John Gray has become one of our liveliest and most influential political philosophers. This current volume is a sequel to his Essays in Political Philosophy. The earlier book ended on a sceptical note, both in respect of what a post-liberal political philosophy might look like, and with respect to the claims of political philosophy itself. John Gray's new book gives post-liberal theory a more definite content. It does so by considering particular thinkers in the history of political thought, by criticizing the conventional wisdom, liberal and socialist, of the Western academic class, and most directly by specifying what remains of value in liberalism. The upshot of this line of thought is that we need not regret the failure of foundationalist liberalism, since we have all we need in the historic inheritance of the institutions of civil society. It is to the practice of liberty that these institutions encompass, rather than to empty liberal theory, that we should repair.
John Nicholas Gray is a English political philosopher with interests in analytic philosophy and the history of ideas. He retired in 2008 as School Professor of European Thought at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Gray contributes regularly to The Guardian, The Times Literary Supplement and the New Statesman, where he is the lead book reviewer.
Mission 2026: Binge reviewing all previous Reads, I was too slothful to review back when I read them.
Reading John Gray’s 'Post-liberalism: Studies in Political Thought' felt like encountering a thinker who has already walked away from an argument most of the world is still trying to win. Gray does not announce the death of liberalism with fanfare.
He conducts its autopsy with calm, almost weary precision. The book is not a manifesto for an alternative ideology so much as a sustained dismantling of liberalism’s self-image as the final form of political rationality.
Gray’s central claim is unsettling in its simplicity: liberalism is not the universal, neutral framework it presents itself as, but a historically contingent political tradition with its own metaphysical assumptions, moral commitments, and internal contradictions. To treat it as the natural endpoint of political evolution is not enlightenment; it is dogma.
'Post-liberalism' asks what political thought looks like once we abandon the belief that liberalism can reconcile plural values, universal rights, and stable social order indefinitely.
The essays in the book range widely, engaging with thinkers from Hobbes and Locke to Berlin, Hayek, and Rawls. What unifies them is Gray’s skepticism toward the liberal promise of harmony. Liberal theory, he argues, rests on the hope that individual freedom, market coordination, and political pluralism can be aligned through rational institutions. But this hope collapses under the weight of real moral conflict.
Gray is particularly sharp in his critique of value pluralism as absorbed into liberal thought. Drawing on Isaiah Berlin, he accepts that human values are incommensurable and often irreconcilable. Where he parts ways with liberal pluralists is in their optimism. Liberalism, he argues, smuggles back a monistic belief that conflicts can be managed without tragic loss, that rights frameworks can adjudicate deep moral disagreement without residue. For Gray, this is fantasy.
One of the book’s most compelling threads is its treatment of liberalism’s relationship with markets. Gray challenges the assumption that free markets naturally support liberal values. Instead, he shows how market societies generate inequalities, instabilities, and cultural disruptions that liberal institutions struggle to contain. The result is not freedom harmonized, but freedom destabilized — social fragmentation masked as choice.
Gray’s critique of Rawls is especially pointed. He respects Rawls’s ambition but questions the plausibility of overlapping consensus in societies marked by deep ethical disagreement. The idea that citizens with radically different worldviews will converge on shared principles of justice, Gray suggests, underestimates the persistence of moral conflict. Political stability, in his view, often depends less on consensus than on uneasy compromise, coercion, or tradition.
What makes 'Post-liberalism' bracing rather than merely contrarian is Gray’s refusal to offer comforting alternatives. He does not replace liberalism with a new universal doctrine. Instead, he gestures toward a politics of modus vivendi — temporary, contingent arrangements that allow incompatible ways of life to coexist without pretending to reconcile them. This is a politics of resignation rather than redemption.
Reading this, amid cultural polarization and democratic fatigue, Gray’s arguments felt less provocative than prophetic. The liberal faith in progress, consensus, and rights-based adjudication seems increasingly strained. Conflicts over identity, religion, nation, and morality resist procedural resolution. Gray’s insistence that some losses are unavoidable feels like a necessary corrective to managerial optimism.
Yet the book is not without its frustrations. Gray’s skepticism can shade into bleakness. By dismantling liberal aspirations without fully articulating viable replacements, he risks leaving readers in a conceptual vacuum. Modus vivendi politics may describe how societies muddle through, but it offers little guidance for reform or resistance. For those committed to liberal ideals, the book can feel like an invitation to surrender.
Still, that discomfort is part of its value. Gray forces readers to confront the possibility that some political hopes are incoherent. The belief that freedom, equality, and pluralism can be maximized simultaneously may be not just unrealistic, but internally contradictory. Accepting this does not require cynicism, but it does require humility.
Stylistically, the book is lean and unsentimental. Gray writes with clarity and occasional sharpness, but rarely with flourish. His tone is analytic, sometimes austere, reflecting his distrust of grand narratives. He does not seek to persuade through passion, but through accumulation of doubt.
In the context of my last reading, 'Post-liberalism' functioned as a kind of intellectual solvent. It dissolved assumptions shared by works on international order, nationalism, and justice. Where others sought better rules or stronger institutions, Gray questioned the coherence of the project itself. That does not make him right, but it makes him indispensable.
What lingers after reading is not agreement, but unease. Gray does not tell you what to believe. He tells you what you can no longer believe without qualification. Liberalism, in his account, survives not because it resolves conflict, but because no alternative has yet proven more tolerable. That is a thinner justification than its champions usually admit.
'Post-liberalism' is not a book for those seeking reassurance. It is for readers willing to accept that politics is tragic, that values collide, and that no theory can redeem the messiness of human coexistence. In stripping liberalism of its metaphysical comfort, Gray does not offer liberation. He offers sobriety.
And perhaps that is the most post-liberal gesture of all.
There is plenty here of interest, but the truth remains that this is really just a collection of essays cobbled together and put between two covers in order to give them a second life in the market. This is not a book about 'post-liberalism', in other words, but rather a semi-random selection of John Gray's more scholarly, academic musings roughly from the period 1987-1993. Some of them are worth reading. Many - particularly those in which Gray was tempted to make unwise predictions about the future - really aren't.