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Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. In Exceeding Our Grasp , Stanford argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise.
The historical record of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by
evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself.
Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true.
The historical record of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by
evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself.
Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true.
234 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
February 17, 2014
Stanford's work is excellent. The scholarship is thorough; the writing is clear; the ideas are engaging. There is really very little to be said that is disparaging about the book, and even what can be said is fairly trivial. Some of the claims in the book overreach the evidence (the strength of the criticisms of scientific realism at the end, for example).
The book divides into two discussions, the first (which is the majority of the book) is about the problem of unconceived alternatives generally, and showing that it is historically important for the biological sciences, particularly the account of heredity given by Darwin, Galton, and successors. This account is very thoughtful, and well characterized against a deep philosophical background (considering only the most relevant information and not attempting to get too deep just to name-drop the important philosophers of science). Stanford makes a case that is deeply compelling, and should be taken seriously by any philosopher of science who is interested in theory formation and preference... which is really all philosophers of science, at some level or other.
The second discussion, which is really just the last few chapters, is a short commentary on scientific realism, where Stanford attacks models of realism that are currently in vogue. The commentary is not very effective, but it offers a nice preface on how Stanford figures his account of unconceived alternatives fits in with the "big question" in philosophy of science, i.e. "what business is science in?" The account isn't supposed to be exhaustive and satisfying, and that's ok, but the expectation entering into this discussion should be with that in mind, there simply isn't the word count for a philosopher to demolish a tradition as diverse and embedded as scientific realism in the last three or four chapters.
Overall, this is a strong and worthwhile read. I enjoyed it a lot, and found it incredibly engaging. Even where Stanford overreaches, he does it in a way which is stimulating, intentional, and thoughtful, and he deserves respect for showing that sort of deliberate construction, rather than being audacious to make a statement.
The book divides into two discussions, the first (which is the majority of the book) is about the problem of unconceived alternatives generally, and showing that it is historically important for the biological sciences, particularly the account of heredity given by Darwin, Galton, and successors. This account is very thoughtful, and well characterized against a deep philosophical background (considering only the most relevant information and not attempting to get too deep just to name-drop the important philosophers of science). Stanford makes a case that is deeply compelling, and should be taken seriously by any philosopher of science who is interested in theory formation and preference... which is really all philosophers of science, at some level or other.
The second discussion, which is really just the last few chapters, is a short commentary on scientific realism, where Stanford attacks models of realism that are currently in vogue. The commentary is not very effective, but it offers a nice preface on how Stanford figures his account of unconceived alternatives fits in with the "big question" in philosophy of science, i.e. "what business is science in?" The account isn't supposed to be exhaustive and satisfying, and that's ok, but the expectation entering into this discussion should be with that in mind, there simply isn't the word count for a philosopher to demolish a tradition as diverse and embedded as scientific realism in the last three or four chapters.
Overall, this is a strong and worthwhile read. I enjoyed it a lot, and found it incredibly engaging. Even where Stanford overreaches, he does it in a way which is stimulating, intentional, and thoughtful, and he deserves respect for showing that sort of deliberate construction, rather than being audacious to make a statement.
February 1, 2016
This was written with far too much academic rigour in its sentence structure. That's not to say the book was bad, it's just not for a general audience. If you have a passion for the history of science and you've been sufficiently desensitized to academic writing, you might actually cherish this book for its content.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews