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My Brain Made Me Do It
As scientists continue to explore how the brain works, using ever more sophisticated technology, it seems likely that new findings will radically alter the traditional understanding of human nature. One aspect of human nature that is already being questioned by recent developments in neuroscience is free will. Do our decisions arise from purely mechanistic processes? Is our feeling of self-control merely an illusion created by our brains? If so, what will become of free will and moral responsibility? These thorny questions and many more are examined with great clarity and insight in this engaging exploration of neuroscience's potential impact on moral responsibility. The author delves into a host of fascinating topics, parts of the brain that scientists believe are involved in the exercise of will-what Parkinson's, Tourette's, and schizophrenia reveal about our ability to control our actions-whether criminal behavior is determined by brain chemistry-how self-reflective consciousness may have evolved from a largely deterministic brainUsing illustrative examples from philosophy, mythology, history, and criminology, and with thorough discussions of actual scientific experiments, the author explores the threat of neuroscience to moral responsibility as he attempts to answer the Are we truly in control of our actions?
244 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
October 31, 2010
Subtitled: The Rise of Neuroscience and the Threat To Moral Responsibility
As neuroscience becomes increasingly able to explain human behavior, more and more scientists feel that free will is being explained out of existence. They believe that free will is an illusion, that our sense of ownership over our decisions and actions is not real. Neurobiological determinism, the view that all our thoughts and actions are determined by our brains, has become a common theme in scientific books written for the public.
Eliezer Sternberg's My Brain Made Me Do It is an attempt to introduce the general public to some of the recent neuroscience findings that appear to many to be at odds with our intuitions about human free will and moral responsibility and an attempt to counteract neurobiological determinism's growing popularity among scientists.
Sternberg's main critique is that neuroscientists attempting to explain deliberation through brain activity have only considered exceedingly simple cases. He believes there is not yet reason to believe that findings will be similar when considering cases when we reflect on what he calls boundless problems, problems for which the relevant features or the proper method of solution cannot be specified beforehand. He believes the "boundlessness" of human reason is what constitutes our free will and that it cannot be fulfilled through a determined algorithm.
The book is divided into three sections. Chapters 1-4 discuss the concepts of free will and moral responsibility and explicate how these might be undermined by neurobiological determinism. Chapters 5-13 discuss a variety of recent neuroscience findings that have been used to throw doubt upon the existence of free will. Each chapter addresses a type of finding, e.g., Daniel Wegner's claims that our thoughts and actions are not causally linked or Apostolos Georgopoulos' predicting movements in monkeys from brain activity recordings. Chapters 14-18 propose Sternberg's positive defense of free will.
Sternberg argues for two theses, one negative and one positive. The negative thesis is that the evidence in support of neurobiological determinism is inadequate and that, consequently, the widespread adoption of this perspective among neuroscientists is unjustified. I found all argument for this to be exceedingly weak. His critiques of various scientific findings are hand-wavy at best. For example, Sternberg critiques Benjamin Libet's studies by saying the timing of the readiness potential could have been calculated incorrectly but does not consider whether the calculations were correct. Later, Sternberg critiques Libet's interpretation of his results: "Libet effectively concludes that since the readiness potential comes before the action, it must cause the action" (84). Sternberg compares Libet's argument to saying that "if a car's brakes were defective before an accident, the brakes must have caused the accident" (85). This is insultingly simplistic. Libet's argument is more akin to saying that before hundreds of accidents of a specific, narrowly-defined type, the brakes were always defective, and the details strongly imply that the brakes, not something else, caused the accident. This misrepresents Libet's position to the point of making him out to be an imbecile. Sternberg's critique of Libet, consisting mainly of straw man arguments, is typical of all his critiques. The quantity of argument is also lacking, often constituting no more than the last page of a chapter (sometimes less).
Sternberg's positive thesis is that the activities constituting free will, reflecting on boundless problems, could not be produced by a determined, algorithmic system. I found this section of the book to be frustrating and disappointing. The "argument" appears to be no more than Sternberg asserting that reflection on boundless problems must be non-algorithmic, then pointing to this reflection and saying, "Look, it's not algorithmic!" There is no argument as to why an exceedingly complex algorithm could not perform the calculations he considers. Many examples of deliberation he cites as too open or complex for mechanistic calculation could be performed by simple Bayesian systems. Throughout the book, Sternberg's explanations of his own points are often unclear. In fact, I believe the clearest description of Sternberg's central argument is actually given by Jerry Samet in the foreword (p. 14).
Something I found missing from this book was any discussion of findings in social psychology. Although the relevant studies would likely not fall under the category of 'Neuroscience,' many findings in this field, both recent and throughout the past several decades, constitute some of the strongest evidence for doubting our intuitive beliefs about free will and moral responsibility. Discussion of moral psychology, about which there is ample neuroscientific data for debate, is missing as well. The absence of these topics reflects a significant gap in the scope of scientific evidence considered by Sternberg.
As for the format of the book, I was often disappointed. Each chapter begins with an illustrative story to set the context for the chapter. Personally, I found these topic introductions to be excruciatingly slow. Readers will miss nothing by skimming, or often even skipping, the first page (or two, or three) of each chapter. The chapter names, presumably meant to be mysterious and enticing, are frustratingly non-descriptive. Combined with the fact that each chapter begins with a story, this means the reader does not know what a chapter is actually about until she has already read several pages.
To his credit, Sternberg does introduce a variety of topics, both philosophical and scientific, and describe a wide range of scientific findings in a way that will be readily understood by any layperson with a fledgling interest in neuroscience, not an easy task. Almost all evaluation or interpretation of the scientific data, on the other hand, is unacceptably simplistic even for the layperson and often biased to the point of misrepresentation. The central tenant of the book is argued circularly. Overall, I cannot recommend this book. With the abundance of books coming out in this genre, readers can afford to miss this one.
This review was originally published by Metapsychology Online Reviews: http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/...
© 2010 Matthew Hudgens-Haney
As neuroscience becomes increasingly able to explain human behavior, more and more scientists feel that free will is being explained out of existence. They believe that free will is an illusion, that our sense of ownership over our decisions and actions is not real. Neurobiological determinism, the view that all our thoughts and actions are determined by our brains, has become a common theme in scientific books written for the public.
Eliezer Sternberg's My Brain Made Me Do It is an attempt to introduce the general public to some of the recent neuroscience findings that appear to many to be at odds with our intuitions about human free will and moral responsibility and an attempt to counteract neurobiological determinism's growing popularity among scientists.
Sternberg's main critique is that neuroscientists attempting to explain deliberation through brain activity have only considered exceedingly simple cases. He believes there is not yet reason to believe that findings will be similar when considering cases when we reflect on what he calls boundless problems, problems for which the relevant features or the proper method of solution cannot be specified beforehand. He believes the "boundlessness" of human reason is what constitutes our free will and that it cannot be fulfilled through a determined algorithm.
The book is divided into three sections. Chapters 1-4 discuss the concepts of free will and moral responsibility and explicate how these might be undermined by neurobiological determinism. Chapters 5-13 discuss a variety of recent neuroscience findings that have been used to throw doubt upon the existence of free will. Each chapter addresses a type of finding, e.g., Daniel Wegner's claims that our thoughts and actions are not causally linked or Apostolos Georgopoulos' predicting movements in monkeys from brain activity recordings. Chapters 14-18 propose Sternberg's positive defense of free will.
Sternberg argues for two theses, one negative and one positive. The negative thesis is that the evidence in support of neurobiological determinism is inadequate and that, consequently, the widespread adoption of this perspective among neuroscientists is unjustified. I found all argument for this to be exceedingly weak. His critiques of various scientific findings are hand-wavy at best. For example, Sternberg critiques Benjamin Libet's studies by saying the timing of the readiness potential could have been calculated incorrectly but does not consider whether the calculations were correct. Later, Sternberg critiques Libet's interpretation of his results: "Libet effectively concludes that since the readiness potential comes before the action, it must cause the action" (84). Sternberg compares Libet's argument to saying that "if a car's brakes were defective before an accident, the brakes must have caused the accident" (85). This is insultingly simplistic. Libet's argument is more akin to saying that before hundreds of accidents of a specific, narrowly-defined type, the brakes were always defective, and the details strongly imply that the brakes, not something else, caused the accident. This misrepresents Libet's position to the point of making him out to be an imbecile. Sternberg's critique of Libet, consisting mainly of straw man arguments, is typical of all his critiques. The quantity of argument is also lacking, often constituting no more than the last page of a chapter (sometimes less).
Sternberg's positive thesis is that the activities constituting free will, reflecting on boundless problems, could not be produced by a determined, algorithmic system. I found this section of the book to be frustrating and disappointing. The "argument" appears to be no more than Sternberg asserting that reflection on boundless problems must be non-algorithmic, then pointing to this reflection and saying, "Look, it's not algorithmic!" There is no argument as to why an exceedingly complex algorithm could not perform the calculations he considers. Many examples of deliberation he cites as too open or complex for mechanistic calculation could be performed by simple Bayesian systems. Throughout the book, Sternberg's explanations of his own points are often unclear. In fact, I believe the clearest description of Sternberg's central argument is actually given by Jerry Samet in the foreword (p. 14).
Something I found missing from this book was any discussion of findings in social psychology. Although the relevant studies would likely not fall under the category of 'Neuroscience,' many findings in this field, both recent and throughout the past several decades, constitute some of the strongest evidence for doubting our intuitive beliefs about free will and moral responsibility. Discussion of moral psychology, about which there is ample neuroscientific data for debate, is missing as well. The absence of these topics reflects a significant gap in the scope of scientific evidence considered by Sternberg.
As for the format of the book, I was often disappointed. Each chapter begins with an illustrative story to set the context for the chapter. Personally, I found these topic introductions to be excruciatingly slow. Readers will miss nothing by skimming, or often even skipping, the first page (or two, or three) of each chapter. The chapter names, presumably meant to be mysterious and enticing, are frustratingly non-descriptive. Combined with the fact that each chapter begins with a story, this means the reader does not know what a chapter is actually about until she has already read several pages.
To his credit, Sternberg does introduce a variety of topics, both philosophical and scientific, and describe a wide range of scientific findings in a way that will be readily understood by any layperson with a fledgling interest in neuroscience, not an easy task. Almost all evaluation or interpretation of the scientific data, on the other hand, is unacceptably simplistic even for the layperson and often biased to the point of misrepresentation. The central tenant of the book is argued circularly. Overall, I cannot recommend this book. With the abundance of books coming out in this genre, readers can afford to miss this one.
This review was originally published by Metapsychology Online Reviews: http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/...
© 2010 Matthew Hudgens-Haney
February 23, 2020
This book is about a philosophical argument, in which the author is on one side. The author's side of the argument is that there exists something called "free will" and something called "moral authority", which explain our behavior. The other side is "determinism", which says that our behavior is a consequence of chemical reactions, which we have no control over.
The author sets forth the arguments of the determinists, citing Damasio and Gazzaniga. Kandel gets a sentence here and there. The same for Ramachandran. Oliver Sachs is not mentioned. He then tries to punch holes in it using works of fiction and historical characters. The personification of free will is Adam from Genesis, who is not mentioned. The personification of moral authority is Moses and his tablets, also not mentioned. If he didn't want to touch the Bible, he could have mentioned Freud or Skinner. How could anyone write about behavior, when this book was written, without mentioning Kahnemann and Tversky?
So, if you have read nothing on this topic before, you can begin with this book, but then you are obligated to read other books on the topic.
The author sets forth the arguments of the determinists, citing Damasio and Gazzaniga. Kandel gets a sentence here and there. The same for Ramachandran. Oliver Sachs is not mentioned. He then tries to punch holes in it using works of fiction and historical characters. The personification of free will is Adam from Genesis, who is not mentioned. The personification of moral authority is Moses and his tablets, also not mentioned. If he didn't want to touch the Bible, he could have mentioned Freud or Skinner. How could anyone write about behavior, when this book was written, without mentioning Kahnemann and Tversky?
So, if you have read nothing on this topic before, you can begin with this book, but then you are obligated to read other books on the topic.
October 10, 2017
Not a bad book, but would have been a better essay. Insightfully picks holes in the idea that science has 'proven' free will is an illusion. But ultimately the book is too long and too obsessed with ideas of morality, crime, and punishment to mount a really compelling case. Relies far too much on the expected moral outrage of its audience at the idea of criminals agency being compromised by circumstances, neurology, mental illness, deprivation etc and gives only the briefest nod to the ways in which a belief in human agency and acknowledgement of the myriad ways in which it can be compromised can be usefully and wisely reconciled.
Read
July 25, 2011The problems of free will, consciousness and moral agency are well described and illustrated with good examples. Also here we have a potted history of the attempts made to solve the above problems, which is enjoyable and informative. The authors own conclusion on the matter however, leaves a lot to be desired as it ends on a distinctly philosophical note. Overall a good read, ideas are raised and dealt with in short chapters, which means that you are unlikely to get bored or confused, I would have appreciated a bit more detail.
June 13, 2019
I was a little disappointed by this book because I expected there to be more neuroscience. This truly is a philosophy book -- it discusses neuroscience topics, but it is just plain philosophy. It was interesting enough all the same, but I wouldn't have read it had I known that ahead of time.
Read my full review, including a rating for content, at RatedReads.com: https://ratedreads.com/brain-made-me-...
Read my full review, including a rating for content, at RatedReads.com: https://ratedreads.com/brain-made-me-...
June 28, 2010
Subtitled: The rise of neuroscience & the threat to moral responsibility.
As someone who is fascinated with biopsycosocial systems, this book gives fascinating examples of people with biological tendencies for certain behaviors. The entire book discussed debated if their biological tendencies caused the behavior or did their free will.
The author strictly believes in free will as the final decision maker.
As someone who is fascinated with biopsycosocial systems, this book gives fascinating examples of people with biological tendencies for certain behaviors. The entire book discussed debated if their biological tendencies caused the behavior or did their free will.
The author strictly believes in free will as the final decision maker.
May 12, 2019
Free will is something that I think everyone should be interested in -- I mean, it's fundamental to our lives and every action! Before I read this book, I was most decidedly on camp #freewillisanillusion, but after hearing the various experiments being broken down and explained in detail, I realise that the experiments done to so called prove free will is pretty limited, and the test results aren't nearly as conclusive as I thought they would be. There are so many loopholes in the experiment that may be caused just by human error which would totally disprove their whole hypotheses! However, there are two things I disagree with the author about: 1) Even if free will doesn't exist, I really don't see why we should be letting people go scott free for killing someone, like I get that they are not morally responsible for what they did, but I still wouldn't want them running about in society, because they have a genetic tendency to be violent, so just lock em away! Or kill them, whatever. I know it sounds inhumane, but if they're really posing a threat to society, then what's the difference between them and a terrorist? 2) I don't buy the author's argument on boundless problems. I don't think there is an infinite set of criteria that need to be considered when making a "moral decision" as defined by the author in the book. I think that there are many many considerations to take into account, yes, and that these considerations run through our minds much faster than in machines that we have nowadays, but that it because the machines we have developed are not advanced enough, and haven't been fed enough information about each individual's past, experience and all that. Like if you say that a person can dismiss certain possibilities based on experience, I'm sure a computer can do that as well if given the same information the human had during the course of his or her life. All that being said, the ideas in this book were presented very well, and made everything pretty easy to understand through metaphors and all, so great job to the writer!
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
November 10, 2016
It has become common knowledge that human body is just one big intricate piece of biological machinery all the way to our brains, the supposed seat of mind or soul, whichever you would call it. Neuroscience is promising to unravel its mysteries in the near future so that one day we will be able to discover, explain and calculate every single feeling and thought we have. The prospect feels as much exciting as it does frightening and even threatening. There might be people that feel okay with feeling biorobots and they can put this book aside. For those who feel there is something inherently wrong with this position, that there must be more to our inner worlds than electric impulses, this book might prove a worthwhile read.
Using the angle of morality and moral decision-making, the author goes on to consider the recent developments and advances in neuroscientific understanding of our minds to defend the position that human consciousness is more than a by-product of our brains working. It is an interesting interdisciplinary study drawing upon a large number of fields, the aforementioned neuroscience and philosophy mostly. As the current body of knowledge on the brain and its intricacies is yet underdeveloped both the problems addressed and the conclusions drawn have a premature feel to them and nonetheless it constitutes a well thought-out attack on the deterministic view of our brain function and mind. Careful, logical examination of the evidence and conclusion with author's own theory about human moral agency, tentative by necessity, leaves a good impression. Personally, this book left me with a hopeful feeling because it proves that complying with laws of reason and scientific method doesn't mean that you have to abandon the notion of free will.
Using the angle of morality and moral decision-making, the author goes on to consider the recent developments and advances in neuroscientific understanding of our minds to defend the position that human consciousness is more than a by-product of our brains working. It is an interesting interdisciplinary study drawing upon a large number of fields, the aforementioned neuroscience and philosophy mostly. As the current body of knowledge on the brain and its intricacies is yet underdeveloped both the problems addressed and the conclusions drawn have a premature feel to them and nonetheless it constitutes a well thought-out attack on the deterministic view of our brain function and mind. Careful, logical examination of the evidence and conclusion with author's own theory about human moral agency, tentative by necessity, leaves a good impression. Personally, this book left me with a hopeful feeling because it proves that complying with laws of reason and scientific method doesn't mean that you have to abandon the notion of free will.
July 2, 2017
A great primer on the question of free will from a purely scientific base
This book approaches the latest developments in neuroscience that champion neurobiological determinism and contrasts them against the idea of free will and moral agency. It is a relatively easy read and uses many examples to illustrate the authors position.
This book approaches the latest developments in neuroscience that champion neurobiological determinism and contrasts them against the idea of free will and moral agency. It is a relatively easy read and uses many examples to illustrate the authors position.
did-not-finish
January 30, 2011I got about 50 pages into this book before deciding it just wasn't for me. Not sure what it is, maybe that I've given the question a lot of thought over the years and that it didn't look like it was going to cover any new ground. I don't mind - I enjoy, actually - reading something I disagree with, but I do mind devoting my precious reading time to something that is "old".
November 2, 2014
Works well as a concise and readable guide to some important arguments in this area, and I found it pretty interesting throughout. Sternberg's own arguments are frustratingly lackluster, though - the closing stages of the book consist largely of underdeveloped and barely supported claims about what he believes consciousness to be.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews