A solid and well-researched account of a little-known campaign of WWI: the conquest of Germany's vast African colonial empire. Although a sideshow to the main event in Europe, the fighting contested a much greater geographical area, poorly-mapped, in conditions which always rivalled and were frequently worse than those on the main fronts.
As the author notes in his introduction, records were scanty and poorly-kept as most military units were irregulars, most of the soldiers were illiterate, and the few diaries which have survived give a very partial account. So Mr Farwell has done a pretty good job, and is honest about the limited and fragmentary information he relies on for parts of this book.
The "World Crisis" of course had nothing to do with Africa, and colonial administrations on both sides of the argument were almost unanimously in favour of avoiding hostilities, feeling that the influence and prestige of "the white man" in Africa would be universally undermined by the spectacle of armies of colonial overlords fighting one another. For the Germans there was some pragmatism in this position, as all the German territories were surrounded by the longer-established colonies of their enemies, who also enjoyed near-complete naval supremacy. Anyway, that's not how things work in wartime, and hostilities were quickly under way. Indeed the first British bullet of the Great War was in fact fired in Togoland (modern Togo), not on the Western Front.
The campaigns in Togoland, Cameroon, and German SW Africa (now Namibia) were relatively brief and are briefly dealt with. The majority of this book concerns the epic struggle in German East Africa (modern Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi), about which there is most contemporary evidence. Here a German colonel (later general), Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, fought a determined guerrilla campaign against vastly-superior forces and actually surrendered only after the main armistice was agreed in faraway Europe.
This part of the conflict is the subject of the only other history I've read of WWI in Africa, "Tanganyikan Guerrilla" in the Pan Military History monograph series. Based heavily on Lettow-Vorbeck's memoirs, that one is essentially a hagiography of L-V as a military genius. This book is more balanced, acknowledging his considerable feat of keeping his small force in being and making a thorough nuisance of himself for 5 years, but pointing out that his campaign achieved nothing of importance, and mainly consisted of a long retreat punctuated by small tactical successes against the larger forces pursuing him. Once Smuts took command in 1915, German East Africa was cleared of Germans in about a year. By the standards of WWI, that's a blitzkrieg. This book is suitably critical of Allied bungling, confused command arrangements, poor inter-service cooperation and inefficiency, but does balance this by pointing out that Lettow-Vorbeck achieved his rapid and elusive movements by abandoning his wounded, German civilians and German subjects to the mercy of the enemy, and that the majority of Allied casualties were caused by disease and climate and strained logistics - again a much simpler problem to solve for a commander of a small force taking no consideration of the civilian population. And Lettow-Vorbeck's account mainly lauds his own success in tying down superior forces and remaining undefeated. Er.......well done, but that's a little beside the point. The German high command, instead of receiving reinforcements and supplies from its overseas possessions, as did the Allies throughout the war, ended up sending supplies TO Africa. German naval strategy was also deserving of censure: having gratuitously attacked Belgian ports and shipping on Lake Tanganyika, the Germans inexplicably lost this huge inland waterway to a madcap adventure involving two British gunboats being transported overland to the lake. Even after the initial surprise and success of this experiment, the remaining German warship on the lake still outgunned and outranged the Allied shipping - until the Germans bizarrely scuttled it and thus surrendered control of the Western border of German East Africa.
The writing is generally good, clear, concise and free of jargon and military-historical nerdery. Historical analysis is forthright and well-argued. The maps are inadequate, but this is I think deliberate, emphasising that the campaigns, too, were fought with inadequate knowledge of the conditions and the topography. The main fault of the book is (as is depressingly common with military history) the total absence of proofreading, resulting in a text littered with spelling mistakes, meandering unedited paragraphs and grammatical errors.
But, in an admittedly-small field, if you want a history of WWI in Africa, this is a very good read.