A HISTORICAL SURVEY OF HOW SAUDI ARABIA CAME TO SUPPORT RADICALISM
Author Stephen Schwartz wrote in the Preface to this 2002 book, “Westerners until now have known almost nothing about the deep conflict that presently rages over the soul of Islam, a struggle to determine its future which is, at the same time, a controversy over its past… When President Bush and other Western leaders assured their publics that terrorism is at odds with true Islam, and were echoed by the Islamic establishments in any Muslim and non-Muslim countries, they were both right and wrong. The strain of Islam that encouraged bin Laden and his followers represents neither a majority of Muslims nor traditional Islamic values. But nor is it a matter of a simple hijacking of the faith.
“The extremist face of Islam, which justifies violence and stirs hatred, reflects rich and powerful interests. That face is possessed by the ideology known as Wahhabism, a ‘death cult’ that is the official religious dispensation of the Saudi kingdom and which the Saudis… have spent decades… exporting to the rest of the world… Yet no history of the Wahhabi cult has been written for a general audience; it is high time to correct this omission… With this book I have tried to present a fresh view of Islam… but equally rejecting the simplistic, ‘crusader’ polemics widely seen in Western intellectual life today. Mainstream Islam restored to its past power, traditional and pluralistic, will generate new, fruitful contributions to humanity… It is imperative that we find reliable Muslim allies in this war… and understand their cultural differences as well as their similarities.” (Pg. xiii-xiv)
He states, “Islamic history reflects this permanent contradiction between consensus and fundamentalism… Consensus maintained that belief, however imperfectly an individual might adhere to it, must not be questioned… belief alone is sufficient for salvation, while fundamentalists declared that faith must be judged in terms of outward conduct. Keepers of the Consensus recognized that human beings are unpredictable in their deeds and may better be judged by their intentions. The fundamentalists became puritan fanatics, treating all who strayed from their norms as unbelievers worthy of extinction.” (Pg. 43)
He observes, “The Ottoman Empire has fatal weaknesses. Yet the deadliest challenge to its rules would come not from the artillery of Christian princes but from a fundamentalist movement among the Arabs. The apocalyptic, militaristic, and totalitarian cult called Wahhabism would shed the blood of many fellow Muslims before eventually hurling a murderous challenge to the Judeo-Christian world.” (Pg. 65)
He outlines, “The essence of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching came down to three points. First, ritual is superior to intentions. Second, no reverence of the dead is permitted. Third, there can be no intercessory prayer, addressed to God by means of the Prophet of saints… Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s followers ascribed a human form to God… An anthropomorphic view of God had hitherto been considered scandalously heretical in Islam.” (Pg. 69) Later, he adds, “Unfortunately, most Western writers on Islam have taken Wahhabi claims to represent reform against the alleged decadence of traditional Islam at face value. Because the Wahhabis rejected ostentatious spirituality, Western observers have seen the movement as analogous with the Christian Reformation.” (Pg. 76)
He recounts, “The Saudi society of the 1930s had been subordinated to Wahhabi religious command, but the country’s population did not submit uniformly, notwithstanding the reports of Western apologists who reproduced Wahhabi claims that they held the enthusiastic and loving allegiance of an overwhelming majority.” (Pg. 109) But later, he adds, “Yet the fact remains that the Wahhabi core of the Saudi state had survived unchanged since its creation. The kingdom cleaved to fundamentalist doctrine under which women were generally confined to the home, and when in public had to cover themselves completely, in excess of the recommendations of traditional Islamic jurisprudence… At the same time, Wahhabi-Saudi dependence on Western technology and finance, and ultimately, on the sword of the unbelievers---the military forces of Christian America---for their security, inevitably sowed profound instability in Saudi Arabia.” (Pg. 124)
He records, “Equally alarmed by the Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia soon found a weapon against it in the person of Iraqi dictator, Saddam Husayn… In 1980, the Saudis backed Saddam in a war of aggression against Iran that would last nine years… Even when the war turned into a disastrous bloodletting for Iraq, the Saudi kingdom moderated its rhetoric but continued supporting Saddam against the Iranians.” (Pg. 149)
He says of the Bosnian war, “News of Muslim women and girls raped in Bosnia stabbed to the heart of every Muslim in the world. The repetition of these reports in global media generated feelings of fear, helplessness, and outrage. The complicity of Christian Europe in the nightmare aggravated these feelings… To Muslims, Bosnia had the impact of a holocaust, in the heart of a Europe that had claimed no such genocide would ever happen again within its borders… [Europe’s] own contribution to this anger---represented by European passivity n the face of the Bosnian horror---is rarely, if ever, acknowledged.” (Pg. 172)
He asserts, “The ideological division of humanity into ‘two worlds’ has been promulgated on different bases: Wahabism applied a religious distinction, Communism, and class standard, and Nazism a racial criterion. But in all cases, fanatics… sought to split their own societies between the virtuous, entitled to hold power and property, and the virtueless, condemned to disappear… Finally, all three of the totalitarian collective illnesses, Wahhabism, Communism, and fascism, represented the stunted, underdeveloped, and deformed modernism of backward societies attempting, by a forced march, to catch up and surpass the more advanced and prosperous cultures.” (Pg. 177)
He points out, “In the wake of the atrocities of September 11, American and other Western commentators asked a perplexing question. The aim of three previous wars fought by the United States and its allies had been to rescue Muslim or Muslim-majority peoples from aggression. The Gulf War saved Kuwait from Iraqi invasion, the 1995 intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina halted Serbian attacks on Muslims, and the NATO campaign against Serbia four years later prevented the expulsion from Kosovo of two million Kosovar Albanians, of whom at least 80 percent were Muslims. Western intervention also saved the Iraqi Kurd. Why then should so many Arab Muslims hate America? Had they forgotten these acts?” (Pg. 195-196)
He explains, “by the end of the 20th century there was to all outward appearances a flourishing and diverse American Muslim community. Indeed, before September 11, Islam was often described as the fastest growing faith in America. However, the great weakness of American Islam was its lack of tradition---the continuity of scholars that, elsewhere in the ummah, has stabilized the community and, with varying results, has guarded it from excesses and extremism. In addition, its public religious institutions were underdeveloped, if only because the community had been so small and scattered… A ’Muslim establishment’ did not exist in America until the mid-1980s when Hamas, the Wahhabi organization fighting Israel, decided to open a political front on U.S. territory: a ‘Wahhabi lobby.’ … Above all, their Wahhabism was visible in their central, obsessive promotion of a rejectionist stance against Israel and their unwavering apologetics for suicide terrorism.” (Pg. 227-229)
He notes, “Although CAIR asserted that its objective was to prevent ‘stereotyping and inaccuracy’ in the depiction of Muslims, its real aim was not to protect American Muslims from harmful prejudice but to prevent Islamic moderates … from conducting an open religious dialogue with American Christians and Jews. The reason is simple: Such a dialogue would reveal to the American public the important truth that the great majority of the world’s more than one billion Muslims do not support Wahhabism.” (Pg. 236)
He points out, “According to [Shaykh Hisham] Kabbani and other dissenters, 80 percent of American mosques are run by Wahhabi imams directly subsidized by Saudi Arabia. This, however, does not imply that ordinary Muslims are enthusiasts of Wahhabism. Khalid Duran is doubtless correct in arguing that no more than 20 percent of American Muslim congregations support Wahhabism.” (Pg. 240)
He summarizes, “The question is not whether Saudi Arabia is a friend or a foe, but whether the Saudi regime can survive, and whether we should conspire with the Wahhabi-Saudi establishment to continue propping it up… Western policymakers must ponder the question: Whither Saudi Arabia?” (Pg. 273) He continues, “Difficult as it may be for our leaders to say so in public, it is clear that Wahhabism-Saudism is part of the ‘axis of evil’---and possibly the most dangerous part. (Pg. 281)
He concludes, “After September 11, the people of the United States, and of the West in general, were deluged with images of the evil face of Islam---the face of Wahhabism… But the other face of Islam waited patiently, seemingly hidden, but no less present, the face of pluralism and coexistence, of Sufis preaching love and healing, of scholars seeking new routes for the Islamic imagination, and of millions upon millions of ordinary Muslims around the world looking confidently toward a world of prosperity and stability… For Westerners to miss such an opportunity would be worse than folly; it would be suicide. In defeating terror, let us therefore clasp the hands of traditional Muslims, and recognize in them our cousins, our sisters, our brothers.” (Pg. 286-287)
This book will be of great interest to those studying Saudi Arabia, and contemporary Islam.