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The Return of History: Conflict, Migration, and Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century
In the 2016 CBC Massey Lectures, former Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General and international relations specialist Jennifer Welsh delivers a timely, intelligent, and fascinating analysis of twenty-first-century geopolitics.
In 1989, as the Berlin Wall crumbled and the Cold War dissipated, the American political commentator Francis Fukuyama wrote a famous essay, entitled “The End of History,” which argued that the demise of confrontation between Communism and capitalism, and the expansion of Western liberal democracy, signalled the endpoint of humanity’s sociocultural and political evolution, and the path toward a more peaceful world. But a quarter of a century after Fukuyama’s bold prediction, history has arbitrary executions, attempts to annihilate ethnic and religious minorities, the starvation of besieged populations, invasion and annexation of territory, and the mass movement of refugees and displaced persons. It has also witnessed cracks and cleavages within Western liberal democracies as a result of deepening economic inequality.
The Return of History argues that our own liberal democratic society was not inevitable, but that we must all, as individual citizens, take a more active role in its preservation and growth.
In 1989, as the Berlin Wall crumbled and the Cold War dissipated, the American political commentator Francis Fukuyama wrote a famous essay, entitled “The End of History,” which argued that the demise of confrontation between Communism and capitalism, and the expansion of Western liberal democracy, signalled the endpoint of humanity’s sociocultural and political evolution, and the path toward a more peaceful world. But a quarter of a century after Fukuyama’s bold prediction, history has arbitrary executions, attempts to annihilate ethnic and religious minorities, the starvation of besieged populations, invasion and annexation of territory, and the mass movement of refugees and displaced persons. It has also witnessed cracks and cleavages within Western liberal democracies as a result of deepening economic inequality.
The Return of History argues that our own liberal democratic society was not inevitable, but that we must all, as individual citizens, take a more active role in its preservation and growth.
304 pages, Kindle Edition
First published September 17, 2016
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November 26, 2016
A good introduction to what ails us.
The 2016 book version of CBC Radio's annual lecture series, the Massey Lectures, is a well written, competent analysis of issues currently faced by liberal democracies.
'The Return of History' by Jennifer Welsh is a very timely analysis of our modern world. In particular, she looks at the current state of the Western liberal democracies and waves a warning flag of distress. Welsh identifies and analyses a number factors which she sees as indicators of the current threat to our lifestyles within liberal democracies and, to some extent, makes recommendations for moving back from the brink. As is often the case in works such as this, the strength of the book lies in the analyses, not in the recommendations. I should note that this book is written for the general educated public. It is not academic and is not in-depth.
The theme, and the title, of the book is a reference to Francis Fukuyama's article "The End of History" published in 1989.
"At the heart of Fukuyama's thesis was the audaciously optimistic idea of progress in history. [...] Fukuyama's claim was that history (at least the history of struggle documented by many historians) would effectively end, or culminate, in the victory of liberal democracy as the guiding ideology for the modern nation-state."
And so, Welsh has taken on to discuss the obvious: that Fukuyama basically got it wrong. In doing so, she addressed four aspects of our current situation in the world and how they effect the stability of liberal democracies.
After laying out her thesis in the first chapter, she sets about exploring different "dimensions of history's return in the twenty-first century."
She begins her exposition with an examination of "how the strategies and tactics of both state and non-state armed actors flouting established principles of international humanitarian law and putting civilian lives at greater and greater risk. This is followed by an analysis of "the unprecedented nature of today's migration challenge and show how new walls are being erected within and beyond Europe."
In the next chapter she discusses "how Russian President Vladimir Putin's revival of geopolitics and his particular brand of 'sovereign democracy' are challenging the West in ways reminiscent of the Cold War standoff." Finally, she examines "history's return within Western liberal democracies themselves ... the dramatic increase in economic inequality and its attack on the value of fairness ..."
As an intelligent introduction to these issues, the book serves the reader well. There is not a great deal in the way of new information to be found here but Welsh provided the thoughtful reader with good basic facts and clear analysis. And these issues do need to be explored if we are to get our democratic foundations back (inasmuch as we had them).
Indeed, I believe that Welsh has barely scratched the surface on these issues and would suggest that anyone who appreciates this book should look behind most of the issues raised for deeper causes and, therefore, more drastic steps to be taken to overcome our current situation.
I won't go on a typical rant here on the evils of our neo-liberal, globalized world but I do suggest that this is a good introduction to some of the issues and what we are losing (have lost). If nothing else, this book should be seen as a call for readers to become better informed and to get involved. (And she did this before Trump was elected. He does make a couple of cameo appearances however.)
This would have been 4 stars if Welsh had not offered up weak, undeveloped ideas for change, particularly in the area of migration.
The 2016 book version of CBC Radio's annual lecture series, the Massey Lectures, is a well written, competent analysis of issues currently faced by liberal democracies.
'The Return of History' by Jennifer Welsh is a very timely analysis of our modern world. In particular, she looks at the current state of the Western liberal democracies and waves a warning flag of distress. Welsh identifies and analyses a number factors which she sees as indicators of the current threat to our lifestyles within liberal democracies and, to some extent, makes recommendations for moving back from the brink. As is often the case in works such as this, the strength of the book lies in the analyses, not in the recommendations. I should note that this book is written for the general educated public. It is not academic and is not in-depth.
The theme, and the title, of the book is a reference to Francis Fukuyama's article "The End of History" published in 1989.
"At the heart of Fukuyama's thesis was the audaciously optimistic idea of progress in history. [...] Fukuyama's claim was that history (at least the history of struggle documented by many historians) would effectively end, or culminate, in the victory of liberal democracy as the guiding ideology for the modern nation-state."
And so, Welsh has taken on to discuss the obvious: that Fukuyama basically got it wrong. In doing so, she addressed four aspects of our current situation in the world and how they effect the stability of liberal democracies.
After laying out her thesis in the first chapter, she sets about exploring different "dimensions of history's return in the twenty-first century."
She begins her exposition with an examination of "how the strategies and tactics of both state and non-state armed actors flouting established principles of international humanitarian law and putting civilian lives at greater and greater risk. This is followed by an analysis of "the unprecedented nature of today's migration challenge and show how new walls are being erected within and beyond Europe."
In the next chapter she discusses "how Russian President Vladimir Putin's revival of geopolitics and his particular brand of 'sovereign democracy' are challenging the West in ways reminiscent of the Cold War standoff." Finally, she examines "history's return within Western liberal democracies themselves ... the dramatic increase in economic inequality and its attack on the value of fairness ..."
As an intelligent introduction to these issues, the book serves the reader well. There is not a great deal in the way of new information to be found here but Welsh provided the thoughtful reader with good basic facts and clear analysis. And these issues do need to be explored if we are to get our democratic foundations back (inasmuch as we had them).
Indeed, I believe that Welsh has barely scratched the surface on these issues and would suggest that anyone who appreciates this book should look behind most of the issues raised for deeper causes and, therefore, more drastic steps to be taken to overcome our current situation.
I won't go on a typical rant here on the evils of our neo-liberal, globalized world but I do suggest that this is a good introduction to some of the issues and what we are losing (have lost). If nothing else, this book should be seen as a call for readers to become better informed and to get involved. (And she did this before Trump was elected. He does make a couple of cameo appearances however.)
This would have been 4 stars if Welsh had not offered up weak, undeveloped ideas for change, particularly in the area of migration.
November 9, 2016
Since 1961, the Massey Lectures – an annual fall talk on a philosophical, economic or cultural issue which is broadcast on Canada’s CBC Radio – have edified and entertained listeners, and for those who purchase the resultant book, readers too. In the 2016 lecture, professor of International Relations Jennifer Welsh responds to Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 essay and 1992 book “The End of History and the Last Man”. Unfortunately, her response is off target. Most of the book is just a recounting of recent history – in particular the world’s trouble spots – rather than a cogent argument against Fukuyama’s thesis.
Fukuyama’s central point was that the end of the Cold War “signaled the endpoint of humanity’s sociocultural and ideological evolution and the ‘universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government.’” As Welsh notes, the ideological victory “entailed three key elements: freely elected governments, the promotion of individual rights, and the creation of a capitalist economic system with relatively modest state oversight.” The argument was not that we would no longer face challenges within or between countries, but rather that we could now agree on a governing ideal and that over time this is what we would all work towards. Our societal evolution had found its final plateau.
With thirty years of additional history to draw upon, Welsh tries to rebut Fukuyama’s thesis. Since the Massey Lectures themselves are actually a five city series of talks, her book contains five chapters: an introduction to the topic; the return of barbarism; the return of mass refugee flight; the return of the Cold War; and the return of inequality. After the introductory setup, each chapter offers a different set of examples to show that Fukuyama was early with his call, or wrong, and that things are so much worse now for the three elements that are core to his ‘end of history’ claim; more specifically that democracy, individual rights and capitalism are under assault.
The CBC show that broadcasts the Massey Lectures is called “Ideas”, and the irony in this year’s lecture is that Welsh is long on narrative and examples but short on ideas. For anyone who has followed the news the past 25 years her early narrative contains nothing new and little insight. Her later chapters devoted to Putin and Russia, and to inequality, do contain some interesting insight, but neither enough to redeem this work nor of any use in rebutting Fukuyama’s original thesis.
Fukuyama wove history, economics and most of all philosophy (especially the German philosopher Friedrich Hegel, whom he references over 300 times) throughout his argument. Fukuyama’s logic flowed consistently through his narrative of our human development, and he used the fall of the Berlin Wall as history’s ending point – the irrefutable triumph of liberal democracy and the death knell of fascism and communism. By contrast, Welsh references Hegel just twice and never engages with Fukuyama’s philosophical underpinnings, preferring instead to recount recent history, as if providing enough examples was a philosophical rebuttal in itself.
Even Welsh’s three central themes are weak and obvious, and unworthy of the intellectual rigor to which a Massey Lecture should adhere. Welsh contends:
1. “that if history is returning, it is doing so with a modern twist”;
2. that “today’s global system contains pockets of those who wish actively to return to [the Cold War]”;
3. “that our own liberal democratic society was not inevitable … and that we must all, as individuals, take a more active role in its preservation and growth.”
Almost any geopolitical event occurring today will have a modern twist. There will always be challenges to liberal democracy, and we should not take them or our progress lightly. But this is hardly deep thought, and it in no way engages with Fukuyama’s far more thoughtful original work.
Fukuyama’s central point was that the end of the Cold War “signaled the endpoint of humanity’s sociocultural and ideological evolution and the ‘universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government.’” As Welsh notes, the ideological victory “entailed three key elements: freely elected governments, the promotion of individual rights, and the creation of a capitalist economic system with relatively modest state oversight.” The argument was not that we would no longer face challenges within or between countries, but rather that we could now agree on a governing ideal and that over time this is what we would all work towards. Our societal evolution had found its final plateau.
With thirty years of additional history to draw upon, Welsh tries to rebut Fukuyama’s thesis. Since the Massey Lectures themselves are actually a five city series of talks, her book contains five chapters: an introduction to the topic; the return of barbarism; the return of mass refugee flight; the return of the Cold War; and the return of inequality. After the introductory setup, each chapter offers a different set of examples to show that Fukuyama was early with his call, or wrong, and that things are so much worse now for the three elements that are core to his ‘end of history’ claim; more specifically that democracy, individual rights and capitalism are under assault.
The CBC show that broadcasts the Massey Lectures is called “Ideas”, and the irony in this year’s lecture is that Welsh is long on narrative and examples but short on ideas. For anyone who has followed the news the past 25 years her early narrative contains nothing new and little insight. Her later chapters devoted to Putin and Russia, and to inequality, do contain some interesting insight, but neither enough to redeem this work nor of any use in rebutting Fukuyama’s original thesis.
Fukuyama wove history, economics and most of all philosophy (especially the German philosopher Friedrich Hegel, whom he references over 300 times) throughout his argument. Fukuyama’s logic flowed consistently through his narrative of our human development, and he used the fall of the Berlin Wall as history’s ending point – the irrefutable triumph of liberal democracy and the death knell of fascism and communism. By contrast, Welsh references Hegel just twice and never engages with Fukuyama’s philosophical underpinnings, preferring instead to recount recent history, as if providing enough examples was a philosophical rebuttal in itself.
Even Welsh’s three central themes are weak and obvious, and unworthy of the intellectual rigor to which a Massey Lecture should adhere. Welsh contends:
1. “that if history is returning, it is doing so with a modern twist”;
2. that “today’s global system contains pockets of those who wish actively to return to [the Cold War]”;
3. “that our own liberal democratic society was not inevitable … and that we must all, as individuals, take a more active role in its preservation and growth.”
Almost any geopolitical event occurring today will have a modern twist. There will always be challenges to liberal democracy, and we should not take them or our progress lightly. But this is hardly deep thought, and it in no way engages with Fukuyama’s far more thoughtful original work.
January 27, 2020
If the moral arc of the universe is long, and bends towards justice, it is only because many hands that care grab it, and pull. Hard.
~~~~~
I don't know about you, GR friend, but I have a terrible habit of buying non-fiction books I don't get around to reading, mostly because it takes longer for me to read a non-fiction book than a novel or book of poetry, so while my *buying* habits are fairly equal, my *reading* habits see the non-fiction books stacking up beside the armchair while the novels get polished off lickety-split.
Accordingly, this year, I am making a point to get through 3 or 4 non-fiction books before cracking open a novel, and pulling the non-fiction from farther down the to-read stack so I can get to some of the ones that have been hopefully waiting for some friendly hands and eyes for lo these many years now. (The poor trees! They gave their lives to collect dust in my bedroom.)
So, this weekend, I pulled The Return of History from near the bottom of the stack, where it's been waiting since I bought it in 2016.
It was an interesting read, as much for the context of reading it now and comparing the last 4 years to where we were when this book was published, after Trump was declared the Republican presidential nominee and before he was elected.
It's true that Fukuyama's claim that we've reached the "end of history" and that western liberal democracies had won the ideological war for all time looks dingier and sounds tinnier by the year, and Welsh lays out plenty of evidence for why this was so even in 2016 (though people keep giving the man book contracts so he can keep trying to salvage his reputation-making argument, which is just bizarre). (I saw a reviewer below claim that this is because Fukuyama's claim was "original," which is also hilarious. Come on. Every ideology that was dominant in its own day thinks its dominance will continue forever! Rome believed in the Empire! The monarchs of Europe believed that monarchies would always rule! This isn't "original," it's myopia.)
Some of her arguments and information were familiar to me; some were not, and I appreciated learning about them; and some are, in retrospect, even more painful. For example, her description of Russia's ambitions and its dedication to cyber-warfare and associated meddling in the affairs of other countries, with what we know now about Trump's presidential campaign ... OUCH. Her championing of Bernie Sanders towards the end, also now knowing that the Russians essentially created the Bernie Bros ... double ouch. The shakiness of the foundations of modern liberal democracies, particularly given income inequality but also given the lack of participation from their citizens ... please pass me a tourniquet. Oh god, the hatred and anti-immigrant sentiment stirred by the smallest stirrings of climate refugees, and what that portends for the rest of our century, I do not want even to contemplate.
There are a few trends that should have been considered in here, and weren't. First among them for me is of course climate change. She refers to "environmental change" a few times in passing as a 21st century cause of mass flight, but that's a pretty shallow and affectless euphemism for the climate collapse we are already seeing unfold in real-time, only four years later. My guess is she paid enough attention to know this was A Thing, but not enough to know the scale and impact of it. In this, she was too gentle by far.
She takes a few well-aimed shots at the complacency of the citizens of modern liberal democracies. Some philosophers and thinkers predicted that the ultimate outcome of liberal democracies would be shallow, complacent people, obsessed by consumerism and allergic to communal work, and she suspects they may have been right. Trump/Brexit/climate collapse/yellow vests/etc. seem to have shaken that complacency enough to begin to build the movements we all need to avoid what's coming, but not enough, and there are still plenty of people who soothe themselves with bad TV and worse gadgets rather than directly engage with the problems we're facing. In my own life, I often see people mis-quoting MLK (in a thousand ways to suit the situation, but in this particular case): "The moral arc of the universe is long, but it bends towards justice." This is endlessly used to justify the laziness and complacency of mostly privileged citizens in liberal democracies, who cry about their powerlessness while being the most powerful citizens in the history of the world, and then comfort themselves with MLK's quote and the thought that it doesn't matter if they personally don't do anything because the "universe's" inherent "moral arc" will just "bend" the right way all on its own. It won't. It takes effort and sacrifice by regular, everyday people; this is a point she makes often, and I wish it had been taken more to heart by more people when she published it four years ago.
~~~~~
Next up for my non-fiction reads are Teardown: Rebuilding Democracy from the Ground Up (from the library) and Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life (from the to-read pile). As they're both coming at Welsh's point about the non-engagement of citizens in democracy from different places and with different analyses, the three of them should make for a nice package review.
~~~~~
I don't know about you, GR friend, but I have a terrible habit of buying non-fiction books I don't get around to reading, mostly because it takes longer for me to read a non-fiction book than a novel or book of poetry, so while my *buying* habits are fairly equal, my *reading* habits see the non-fiction books stacking up beside the armchair while the novels get polished off lickety-split.
Accordingly, this year, I am making a point to get through 3 or 4 non-fiction books before cracking open a novel, and pulling the non-fiction from farther down the to-read stack so I can get to some of the ones that have been hopefully waiting for some friendly hands and eyes for lo these many years now. (The poor trees! They gave their lives to collect dust in my bedroom.)
So, this weekend, I pulled The Return of History from near the bottom of the stack, where it's been waiting since I bought it in 2016.
It was an interesting read, as much for the context of reading it now and comparing the last 4 years to where we were when this book was published, after Trump was declared the Republican presidential nominee and before he was elected.
It's true that Fukuyama's claim that we've reached the "end of history" and that western liberal democracies had won the ideological war for all time looks dingier and sounds tinnier by the year, and Welsh lays out plenty of evidence for why this was so even in 2016 (though people keep giving the man book contracts so he can keep trying to salvage his reputation-making argument, which is just bizarre). (I saw a reviewer below claim that this is because Fukuyama's claim was "original," which is also hilarious. Come on. Every ideology that was dominant in its own day thinks its dominance will continue forever! Rome believed in the Empire! The monarchs of Europe believed that monarchies would always rule! This isn't "original," it's myopia.)
Some of her arguments and information were familiar to me; some were not, and I appreciated learning about them; and some are, in retrospect, even more painful. For example, her description of Russia's ambitions and its dedication to cyber-warfare and associated meddling in the affairs of other countries, with what we know now about Trump's presidential campaign ... OUCH. Her championing of Bernie Sanders towards the end, also now knowing that the Russians essentially created the Bernie Bros ... double ouch. The shakiness of the foundations of modern liberal democracies, particularly given income inequality but also given the lack of participation from their citizens ... please pass me a tourniquet. Oh god, the hatred and anti-immigrant sentiment stirred by the smallest stirrings of climate refugees, and what that portends for the rest of our century, I do not want even to contemplate.
There are a few trends that should have been considered in here, and weren't. First among them for me is of course climate change. She refers to "environmental change" a few times in passing as a 21st century cause of mass flight, but that's a pretty shallow and affectless euphemism for the climate collapse we are already seeing unfold in real-time, only four years later. My guess is she paid enough attention to know this was A Thing, but not enough to know the scale and impact of it. In this, she was too gentle by far.
She takes a few well-aimed shots at the complacency of the citizens of modern liberal democracies. Some philosophers and thinkers predicted that the ultimate outcome of liberal democracies would be shallow, complacent people, obsessed by consumerism and allergic to communal work, and she suspects they may have been right. Trump/Brexit/climate collapse/yellow vests/etc. seem to have shaken that complacency enough to begin to build the movements we all need to avoid what's coming, but not enough, and there are still plenty of people who soothe themselves with bad TV and worse gadgets rather than directly engage with the problems we're facing. In my own life, I often see people mis-quoting MLK (in a thousand ways to suit the situation, but in this particular case): "The moral arc of the universe is long, but it bends towards justice." This is endlessly used to justify the laziness and complacency of mostly privileged citizens in liberal democracies, who cry about their powerlessness while being the most powerful citizens in the history of the world, and then comfort themselves with MLK's quote and the thought that it doesn't matter if they personally don't do anything because the "universe's" inherent "moral arc" will just "bend" the right way all on its own. It won't. It takes effort and sacrifice by regular, everyday people; this is a point she makes often, and I wish it had been taken more to heart by more people when she published it four years ago.
~~~~~
Next up for my non-fiction reads are Teardown: Rebuilding Democracy from the Ground Up (from the library) and Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life (from the to-read pile). As they're both coming at Welsh's point about the non-engagement of citizens in democracy from different places and with different analyses, the three of them should make for a nice package review.
September 2, 2017
The premise of the book is flawed to begin with. Is a rebuttle of "The End of History" really necessary? Does Fukuyama exist as anything more than a joke for undergrads anyway? Have you been following current events for the past twenty five years? Great, you can probably skip this one. Most of the book is recap, and the conclusions Welsh reaches aren't worth the time it takes to get to them. The chapter on Russia is relatively insightful, owing to the author's background in international relations. For the rest of the book I found myself (to quote another review) "on my knees begging for some critical analysis."
July 15, 2017
This Massey Lecture was overall quite interesting, though at times I found myself on my knees begging for some critical analysis. For example: "Instead, the contemporary era is marked more by a clash of values — between the West’s championing of open elections, freedom of expression and movement, and the rule of law, and Russia’s hybrid version of democracy, with an oligarchic governance structure and limits on individual freedoms, in exchange for economic growth. The Russian model, with its emphasis on national identity and religion, also looks very conservative in its orientation, in contrast to the radicalism that underpinned Marxism-Leninism" (p.215). What does that even mean?
The last chapter, however, redeemed the book in my opinion. Some good critical analysis based on the premise: "The West must again defend itself, not primarily through military prowess, but by re-cultivating its liberal democratic ideal" (p.248) - or, more generally, cultivating a society of fairness.
Welsh argues: "Deepening economic inequality is a moral issue — it erodes individuals' capacity to see one another as worthy of respect and weakens social cohesion. Economists have demonstrated its pernicious effects on economic growth. Sociologists and medical researchers have outlined its devastating effects on health outcomes and life expectancy. And political scientists have illustrated how it undercuts the value of fairness, which is a critical foundation of liberal democracy" (p.292).
I'm not inclined to believe that the 'liberal democratic ideal' is the best mechanism for this today, but at least the author acknowledged that we are moving in the wrong direction.
The last chapter, however, redeemed the book in my opinion. Some good critical analysis based on the premise: "The West must again defend itself, not primarily through military prowess, but by re-cultivating its liberal democratic ideal" (p.248) - or, more generally, cultivating a society of fairness.
Welsh argues: "Deepening economic inequality is a moral issue — it erodes individuals' capacity to see one another as worthy of respect and weakens social cohesion. Economists have demonstrated its pernicious effects on economic growth. Sociologists and medical researchers have outlined its devastating effects on health outcomes and life expectancy. And political scientists have illustrated how it undercuts the value of fairness, which is a critical foundation of liberal democracy" (p.292).
I'm not inclined to believe that the 'liberal democratic ideal' is the best mechanism for this today, but at least the author acknowledged that we are moving in the wrong direction.
August 4, 2018
I wouldn’t call this book bad, it is certainly full of interesting anecdotes and good arguments. However, reading it as a work of philosophy and evaluating it as such, much of the book is just superfluous. The actual critical engagement with Fukuyama’s ideas could likely be condensed down considerably aside from the historical stories she presents.
November 18, 2018
Other than the Russian chapter which was a let down, the book gives a decent account of the current political environment making the connection to historical events. Not listing Libya as one of the countries in the middle east that had a revolution, if done on purpose is genius. I learned a lot reading this book :)
December 29, 2016
So we're heading back to an older world with great power politics, inequality, and human suffering.
But I wonder if Jennifer Welsh would have done better to take the much longer view (à la Piketty) and position this change as being waaaaay back to the future? Instead we hovered around the beginning of the twentieth century a bit too much.
That would have set her up to talk about the last half-century as historical exception and really go for our return into history.
But I wonder if Jennifer Welsh would have done better to take the much longer view (à la Piketty) and position this change as being waaaaay back to the future? Instead we hovered around the beginning of the twentieth century a bit too much.
That would have set her up to talk about the last half-century as historical exception and really go for our return into history.
January 20, 2019
This title of this book is a reference to the 1989 essay by Francis Fukuyama "The End of History?" which was written during the collapse of the USSR and explored whether the collapse meant that liberal democracies were now the final form of human governments and would be how we organize ourselves till the end of days.
As you can get from the title the author argues that, in fact, no, this is not the case and other forms of more authoritative governments can/will arise and there are signs that liberal democracies are not living up to their full potentials, both at home and abroad.
The book is broken up into four sections: conflict, migration, geopolitics, and inequality in the 21st century. The conflict section mostly focuses on the Middle East and ISIS, the migration section mostly focuses on refugees and their difficulties getting into Europe, and the geopolitics section essentially follows the deteriorating relations between Russia and the West. The final chapter on inequality was quite interesting and went into details about how inequality can cause instability in a liberal democracy and also make it less attractive to other people.
This book had a very similar premise to "Suicide of the West" by Jonah Goldberg (but with a slightly less sensational tone), in that it is easy to become complacent in a way of life and assume that it is the default and will remain forever, but that's not the case. Societies take a lot of work and must continually work to preserve its values and prosperity.
My main gripe with this book is that it seemed to focus too much on Russia. I guess since it is about the return of "history" that makes sense, but I think I would have enjoyed some more comments on China, which was only ever mentioned in passing. Perhaps that was outside the scope though.
As you can get from the title the author argues that, in fact, no, this is not the case and other forms of more authoritative governments can/will arise and there are signs that liberal democracies are not living up to their full potentials, both at home and abroad.
The book is broken up into four sections: conflict, migration, geopolitics, and inequality in the 21st century. The conflict section mostly focuses on the Middle East and ISIS, the migration section mostly focuses on refugees and their difficulties getting into Europe, and the geopolitics section essentially follows the deteriorating relations between Russia and the West. The final chapter on inequality was quite interesting and went into details about how inequality can cause instability in a liberal democracy and also make it less attractive to other people.
This book had a very similar premise to "Suicide of the West" by Jonah Goldberg (but with a slightly less sensational tone), in that it is easy to become complacent in a way of life and assume that it is the default and will remain forever, but that's not the case. Societies take a lot of work and must continually work to preserve its values and prosperity.
My main gripe with this book is that it seemed to focus too much on Russia. I guess since it is about the return of "history" that makes sense, but I think I would have enjoyed some more comments on China, which was only ever mentioned in passing. Perhaps that was outside the scope though.
January 18, 2021
The Return of History is a thoughtful examination of global political trends from the last 30 years. Welsh's prose is clear, well-organized and easy to follow, and summarizes the barbarism of ISIS, the challenge of mass migration, renewed Western-Russian tensions, and the sclerosis of inequality with consistent aplomb.
I sometimes think Welsh takes Fukuyama's end of history thesis a little too seriously, despite her critique, and uses the word "history" far too liberally as a stand-in for concepts like "conflict" and "challenges to the temporary liberal democratic hegemony".
The Afterword in the 2017 edition partially redeems my chief criticism of the book - its relative silence on neo-liberal economics. Welsh acknowledges her critics in the Afterword, and attempts to reconcile her liberalism with an admission that liberalism's commitment to economic freedom is highly problematic. (Welsh mentions C.B. MacPherson's The Real World of Democracy in this context. Like Welsh, my first foray into political philosophy was this engaging book.)
Check out Yascha Mounk's The People vs. Democracy and Holmes and Kratziv's The Light that Failed if you're interested in modern world politics.
I sometimes think Welsh takes Fukuyama's end of history thesis a little too seriously, despite her critique, and uses the word "history" far too liberally as a stand-in for concepts like "conflict" and "challenges to the temporary liberal democratic hegemony".
The Afterword in the 2017 edition partially redeems my chief criticism of the book - its relative silence on neo-liberal economics. Welsh acknowledges her critics in the Afterword, and attempts to reconcile her liberalism with an admission that liberalism's commitment to economic freedom is highly problematic. (Welsh mentions C.B. MacPherson's The Real World of Democracy in this context. Like Welsh, my first foray into political philosophy was this engaging book.)
Check out Yascha Mounk's The People vs. Democracy and Holmes and Kratziv's The Light that Failed if you're interested in modern world politics.
June 11, 2017
In the multiple Star Trek television series, Starfleet and the Federation of Planets develops a code of conduct for its members who find themselves displaced in time – the Temporal Prime Directive. The aim of this Directive is to prevent damage to the timeline and history from being altered, which can frequently result in the erasure of the semi-utopian future in which they live. I’m not usually a fan of time-travel narratives, but I like the point behind the Temporal Prime Directive: the future is not inevitable; progress is not destiny, but decision.
This theme is also the most appealing aspect of Jennifer Welsh’s The Return of History. Throughout a sequence of five chapters structured as a response to Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 essay “The End of History”, Welsh argues against the narrative of the inevitable rise of liberal democracy following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in favour of examining our history, learning from our mistakes, and anticipating the challenges faced by liberal democracies and how they can rise to defeat them. She stresses, however, that there needs to be a conscious decision to rise – the triumph is not inevitable.
The chapters cover the background to the argument, which I found very useful; ‘Barbarism’, meaning essentially civilian casualties in war, and how the actions of liberal democracies affect how they are viewed overseas; refugees and the failure to appreciate how mass flight has changed since the Second World War; the rise of Russia and ‘Cold War 2.0’; and the destabilizing effects of inequality and the failure of governments to tackle it – largely because they do not accept responsibility for it. The first and last were the ones I found most engaging – the former because the intellectual background interests me and the latter because inequality feels like something I am positioned to challenge – but all the chapters are interesting, even if “The Return of the Cold War” feels a little over-long (maybe I’m just sick of hearing about Russia).
It has to be said that my impression of this book was shaped by the time in which I was reading it. So, for example, had I read the line “Corbyn’s strong critique of inequality and the ruling economic policy of austerity were deemed to have made him implausible and unelectable” (p. 277) prior to 5pm EST on Thursday, I would have sighed and nodded in mute agreement; reading it not only after the release of the UK exit poll at 5pm EST last Thursday but also after the relative accuracy of that poll had been confirmed by the end of the next day, I laughed in derision at the fools who thought Corbyn was unelectable (despite having occasionally been one myself), even though he didn’t actually win the election. This comes down to that prevailing theme: progress as decision, not destiny. Before Thursday, I had grimly accepted that my country would continue to make decisions that lead in the worst possible directions; now I have hope that we can make the decisions that will lead us to address inequality at home.
In the closing chapter, Welsh referred to Fukuyama as an “optimist” in contrast to her own “Chicken Little” approach (pp. 286-87). I couldn’t help but think of Rebecca Solnit’s definition of ‘optimism’ as assuming that things will turn out for the best, and ‘hope’ as the decision to work to ensure that they do. On this definition, Welsh is very hopeful; between this book and the election, I now feel that I can be more hopeful too.
This theme is also the most appealing aspect of Jennifer Welsh’s The Return of History. Throughout a sequence of five chapters structured as a response to Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 essay “The End of History”, Welsh argues against the narrative of the inevitable rise of liberal democracy following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in favour of examining our history, learning from our mistakes, and anticipating the challenges faced by liberal democracies and how they can rise to defeat them. She stresses, however, that there needs to be a conscious decision to rise – the triumph is not inevitable.
The chapters cover the background to the argument, which I found very useful; ‘Barbarism’, meaning essentially civilian casualties in war, and how the actions of liberal democracies affect how they are viewed overseas; refugees and the failure to appreciate how mass flight has changed since the Second World War; the rise of Russia and ‘Cold War 2.0’; and the destabilizing effects of inequality and the failure of governments to tackle it – largely because they do not accept responsibility for it. The first and last were the ones I found most engaging – the former because the intellectual background interests me and the latter because inequality feels like something I am positioned to challenge – but all the chapters are interesting, even if “The Return of the Cold War” feels a little over-long (maybe I’m just sick of hearing about Russia).
It has to be said that my impression of this book was shaped by the time in which I was reading it. So, for example, had I read the line “Corbyn’s strong critique of inequality and the ruling economic policy of austerity were deemed to have made him implausible and unelectable” (p. 277) prior to 5pm EST on Thursday, I would have sighed and nodded in mute agreement; reading it not only after the release of the UK exit poll at 5pm EST last Thursday but also after the relative accuracy of that poll had been confirmed by the end of the next day, I laughed in derision at the fools who thought Corbyn was unelectable (despite having occasionally been one myself), even though he didn’t actually win the election. This comes down to that prevailing theme: progress as decision, not destiny. Before Thursday, I had grimly accepted that my country would continue to make decisions that lead in the worst possible directions; now I have hope that we can make the decisions that will lead us to address inequality at home.
In the closing chapter, Welsh referred to Fukuyama as an “optimist” in contrast to her own “Chicken Little” approach (pp. 286-87). I couldn’t help but think of Rebecca Solnit’s definition of ‘optimism’ as assuming that things will turn out for the best, and ‘hope’ as the decision to work to ensure that they do. On this definition, Welsh is very hopeful; between this book and the election, I now feel that I can be more hopeful too.
January 7, 2019
Welsh centres her book on refuting Fukuyama's thesis from the end of history. She does so by pointing out the challenges liberal democracy has been facing over the past 5 years. However her book is very short on the analysis and policy or global suggestions usually provided in the Massey lectures. Her thesis is essentially that the world may not be moving toward liberal democracy as quickly or readily as Fukuyama thought, and as individuals we must play a role in its growth. She also states that if history is returning, "it is doing so with a modern twist" which seems to be stating the obvious.
She focuses on geopolitical events that have been front page news over the past few years, without adding much insight. As a result, if you have kept up with the news, the book is a rather slow read, offering little you aren't already aware of. Finally there were also several instances (eg. pg 128) where she conveyed the same statistic in several ways to demonstrate their magnitude when the initial statistic was sufficient, making for tedious reading.
She focuses on geopolitical events that have been front page news over the past few years, without adding much insight. As a result, if you have kept up with the news, the book is a rather slow read, offering little you aren't already aware of. Finally there were also several instances (eg. pg 128) where she conveyed the same statistic in several ways to demonstrate their magnitude when the initial statistic was sufficient, making for tedious reading.
June 13, 2020
Interesting points, but I found it a bit of a difficult read. I'm not sure if it was the style or the fact that I couldn't sit down and just read through it, but it was not easy to put this down and come back to it.
The return to inequality chapter was most jarring to me. The rise of unequal wealth distribution within OECD countries, the fact that the wealthy don't create more wealth (or even create jobs) - they just hoard the available wealth to themselves. So working hard or meritocracy no longer applies - no wonder there is a rise in populism. It goes on to discuss that wealth then influences politics creating a "one dollar one vote" system instead of one person one vote. Whereby the inequality won't change as those who can pay do so to keep their taxes non existent.
The return to inequality chapter was most jarring to me. The rise of unequal wealth distribution within OECD countries, the fact that the wealthy don't create more wealth (or even create jobs) - they just hoard the available wealth to themselves. So working hard or meritocracy no longer applies - no wonder there is a rise in populism. It goes on to discuss that wealth then influences politics creating a "one dollar one vote" system instead of one person one vote. Whereby the inequality won't change as those who can pay do so to keep their taxes non existent.
July 10, 2020
A great primer for those interested in some of the major macro-level problems the West is facing today. This book provides a review of the post-Cold War world in which Liberal Democracy has been deemed the victor.
For those interested, it covers the following topics and events:
1. The rise of Right-wing populism across the world.
2. Islamic Extremism.
3. The Refugee Crisis from Syria and the Middle East.
4. Renewed antagonistic relationships with Russia
5. Growing wealth inequality within liberal democraries
I found The Return of History to be a great starting point for diving into these relevant issues. It provides well-cited background for those who aren't acquainted with the aforementioned issues but at the same time, it doesn't dive too deep that it becomes a difficult read.
For those interested, it covers the following topics and events:
1. The rise of Right-wing populism across the world.
2. Islamic Extremism.
3. The Refugee Crisis from Syria and the Middle East.
4. Renewed antagonistic relationships with Russia
5. Growing wealth inequality within liberal democraries
I found The Return of History to be a great starting point for diving into these relevant issues. It provides well-cited background for those who aren't acquainted with the aforementioned issues but at the same time, it doesn't dive too deep that it becomes a difficult read.
October 17, 2017
Good summary of broad historical trends leading up to the 21st century. With exception of citing examples of Latin America and the Middle East in early chapters, this book is largely eurocentric in its critic of 'liberal democracy' (but to be fair Welsh did seem to have framed it as a critic of the complacency of WESTERN liberal democracies).
If you are familiar with major events in current affairs in recent years, upon which she bases her main 'return to history' thesis and illustrates at great length, namely - '03 Iraq War, '08 financial crisis, Crimea, Syria, Trump, rise of far-right parties in EU nations etc... yeah you can skip this book.
If you are familiar with major events in current affairs in recent years, upon which she bases her main 'return to history' thesis and illustrates at great length, namely - '03 Iraq War, '08 financial crisis, Crimea, Syria, Trump, rise of far-right parties in EU nations etc... yeah you can skip this book.
September 21, 2019
I will admit it was a little hard to get into it at first but I read the last 200 pages in a week. She presents some very interesting ideas and her perspective on the situation in Russia has made me reevaluate my thoughts as well. Inequality is truly a cancer that must be eradicated if we are to continue living in relative peace, it’s amazing how scummy politicians use it to manipulate us. The only point I really disagreed with was the whole thing about rich people who care about other by donating like absolutely microscopic amounts of their money, the author was absolutely to indulgent of them and I can’t abide by that.
February 3, 2018
The 2016 Massey Lecturer, Jennifer Welsh, seeks to challenge Francis Fukuyama's assertion that the "end of history" came with the end of the Cold War, and the end to ideological disputes around the world. She argues that far from an end to history, what we are witnessing in 2016 is the return of history; a return of barbarism, inequality, the Cold War, mass flight, and inequality. Although I feel she relies on a sensationalist view of instability in the world, her lectures are interesting and insightful.
April 6, 2021
I picked up this book at a used book sale because it was based on a Massey Lecture series that I had somehow missed. The Return of History is based on the 2016 Massey Lectures by Jennifer Welsh. It is a comprehensive look at how the (mostly short-term) thinking by Western governments about economics, security, and deployment of military power has affected conflict, migration, and politics around the world. Well worth the read.
August 6, 2022
The CBC Massey Lectures are usually thoughtful and articulate essays on a current topic. This set of lectures, from 2016, deals with - as the title says - conflict, migration, and geopolitics and takes a contrasting position to Fukuyama's "End of History" essay.
Many of these lectures become dated with time as events unfold, but there is little that has happened in the last six years, and especially the last six months, to contradict her conclusions. If anything, they are more on the nose than previously.
A fairly short, easy read.
Many of these lectures become dated with time as events unfold, but there is little that has happened in the last six years, and especially the last six months, to contradict her conclusions. If anything, they are more on the nose than previously.
A fairly short, easy read.
August 5, 2017
Anyone with even a half-hearted interest in the history and politics of the post-cold war era will find most of the content in this book very familiar. However, there's nothing like having a clear-cut, well-written, concise, useful primer on the state of affairs of the early 21s century to refer to and use when needed...and this history teacher can already see numerous opportunities to use this lovely resource in the future.
July 21, 2018
An amazing book, that challenges your understanding of what is happening in the world, how we got here and pushes you to see the need for change. Written a couple years ago, it explains accurately, what we are seeing around the world. I’m in awe of how Jennifer Welsh seemed to understand where we were going.
June 20, 2025
A bit dated (published in 2016), but a good high level review of the challenges faced by today's liberal democracies, the history that led to where we are, and a view to how we should think about and tackle the issues of migration, inequality, modern warfare, and global politics. Sadly the trends highlighted in the book seem to have gotten worse - would have loved a revised edition.
June 1, 2017
This is one of the best Massey Lectures in recent years. Dr. Welsh offers thoughtful insights into the causes of the current state of the world. In the face of so much biased and shallow reporting in the news media, Dr. Welsh's perspective is refreshing and welcome.
June 19, 2017
Dry
I gave up on this book when I got to chapter 3. Regrettably, if one wants a sense of where we are historically and geopolitically, then I suggest Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and Strauss and Howe's the Fourth Turning. This book is not very readable.
I gave up on this book when I got to chapter 3. Regrettably, if one wants a sense of where we are historically and geopolitically, then I suggest Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and Strauss and Howe's the Fourth Turning. This book is not very readable.
January 12, 2021
History has returned, according to Jennifer Welsh, and this is a decent exploration of the rationale of her position -- and it's almost prophetic, 5 years later. Might be a tad dated, considering it explored current events of the time (~2016), but still a recommended read.
February 7, 2024
If a bit outdated it's still pretty good. Marred at the end by a front page-depth paean to questionable studies in behavioral economics research, the majority is solidly within the writer's wheelhouse - geopolitics and the challenges to Liberal Democracy.
July 18, 2018
Good insights of today - but less conclusive than expected.
September 16, 2018
This is a good analysis of current political scenes in the world and the events that may have activated or influenced them.
October 30, 2019
Although, in retrospect, a bit too much analysis is spent on ISIS, this progressive book paints a great picture of where things now stand with history, or the evolution of liberal democracies.
November 23, 2019
Interesting to step back and think about history and the trends in the world. The final chapter on inequality was especially profound and poignant....
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