The Evolution of the Soul

by Richard Swinburne

This is a revised and updated version of Swinburne's controversial treatment of the eternal philosophical problem of the relation between mind and body. He argues that we can only make sense of the interaction between the mental and the physical in terms of the soul, and that there is no scientific explanation of the evolution of the soul.

Genres: Philosophy, Religion, Theology, Metaphysics

375 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1986

About the author

Richard G. Swinburne is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford. Over the last 50 years Swinburne has been a very influential proponent of natural theology, that is, philosophical arguments for the existence of God. His philosophical contributions are primarily in philosophy of religion and philosophy of science. He aroused much discussion with his early work in the philosophy of religion, a trilogy of books consisting of The Coherence of Theism, The Existence of God, and Faith and Reason.

Reviews

[Warren Fournier · Rating 5 out of 5]

Martians, robots, and synthesized animals. You know many of the sci-fi stories that tackle the debate over what makes an entity a person or where begins the soul. It has been a subject of endless fascination for me, which is why "Frankenstein," in all its iterations, is probably my favorite story of all time. And it is why the work of philosopher Richard Swinburne is also so attractive to me.

On the day after Christmas 2024, Swinburne turned 90 years young, and I thought it fitting to revisit one of his classic books, "The Evolution of the Soul" from 1986.

The title tells you what you need to know about what this book is about. Here, he attempts to answer such questions as:

If we are to assume humans evolved from earlier species, and also assume humans have souls, then did souls evolve too? Is there an evolutionary advantage to having a soul? Do other animals have souls? What about synthesized entities that use artificial intelligence? Given what we know about neuroscience, how is the soul distinct from brain processes? What logical evidence do we have that a soul exists apart from the brain? And if the soul is a part of the human person, when does it come into existence--at conception or when the brain becomes suitably complex for consciousness?

One of the most interesting and key chapters here concerns the development of complex language. What does language have to do with the evolution of the soul? If you are asking that question, then this book is for you!

Swinburne is one of the few "modern" philosophers who still has the hutzpah to create a system of logical explanations for experience that still leaves room for a soul. He is a true contemporary dualist who is able to recognize the problems with Descartes' style of radical dualism, and he uses current theories and applications in technology, medicine, and philosophies of mind to shed new light on ancient wisdom. We all know that thought, sensation, and desires are not adequately explained by physics, but reading this book can, at the very least, leave you very open to the idea that SOMETHING beyond neurochemistry, complex neural wiring, and genetic expression is responsible for our experience of mind and self.

Of course, I can't guarantee that you'll agree with his conclusions, but your approval isn't necessary for you to enjoy these ideas. I certainly didn't subscribe to every detail Swinburne gives.

For example, he concludes that the soul is an immaterial structure of inate propositions carried out by neuronal correlates. In other words, the soul evolves from complex brain structures and requires the brain for conscious operation in our world. He does not argue that the soul requires a brain to EXIST, only to function. Therefore, a person in a coma nevertheless has a soul. The soul doesn't cease to exist and then come back into existence during and after deep sleep. But he says that essentially the soul can't operate in our reality without a working brain.

And that may or may not be true. In my opinion, if I am to assume the soul exists, it does not follow that the soul requires a functioning brain to be efficacious. Based on his own logic, there are no consequences of natural laws on the soul. So if this is correct, then the soul continues after the death of the body, but at that point our knowledge ends. It could very well be that the soul continues to operate and be conscious, but in a reality that our neuroanatomy can't access. We have no "a priori" or "a posteriori" knowledge of what the soul is up to after the body dies.

One can argue that the soul can interact with the environment independent of the body by which it is expressed (i.e., ghosts, mediums, telepathy or mind-over-matter), and Swinburne does explore these options briefly at the end, but rightfully concludes that there is no hard evidence found in antecdotal reports from parapsychology. As interesting as those discussions may be for you and me, my suspicion is that, behind all this talk of the soul needing a brain to function, Swinburne was harboring some unexpressed hope to justify the Christian belief in the resurrection of the body.

Many specific critiques I've read about this book over the years from other readers have tended to indicate that the reader perhaps skimmed at some crucial moments and missed vital points that might have satisfied their objections or cleared up a misunderstanding. It's certainly easy to get lost and confused when reading through philosophical proofs. I certainly have. But Swinburne is easier to follow than most. I don't think you need to have a firm background in contemporary philosophy to understand most of this book. He goes into some detailed logical arguments that are surprisingly easy to grasp, a testament to his skill as a writer and educator. The only point where almost anyone will struggle is the fascinating section which concerns the quantum limits of physical determinism. It is very technical, needs some appreciation of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and requires significant concentration in order to follow the logical string, but if you can get the gist, it is a powerful part of his three-pronged argument which concludes that human purposings are not determined by states of the brain.

Obviously, the more experienced you are in philosophical argument, the better able you will be to analyze his ideas critically. I am no professional philosopher, but I've been around the block, with many years of neurology, psychiatry, pharmacology, and philosophy training crammed in my brain, and I still think Swinburne effectively shows that the philosophies of materialists and epiphenomenalists leave a lot to be desired. Swinburne may not be able to give us all the answers himself, but he sure leaves me as satisfied as I'm likely to get.

One last point I want to make is how gracious this book is to detractors and those who hold differing conclusions. Philosophers tend to get a little carried away in their disdain for the work of their peers. There's nothing wrong with getting a little spicy, and certainly a philosopher will find it necessary to show how some propositions are false. But too often have I read philosophers who fail to support their own ideas and spend the majority of their book or article disparaging their colleagues. You won't find that here. Swinburne is a class act.

In conclusion, this is one of the best books I've yet to read on the mind-body connection. It helped clear up some aspects of the argument for me so that I feel more prepared to revisit other books I have from authors with a different take on the issue. After all, when I look back at everything that's happened in our world in the 40 years since this book was written, I can't help but believe that we had better give the mind/spirit/soul some respect and attention again.

SCORE: 4.5/5

[Joseph Schrock · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found Richard Swinburne’s book on the human soul to be sufficiently of interest to motivate me, over a period of some 15 years, to read his book the second time. The book does, of course, delve into very deep and technical philosophical issues. I do not agree with all of Swinburne’s outlook on the nature of the soul.

The book definitely seeks to support a dualist view of reality – mind (spirit) and matter. I find myself compelled to subscribe to this worldview, but I do not believe that this requires me to endorse Descartes’ radical dualism. Mind and matter obviously interrelate. This rules out each of the “substances” (mind and matter) being unrelated to each other. The technicalities of how such interrelation can occur are too deep and difficult for human intelligence to effectively decipher. However, Alfred North Whitehead made extremely vital contributions to explaining a possible scenario by which all reality (according to his philosophical scheme) is ultimately comprised of a “physical pole” and a “mental pole”. Of course, Swinburne’s dualism is rather dramatically different from Whitehead’s “pan-experientialism”. Yet, both worldviews allow for the special and unique nature of the mental versus strict physicality.

One fairly substantial diversion my worldview has from Swinburne’s is that he subscribes to a view of the human soul such that the soul’s conscious awareness and its efficacious functioning require a corporeal body through means of which the soul can have efficacy. This is, of course, in line with what I believe to be his Christian views on the resurrection of the body and soul. He does not expressly (in the book being reviewed here) subscribe to Christianity, but I believe that his worldview entails Christianity. I, on the other hand, believe that the human soul has an intrinsic power to so engage reality as to survive in a viable fashion the death of the body. Therefore, I part company with Swinburne’s conviction that a corporeal body is needed in order that the soul can be rendered viable. Events like telepathy, clairvoyance, psychokinesis, reincarnation, the possibility for séances with deceased people, etc. all are supportive of a worldview in which mental phenomena are causally efficacious.

Suffice it to say that Swinburne’s book on the human soul proved to be highly demanding reading – sometimes stretching to the limits my powers of philosophical analysis. I would recommend this book to anyone who has a serious interest in coming to terms with the incomprehensibly rich and mysterious phenomenon of being human. Materialists and skeptics of various stripes would likely preemptively dismiss this book’s thesis as sheer bunk. Fortunately, materialists don’t get to have “the last word” on these issues.

[Zachary Lawson · Rating 2 out of 5]

Perhaps I went into this book with the wrong expectations, but I found it disappointing. There are really interesting and thought provoking discussions along the way; however, as far as giving an evolutionary account of the soul in animals, Swinburne tosses his hands up and says “it’s a mystery!”. Fine and well if you’re me; not fine and well if you’re writing a book titled “The Evolution of the Soul”. Secondly, where Swinburne does attempt to describe the evolutionary development of the mental life (thought, sensation, belief, desire, and purpose), it’s rife with “well, obviously natural selection would select for such-and-so” with little justification. Moreover, these assumptions have been seriously challenged by Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism and the subsequent discussion. (To be fair, this book is from 1986 and Plantinga’s EAAN didn’t get a serious treatment until 2002). Last, Swinburne’s argument for why souls can persist past death of the body is “lol God”. True, but ultimately unsatisfying.

“Evolution of the Soul” is interesting, but disappoints where it counts. There’s probably better contemporary literature on the mind-body problem.

2.4/5

[Ryan Garrett · Rating 4 out of 5]

Swinburne is a superb philosopher and his writing is clear, easily understood, and profoundly insightful into the (soul)/mind-body topic. I really appreciate his common-sense approach which relies on reality and his incredibly well reasoned and logical dualist arguments. I would quibble with some of his conclusions (particularly regarding evolutionary biology which has now been destabilized by recent findings); however, overall I would agree with him on most things. Gracious in his approach & tone (unlike Churchland, Ravenscroft, and others), this is an important book to be considered in any study of philosophy of mind.

[Jacob Aitken · Rating 4 out of 5]

Swinburne's thesis is that the human person cannot be reduced to brain-states, and that this non-reducible entity is what we call "the soul." The first part of the book analyses how perceptions, beliefs, thoughts, and desires are {probably} not reducible to mere brain-events.

Structure of the Soul

If we say the person can continue if the body is destroyed, we mean it is logically possible (146).

basic argument: knowledge of what happens to bodies and their parts will not necessarily give you knowledge of the persons within them (147). Cf., B. Williams, “Mad Surgeon Story.” Further, a man’s mental properties are not necessarily the same as his physical properties (155). At least, we have no reason for thinking so and those who hold to materialism have far more to prove.

Origin and Life of the Soul

problem: can the soul function when it is not having conscious episodes (sleep, etc)? Swinburne makes the distinction that the soul cannot “function” without a properly functioning brain, but it can exist without the brain (176).

I am not so sure Swinburne’s evolutionary narrative accounts for morality. He asserts with Darwin that those who evolved have well-marked social instincts which would eventually acquire morality (224). The only evidence he offers is that animals demonstrate altruism towards their kin (except for those animals who eat their young and eat their mates, no doubt). The universality of morality, therefore, can be attributed to some “core principles” (226).

I am not persuaded and neither was T. H. Huxley. Swinburne admits with Huxley that the “practice of what is ethically best...is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic system” (quoted in Swinburne, 227).

His argument for free will is along the lines that Quantum Mechanics has ruled out a universal physical determinism, which would be our wills aren’t determined by our brain-states. So far, so good. The rest of the chapter consisted of mathematical formulas before which even the mightiest reader would quail.

The Structure of the Soul

Agents have belief-desire sets. Per Quine, our beliefs “form a net which impinges on experience only at its edges” (see Quine, From a Logical Point of View, 42-46). Our beliefs have to “mesh” with other beliefs (though there can be inconsistencies that aren’t obvious). Swinburne takes Quine’s correct thesis and adds to it: desires interact with our belief network (Swinburne 263-264).

Desires require beliefs. If a man desire heroin and knows the effects of heroin, and you inject him with heroin, then as the effects wear off he will desire more heroin. If you inject a sleeping man with heroin, as the effects wear off he will feel uneasy but won’t desire heroin (not knowing what to desire).

There are three ways to change desires: bodily change, a belief change, and a change of other desires (270-271). Swinburne gives an extended and fascinating account of how our beliefs and desires function. The upshot of this is our beliefs can’t always be “changed” by neural procedures. If one did succeed in “switching” beliefs, my other beliefs in the “web,” themselves not changed, would “conspire to restore” that former belief which gave unity (281). Granted, this isn’t a powerful stand-alone argument for the existence of the soul, but it is a difficulty for materialist views.

The Future of the Soul

Swinburne discusses various "dis-embodied" scenarios and rejects most of them. He holds that Near-Death Experiences do not obtain because in all of these accounts it has not shown that the brain ceased to function. I disagree.

His conclusion: the soul cannot survive the body simply on its own powers. I suppose that’s true, but Swinburne comes dangerously close to (if not actually affirming) “soul sleep.” He likens the soul to a light bulb and the brain to the socket. The light bulb still exists if the power is off, but it does not function.

Pros:
*Excellent discussion of belief-formation and how we change our desires.
*Magnificent command of the secondary literature. I didn't know what John Searle (Intentionality) and Saul Kripke (Naming and Necessity) were talking about until Swinburne explained them.
*The appendices were wonderful. Great discussion on Jaegwon Kim and supervenience. Lots of tantalizing suggestions for future constructions.

Criticism:

Swinburne holds to neo-Darwinian evolution. He claims, or appears to, that the soul evolved *separately* from the brain/body. Perhaps, but few people, whether non-Christian or Christian, will buy that. Further, given Swinburne's above agreement with Huxley, it's not clear how evolution works with the idea of a moral soul.

I reject Swinburne's rejection of near-death experiences for the same reason I reject his "soul-sleep." However, those objections turn on biblical data, which isn't relevant to his thesis (so no point listing them here).

[Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The theme of the book is the nature and source of the differences between the inanimate objects which alone existed on the Earth at its formation, and the animals and men which have subsequently evolved."

In "The Evolution of the Soul," Richard Swinburne tackles the philosophy of mind with a thorough and intriguing model that amounts to a version of Cartesian substance dualism. Taking advantage of such diverse fields as psychology and quantum mechanics, the book covers the nature of the mental life, the origin and development of souls, differences between human and animal souls, and the possibility of life after death.

The later chapters get pretty technical, but two of my favorite parts are very accessible:

1) The first section of the book deals with the five kinds of mental states that compose the mental life: sensations, thoughts, beliefs, purposings, and desires. These chapters provide an excellent framework for any discussion of the philosophy of mind.

2) Swinburne's four principles of inductive inference (credulity, testimony, simplicity, and charity) are clearly presented and compellingly defended.

Overall, the book is excellent. But there is one aspect that begs for further development. (To be clear, I think this "deficiency" is relatively minor; it doesn't undercut Swinburne's position, but it leaves room for refinement or modification.)

Swinburne says a lot about what a soul does, but relatively little about what a soul is. This has the effect of reducing the soul to its functions, which amounts to identifying the soul with consciousness. In turn, that raises the question of whether the soul continues to exist when it's not functioning (Does the soul exist while you're asleep?). Swinburne thinks so, but his account of how this works verges on arbitrariness (and he admits as much).

Swinburne repeatedly emphasizes the radical differences between the physical and the mental, but he seems to imply that mentality "evolved" in a way much like biological evolution, though he never expands on this. Since he doesn't offer much by way of describing what the soul is, his scientific/physical commitments get in the way of his dualism, leaving a sense that there's more to be said.

Ultimately, "The Evolution of the Soul" deserves its standing as a premier work in the philosophy of mind. It has much to offer anyone interested in the subject, whatever their prior convictions.

NOTE: The Revised Edition includes seven new appendices covering a range of related topics (and Appendix D touches on some of my aforementioned concerns, though not all).

[Jeffrey · Rating 3 out of 5]

Swineburne begins a "brief" treaty on the nature of humanity, arguing that man is not a monism (either mental, or physical) but is a duality of both the mind and the brain. Arguing that the mind needs the brain to function, but one ought not confuse functionality with existence, he moves through three phases in his work. The first is to identify the nature of the rich mental life that we all experience delving through five areas of the mental life and concluding with some useful psychological imports of belief and desire. Second, he briefly discusses the nature of hte soul. Lastly, he discusses some concluding thoughts.

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good book overall, although I personally think Swinburne would have been well served to spend a little more time on fewer issues instead of glancing at many.

Swinburne's view is that we are body/soul composites, that the soul evolved naturally with the human organism, and that the functioning of the soul relies on the functioning of the brain.

[Rachael · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a philosophical account about the mental life, arguments for why mental properties are not brain states, and the structure of the soul (bearer of consciousness). If you are interested in a thoroughly reasoned out argument for why we are more than a collection of cells this is a worthwhile read.

[Marcos · Rating 5 out of 5]

In a nutshell, this is a philosophy book with a focus on a theory of ontology. It can be very technical, but it makes a lot of great insight for the Christian Worldview for deeper understanding of dualistic metaphysics.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really good book. I would give it 5 stars if it were not for his torturous prose! Very interesting insights, whether he intended to or not, concerning moral formation.