been set and that only minor alterations are necessary in order to deal adequately with human behavior. But if the foregoing criticisms are reasonably valid, the system may need considerable modification before it is applicable to the full range of human behavior.” (Pg. 57)
He argues, “[Skinner’s] extrapolations appear sound when dealing with rather simple kinds of human learning. But when the focus is shifted to such cognitive functions as analysis, evaluation, complex judgments, synthesis of concepts, and the like, it seems well-nigh impossible to demonstrate the validity of his extrapolations. Thus, when dealing with complex actions of humans that … defy demonstrative expression, Skinner falls back on faith. His faith rests on his experience that the principles have worked … before and his assumption that they should not suddenly fall apart…” (Pg. 96)
He also states, “People just do not like the idea that their behavior is completely determined. Therefore, as long as the operant plan remains rigidly deterministic… persuading people that it should be given a good try---may be quite difficult…” (Pg. 208)
This book will be of keen interest to those seeking clear, non-technical critiques of Skinner.
Author Finley Carpenter wrote in the Preface to this 1974 book, “Is Skinner correct in claiming that the popular beliefs about freedom are fictitious and misleading? Do humans actually need freedom? If freedom is a basic need, how can that fact be demonstrated? What is the nature or freedom---is it more than just a state of mind? Those and allied questions stimulated the writing of this book.”
He continues, “I have come to the conclusion that our future will be somewhat determined by the decisions we adopt about freedom and the actions we take thereby. If we cling to the fictions, we shall play into the hands of power seekers who aspire to establish a totalitarian system. But if we learn to value a realistic freedom and to promote its growth and distribution, the gloomy predictions of science fiction writers may be avoided. I believe that education can play a key role in promoting the important freedoms. But it cannot do the job without support of the larger society. It seems most important to modify the popular notions of freedom and to show that the value we place in freedom need not rest on untenable assumptions.”
In the Introduction, he suggests, “Whether we like the Skinnerian position or not, it may be risky to ignore it. To label Skinner a fraud as a means of evading his thesis, as some critics have done, is to give it unwitting support. The angry reactions simply demonstrate… to the pro-Skinnerians, that people behave mechanically… Skinner actually controlled the behavior of his critics by tossing them a bitter morsel. It seems likely that Skinner knew all along what reaction his book [‘Beyond Freedom and Dignity’] would cause….” (Pg. xiii-xiv)
He outlines, “All organisms, including humans, are greatly influenced by the consequences produced by their own behavior---that is the basic notion of Skinnerian psychology. Its meaning embraces the following simpler statements: (1) All animals and humans are behaving creatures. (2) A given act is followed by an experience that is a consequence of the act. (3) The quality of the consequence influences further action… the consequence arises in the outer environment. Therefore the environment holds the key to most of the changes that occur in the way a person behaves.” (Pg. 5)
He argues, “In theory, Skinner’s psychology supports religion, regardless of whatever religious beliefs that Skinner himself may have. Insofar as a religion helps to sensitize a person to useful contingencies, it is good despite whatever theological weaknesses it may have… it makes no practical difference whether or not a doctrine is fundamentally true… The final assessment of any religion must, for a Skinnerian, be based on its behavioral influence.” (Pg. 14)
He explains, “It is impossible to determine exactly what stimulus or set of stimuli gives rise to each and every act. Therefore, a great deal of behavior occurs without an observer’s being able to determine just what stimuli predispose it. Operant behavior, then, is that which is roughly, but not technically, equivalent to voluntary behavior… The main thrust of his psychology is to study operant behavior and to describe its systematic changes as certain environmental conditions are changed.” (Pg. 18-19)
He notes, “Skinner claims that the desire to lose weight, though it seems to originate in the mind of the person, is actually determined by the social environment… So the desire to lose or gain weight does not arise from a perfectly free decision of the person, but is conditioned by the social community.” (Pg. 26)
He points out, “Skinner concedes that an adequate psychology of rats is insufficient to cover all human action. But he is silent about what kind of principle should be added to those he has developed from the study of lower animals.” (Pg. 39)
He states, “Skinner’s system is deterministic, but it is also less mechanistic than classical behaviorism because it leaves room for doubt about causation, particularly about the SPECIFIC cause of the original act... If the organism can initiate action without any identifiable stimulus source that can be isolated as such, it cannot be accepted as a part of a purely mechanistic scheme.” (Pg. 50)
He notes, “[Skinner] finds little value in explanations that are immune to verification. He has expressed that spirit admirably in dealing with the behavior of rats and pigeons. But when it comes to certain human behaviors of a complex sort, his verbal analyses appear to go beyond the kinds of experimental tests to which he subscribes… while Skinner may be theoretically correct in analyzing all sorts of human behavior, he reaches a point where it does not seem possible to demonstrate the validity of his verbal account by experimental means.” (Pg. 52)
He asserts, “It is … difficult to use the Skinnerian model to condition thinking and other covert responses, because covert behavior is outside the realm of observation. Since an observable response and an observable consequence are conditions central to operant conditioning, the whole area of covert behavior can be handled only by speculation, which is not … compatible with the Skinnerian spirit.” (Pg. 55)
He points out, “Skinner … admits that the science of human behavior is not complete, that it needs further development. He also admits that rats and pigeons are not perfect models of humans. It would appear, therefore, that we need some psychological principles in addition to those developed from animal data. Yet Skinner also seems to think that the foundation of a science of human behavior has been set and that only minor alterations are necessary in order to deal adequately with human behavior. But if the foregoing criticisms are reasonably valid, the system may need considerable modification before it is applicable to the full range of human behavior.” (Pg. 57)
He argues, “[Skinner’s] extrapolations appear sound when dealing with rather simple kinds of human learning. But when the focus is shifted to such cognitive functions as analysis, evaluation, complex judgments, synthesis of concepts, and the like, it seems well-nigh impossible to demonstrate the validity of his extrapolations. Thus, when dealing with complex actions of humans that … defy demonstrative expression, Skinner falls back on faith. His faith rests on his experience that the principles have worked … before and his assumption that they should not suddenly fall apart…” (Pg. 96)
He also states, “People just do not like the idea that their behavior is completely determined. Therefore, as long as the operant plan remains rigidly deterministic… persuading people that it should be given a good try---may be quite difficult…” (Pg. 208)
This book will be of keen interest to those seeking clear, non-technical critiques of Skinner.
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