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Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality
731 pages, Hardcover
First published January 9, 1975
9 people want to read
About the author
Patrick, Baron Devlin
6 booksPatrick Arthur Devlin, Baron Devlin, PC was a British lawyer, judge and jurist. He worked as junior barrister for William Jowitt while Jowitt was Attorney-General, and by the late 1930s he had become a successful commercial lawyer. During the Second World War he worked for various ministries of the UK Government, and in 1948 Jowitt (by then Lord Chancellor) made Devlin (then aged 42) a High Court judge, the second-youngest such appointment in the 20th century. Devlin was knighted later that year.
In 1960, Devlin was made a Lord Justice of Appeal, and the following year he became a Law Lord and life peer as Baron Devlin, of West Wick in the County of Wiltshire.
After retirement, Baron Devlin was a judge on the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization until 1986. He was also chairman of the Press Council from 1964–69, and High Steward of Cambridge University from 1966 until 1991. He also spent time writing about law and history, especially the interaction of law with moral philosophy, and the importance of juries.
In 1960, Devlin was made a Lord Justice of Appeal, and the following year he became a Law Lord and life peer as Baron Devlin, of West Wick in the County of Wiltshire.
After retirement, Baron Devlin was a judge on the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization until 1986. He was also chairman of the Press Council from 1964–69, and High Steward of Cambridge University from 1966 until 1991. He also spent time writing about law and history, especially the interaction of law with moral philosophy, and the importance of juries.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
February 14, 2022
An insightful and sensitive study of American policy towards the war in Europe up to America's entry into the war, relying mostly on secondary sources.
Devlin emphasizes how centralized decisionmaking was in the Wilson White House, with Wilson and House making many key decisions with little Cabinet input, and the secretary of state being kept out of the loop on many foreign policy debates. He ably lays out how Wilson moved from one position to the other until he was forced into the war by his own logic. Secretary of State Bryan is sometimes portrayed as naive, but here he comes off as intelligent and reasonable, sensitive to issues that Wilson and House often seemed ignorant of (although it does seem like, in the end, Devlin dismisses him as a naive fool) The analysis of international legal issues is good, especially the law of the seas (“The rules now seem almost as unreal as jousting and very much less precise”) He does a good job laying out Wilson’s conviction that the war was being fought over no real pressing issues, and in explaining the importance of American policy to the belligerents as the world’s most powerful neutral.
The writing is precise, but sometimes you can tell the book was written by a lawyer. Sometimes Devlin will stop the narrative to seemingly raise points and literally ask several questions for page after page, as if debating himself. Devlin covers Wilson’s academic and political career in some detail, including his presidency before the outbreak of the war. These sections take up over a hundred pages, and many readers will no doubt find them tedious and overstuffed. Topics such as the Boer War, the revolution in Mexico, German politics and even Wilson’s second marriage are covered in probably more detail than you want. Also, Devlin doesn’t always seem familiar with American history, making some questionable statements about the Spanish-American War, events in the Philippines, and the populist movement, for example. He also seems to downplay the domestic political reasons behind Wilson’s stance of neutrality.
There’s also some strange parts. At times it seems like Devlin wants to reduce every issue to one related to Wilson’s state of mind. Devlin also seems to admire Edward House, though I don’t know why. He also describes the willingness of British statesmen to stay in the war despite so many Allied reverses, and compares it favorably to Britain in 1940. I don’t know the reason for this, either. It’s understandable why Churchill seems heroic in 1940; it’s also understandable why British leaders in 1915 seem dumb, stubborn, passive, shortsighted, unimaginative, and duplicitous. Also, Devlin describes the history of American neutrality in previous European wars, which seemed unnecessary. He also covers American relations with other belligerents of the Great War (Italy, Austria, etc.), and these stories often seem irrelevant to the larger issues.
The book also includes the story of Frank Cobb’s April 2, 1917 discussion with Wilson, where Wilson supposedly unburdened himself of his fear for the country and his desperation for a way out. There are reasons to doubt this story, since Cobb left no oral or written account of such a meeting and the story first appeared after the deaths of both Wilson and Cobb. The White House visitor logs have no record of a visit by Cobb that night. Wilson didn’t even keep his cabinet in the loop on his upcoming speech to Congress, so why would he summon a journalist from New York that he wasn’t really friends with?
Still, a solid and witty work.
Devlin emphasizes how centralized decisionmaking was in the Wilson White House, with Wilson and House making many key decisions with little Cabinet input, and the secretary of state being kept out of the loop on many foreign policy debates. He ably lays out how Wilson moved from one position to the other until he was forced into the war by his own logic. Secretary of State Bryan is sometimes portrayed as naive, but here he comes off as intelligent and reasonable, sensitive to issues that Wilson and House often seemed ignorant of (although it does seem like, in the end, Devlin dismisses him as a naive fool) The analysis of international legal issues is good, especially the law of the seas (“The rules now seem almost as unreal as jousting and very much less precise”) He does a good job laying out Wilson’s conviction that the war was being fought over no real pressing issues, and in explaining the importance of American policy to the belligerents as the world’s most powerful neutral.
The writing is precise, but sometimes you can tell the book was written by a lawyer. Sometimes Devlin will stop the narrative to seemingly raise points and literally ask several questions for page after page, as if debating himself. Devlin covers Wilson’s academic and political career in some detail, including his presidency before the outbreak of the war. These sections take up over a hundred pages, and many readers will no doubt find them tedious and overstuffed. Topics such as the Boer War, the revolution in Mexico, German politics and even Wilson’s second marriage are covered in probably more detail than you want. Also, Devlin doesn’t always seem familiar with American history, making some questionable statements about the Spanish-American War, events in the Philippines, and the populist movement, for example. He also seems to downplay the domestic political reasons behind Wilson’s stance of neutrality.
There’s also some strange parts. At times it seems like Devlin wants to reduce every issue to one related to Wilson’s state of mind. Devlin also seems to admire Edward House, though I don’t know why. He also describes the willingness of British statesmen to stay in the war despite so many Allied reverses, and compares it favorably to Britain in 1940. I don’t know the reason for this, either. It’s understandable why Churchill seems heroic in 1940; it’s also understandable why British leaders in 1915 seem dumb, stubborn, passive, shortsighted, unimaginative, and duplicitous. Also, Devlin describes the history of American neutrality in previous European wars, which seemed unnecessary. He also covers American relations with other belligerents of the Great War (Italy, Austria, etc.), and these stories often seem irrelevant to the larger issues.
The book also includes the story of Frank Cobb’s April 2, 1917 discussion with Wilson, where Wilson supposedly unburdened himself of his fear for the country and his desperation for a way out. There are reasons to doubt this story, since Cobb left no oral or written account of such a meeting and the story first appeared after the deaths of both Wilson and Cobb. The White House visitor logs have no record of a visit by Cobb that night. Wilson didn’t even keep his cabinet in the loop on his upcoming speech to Congress, so why would he summon a journalist from New York that he wasn’t really friends with?
Still, a solid and witty work.
February 18, 2019
A "Must Read" For Anyone Interested In Its Subject
Lord Justice Devlin has written a magnificent account of United States policy, and the personal views of President Wilson himself, during the first two years of World War One. The two were closely related, as Wilson's administration, more than most, was something of a one man band, with Cabinet officers (notably Secretary of State Lansing) often treated a bit like office boys.
Devlin notes the variations in Wilson's outlook as the war proceeded, from being distinctly pro-Ally in 1915 to a much cooler attitude in 1916, as British blacklists and other blockade measures brought Anglo-American relations under increasing strain, to the point where an intelligent man like Colonel House could talk seriously of America being drawn into war against the Allies rather than the Germans. That was, of course, highly unlikely, but Devlin spells out how American belligerancy in April 1917 came as a life saver for a Britain faced with a looming financial crisis.
Devlin also gives an interesting and sympathetic picture of Wilson's first Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan. Widely dismissed as a naive fool, he comes over here as a sensible (if sentimental) man with perfectly valid concerns about where Wilson's policies might lead, and who may, on this point, have been more perceptive than the President himself.
On the central question of why, in the end, America abandoned neutrality, Devlin concludes, and makes a pretty good case, that it was "because Wilson so decided". However, he also makes it clear that it was the Germans themselves who played the biggest role in deciding him to join the war against them. Quite literally, they torpedoed themselves in the foot, and snatched defeat from the jaws of almost certain victory.
In a preface, Devlin injects a personal note. He himself was "in" the WW1 generation but not "of" it, old enough to remember the war, but still too young to fight. Dedicating his book to the "Unfulfilled" who fell in WW1, losing the chance to make their mark in the world as he had done, and especially to one particular member of his own family. He says poignantly that "if it could have been written differently, my cousin would not have died". That line brings me out in goose bumps.
All in all, this book is an absolute "must" for anyone interested in its subject matter, or who cares about how and why WW1 and its aftermath turned out the way they did.
Lord Justice Devlin has written a magnificent account of United States policy, and the personal views of President Wilson himself, during the first two years of World War One. The two were closely related, as Wilson's administration, more than most, was something of a one man band, with Cabinet officers (notably Secretary of State Lansing) often treated a bit like office boys.
Devlin notes the variations in Wilson's outlook as the war proceeded, from being distinctly pro-Ally in 1915 to a much cooler attitude in 1916, as British blacklists and other blockade measures brought Anglo-American relations under increasing strain, to the point where an intelligent man like Colonel House could talk seriously of America being drawn into war against the Allies rather than the Germans. That was, of course, highly unlikely, but Devlin spells out how American belligerancy in April 1917 came as a life saver for a Britain faced with a looming financial crisis.
Devlin also gives an interesting and sympathetic picture of Wilson's first Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan. Widely dismissed as a naive fool, he comes over here as a sensible (if sentimental) man with perfectly valid concerns about where Wilson's policies might lead, and who may, on this point, have been more perceptive than the President himself.
On the central question of why, in the end, America abandoned neutrality, Devlin concludes, and makes a pretty good case, that it was "because Wilson so decided". However, he also makes it clear that it was the Germans themselves who played the biggest role in deciding him to join the war against them. Quite literally, they torpedoed themselves in the foot, and snatched defeat from the jaws of almost certain victory.
In a preface, Devlin injects a personal note. He himself was "in" the WW1 generation but not "of" it, old enough to remember the war, but still too young to fight. Dedicating his book to the "Unfulfilled" who fell in WW1, losing the chance to make their mark in the world as he had done, and especially to one particular member of his own family. He says poignantly that "if it could have been written differently, my cousin would not have died". That line brings me out in goose bumps.
All in all, this book is an absolute "must" for anyone interested in its subject matter, or who cares about how and why WW1 and its aftermath turned out the way they did.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews