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Lemay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis Lemay
The firebombing of Tokyo.Strategic Air Command. John F. Kennedy. Dr. Strangelove. George Wallace. All of these have one man in common - General Curtis Lemay, who remains as enigmatic and controversial as he was in life. Until now. Warren Kozak traces the trajectory of America's most infamous general, from his firebombing of Tokyo, guardianship of the U.S. Nuclear arsenal in the Cold War, frustrated career in government and short lived political run. Curtis Lemay's life spanned an epoch in American military history, from the small U.S. army air corps of the interwar years to the nuclear age.
14 pages, Audio CD
First published January 1, 2009
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June 10, 2010
With much confidence I say that your American parents or grandparents used to practice 'duck-n-cover' drills at middle school in the 1950s? Girls in bobby socks and skirts, and boys with parted hair--both ducking under their individual wooden desks, pushing the chair away, and covering the base of their skulls with their hands. Innocent. Fearing. Waiting for the nuclear blast that would light up the classroom with 2 trillion watts and burn construction paper off the walls. Followed by the pressure wave that would bend the building over and vaporize the mortar patina into puffs of smoke violently windward. They were practicing the checklist to protect themselves from a nuclear exchange that would crater suburban America. Hopefully our nukes were on the way to the Red Bear, to incinerate their little children, packed together in their classrooms in neat little rows under their wooden desks. Who would launch the bombers that carried the nuclear tips? General Curtis LeMay.
America will never produce another General like Curtis LeMay. Why? Well, it's not for lack of fortitude, courage, intelligence, or skill; it's not for lack of combat opportunities, battlefield promotion, or fear of nuclear annihilation; it's not a lack of new fielded weapon systems to master, State-on-State hostilities to negotiate, or Dept of Defense bureaucracy to maneuver. No. The United States will never produce another taciturn, defiant, terrifying LeMay because our democracy at this particular point in history will not allow military leaders to be so powerful.
LeMay was the commander of SAC. Strategic Air Command. He was in growling, grumbling control of the world's largest-ever nuclear weapon air force. And he was very, very young.
LeMay was one of the last from that warrior class who experienced kinetic warfare on a global scale against uniformed, fielded armies. A class that wore uniforms to every meal; that launched B-17s in the hundreds, echelon after echelon; that smoked cigars indoors; that ignited 16 sq miles of downtown Tokyo for the largest, single, man-made civilian carnage in any war, ever; that said things like 'goddammit Mr. President' or 'these are my men Senator;' that led men into aerial combat by flying the first bomber to go feet-dry over Europe. This class of warriors is restrained now. Muted. Cowed into politically correct, media friendly, exercise-shapely, white-toothed, academic types.
From the 1930s to the 1960s--LeMay's era--the active duty military comprised 3 million from a population of 200 million--1.5%. Now there's just over a million serving a country of 300 million--0.3%. Numbers matter. You're less likely to have family members in the military; there's no draft; there's less battlefield deaths. The arsenal is drastically reduced. There are treaties, and kilotonnage limits, and worldwide pressure to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, thank God. But not when LeMay reigned. The debate for the use of nuclear weapons (in the wake of the suicide-obsessed Japanese, the Holocaust Germans, and the Krazy Kommies) was in its infancy. And so your parents and grandparents continued to hide under their desks and low against hallway walls and stock their fallout shelters and paint their radiation hazard placards. What the hell must that have felt like? Signing yearbooks and hiding from fallout.
We can't have another LeMay because we should never chose global kinetic war again. We should just get mired in insurgencies and nation building--oh wait...! Our weapons are now even more powerful and frightening: cyber payloads, electromagnetic pulse, lasers, biochemical delivery. LeMay's most famous quote (misattributed) was, "we'll bomb them back into the Stone Age." Now we can do worse. We can flip a switch and stop their power. We can send an email and ensnare their internet. We can laze a microwave repeater and drop their grid. Within seconds, there's no refrigeration, no water pressure, no HVAC, no communication, no transistors. With our just-in-time food and product delivery, we've forgotten how to live and survive in Stone Age conditions. Our parents and grandparents had a much better shot at survival than we do, what with our double-choc, half-decaf, soy, iced frappe-latte and our Mac.
We'll never know the power of this poem:
This book is not the authoritative biography of LeMay--the one which he co-authored. That would be Mission with LeMay: My Story at 531 pages. Instead, this is a streamlined little biography about his itinerant youth, his time as a cadet in the Army Air Corps Tactical School, his many duties training men to fly pre-WWII, his stint at the mighty, mighty 8th Air Force launching bomber Group after bomber Group over Germany, his relocation to the China-India-Burma theater, his reassignment to Tinian in command of the B-29s that roasted Japan, then to SAC, then to the Pentagon, and finally to the worst decision in his life--to run as George Wallace's VP in 1968.
I recommend this book to Air Force nuts and people who dreamed of flying the "Super Fortress" and "Stratofortress."
America will never produce another General like Curtis LeMay. Why? Well, it's not for lack of fortitude, courage, intelligence, or skill; it's not for lack of combat opportunities, battlefield promotion, or fear of nuclear annihilation; it's not a lack of new fielded weapon systems to master, State-on-State hostilities to negotiate, or Dept of Defense bureaucracy to maneuver. No. The United States will never produce another taciturn, defiant, terrifying LeMay because our democracy at this particular point in history will not allow military leaders to be so powerful.
LeMay was the commander of SAC. Strategic Air Command. He was in growling, grumbling control of the world's largest-ever nuclear weapon air force. And he was very, very young.
LeMay was one of the last from that warrior class who experienced kinetic warfare on a global scale against uniformed, fielded armies. A class that wore uniforms to every meal; that launched B-17s in the hundreds, echelon after echelon; that smoked cigars indoors; that ignited 16 sq miles of downtown Tokyo for the largest, single, man-made civilian carnage in any war, ever; that said things like 'goddammit Mr. President' or 'these are my men Senator;' that led men into aerial combat by flying the first bomber to go feet-dry over Europe. This class of warriors is restrained now. Muted. Cowed into politically correct, media friendly, exercise-shapely, white-toothed, academic types.
From the 1930s to the 1960s--LeMay's era--the active duty military comprised 3 million from a population of 200 million--1.5%. Now there's just over a million serving a country of 300 million--0.3%. Numbers matter. You're less likely to have family members in the military; there's no draft; there's less battlefield deaths. The arsenal is drastically reduced. There are treaties, and kilotonnage limits, and worldwide pressure to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, thank God. But not when LeMay reigned. The debate for the use of nuclear weapons (in the wake of the suicide-obsessed Japanese, the Holocaust Germans, and the Krazy Kommies) was in its infancy. And so your parents and grandparents continued to hide under their desks and low against hallway walls and stock their fallout shelters and paint their radiation hazard placards. What the hell must that have felt like? Signing yearbooks and hiding from fallout.
We can't have another LeMay because we should never chose global kinetic war again. We should just get mired in insurgencies and nation building--oh wait...! Our weapons are now even more powerful and frightening: cyber payloads, electromagnetic pulse, lasers, biochemical delivery. LeMay's most famous quote (misattributed) was, "we'll bomb them back into the Stone Age." Now we can do worse. We can flip a switch and stop their power. We can send an email and ensnare their internet. We can laze a microwave repeater and drop their grid. Within seconds, there's no refrigeration, no water pressure, no HVAC, no communication, no transistors. With our just-in-time food and product delivery, we've forgotten how to live and survive in Stone Age conditions. Our parents and grandparents had a much better shot at survival than we do, what with our double-choc, half-decaf, soy, iced frappe-latte and our Mac.
We'll never know the power of this poem:
From my mother's sleep I fell into the State,
And I hunched in its belly till my wet fur froze.
Six miles from earth, loosed from its dream of life,
I woke to black flak and the nightmare fighters.
When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose.
~~Randall Jarrell
This book is not the authoritative biography of LeMay--the one which he co-authored. That would be Mission with LeMay: My Story at 531 pages. Instead, this is a streamlined little biography about his itinerant youth, his time as a cadet in the Army Air Corps Tactical School, his many duties training men to fly pre-WWII, his stint at the mighty, mighty 8th Air Force launching bomber Group after bomber Group over Germany, his relocation to the China-India-Burma theater, his reassignment to Tinian in command of the B-29s that roasted Japan, then to SAC, then to the Pentagon, and finally to the worst decision in his life--to run as George Wallace's VP in 1968.
I recommend this book to Air Force nuts and people who dreamed of flying the "Super Fortress" and "Stratofortress."
December 31, 2019
Curtis LeMay and George McGovern are two sides of the same coin—neither are remembered for their heroism in war—and are scoffed at or vilified for their later political endeavors. McGovern hated war because he had waged it. LeMay’s opinion of war was “if you decide to go to war, then wage it without restraint”. He waged war without restraint. This book is somewhat disappointing because it mainly covers LeMay in a positive light and does not cover any negative aspects in any great detail. LeMay’s foray into politics as George Wallace’s running mate remains inexplicable. If a reader is interested in the criticism of LeMay, there are plenty of other books, articles and kooky films to fill that urge. I wanted a fair recounting of LeMay’s career and took away points for the author’s hagiographic style. However, there is plenty of great material to work with as LeMay was in the right place at the right time.
Training? We don’t need no stinking training…!
Humorous story about the terrible weather the Americans encounter upon arrival in the UK:
LeMay was a hard boss but he cared for his men:
LeMay did not give a lot of credence to battle fatigue but he would make allowances if you were otherwise competent:
LeMay is tasked to come up with an effective bombing campaign against Japan. The book goes in detail on how he came to the new tactics. He faced a lot of push back on his low-level plan:
LeMay was most troubled by the potential for a massive loss of his own crewmen, not Japanese civilians. In his memoirs, LeMay makes more than one reference to a letter that continually weighed on him.
Dear General:
This is the anniversary of my son Nicky being killed over Hamburg/Berlin/Tokyo. You killed him General. I just wanted to remind you of it. I’m going to send you a letter each year on the same date, the anniversary of his death, to remind you.
The book gives this account of the first of the fire raids. Deadly beautiful:
“They came in majesty,” wrote Father Bitter, giving the B-29s almost human, even divine power, “like kings of the earth. The flak from the ground poured up toward them, but they held their course, proud and regal and haughty, as if they said ‘I am too great for any man to do me harm.’ I watched them as if I were in a trance.”
Training? We don’t need no stinking training…!
Humorous story about the terrible weather the Americans encounter upon arrival in the UK:
LeMay was a hard boss but he cared for his men:
LeMay did not give a lot of credence to battle fatigue but he would make allowances if you were otherwise competent:
LeMay is tasked to come up with an effective bombing campaign against Japan. The book goes in detail on how he came to the new tactics. He faced a lot of push back on his low-level plan:
LeMay was most troubled by the potential for a massive loss of his own crewmen, not Japanese civilians. In his memoirs, LeMay makes more than one reference to a letter that continually weighed on him.
Dear General:
This is the anniversary of my son Nicky being killed over Hamburg/Berlin/Tokyo. You killed him General. I just wanted to remind you of it. I’m going to send you a letter each year on the same date, the anniversary of his death, to remind you.
The book gives this account of the first of the fire raids. Deadly beautiful:
“They came in majesty,” wrote Father Bitter, giving the B-29s almost human, even divine power, “like kings of the earth. The flak from the ground poured up toward them, but they held their course, proud and regal and haughty, as if they said ‘I am too great for any man to do me harm.’ I watched them as if I were in a trance.”
August 10, 2016
Lemay's Quiet Genius and Stoic Work Ethic Revealed in this Enjoyable Book
I recently bought this excellent book and was delighted with it. As other reviewers have rightly noted, it reveals wonderful insights into Lemay's personality and work ethic, which in turn helped him to become an outstanding leader, problem solver, and innovator.
All Americans, and indeed much of the free world, are better off today because of his contributions to the war effort in World War II, and later in the reformation and building of Strategic Air Command (SAC) -- creating a credible threat to any would-be aggressor. Indeed, those of us who are old enough to remember how our lives were affected by the real possibility of nuclear attack from the 1950s through the 1980s owe a debt of gratitude to Lemay's genius. He kept us safe by making certain that our enemies knew that attacking the United States with nuclear weapons would be both futile and suicidal -- and thus they never did.
This is a wonderful book and I highly recommend it -- to "hawks" and "doves" alike. It's a great read. Indeed, I read it twice!
I recently bought this excellent book and was delighted with it. As other reviewers have rightly noted, it reveals wonderful insights into Lemay's personality and work ethic, which in turn helped him to become an outstanding leader, problem solver, and innovator.
All Americans, and indeed much of the free world, are better off today because of his contributions to the war effort in World War II, and later in the reformation and building of Strategic Air Command (SAC) -- creating a credible threat to any would-be aggressor. Indeed, those of us who are old enough to remember how our lives were affected by the real possibility of nuclear attack from the 1950s through the 1980s owe a debt of gratitude to Lemay's genius. He kept us safe by making certain that our enemies knew that attacking the United States with nuclear weapons would be both futile and suicidal -- and thus they never did.
This is a wonderful book and I highly recommend it -- to "hawks" and "doves" alike. It's a great read. Indeed, I read it twice!
December 22, 2021
Author Warren Kozak pens a highly readable account of the life of General Curtis LeMay, probably one of the most controversial modern military leaders for the United States. Undoubtedly he was the hero of WWII, creating winning strategies such as the firebombing of Tokyo, Japan, that enabled the US to emerge as the victor of this horrendous war. He was the founder of the modern USAF and Strategic Air Command. During a time of war, he was lauded as a hero. In times of peace, he was viewed as short, abrupt, and vilified as a war monger. Kozak takes extraordinary pains to portray LeMay as a man who was the product of his upbringing and his times, and one that believed that if a country went to war, then it should be prepared to do whatever it takes to end the war quickly.
As a student of history who was born in a time of peace, I have often thought of LeMay as the warmongering villain, as this was his current portrayal by media at the time. Kozak's biography does a good job in swinging the pendulum back for Kozak, and paints him in a light that makes the general necessary for his times. Recommended for history buffs.
As a student of history who was born in a time of peace, I have often thought of LeMay as the warmongering villain, as this was his current portrayal by media at the time. Kozak's biography does a good job in swinging the pendulum back for Kozak, and paints him in a light that makes the general necessary for his times. Recommended for history buffs.
May 14, 2018
This could have been great, and clearly LeMay is a character worthy of objective assessment after all these years.
However, while this book certainly provides a needed adjustment to the perception of LeMay as a Dr. Strangelove character - and offers a fascinating portrait of how a difficult childhood helped shape the commander and personality he became - overall, "LeMay" just doesn't get there. It's bad enough that there are far too many factual errors (e.g., Ploesti is in Romania, not Poland, and was hit by B-24s, not B-17s); worse, the book is riddled with misinterpretations and unsupported grandiose statements, and totally fails to pull the thread on critical things stemming from from the decent narrative. While the misstatements aren't worth belaboring - one doozy claiming that the USAAF bomber campaign over Germany was designed, from the outset, to destroy the Luftwaffe - the analytical shortcomings are worth mentioning in more detail, because they show what an opportunity Kozak missed.
Kozak's central thesis is that LeMay was a first-rate leader, and that due to a difficult childhood that put all the responsibility for his family onto his shoulders at a terrifyingly young age (by 8, he was the main breadwinner. . . ), he was ideally suited temperamentally and mentally to combat and the particular stresses of the air wars against Germany and Japan. Fair enough - this is the heart of the narrative, and it's pretty well-argued and interesting.
However, Kozak also argues that his unparalleled leadership skills made SAC so effective and efficient, and that LeMay was also a sharp strategic mind - he throws in the McNamara quote about "the greatest strategic mind this country has ever produced." And here, things fall apart. LeMay did indeed turn SAC around and create its culture of efficiency and professionalism - a culture that led to a poisonous "zero-defects" mentality, a lack of realistic combat training, and horrific results and bad losses during Vietnam. By 1972, TAC commanders and staffs that had learned and developed significantly over years of war in Vietnam were stunned to silence by the tactical incompetence of the SAC guys planning Linebacker II flights from Guam. While LeMay was retired, the B-52 force he built and shaped proved itself utterly unprepared for combat. And while one can argue that Vietnam was "not the war SAC planned for," crappy route planning and ignorance of the capabilities of (and countermeasures against) modern Soviet-made air defense systems do not seem like things at which the command responsible for planning nuclear war against the Soviet Union should have been so poor. Much like with the Navy's Hyman Rickover, LeMay's perfectionism - however effective he may have been - created a poisonous legacy once he himself was gone. While Kozak discussed Vietnam, it is only in the context of LeMay's feelings about that war and his "bomb them into the Stone Age comment," rather than any discussion at all about how the command that LeMay had so completely imprinted with his own personality and virtues performed in its most significant combat episode.
Similarly, the "great strategic mind" stuff is left wildly unsupported as well. Arguing that the US should not commit troops to action at all unless it is prepared to use all weapons (up to and including nuclear weapons) to win and win decisively is not necessarily strategic incisiveness. Moreover, except for the USAAF Eighth Air Force / RAF Bomber Command arguments about daylight "precision" vs. night area bombing, Kozak doesn't touch on the strategy of the bombing campaign virtually at all. LeMay started as a group commander, but he was senior enough during most of the campaign that ignoring the strategic angle is totally nonsensical. How did LeMay think about the back-and-forth on strategy from 1942-44? Given the USAAF's failure to hit critical targets repeatedly (Regensburg/Schweinfurt, Ploesti, etc.), how did LeMay think about the actual mechanism by which his bombers would defeat Germany? There's so little discussion of this that one is left with the impression that LeMay was a brilliant combat leader and tactical innovator (box formation, etc.), but that he completely ignored the strategic angle. Indeed, even all of the innovations in the Pacific were largely tactical - "how are we going to hit the target?" It all completely fails to square with the assertion (and head-scratching McNamara quote) that LeMay was a brilliant strategist.
And all of this completely ignores the book's other major flaw - just how readily Kozak disposes the whole Wallace episode as an "unfortunate judgment." Kozak goes to great lengths to portray LeMay as a man who cared only about performance that he didn't care about politics, religion, or his airmen's personal beliefs, yet was so perturbed by the "moral decay" in the 1960s that he joined segregationist George Wallace's presidential campaign. Kozak argues LeMay was utterly dedicated to the Constitutional principles of civilian control of the military, yet, whether it is the B-70 bomber episode (where LeMay's attempted end-arounds of McNamara and the Kennedy Administration provided the first example of a depressingly commonplace tactic today) or LeMay's justifying his tie-up with George Wallace on the basis of his dislike of LBJ and concern that Hubert Humphrey would be more of the same, the facts suggest a more nuanced view is necessary.
Maybe the mistake is mine for picking up a history meant to be narrative and not analytical. The narrative is fine. The analysis - where it exists - is lacking.
However, while this book certainly provides a needed adjustment to the perception of LeMay as a Dr. Strangelove character - and offers a fascinating portrait of how a difficult childhood helped shape the commander and personality he became - overall, "LeMay" just doesn't get there. It's bad enough that there are far too many factual errors (e.g., Ploesti is in Romania, not Poland, and was hit by B-24s, not B-17s); worse, the book is riddled with misinterpretations and unsupported grandiose statements, and totally fails to pull the thread on critical things stemming from from the decent narrative. While the misstatements aren't worth belaboring - one doozy claiming that the USAAF bomber campaign over Germany was designed, from the outset, to destroy the Luftwaffe - the analytical shortcomings are worth mentioning in more detail, because they show what an opportunity Kozak missed.
Kozak's central thesis is that LeMay was a first-rate leader, and that due to a difficult childhood that put all the responsibility for his family onto his shoulders at a terrifyingly young age (by 8, he was the main breadwinner. . . ), he was ideally suited temperamentally and mentally to combat and the particular stresses of the air wars against Germany and Japan. Fair enough - this is the heart of the narrative, and it's pretty well-argued and interesting.
However, Kozak also argues that his unparalleled leadership skills made SAC so effective and efficient, and that LeMay was also a sharp strategic mind - he throws in the McNamara quote about "the greatest strategic mind this country has ever produced." And here, things fall apart. LeMay did indeed turn SAC around and create its culture of efficiency and professionalism - a culture that led to a poisonous "zero-defects" mentality, a lack of realistic combat training, and horrific results and bad losses during Vietnam. By 1972, TAC commanders and staffs that had learned and developed significantly over years of war in Vietnam were stunned to silence by the tactical incompetence of the SAC guys planning Linebacker II flights from Guam. While LeMay was retired, the B-52 force he built and shaped proved itself utterly unprepared for combat. And while one can argue that Vietnam was "not the war SAC planned for," crappy route planning and ignorance of the capabilities of (and countermeasures against) modern Soviet-made air defense systems do not seem like things at which the command responsible for planning nuclear war against the Soviet Union should have been so poor. Much like with the Navy's Hyman Rickover, LeMay's perfectionism - however effective he may have been - created a poisonous legacy once he himself was gone. While Kozak discussed Vietnam, it is only in the context of LeMay's feelings about that war and his "bomb them into the Stone Age comment," rather than any discussion at all about how the command that LeMay had so completely imprinted with his own personality and virtues performed in its most significant combat episode.
Similarly, the "great strategic mind" stuff is left wildly unsupported as well. Arguing that the US should not commit troops to action at all unless it is prepared to use all weapons (up to and including nuclear weapons) to win and win decisively is not necessarily strategic incisiveness. Moreover, except for the USAAF Eighth Air Force / RAF Bomber Command arguments about daylight "precision" vs. night area bombing, Kozak doesn't touch on the strategy of the bombing campaign virtually at all. LeMay started as a group commander, but he was senior enough during most of the campaign that ignoring the strategic angle is totally nonsensical. How did LeMay think about the back-and-forth on strategy from 1942-44? Given the USAAF's failure to hit critical targets repeatedly (Regensburg/Schweinfurt, Ploesti, etc.), how did LeMay think about the actual mechanism by which his bombers would defeat Germany? There's so little discussion of this that one is left with the impression that LeMay was a brilliant combat leader and tactical innovator (box formation, etc.), but that he completely ignored the strategic angle. Indeed, even all of the innovations in the Pacific were largely tactical - "how are we going to hit the target?" It all completely fails to square with the assertion (and head-scratching McNamara quote) that LeMay was a brilliant strategist.
And all of this completely ignores the book's other major flaw - just how readily Kozak disposes the whole Wallace episode as an "unfortunate judgment." Kozak goes to great lengths to portray LeMay as a man who cared only about performance that he didn't care about politics, religion, or his airmen's personal beliefs, yet was so perturbed by the "moral decay" in the 1960s that he joined segregationist George Wallace's presidential campaign. Kozak argues LeMay was utterly dedicated to the Constitutional principles of civilian control of the military, yet, whether it is the B-70 bomber episode (where LeMay's attempted end-arounds of McNamara and the Kennedy Administration provided the first example of a depressingly commonplace tactic today) or LeMay's justifying his tie-up with George Wallace on the basis of his dislike of LBJ and concern that Hubert Humphrey would be more of the same, the facts suggest a more nuanced view is necessary.
Maybe the mistake is mine for picking up a history meant to be narrative and not analytical. The narrative is fine. The analysis - where it exists - is lacking.
December 7, 2024
The story of America's youngest general. Not an easy man to appreciate, LeMay was controversial and yet misunderstood. He was an outstanding combat leader of heavy bombers in Europe in World War II, personally leading, for instance, the Schweinfurt–Regensburg mission. He transferred to the Pacific to command the B-29 fleet that was not having much impact on the war with Japan. Always known as a doer rather than a thinker, LeMay changed the method of attack to nighttime area bombings of entire cities to get the job done and make strategic bombing part of the victory. During the Cold War, LeMay was famously in command of the Strategic Air Command, the US Air Forces mighty nuclear force, and while he did recommend bombing the North Vietnamese "back into the stone age," he was in good company. Curtis LeMay was a notorious martinet and believer in drills and long hours. A couple of days after taking command at SAC, he threw a surprise all-hands simulated attack on Cleveland. The results were chaotic: some planes never took off, entire squadrons were late or got lost, at one base they couldn't open the vault to the nuclear triggers, etc., etc. To this day, they say so many heads rolled at SAC HQ that the place looked like a bowling alley in a Polish neighborhood on a Friday night. His political naivete was displayed when he spoiled his reputation by running as George Wallace's VP in 1968, though he would later disavow Wallace's racial views. He never said very much, and when he spoke, it was always around his cigar. A well-written book about an interesting yet limited soldier.
December 2, 2021
More interesting than the 3 star rating would lead you to believe.
But also a fairly wide lens. There are huge sections upon his bombing fleets (B-17's, B-29's primarily) which are not at all purely focused on LeMay's life.
He lead them (his flyers, soldiers) and also probably killed more civilians than all the rest of the generals in American wars combined. His strategy to pocket bomb Japan being successful. And also preventing millions and millions of other human deaths that would have been the result of an invasion of Japan. (Similar to what was done in Europe starting on D-Day.)
Intrepid. Off the charts on nearly every scale. Brilliant. And one of the only men of this caliber that actually LEAD physically, not just ordered. But very complex and also making some after war horrendous decisions, IMHO.
I hear there is a better book from other reviews. I will read it. He was the perfect man at the correct time and place in which he was needed.
This book would be highly appreciated by those who are pilots or interested in the aircraft of that period and just after. All warfare was changed by the existence of aerial machines and the experts who truly understood their capacities.
But also a fairly wide lens. There are huge sections upon his bombing fleets (B-17's, B-29's primarily) which are not at all purely focused on LeMay's life.
He lead them (his flyers, soldiers) and also probably killed more civilians than all the rest of the generals in American wars combined. His strategy to pocket bomb Japan being successful. And also preventing millions and millions of other human deaths that would have been the result of an invasion of Japan. (Similar to what was done in Europe starting on D-Day.)
Intrepid. Off the charts on nearly every scale. Brilliant. And one of the only men of this caliber that actually LEAD physically, not just ordered. But very complex and also making some after war horrendous decisions, IMHO.
I hear there is a better book from other reviews. I will read it. He was the perfect man at the correct time and place in which he was needed.
This book would be highly appreciated by those who are pilots or interested in the aircraft of that period and just after. All warfare was changed by the existence of aerial machines and the experts who truly understood their capacities.
November 7, 2011
I really didn't know a lot about LeMay when I started this book. And by not a lot, I mean basically nothing. However, the flap copy intrigued me and I thought, why not? And I actually really enjoyed the book. It definitely offers another side of LeMay. As I quickly learned, most people think of him as this crude, cigar-chomping, trigger-happy general. But he had a softer side to him as well and he was extremely devoted to his family. And I love the fact that he always lead his men into battle. He was difficult to work with and not an easy person to know, and while his tactics were controversial, I think there was some real genius in them as well. I also thought the book was very well written. Overall, I'd recommend this book.
December 9, 2010
I was really interested to learn more about LeMay, someone both controversial but significant and possibly brilliant. This book does not do the subject justice.
Sometimes repetitive, occasionally inaccurate, stuffed with too many vague anecdotes, wandering too often from its subject, and feels like it can't find an critical word about LeMay. If you can't find anything bad to say about a controversial figure then you're intentionally trying not to. A poor, overly-apologist biography.
Sometimes repetitive, occasionally inaccurate, stuffed with too many vague anecdotes, wandering too often from its subject, and feels like it can't find an critical word about LeMay. If you can't find anything bad to say about a controversial figure then you're intentionally trying not to. A poor, overly-apologist biography.
August 15, 2018
Most of the WWII generation and some from the Baby Boomer generation could say they remember who Curtis LeMay was and what he contributed to the history of the United States and the world. But even then many from that generation couldn’t tell you much about his distinguished 37 year military career and what it meant to the peace, freedom and prosperity for the following generations of American’s and the rest of the world.
Rather than list his long resume of distinguish accomplishments in the military I urge you to Google his Bio or read this book because it gives a very detailed accounting of his entire career. LeMay must go down in American and World history as one of the greatest military strategists and commanders in the history of warfare. Sadly for most of the Liberals, Pacifists and Apologists who lived through the 60’s and 70’s he’s defined by 2 some say 3 controversial events. I certainly don’t agree with that assessment but for some it forever damned his reputation after his retirement in 1965. By retirement he had attained the rank of a 4 Star General and was a member of the Joint Chief’s serving as Chief of Staff for the Air Force under John F. Kennedy and then Lyndon Johnson.
In this essay/review I’ll only deal with the one controversial event that I believe is the most relevant because it deals the rules of engagement in war which ultimately lead to his forced retirement in 1965. The other 2 controversies you’ll have to read about in the book or discover for yourself because I believe they shouldn’t be what sums up his life in total which was in my mind was extraordinary one.
In brief those 2 events were the incendiary and atomic bombing of Japan and admittedly his biggest mistake which was to accept George Wallace’s invitation to be his Vice Presidential running mate in 1968. The latter is obviously not defendable but the former is highly defendable and debatable. He had his reasons for running with Wallace but he was no racist, it had everything to do with the Vietnam War and his feud with Johnson and McNamara and nothing to do with wanting a life in politics. Once you do the research about his career you’ll discover this but this in no way excuses him in anyway supporting a bigot like Wallace.
As for the bombing of Japan; it ended the war quicker and saved countless lives on both sides. Prior to the atomic bombings the US had planned an invasion of the mainland of Japan that would have taken 500,000 to a million US soldiers to conduct. The loss of American and Japanese lives would have been catastrophic because the Japanese were not going to surrender without a murderous fight. It was the right thing to do then and it would be the right thing to do now, given similar circumstances. Many people that know of LeMay’s career and military tactics would strongly disagree on this point but I believe they must not have a clear understanding of the facts.
Once you’ve read the book and take the emotional side out of the argument it was the logical, reasonable and rational decision to make and it was the only course of action. Once thing is certain, LeMay’s overall military strategy was and still is the best one ever conceived to preserve peace, freedom and limit causalities in the time of war. Simply put, its peace through strength, and if dragged into a military conflict he firmly believed the US should use every resource available and end it as quickly as possible to save lives. In 1980 a man named Ronald Reagan echoed that same philosophy and it lead to the end of the Cold War in 1992.
LeMay was forced to retire as Joint Chief for the Air Force in 1965 because he didn’t agree with Robert McNamara’s military strategy of “flexible response” or “limited warfare” in Vietnam. LeMay from the start of the conflict believed a massive bombing campaign in Hanoi and on the ports in North Vietnam where they were being supplied would be the most effective way to end the war quickly and save America and Vietnamese lives in the process just as it had worked to end WWII.
JFK, Johnson and particularly McNamara didn’t see it that way and felt that the civilian casualties that would pile up with a massive bombing campaign would be to unpopular with Americans and the Russians and Chinese would join in if a broader air war was employed. Obviously civilian casualties would have been unavoidable but the overall loss of life would have been tremendously reduced.
From the time LaMay become a Joint Chief in 1961 under JFK until 1965 when he was forced out he strongly urged for a very aggressive bombing campaign up to and including the possibly of using nuclear weapons. The nuke was really the last option for him but he believed and rightfully so that instead bombing them with tons of explosives and incendiaries would end the war in a matter of months instead of years of a bloody ground campaign. He tried unsuccessfully again and again to convince the trio that bombing would end the war or bring them to the table for peace negations.
3 years after his retirement and still upset about the US’s war strategy he wrote his memoir entitled Mission by LeMay, in it he was quoted as saying this about the Vietnam War, “My solution to the problem would be to tell the North Vietnamese Communists frankly that they've got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression or we're going to bomb them into the Stone Age.”
Later, after the book was published, he denied saying this and claimed his Biographer embellished his words and came up with the quote himself. No matter the quote is one that was in his book so he had to own it for the rest of his life. His detractors always lead with this statement when describing him and not his brilliant military career. Whether he did say it or not it’s likely something LaMay would have said in a private conversation given his views on warfare and as future events unfolded he was absolutely right.
On Christmas Day in 1972 Nixon ordered the biggest bombardment conducted by the US Air Force since the end of World War II on North Vietnam. US B-52’s dropped at least 20,000 tons of explosives on Hanoi. Operation Linebacker II was Nixon's attempt to hasten the end of the Vietnam War, as the growing strength of the Viet Cong caused heavy casualties among US ground troops. On January 8, 1973 all parties were back in the negotiating room in Paris. The Paris Peace Accords were signed by the end of the month. The assault brought about a deal that was signed a month later and it led to the end of US involvement in the war.
LaMay was proven right, in the end he had a huge dose of vindication, when his bombing strategy was finally deployed to bring the war to end only it was 11 years too late and after many lives had been lost. It’s a tragedy that the US didn’t start a big bombing campaign in the early 60’s and countless lives would have been saved on both sides.
58,282 Americans died and another 153,303 Americans were wounded in action in Vietnam. 95,000-430,000 South Vietnamese civilians and 50,000-65,000 North Vietnamese civilians died in the war. And a staggering 1,100,000 North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong military personnel deaths were reported by North Vietnam.
LeMay was a military genius and his defense policy and military strategies keep America safe during his tenure of military service. It’s an absolute tragedy that Kennedy and Johnson didn’t listen to him about Vietnam. He wanted to win it and save American lives just as he did in WWII. In my opinion he’s a Hero and nothing can tarnish what has to be one of the greatest leaders this country has ever produced. God Bless you LeMay, I thank you for the freedom men like you passed onto my generation.
Rather than list his long resume of distinguish accomplishments in the military I urge you to Google his Bio or read this book because it gives a very detailed accounting of his entire career. LeMay must go down in American and World history as one of the greatest military strategists and commanders in the history of warfare. Sadly for most of the Liberals, Pacifists and Apologists who lived through the 60’s and 70’s he’s defined by 2 some say 3 controversial events. I certainly don’t agree with that assessment but for some it forever damned his reputation after his retirement in 1965. By retirement he had attained the rank of a 4 Star General and was a member of the Joint Chief’s serving as Chief of Staff for the Air Force under John F. Kennedy and then Lyndon Johnson.
In this essay/review I’ll only deal with the one controversial event that I believe is the most relevant because it deals the rules of engagement in war which ultimately lead to his forced retirement in 1965. The other 2 controversies you’ll have to read about in the book or discover for yourself because I believe they shouldn’t be what sums up his life in total which was in my mind was extraordinary one.
In brief those 2 events were the incendiary and atomic bombing of Japan and admittedly his biggest mistake which was to accept George Wallace’s invitation to be his Vice Presidential running mate in 1968. The latter is obviously not defendable but the former is highly defendable and debatable. He had his reasons for running with Wallace but he was no racist, it had everything to do with the Vietnam War and his feud with Johnson and McNamara and nothing to do with wanting a life in politics. Once you do the research about his career you’ll discover this but this in no way excuses him in anyway supporting a bigot like Wallace.
As for the bombing of Japan; it ended the war quicker and saved countless lives on both sides. Prior to the atomic bombings the US had planned an invasion of the mainland of Japan that would have taken 500,000 to a million US soldiers to conduct. The loss of American and Japanese lives would have been catastrophic because the Japanese were not going to surrender without a murderous fight. It was the right thing to do then and it would be the right thing to do now, given similar circumstances. Many people that know of LeMay’s career and military tactics would strongly disagree on this point but I believe they must not have a clear understanding of the facts.
Once you’ve read the book and take the emotional side out of the argument it was the logical, reasonable and rational decision to make and it was the only course of action. Once thing is certain, LeMay’s overall military strategy was and still is the best one ever conceived to preserve peace, freedom and limit causalities in the time of war. Simply put, its peace through strength, and if dragged into a military conflict he firmly believed the US should use every resource available and end it as quickly as possible to save lives. In 1980 a man named Ronald Reagan echoed that same philosophy and it lead to the end of the Cold War in 1992.
LeMay was forced to retire as Joint Chief for the Air Force in 1965 because he didn’t agree with Robert McNamara’s military strategy of “flexible response” or “limited warfare” in Vietnam. LeMay from the start of the conflict believed a massive bombing campaign in Hanoi and on the ports in North Vietnam where they were being supplied would be the most effective way to end the war quickly and save America and Vietnamese lives in the process just as it had worked to end WWII.
JFK, Johnson and particularly McNamara didn’t see it that way and felt that the civilian casualties that would pile up with a massive bombing campaign would be to unpopular with Americans and the Russians and Chinese would join in if a broader air war was employed. Obviously civilian casualties would have been unavoidable but the overall loss of life would have been tremendously reduced.
From the time LaMay become a Joint Chief in 1961 under JFK until 1965 when he was forced out he strongly urged for a very aggressive bombing campaign up to and including the possibly of using nuclear weapons. The nuke was really the last option for him but he believed and rightfully so that instead bombing them with tons of explosives and incendiaries would end the war in a matter of months instead of years of a bloody ground campaign. He tried unsuccessfully again and again to convince the trio that bombing would end the war or bring them to the table for peace negations.
3 years after his retirement and still upset about the US’s war strategy he wrote his memoir entitled Mission by LeMay, in it he was quoted as saying this about the Vietnam War, “My solution to the problem would be to tell the North Vietnamese Communists frankly that they've got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression or we're going to bomb them into the Stone Age.”
Later, after the book was published, he denied saying this and claimed his Biographer embellished his words and came up with the quote himself. No matter the quote is one that was in his book so he had to own it for the rest of his life. His detractors always lead with this statement when describing him and not his brilliant military career. Whether he did say it or not it’s likely something LaMay would have said in a private conversation given his views on warfare and as future events unfolded he was absolutely right.
On Christmas Day in 1972 Nixon ordered the biggest bombardment conducted by the US Air Force since the end of World War II on North Vietnam. US B-52’s dropped at least 20,000 tons of explosives on Hanoi. Operation Linebacker II was Nixon's attempt to hasten the end of the Vietnam War, as the growing strength of the Viet Cong caused heavy casualties among US ground troops. On January 8, 1973 all parties were back in the negotiating room in Paris. The Paris Peace Accords were signed by the end of the month. The assault brought about a deal that was signed a month later and it led to the end of US involvement in the war.
LaMay was proven right, in the end he had a huge dose of vindication, when his bombing strategy was finally deployed to bring the war to end only it was 11 years too late and after many lives had been lost. It’s a tragedy that the US didn’t start a big bombing campaign in the early 60’s and countless lives would have been saved on both sides.
58,282 Americans died and another 153,303 Americans were wounded in action in Vietnam. 95,000-430,000 South Vietnamese civilians and 50,000-65,000 North Vietnamese civilians died in the war. And a staggering 1,100,000 North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong military personnel deaths were reported by North Vietnam.
LeMay was a military genius and his defense policy and military strategies keep America safe during his tenure of military service. It’s an absolute tragedy that Kennedy and Johnson didn’t listen to him about Vietnam. He wanted to win it and save American lives just as he did in WWII. In my opinion he’s a Hero and nothing can tarnish what has to be one of the greatest leaders this country has ever produced. God Bless you LeMay, I thank you for the freedom men like you passed onto my generation.
June 29, 2015
This book is hands down one of the best biographies I have read. Warren Kozak has done a masterful job in creating this highly readable book on the life of Curtis Lemay.
I must say I have had this book for a while putting it on the back burners as I thought it might be a bit of heavy reading. After blowing away the cobwebs I was very quickly drawn into the life of one of the most misunderstood and maligned American Generals of the 20th Century.
I like many thought this man to be a megalomaniac hell bent on bombing the World back into the “stone ages”. What I found was a very intelligent man with great analytical minds who lead from the front and changed the face of aerial bombing for ever.
I have taken many a lesson away from this book and now have a completely different via of the man. This book is for anyone with an interest in the modern air force and is a very accessible book. In my humble opinion this book is history writing at its finest.
.
I must say I have had this book for a while putting it on the back burners as I thought it might be a bit of heavy reading. After blowing away the cobwebs I was very quickly drawn into the life of one of the most misunderstood and maligned American Generals of the 20th Century.
I like many thought this man to be a megalomaniac hell bent on bombing the World back into the “stone ages”. What I found was a very intelligent man with great analytical minds who lead from the front and changed the face of aerial bombing for ever.
I have taken many a lesson away from this book and now have a completely different via of the man. This book is for anyone with an interest in the modern air force and is a very accessible book. In my humble opinion this book is history writing at its finest.
.
April 18, 2024
Let's call it 3.75 -- very interesting, clearly written and engaging, but no great work of scholarship. But it doesn't pretend to be. Just a fair and even-handed portrait of a man difficult to judge -- and a man who perhaps hasn't gotten a fair shake from modern history, when warriors and Cold Warriors are out of fashion.
I read this book in a strange fashion, starting with Chapter Seven (page 165), the chapter about the introduction and development of the B-29. Started here because my father-in-law was a B-29 bombardier serving under LeMay and remained in the Strategic Air Command (SAC) all of his career. That's really all I intended to read and the reason I got the book, and the chapters of the bombing of Japan and the subsequent development of SAC were of special interest.
After reading to the end, I decided to go back and start at the beginning. The Prologue was excellent -- explains LeMay and his position in history -- and the whole rest of the story is a good read. The bottom line: LeMay overcame great obstacles his entire life through discipline, dedication, and hard work. Yes, he was brilliant, but he didn't trust to brilliance alone; he knew it wasn't enough. And he didn't care what anyone thought about him, as long as he did the job.
The world could stand a whole lot more Curtis LeMays.
4/17/24: Just finished another book on the end of WW II with Japan and returned to this for a refresher — started reading in the same place again, p. 165, the development of the B-29. Probably won't go back to read the first part of the book again.
Didn't read the whole book again this time, but did go to the back and read the acknowledgments, which I didn't remember from the first read. In it the author mentioned the many men he met who knew LeMay and praised him for qualities that don't seem to fit the stereotype (as in "Dr. Strangelove") of a bomb-happy crazy guy. My father-in-law, a B-29 bombardier who served under LeMay on Tinian and also for more than fifteen years in SAC after the war, had nothing but good things to say about LeMay. I'm sorry I couldn't discuss this book with my father-in-law.
I read this book in a strange fashion, starting with Chapter Seven (page 165), the chapter about the introduction and development of the B-29. Started here because my father-in-law was a B-29 bombardier serving under LeMay and remained in the Strategic Air Command (SAC) all of his career. That's really all I intended to read and the reason I got the book, and the chapters of the bombing of Japan and the subsequent development of SAC were of special interest.
After reading to the end, I decided to go back and start at the beginning. The Prologue was excellent -- explains LeMay and his position in history -- and the whole rest of the story is a good read. The bottom line: LeMay overcame great obstacles his entire life through discipline, dedication, and hard work. Yes, he was brilliant, but he didn't trust to brilliance alone; he knew it wasn't enough. And he didn't care what anyone thought about him, as long as he did the job.
The world could stand a whole lot more Curtis LeMays.
4/17/24: Just finished another book on the end of WW II with Japan and returned to this for a refresher — started reading in the same place again, p. 165, the development of the B-29. Probably won't go back to read the first part of the book again.
Didn't read the whole book again this time, but did go to the back and read the acknowledgments, which I didn't remember from the first read. In it the author mentioned the many men he met who knew LeMay and praised him for qualities that don't seem to fit the stereotype (as in "Dr. Strangelove") of a bomb-happy crazy guy. My father-in-law, a B-29 bombardier who served under LeMay on Tinian and also for more than fifteen years in SAC after the war, had nothing but good things to say about LeMay. I'm sorry I couldn't discuss this book with my father-in-law.
June 2, 2014
I was about 2 minutes into this book when it became clear that this was probably going to be more hagiography than biography. If you're interested in LeMay and are willing to read multiple books, I'd probably recommend including this one, but I didn't think that this book provided a critical enough eye to a guy who definitely merits serious scrutiny. I will admit that this book has driven me to review some of the conceived notions that I had about Curtis LeMay.
July 29, 2019
An interesting look into the mind and motivations of one of the Air Force’s principal architects. He not only developed the concept of strategic bombing, carried out the Tokyo firebombings, and built Strategic Air Command, but he is also the creative mind behind auto-hobby shops on Air Force bases and the reason the Air Force has dorm rooms rather than open bay barracks.
January 4, 2022
Certainly a biography with an agenda, but I think a bit of reputation resuscitation is exactly what is needed with a figure like LeMay. Not every general gets caricatured by Stanley Kubrick, but if they do it seems only fair that someone steps in to set the record straight.
April 15, 2023
Left a lot to be desired. Wave top coverage of a very complex life. I understand the necessity to be brief to cover so many things and such a wild life, but I also wish there was a three part series on him instead.
July 20, 2009
Curtis Lemay is one of the most celebrated men in the US military forces of WW2. However it was not without controversy that he is viewed from the perch of the 21st century. For under his command the fire-bombing and nuclear bombing of Japan occurred. What one finds is that this is an incredibly pragmatic, honest, unselfish hard worker who tirelessly strove to protect those airmen beneath him. He also possessed an indefatigable energy to solve any hardship or broken situation in his path.
Even a reader raised in a liberal family can come to appreciate the reasons for the choices and judgment that Lemay used. What I enjoyed about this book is the history, and the perspective one gains on how different a time it really was in the 1930's and 1940's. It is too easy today to brush aside Hitler as an atrocious historical figure, but as this genocidal dictator was conquering western Europe it can be understood how the people of world at that time came to see things in black and white. In this sense, it is not a stretch to follow why the cold war was initiated . Did Stalin have plans as grand as Hitlers?
Lemay continued his military career into the 1960's, creating the Strategic Air Command and ultimately becoming the Chief of the Air Force.
Unfortunately this book is written in bland, choppy sentences, and it appears that most of the quotes and facts were quickly researched and/or lifted from other biographers or films. Mr. Kozak is described as an accomplished journalist on the book jacket, but it felt like the presentation of this material was a quick jot down of the bits and pieces. And then when Mr. Kozak attempts to deduce conclusions or theoretical arguments it is less (much less) than impressive.
Even a reader raised in a liberal family can come to appreciate the reasons for the choices and judgment that Lemay used. What I enjoyed about this book is the history, and the perspective one gains on how different a time it really was in the 1930's and 1940's. It is too easy today to brush aside Hitler as an atrocious historical figure, but as this genocidal dictator was conquering western Europe it can be understood how the people of world at that time came to see things in black and white. In this sense, it is not a stretch to follow why the cold war was initiated . Did Stalin have plans as grand as Hitlers?
Lemay continued his military career into the 1960's, creating the Strategic Air Command and ultimately becoming the Chief of the Air Force.
Unfortunately this book is written in bland, choppy sentences, and it appears that most of the quotes and facts were quickly researched and/or lifted from other biographers or films. Mr. Kozak is described as an accomplished journalist on the book jacket, but it felt like the presentation of this material was a quick jot down of the bits and pieces. And then when Mr. Kozak attempts to deduce conclusions or theoretical arguments it is less (much less) than impressive.
March 26, 2013
Curtis Lemay was and is one of the most amazing and villified military men of the 20th Century. Both one of the most inspiring military leaders and also, one of the most frightening ones. He was also a product of a time much different from the world we live in now. This is a great book that takes time to examine not only Lemay the General, but Lemay the man. What gave him his outlook on everything and made him the man he was. Like most great men, he had his flaws and the author does not avoid talking about them, but you get a better understanding of what made Lemay "Tick". A very good look at one of the most influential players in American History.
April 1, 2024
An interesting, yet flawed, read on one of the most interesting personalities of the second world war and cold war era, a man much maligned, many would say for good reason.
In British terms, LeMay was an American equivalent of Arthur 'Bomber' Harris at RAF Bomber Command, but with a career that went on long after the end of the war, playing a part in geopolitics well into the 1960s.
LeMay made his name in World War Two. He was a genius organiser who played a huge part in creating the US's wartime bomber force, from literally almost nothing, to a massive killing machine.
The British Royal Navy may have been the world's most sophisticated, awe-inspiring instrument of war in years prior to World War Two, but throughout the cold war, it was without a doubt the USAF, and LeMay contributed hugely to that.
He had a genius for finding simple answers to complicated questions. The Americans struggled to bomb Japan. Two main problems - the weather was always cloudy and Japanese industry was largely dispersed to micro-production locations amongst the civilian population, and difficult to destroy. No equivalent to nice big targets like factories in the Ruhr.
LeMay's solution was two-fold. Japanese flak defences were of poor quality, so his bombers would fly in low, under the cloud. He also realised that Japanese cities, being largely built of wood and paper, would burn. If you couldn't destroy all those people carrying out war production from their spare rooms, you could just burn down the entire city around them. So he did.
In the firebombing of Tokyo, LeMay's bombers killed more people in one night than either of the two atomic bomb attacks did. He then went on to methodically burn down city after city, recorded with blunt frankness as percentages (20% of Kyoto, 40% of Yokohama and so on). This was the world's first use of napalm, a weapon made famous by a later war, but one which LeMay first used in anger.
Difficult questions, simple answers.
His World War Two story alone is worthy of a book, but he went on to play an even bigger part in geopolitics during the peace.
Incredibly, in the immediate years after the war, the US allowed their air force to rapidly shrink again, complacent in peace. Following the Berlin air lift, realisation set in that this was a very dangerous path to follow, and LeMay changed things. He built Strategic Air Command up from almost nothing through the 1950s, gaining a reputation for being the most hawkish of the hawks, for being a proponent of pre-emptive attack if needed.
These days the thing most remembered of him is the table-thumping, 'bombs away' LeMay, the belligerent cold war warrior who openly expressed his belief nuclear weapons should be used with no more hesitation than any other piece of the machinery of death. Why be squeamish when we had shown no qualms about burning to death 100,000 people with incendiary bombs, was his argument.
Many will know that LeMay was portrayed in Stanley Kubrick's 'Dr Strangelove' - what most won't be aware of is that Kubrick actually used two characters to portray him (General Jack D. Ripper, and General Buck Turgidson), perhaps a reflection on what an enormous character he was.
The reason the book, though very readable indeed, is flawed is not, as some have suggested, that it's a hagiography, that's a little bit further than I'd go. I did, however, feel that the author had clearly set out to rejuvenate LeMay's reputation and at times made little attempt to hide it.
What the author does well is reveal the true military genius of the man. Not only a genius, he was extremely brave - when his crews expressed disbelief at being asked to fly straight and level over their target for the first time, LeMay responded by telling them he'd be flying in the lead bomber, which he did.
Where I struggled with the book is the lack of any real, consistent moral criticism, or even questioning, of much of what LeMay did.
A clear example of this is how the author covers LeMay's disastrous (and near inexplicable) decision to be the running mate of the vile segregationist, racist George Wallace in the 1968 presidential election. It is no surprise that someone like him would be on the right wing politically, not at all, but really, how is this acceptable?
Kozak does his best to explain this away - he'd never shown any sign of being pro segregation or racist with the men under his command in WW2 or when he ran Strategic Air Command in the post war years, he openly said he didn't believe in segregation etc etc.
All of which would be more credible were we talking about someone making ill-advised racist remarks, but we are not, this was not a split second error of judgement, a revealing quip - he ran for Vice President alongside America's best known racist. That's difficult to talk away, but I still thought the author had a decent shot at trying.
Anyway, a very readable book, about a very interesting character, but I'll seek out another more critical study if one exists.
In British terms, LeMay was an American equivalent of Arthur 'Bomber' Harris at RAF Bomber Command, but with a career that went on long after the end of the war, playing a part in geopolitics well into the 1960s.
LeMay made his name in World War Two. He was a genius organiser who played a huge part in creating the US's wartime bomber force, from literally almost nothing, to a massive killing machine.
The British Royal Navy may have been the world's most sophisticated, awe-inspiring instrument of war in years prior to World War Two, but throughout the cold war, it was without a doubt the USAF, and LeMay contributed hugely to that.
He had a genius for finding simple answers to complicated questions. The Americans struggled to bomb Japan. Two main problems - the weather was always cloudy and Japanese industry was largely dispersed to micro-production locations amongst the civilian population, and difficult to destroy. No equivalent to nice big targets like factories in the Ruhr.
LeMay's solution was two-fold. Japanese flak defences were of poor quality, so his bombers would fly in low, under the cloud. He also realised that Japanese cities, being largely built of wood and paper, would burn. If you couldn't destroy all those people carrying out war production from their spare rooms, you could just burn down the entire city around them. So he did.
In the firebombing of Tokyo, LeMay's bombers killed more people in one night than either of the two atomic bomb attacks did. He then went on to methodically burn down city after city, recorded with blunt frankness as percentages (20% of Kyoto, 40% of Yokohama and so on). This was the world's first use of napalm, a weapon made famous by a later war, but one which LeMay first used in anger.
Difficult questions, simple answers.
His World War Two story alone is worthy of a book, but he went on to play an even bigger part in geopolitics during the peace.
Incredibly, in the immediate years after the war, the US allowed their air force to rapidly shrink again, complacent in peace. Following the Berlin air lift, realisation set in that this was a very dangerous path to follow, and LeMay changed things. He built Strategic Air Command up from almost nothing through the 1950s, gaining a reputation for being the most hawkish of the hawks, for being a proponent of pre-emptive attack if needed.
These days the thing most remembered of him is the table-thumping, 'bombs away' LeMay, the belligerent cold war warrior who openly expressed his belief nuclear weapons should be used with no more hesitation than any other piece of the machinery of death. Why be squeamish when we had shown no qualms about burning to death 100,000 people with incendiary bombs, was his argument.
Many will know that LeMay was portrayed in Stanley Kubrick's 'Dr Strangelove' - what most won't be aware of is that Kubrick actually used two characters to portray him (General Jack D. Ripper, and General Buck Turgidson), perhaps a reflection on what an enormous character he was.
The reason the book, though very readable indeed, is flawed is not, as some have suggested, that it's a hagiography, that's a little bit further than I'd go. I did, however, feel that the author had clearly set out to rejuvenate LeMay's reputation and at times made little attempt to hide it.
What the author does well is reveal the true military genius of the man. Not only a genius, he was extremely brave - when his crews expressed disbelief at being asked to fly straight and level over their target for the first time, LeMay responded by telling them he'd be flying in the lead bomber, which he did.
Where I struggled with the book is the lack of any real, consistent moral criticism, or even questioning, of much of what LeMay did.
A clear example of this is how the author covers LeMay's disastrous (and near inexplicable) decision to be the running mate of the vile segregationist, racist George Wallace in the 1968 presidential election. It is no surprise that someone like him would be on the right wing politically, not at all, but really, how is this acceptable?
Kozak does his best to explain this away - he'd never shown any sign of being pro segregation or racist with the men under his command in WW2 or when he ran Strategic Air Command in the post war years, he openly said he didn't believe in segregation etc etc.
All of which would be more credible were we talking about someone making ill-advised racist remarks, but we are not, this was not a split second error of judgement, a revealing quip - he ran for Vice President alongside America's best known racist. That's difficult to talk away, but I still thought the author had a decent shot at trying.
Anyway, a very readable book, about a very interesting character, but I'll seek out another more critical study if one exists.
July 23, 2022
I was a little surprised, but not that surprised, that when I was trying to think of who I admired, this guy came up. Curtis LeMay? Wasn't he the guy that was in charge of bombing Europe and then systematically firebombed Japan? Then headed the Strategic Air Command to aggressively prepare for the nuclear bombing of Russia?
I was not expecting the book to take my view of him that there was something to be admired about him. One, it seems like he rose up the ranks so quickly because the training and preparation he put the men under him reduced causalities, and he was very innovate in bombing tactics which improved accuracy & reduced allied casualties as they were adopted.
Part of what I appreciated in him was:
- someone to look up to as someone who was a great leader, but very bad at public speaking and in general, quite shy.
- took great care for his men and shouldered a lot of responsibility for their losses and reducing them --- whatever the cost
In this case the cost, the externality of him trying to save the men under his command was a brutal decimation of the enemy. This is hard for me to stomach, and during the course of reading this book, had my opinions shift on war. It stopped seeming exciting or positive in any way, mostly just seems like a thing to be avoided.
The book skimmed over his involvement in the Korean War and honestly did a such a slapdash covering of his tenure of the SAC that I was surprised at how I had probably learned more from scant coverings where LeMay was a secondary character in all the other Bomb books I read. It wasn't meant to be a tome of a book though.
As a person, and his personal character, I think I'm finishing the book just "pro-LeMay". However, he seems woefully ignorant of politics and other things. (Seriously??!? WALLACE?! WALLACE?! The author of the book pulled a fast one in his attempt to save LeMay's repuation, and did pretty well, but that's pretty hard to jump back from.) His general advice of "debate long & hard if you want to go to war, but if you do strike with overwhelming force" will take a place as a voice in the grand debate of my head, but there were other voices he wasn't paying attention to. Nuclear Weapons had far greater symbolic power than he ascribed to them and are not 'just another bomb'. While Hiroshima / Nagasaki had fewer causalities than Tokyo, I think that to many eyes, a nuclear bomb suggests something like decimation, holocaust, and salting the earth, where standard bombing runs can still have some plausible deniability that you're going after strategic targets. And the gap is even larger now that we actually have precision bombing. His ignorance of the devices he was using potentially had large consequences for the lack of security surrounding nukes as seen in The Doomsday Machine. There's a lot in The Doomsday Machine and Dark Sun that I would like to re-read, as this book left out a lot of the details there and I want to put the pieces back together.
I was not expecting the book to take my view of him that there was something to be admired about him. One, it seems like he rose up the ranks so quickly because the training and preparation he put the men under him reduced causalities, and he was very innovate in bombing tactics which improved accuracy & reduced allied casualties as they were adopted.
Part of what I appreciated in him was:
- someone to look up to as someone who was a great leader, but very bad at public speaking and in general, quite shy.
- took great care for his men and shouldered a lot of responsibility for their losses and reducing them --- whatever the cost
In this case the cost, the externality of him trying to save the men under his command was a brutal decimation of the enemy. This is hard for me to stomach, and during the course of reading this book, had my opinions shift on war. It stopped seeming exciting or positive in any way, mostly just seems like a thing to be avoided.
The book skimmed over his involvement in the Korean War and honestly did a such a slapdash covering of his tenure of the SAC that I was surprised at how I had probably learned more from scant coverings where LeMay was a secondary character in all the other Bomb books I read. It wasn't meant to be a tome of a book though.
As a person, and his personal character, I think I'm finishing the book just "pro-LeMay". However, he seems woefully ignorant of politics and other things. (Seriously??!? WALLACE?! WALLACE?! The author of the book pulled a fast one in his attempt to save LeMay's repuation, and did pretty well, but that's pretty hard to jump back from.) His general advice of "debate long & hard if you want to go to war, but if you do strike with overwhelming force" will take a place as a voice in the grand debate of my head, but there were other voices he wasn't paying attention to. Nuclear Weapons had far greater symbolic power than he ascribed to them and are not 'just another bomb'. While Hiroshima / Nagasaki had fewer causalities than Tokyo, I think that to many eyes, a nuclear bomb suggests something like decimation, holocaust, and salting the earth, where standard bombing runs can still have some plausible deniability that you're going after strategic targets. And the gap is even larger now that we actually have precision bombing. His ignorance of the devices he was using potentially had large consequences for the lack of security surrounding nukes as seen in The Doomsday Machine. There's a lot in The Doomsday Machine and Dark Sun that I would like to re-read, as this book left out a lot of the details there and I want to put the pieces back together.
February 4, 2024
Great book, I learned plenty about about General Curtis LeMay, who has been vilified because of his later moments. This book opened my eyes to the real LeMay, he was hardnosed, introverted and straight forward in his approach. He would listen to all points of views before making a decision but when that decision was made, he went full-bore ahead to finish the job. His tactics during the early part of WW2, helped save lives were other commands were taking worse losses in European Theatre of Operations. Then when he went to the Pacific, he utilized British General Arthur "Bomber" Harris strategy of area bombing which destroyed Japanese cities and industry (which was spread out in individual homes). At the end of the war when Japan listed the top Allied Operations that helped end the war, the Number 1 reason was the firebombing of Tokyo and other cities. The firebombing of Tokyo actually killed more people than the Atomic Bomb being dropped on Hiroshima. After WW2, he was instrumentally in creating the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and turning into the reason that we most likely stayed out of WW3. He was against the Bay of Pigs disaster without American Air Assistance. He was against Vietnam when they wouldn't bomb Haiphong Harbor. Even though he was proved right when Nixon authorized Operation Linebacker II, which brought the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table in Paris. Just as a point, he never said that to win the Vietnam War, we would have to "Bomb back to the Stone Age". His biggest mistake was agreeing to join George Wallace's 1968 run for the Presidency. My conclusions are that while LeMay was very to himself, he cared about his men and keeping casualties as low as possible.
November 25, 2022
Lemay's image is more of a caricature than a real picture of the man and it appears that the author set out to set the record somewhat straighter. Mission accomplished.
The book is pretty readable. Of course, the reader needs to have some interest in things like airplanes and war; this isn't a good book for someone who is unfamiliar with either.
I do have some quibbles. I think that the author could have dug a little deeper into Lemay's psyche. He acknowledges repeatedly that nearly everyone found Lemay's demeanor to be quite brusque and off-putting, and that Lemay could sometimes unclamp his firmly-clenched jaw just to stick his foot in his mouth (e.g., with Kennedy during the Cuba missile crisis, or when announcing his foolish candidacy for vice-president as the running mate to George Wallace). However, the analysis of Lemay's personality could have gone deeper, in my opinion.
There are a couple of errors of fact. For example, the RAF's "dambuster" raid is described as having damaged one dam. This is true, but it also destroyed two others, which was why the raid was such a big deal. And they really were destroyed. By chance, I spoke to a post-war veteran yesterday who described the Mohne dam, which he saw while posted in Europe, and he said that you could clearly see where the new concrete had been poured to fill the breach made by the raiders.
However, the overall book seems to be accurate and reasonably well-balanced, and pretty easy to read.
The book is pretty readable. Of course, the reader needs to have some interest in things like airplanes and war; this isn't a good book for someone who is unfamiliar with either.
I do have some quibbles. I think that the author could have dug a little deeper into Lemay's psyche. He acknowledges repeatedly that nearly everyone found Lemay's demeanor to be quite brusque and off-putting, and that Lemay could sometimes unclamp his firmly-clenched jaw just to stick his foot in his mouth (e.g., with Kennedy during the Cuba missile crisis, or when announcing his foolish candidacy for vice-president as the running mate to George Wallace). However, the analysis of Lemay's personality could have gone deeper, in my opinion.
There are a couple of errors of fact. For example, the RAF's "dambuster" raid is described as having damaged one dam. This is true, but it also destroyed two others, which was why the raid was such a big deal. And they really were destroyed. By chance, I spoke to a post-war veteran yesterday who described the Mohne dam, which he saw while posted in Europe, and he said that you could clearly see where the new concrete had been poured to fill the breach made by the raiders.
However, the overall book seems to be accurate and reasonably well-balanced, and pretty easy to read.
April 22, 2021
I finished Lemay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis Lemay (Hardcover) by Warren Kozak. Aside from a basic idea of his World War II military service, his leadership of SAC and his being present during the Cuban Missile Crisis I knew little about General Lemay.
Lemay was a doer, not a talker, not a politician and not meant for small talk, he was like Patton well suited for the military and warfare, not as much for a peacetime service, although he postwar years were spent in making the U.S. Air Force a premier member of the armed forces.
Too often remember for a poor political association with George Wallace and for being considered character who inspired Dr. Strangelove, Lemay was rather a professional in every positive way, He would be given a problem and solve it. He had no problems to the end of his life with the firebombing of Tokyo, or the dropping of the atomic bombs. He was of the mindset that war was to be fully fought and was not in favor of limited war.
A controversial figure like George Patton, he made many contribution to the military, the Army \Air Corps and the the Air Force but was poorly suited to peace. His importance however should not be dismissed.
Lemay was a doer, not a talker, not a politician and not meant for small talk, he was like Patton well suited for the military and warfare, not as much for a peacetime service, although he postwar years were spent in making the U.S. Air Force a premier member of the armed forces.
Too often remember for a poor political association with George Wallace and for being considered character who inspired Dr. Strangelove, Lemay was rather a professional in every positive way, He would be given a problem and solve it. He had no problems to the end of his life with the firebombing of Tokyo, or the dropping of the atomic bombs. He was of the mindset that war was to be fully fought and was not in favor of limited war.
A controversial figure like George Patton, he made many contribution to the military, the Army \Air Corps and the the Air Force but was poorly suited to peace. His importance however should not be dismissed.
September 23, 2017
I can’t help but feeling sorry for him. Emerging from World War II as one of the men most responsible for America’s victory, he became one of the most ridiculed figures in post-war era. It was all because he was believing in what he thought was the right thing to do. He was perceived as cold, rude, and politically tone-deaf, but in truth he did not like to socialize that much. His preference to talk as little as possible led him being lampooned as a caveman in a bomber plane, and his most memorable quote was when he said that he preferred to bomb Viet Nam back to the Stone Age. It saddened me that while he believed that men would be judged by his actions rather than his words, the American public did it the other way around, with movies like Dr. Strangelove parodied him as a paranoid, nuclear bomb maniac. His believe in total war also came vindicated in cases like Viet Nam War, or Iraq War, in which America was going into war yet refuse to commit itself caused the wars going nowhere. I believe in LeMay doctrine, and also abhorred the planners of Viet Nam War under Kennedy and Johnson.
October 29, 2024
A thorough, interesting, and easy-to-read bio about an important WWII general I knew nothing about, which isn't right because he was one of the most influential people in the US victory both in Europe and Japan. He was controversial and brutally effective in leading our burgeoning Air Force that became the finest group of flyers and war machines in the world. Unfortunately what was his unfairly tenuous reputation was then forever ruined by his foolishly deciding to become George Wallace's running mate for Vice President in 1968. Eisenhower is justifiably celebrated for leading the victorious Allied troops in Europe, but without LeMay it would have been an even harder (much) row to hoe as it was LeMay who was responsible for destroying Germany's ability to continue to wage war by destroying Hitler's means of war production. The civilian casualties were appalling and tragic both there and in Japan but LeMay's tactics did end the conflicts and therefore finally put an end to the killing on all sides.
August 17, 2020
Although I was in SAC from 1985-1990, I knew little of LeMay other than anecdotal stories. I came to appreciate SAC’s use of checklists, so that everyone could do their job perfectly. 100% was the minimum standard. I had forgotten LeMay’s run with Wallace, if I even knew about it at all. The only thing I remember about the 1968 election was that I shook Humphrey’s hand one day, because I happened to be standing in the way during a campaign stop. I remembered that, only because I was 12 years old and it seemed like it was supposed to be important. I learned a lot of things I didn’t know about WWII bombing campaigns in Germany and Japan. A very good read! A few reviewers seem to have disdain for Regnery Publishing, a publisher of Conservative books, therefore this book must be bad. I’ve never heard of Regnery Publishing, but now that I have, it looks like I’ll be buying more of their books. We need more Conservative voices.
November 6, 2021
Tour de force for a real straight shooter who rose without any advantages or preferment to enter the US Army pilot school in the late 1920's, and then went on to be at the centre of every major wartime and Cold war event.
The biographer brings a complicated personality to life who devoted himself to the service of the nation, and then fell out of favour after the Cold war ended. A country needs such hard men in times of crises but cannot bear to see themselves in his reflection when the long peace eventuates. Very sad.
From working to pay himself through university for a degree so that he could compete with the IVY leaguers for pilot school to youngest Colonel and General in the US Army Air Force to two terms as Chief of the Air Force ...this is an amazing life.
But he also flew missions with his fliers and shared their dangers all the time up to the early days of his generalship. An airman's airman indeed.
Must read
The biographer brings a complicated personality to life who devoted himself to the service of the nation, and then fell out of favour after the Cold war ended. A country needs such hard men in times of crises but cannot bear to see themselves in his reflection when the long peace eventuates. Very sad.
From working to pay himself through university for a degree so that he could compete with the IVY leaguers for pilot school to youngest Colonel and General in the US Army Air Force to two terms as Chief of the Air Force ...this is an amazing life.
But he also flew missions with his fliers and shared their dangers all the time up to the early days of his generalship. An airman's airman indeed.
Must read
February 14, 2025
I suppose for readers of my generation, LeMay is remembered as the war-happy, hard-edged running mate of George Wallace in the 1968 presidential election. But, as with most things in life, a person is much more than the image the media creates. Whether you like him or not, LeMay was just the commander America needed as it developed and deployed its airborne military might against two of the most powerful and brutal enemies our nation ever faced -- simultaneously on both sides of the globe. Questions of morality and humanity always swirl around a man like LeMay and those questions are more than justified. However, I can't help but think that most Americans of his day were thrilled to have a single-minded general thoroughly committed to defeating his country's enemies first while leaving the inevitable judgments about his character for another day.
July 27, 2020
A lot of information and world history in here
I started this book Thinking that Curtis LeMay was a bit of a villain. I did not especially want to like him, but I did want to learn about him. Well I learned a lot.
Curtis LeMay learned to fly on a Biplane and ended his career with intercontinental ballistic missiles. This book covers all the time in between with a focus on WWII.
I especially wanted to know: Why. Why did they do certain things a certain way and this book came through and answered my questions in a way that helped me understand the background, the historical context, and the technical difficulties.
I can recommend this book to people who want to know the thinking behind the many of the decisions that shaped the world we live in now.
I started this book Thinking that Curtis LeMay was a bit of a villain. I did not especially want to like him, but I did want to learn about him. Well I learned a lot.
Curtis LeMay learned to fly on a Biplane and ended his career with intercontinental ballistic missiles. This book covers all the time in between with a focus on WWII.
I especially wanted to know: Why. Why did they do certain things a certain way and this book came through and answered my questions in a way that helped me understand the background, the historical context, and the technical difficulties.
I can recommend this book to people who want to know the thinking behind the many of the decisions that shaped the world we live in now.
January 28, 2019
Good read for those who love reading history, warriors, autobiography-biography,and American histroy of WWII. Lemay is one of those Americn warriors who rise to the top in war time by meriotocracy in our political system to defeat our enemies and keep America free. However they don't quite fit in our system during peace time. Warren Kozak does a very good job with this book. It is a fair and non-judgemental story about one of United States' finest generals.
Lemay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis Lemay
Lemay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis Lemay
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