What do you think?
Rate this book
Clashing over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy
Should the United States be open to commerce with other countries, or should it protect domestic industries from foreign competition? This question has been the source of bitter political conflict throughout American history. Such conflict was inevitable, James Madison argued in The Federalist Papers, because trade policy involves clashing economic interests. The struggle between the winners and losers from trade has always been fierce because dollars and jobs are at depending on what policy is chosen, some industries, farmers, and workers will prosper, while others will suffer. Douglas A. Irwin’s Clashing over Commerce is the most authoritative and comprehensive history of US trade policy to date, offering a clear picture of the various economic and political forces that have shaped it. From the start, trade policy divided the nation—first when Thomas Jefferson declared an embargo on all foreign trade and then when South Carolina threatened to secede from the Union over excessive taxes on imports. The Civil War saw a shift toward protectionism, which then came under constant political attack. Then, controversy over the Smoot-Hawley tariff during the Great Depression led to a policy shift toward freer trade, involving trade agreements that eventually produced the World Trade Organization. Irwin makes sense of this turbulent history by showing how different economic interests tend to be grouped geographically, meaning that every proposed policy change found ready champions and opponents in Congress.As the Trump administration considers making major changes to US trade policy, Irwin’s sweeping historical perspective helps illuminate the current debate. Deeply researched and rich with insight and detail, Clashing over Commerce provides valuable and enduring insights into US trade policy past and present.
862 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 29, 2017
149 people are currently reading
1396 people want to read
About the author
Douglas A. Irwin
22 books26 followersDouglas A. Irwin
An economic historian, he is the John French Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College, one of the eight Ivy League universities in the United States, and a research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). He previously taught at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and served as an economist for the Federal Reserve and the President's Council of Economic Advisers. He has published seven books on U.S. economics and trade policy, making him a leading authority in the field. He is also a frequent contributor to The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and The Financial Times.
An economic historian, he is the John French Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College, one of the eight Ivy League universities in the United States, and a research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). He previously taught at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and served as an economist for the Federal Reserve and the President's Council of Economic Advisers. He has published seven books on U.S. economics and trade policy, making him a leading authority in the field. He is also a frequent contributor to The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and The Financial Times.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
March 17, 2018
This is the first comprehensive history of U.S. trade policy in over a century, and it couldn't be more timely or better written.
Douglas Irwin, a notable economic historian at Dartmouth, shows that the United States's trade policy has always been essential to its politics, but if anything those battles have become less heated over time. In the early years, of course, tariffs were over 90% of our revenue, and from the first tariff act of 1789 to the Civil War revenue was the focus of such political debates. Although many accuse Alexander Hamilton of being a protectionist, in fact he and the Federalists wanted to encourage trade to acquire more government revenue, while the Jeffersonian group was willing to sacrifice trade to punish the British or other Europeans for slights, which explains why many of the Northern manufacturers moved over to the Jeffersonian Democrat side. Later, they fled to the Whigs and then the Republicans.
One relative consistency in U.S. trade policy was the South's need for cotton exports. For a long time, cotton was 50% of all U.S. exports, and even in the early 20th century it was still a quarter of all exports. Thus the South was fiercely against most tariffs, which they worried would cause foreign retaliation against U.S. exports. They usually faced off against the North, which had more import-heavy sectors like iron and textiles, and which demanded protection. After the Civil War, under the now-dominate Republicans, the North got it, and kept tariffs at the absurdly high rate of almost 50% of the value of imports until the Great Depression.
Irwin shows that one major factor in tariff changes was inflation and deflation. The North tended to favor specific tariffs on individual items (50 cents per barrel of nails, say), to hide the cost, while the South favored ad valorem duties on the value of the product (10% on iron imports). For awhile the North got about half of all imports on the specific schedule, but that meant tariffs went up and down depending on the price level. In the late 19th century and in the early Great Depression, deflation raised tariffs far more than any act did (even the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930 aided protectionists less than the 30% deflation in that period). After World War II, however, inflation wore away much of U.S. protection, and, almost unaware, opened up the U.S market. The U.S. emerged with tariff rates about 10%, some of the lowest in the world, but the U..S also emerged as an industrial behemoth, with little global competition and so few complaints on either side.
After World War II, Republicans finally made their peace with low tariffs, international trade groups, and gradual trade negotiations. It wasn't until 1970, in a vote on textile tariffs, however, that the parties officially switched, with Democrats and labor becoming more protectionist and Republicans becoming more free trade. Despite all the recent hullabaloo and attacks on trade though, neither side seems eager to overturn our general low tariffs (usually no more than 4%) and international groups ensuring it. Both sides now attack it, but usually only at the margins. Trade policy has become more rhetorical and less substantive.
Irwin has a fine grasp on this history and the effects on U.S. economics and policy. Overall, he makes this dense book continuously entertaining and insightful, an impressive accomplishment.
Douglas Irwin, a notable economic historian at Dartmouth, shows that the United States's trade policy has always been essential to its politics, but if anything those battles have become less heated over time. In the early years, of course, tariffs were over 90% of our revenue, and from the first tariff act of 1789 to the Civil War revenue was the focus of such political debates. Although many accuse Alexander Hamilton of being a protectionist, in fact he and the Federalists wanted to encourage trade to acquire more government revenue, while the Jeffersonian group was willing to sacrifice trade to punish the British or other Europeans for slights, which explains why many of the Northern manufacturers moved over to the Jeffersonian Democrat side. Later, they fled to the Whigs and then the Republicans.
One relative consistency in U.S. trade policy was the South's need for cotton exports. For a long time, cotton was 50% of all U.S. exports, and even in the early 20th century it was still a quarter of all exports. Thus the South was fiercely against most tariffs, which they worried would cause foreign retaliation against U.S. exports. They usually faced off against the North, which had more import-heavy sectors like iron and textiles, and which demanded protection. After the Civil War, under the now-dominate Republicans, the North got it, and kept tariffs at the absurdly high rate of almost 50% of the value of imports until the Great Depression.
Irwin shows that one major factor in tariff changes was inflation and deflation. The North tended to favor specific tariffs on individual items (50 cents per barrel of nails, say), to hide the cost, while the South favored ad valorem duties on the value of the product (10% on iron imports). For awhile the North got about half of all imports on the specific schedule, but that meant tariffs went up and down depending on the price level. In the late 19th century and in the early Great Depression, deflation raised tariffs far more than any act did (even the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930 aided protectionists less than the 30% deflation in that period). After World War II, however, inflation wore away much of U.S. protection, and, almost unaware, opened up the U.S market. The U.S. emerged with tariff rates about 10%, some of the lowest in the world, but the U..S also emerged as an industrial behemoth, with little global competition and so few complaints on either side.
After World War II, Republicans finally made their peace with low tariffs, international trade groups, and gradual trade negotiations. It wasn't until 1970, in a vote on textile tariffs, however, that the parties officially switched, with Democrats and labor becoming more protectionist and Republicans becoming more free trade. Despite all the recent hullabaloo and attacks on trade though, neither side seems eager to overturn our general low tariffs (usually no more than 4%) and international groups ensuring it. Both sides now attack it, but usually only at the margins. Trade policy has become more rhetorical and less substantive.
Irwin has a fine grasp on this history and the effects on U.S. economics and policy. Overall, he makes this dense book continuously entertaining and insightful, an impressive accomplishment.
November 12, 2018
This book presents a history of US trade policy from the beginning of the country until the election of 2016 or so. It is thorough and well done. The author does a good job of explaining the story and summarizing along the way. There are really nice summary tables with consistently presented and well explained data. This is a detailed book of economic history written by an accomplished economist, so readers should be forewarned that there is dense prose and occasionally rough sledding ahead in working through the book. On the whole, however, this is an exceptionally well done book. If one is interested in learning about trade policy, this is the book to do so.
Recent efforts by the current administration to redraft US trade and tariff policy got me interested in getting some more background on trade. My fear was that the current policy initiatives were based more on politics than sound policy with overall results that might lead to problems for many adversely affected by the initiatives. On this concern, Professor Irwin’s book provides good news and bad news. The good news is that US trade policy exhibits surprising and long lived continuities, such that when considering short term initiatives, the odds on stability are always longer than they seem at first. It takes some sharp dislocations, such as due to Civil War or worldwide depression, to lead to long lasting changes in trade regimes. (... but didn’t we just have one of those dislocations in 2008??). The bad news out of Irwin’s book is that trade policy is always political and always involves messy conflicts and transient compromises. Observed continuity comes from the long term factors that lead to stability in the US and world economies. Irwin’s exposition illustrates this interaction of long term stability and short term polical maneuvering in great detail.
OK, it is a bit of a slog, but it was well worth it.
Recent efforts by the current administration to redraft US trade and tariff policy got me interested in getting some more background on trade. My fear was that the current policy initiatives were based more on politics than sound policy with overall results that might lead to problems for many adversely affected by the initiatives. On this concern, Professor Irwin’s book provides good news and bad news. The good news is that US trade policy exhibits surprising and long lived continuities, such that when considering short term initiatives, the odds on stability are always longer than they seem at first. It takes some sharp dislocations, such as due to Civil War or worldwide depression, to lead to long lasting changes in trade regimes. (... but didn’t we just have one of those dislocations in 2008??). The bad news out of Irwin’s book is that trade policy is always political and always involves messy conflicts and transient compromises. Observed continuity comes from the long term factors that lead to stability in the US and world economies. Irwin’s exposition illustrates this interaction of long term stability and short term polical maneuvering in great detail.
OK, it is a bit of a slog, but it was well worth it.
August 2, 2019
Fascinating detailed review of US trade policy and lessons. The shift from revenue (prior to the income tax tariffs were the major source of government revenue) to protection (from foreign competition) to reciprocity over time is detailed. In light of the iconoclastic measures being pursued these days in terms of trade policy, I wanted to review both the policies and the lessons drawn from them. This was a good book for that purpose, and does nothing to convince me the administration has a plan or understands what they are doing. Quite a project.
Read
June 12, 2025Douglas A. Irwin’s "Clashing over Commerce" traces the long and complex history of American trade policy, showing how debates over trade have been central to the nation’s political and economic development since its founding. From the earliest days of the republic to the twenty-first century, decisions about tariffs, imports, and international agreements have sparked fierce disagreements, shaped regional alliances, and reflected changing ideas about the United States’ role in the global economy. Irwin argues that trade has never been a straightforward economic issue; instead, it has always been deeply entangled with power, politics, and national identity.
The story begins in the colonial period, when economic frustration contributed to the desire for independence. American colonists relied heavily on transatlantic commerce to sustain their economies, importing essential goods and exporting agricultural products. British trade regulations, particularly the Navigation Acts, funneled colonial trade through English ports, increasing costs and reducing profits. After the Seven Years’ War, Britain intensified its control over colonial trade and imposed new taxes, which inflamed tensions and led to widespread resistance. Economic boycotts became a form of protest, as colonists tried to pressure Parliament by cutting off imports. These efforts offered mixed results, but they helped solidify the idea that economic autonomy was essential to political freedom. When diplomatic efforts failed, the push for independence accelerated.
Following the Revolution, Americans hoped that free trade would bring prosperity, but the war and its aftermath brought severe disruptions. British blockades and port occupations devastated commerce, and once peace returned, Britain continued to restrict American access to key markets, especially in the West Indies. Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government lacked authority to respond effectively. Some states attempted their own trade policies, but conflicting interests and regional divisions undermined these efforts. Southern states, worried about congressional control favoring northern interests, resisted centralizing trade authority. The resulting confusion helped pave the way for the 1787 Constitutional Convention, which granted Congress full power over foreign commerce and laid the foundation for federal economic policy.
In the early years of the republic, import duties became the primary source of government revenue. With no income tax or central bank, tariffs funded most federal functions, from debt payments to military expenses. Import taxes were relatively easy to administer and politically more acceptable than direct taxes. As Congress raised rates in the 1790s, average tariffs on taxable goods reached around 20 percent. While officially aimed at generating income, these tariffs also gave an advantage to domestic manufacturers. This dual purpose—raising revenue and protecting industry—would define American trade policy for decades to come.
Regional differences soon emerged. The industrializing North supported higher tariffs to shelter growing industries from foreign competition, while the South, more reliant on exports and imported goods, opposed such measures. Trade policy became not just an economic issue, but a reflection of competing regional and political interests. As domestic industry expanded during the War of 1812, protectionist sentiment grew stronger, and by 1816 Congress passed a tariff with clear protective aims. Tensions escalated in 1828 with the 'Tariff of Abominations,' which provoked a major backlash from the South, including threats of nullification by South Carolina. A compromise avoided a full-blown crisis, but the precedent for high protective tariffs was firmly set.
The Civil War further solidified protectionist policies. Already high, tariffs were raised even more during the war to fund the Union government, and unlike other wartime measures, they remained elevated long after the conflict ended. For nearly seven decades following the war, tariffs became a defining feature of national economic strategy. Protectionism became an article of faith for the Republican Party, which dominated politics for much of this era and drew strong support from industrial regions. The argument was that shielding domestic industries from foreign competition would promote national development and secure jobs. This policy benefited manufacturing centers in the North and East, but came at a cost to southern and western farmers, who faced higher prices for goods and gained little from tariff protection.
Efforts to reduce tariffs repeatedly ran into resistance. Presidents like Grover Cleveland made tariff reform a priority, but congressional negotiations were often mired in compromise and special-interest lobbying. Tariff schedules were frequently tailored to protect particular industries, reflecting local political pressures rather than coherent national planning. This led to a system shaped more by political deal-making than by strategic economic thinking. The situation culminated in the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which raised duties to record levels. Intended to protect domestic producers during the Great Depression, the law instead triggered retaliatory measures from other countries, deepening the global economic crisis and discrediting protectionist policies.
A dramatic shift occurred in the 1930s, as the United States moved away from high tariffs and toward a policy of reciprocal trade agreements. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 marked a turning point by transferring the power to negotiate tariffs from Congress to the executive branch. This allowed for bilateral deals in which the U.S. would lower tariffs in exchange for similar concessions from trading partners. This new approach treated trade as a diplomatic tool as much as an economic one and helped foster a more open international trading system. The change in policy reflected a broader shift in political attitudes, especially within the Democratic Party during the New Deal era.
The postwar years saw further institutionalization of trade liberalization. The U.S. played a central role in establishing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, creating a multilateral framework for reducing trade barriers and resolving disputes. Trade policy now served foreign policy goals as well: by promoting economic integration, the U.S. hoped to encourage global stability and contain communism. Successive presidential administrations, with bipartisan support, pursued liberal trade agreements as part of a broader internationalist strategy. From Truman through Nixon, trade liberalization became part of the consensus in Washington.
Yet even during this period of broad agreement, new challenges emerged. As the U.S. opened its markets, it began to face increasing competition from rebuilt European economies and rising industrial powers like Japan. Domestic industries such as steel and textiles came under pressure. Rather than reversing course on liberalization, policymakers introduced selective measures like quotas and safeguards to provide relief without abandoning the broader trade framework. Meanwhile, the nature of trade was changing. Intra-industry trade and global supply chains became more common, and large multinational firms increasingly shaped trade preferences. Labor groups, once divided on trade, began to express growing concern as wages stagnated and industrial jobs declined.
By the 1990s, the postwar consensus was starting to fray. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in 1993, received bipartisan backing, but passed by a narrower margin than earlier deals. Public opposition to trade deals began to rise, cutting across traditional party lines. The end of the Cold War removed a key justification for open trade, and the rapid globalization of the 1990s and 2000s introduced new tensions. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 brought massive shifts in global production, fueling American imports but also accelerating the decline of many domestic industries. Critics argued that trade agreements favored corporations and neglected workers, leading to economic insecurity in many communities.
By the 2010s, trade had become a politically explosive issue. Long-standing assumptions about the benefits of free trade were openly challenged by both major parties. The Trans-Pacific Partnership faced intense opposition and was ultimately abandoned. In 2016, trade became a defining issue in the presidential campaign, with candidates on both sides questioning the value of globalization. What had once been a technocratic domain of economists and diplomats became a central arena for debates over economic justice, identity, and the future of American capitalism.
In "Clashing over Commerce", Irwin demonstrates that trade policy has always been a reflection of broader societal struggles—over power, prosperity, and the direction of the nation. Far from being a dry policy area, trade has repeatedly ignited some of the most intense conflicts in American politics. By examining the history of trade debates over more than two centuries, Irwin shows how economic decisions are shaped not just by markets but by the competing visions of what America is, and what it should become. Understanding that long and contested history is essential to making sense of the trade debates that continue to define the country today.
The story begins in the colonial period, when economic frustration contributed to the desire for independence. American colonists relied heavily on transatlantic commerce to sustain their economies, importing essential goods and exporting agricultural products. British trade regulations, particularly the Navigation Acts, funneled colonial trade through English ports, increasing costs and reducing profits. After the Seven Years’ War, Britain intensified its control over colonial trade and imposed new taxes, which inflamed tensions and led to widespread resistance. Economic boycotts became a form of protest, as colonists tried to pressure Parliament by cutting off imports. These efforts offered mixed results, but they helped solidify the idea that economic autonomy was essential to political freedom. When diplomatic efforts failed, the push for independence accelerated.
Following the Revolution, Americans hoped that free trade would bring prosperity, but the war and its aftermath brought severe disruptions. British blockades and port occupations devastated commerce, and once peace returned, Britain continued to restrict American access to key markets, especially in the West Indies. Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government lacked authority to respond effectively. Some states attempted their own trade policies, but conflicting interests and regional divisions undermined these efforts. Southern states, worried about congressional control favoring northern interests, resisted centralizing trade authority. The resulting confusion helped pave the way for the 1787 Constitutional Convention, which granted Congress full power over foreign commerce and laid the foundation for federal economic policy.
In the early years of the republic, import duties became the primary source of government revenue. With no income tax or central bank, tariffs funded most federal functions, from debt payments to military expenses. Import taxes were relatively easy to administer and politically more acceptable than direct taxes. As Congress raised rates in the 1790s, average tariffs on taxable goods reached around 20 percent. While officially aimed at generating income, these tariffs also gave an advantage to domestic manufacturers. This dual purpose—raising revenue and protecting industry—would define American trade policy for decades to come.
Regional differences soon emerged. The industrializing North supported higher tariffs to shelter growing industries from foreign competition, while the South, more reliant on exports and imported goods, opposed such measures. Trade policy became not just an economic issue, but a reflection of competing regional and political interests. As domestic industry expanded during the War of 1812, protectionist sentiment grew stronger, and by 1816 Congress passed a tariff with clear protective aims. Tensions escalated in 1828 with the 'Tariff of Abominations,' which provoked a major backlash from the South, including threats of nullification by South Carolina. A compromise avoided a full-blown crisis, but the precedent for high protective tariffs was firmly set.
The Civil War further solidified protectionist policies. Already high, tariffs were raised even more during the war to fund the Union government, and unlike other wartime measures, they remained elevated long after the conflict ended. For nearly seven decades following the war, tariffs became a defining feature of national economic strategy. Protectionism became an article of faith for the Republican Party, which dominated politics for much of this era and drew strong support from industrial regions. The argument was that shielding domestic industries from foreign competition would promote national development and secure jobs. This policy benefited manufacturing centers in the North and East, but came at a cost to southern and western farmers, who faced higher prices for goods and gained little from tariff protection.
Efforts to reduce tariffs repeatedly ran into resistance. Presidents like Grover Cleveland made tariff reform a priority, but congressional negotiations were often mired in compromise and special-interest lobbying. Tariff schedules were frequently tailored to protect particular industries, reflecting local political pressures rather than coherent national planning. This led to a system shaped more by political deal-making than by strategic economic thinking. The situation culminated in the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which raised duties to record levels. Intended to protect domestic producers during the Great Depression, the law instead triggered retaliatory measures from other countries, deepening the global economic crisis and discrediting protectionist policies.
A dramatic shift occurred in the 1930s, as the United States moved away from high tariffs and toward a policy of reciprocal trade agreements. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 marked a turning point by transferring the power to negotiate tariffs from Congress to the executive branch. This allowed for bilateral deals in which the U.S. would lower tariffs in exchange for similar concessions from trading partners. This new approach treated trade as a diplomatic tool as much as an economic one and helped foster a more open international trading system. The change in policy reflected a broader shift in political attitudes, especially within the Democratic Party during the New Deal era.
The postwar years saw further institutionalization of trade liberalization. The U.S. played a central role in establishing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, creating a multilateral framework for reducing trade barriers and resolving disputes. Trade policy now served foreign policy goals as well: by promoting economic integration, the U.S. hoped to encourage global stability and contain communism. Successive presidential administrations, with bipartisan support, pursued liberal trade agreements as part of a broader internationalist strategy. From Truman through Nixon, trade liberalization became part of the consensus in Washington.
Yet even during this period of broad agreement, new challenges emerged. As the U.S. opened its markets, it began to face increasing competition from rebuilt European economies and rising industrial powers like Japan. Domestic industries such as steel and textiles came under pressure. Rather than reversing course on liberalization, policymakers introduced selective measures like quotas and safeguards to provide relief without abandoning the broader trade framework. Meanwhile, the nature of trade was changing. Intra-industry trade and global supply chains became more common, and large multinational firms increasingly shaped trade preferences. Labor groups, once divided on trade, began to express growing concern as wages stagnated and industrial jobs declined.
By the 1990s, the postwar consensus was starting to fray. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in 1993, received bipartisan backing, but passed by a narrower margin than earlier deals. Public opposition to trade deals began to rise, cutting across traditional party lines. The end of the Cold War removed a key justification for open trade, and the rapid globalization of the 1990s and 2000s introduced new tensions. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 brought massive shifts in global production, fueling American imports but also accelerating the decline of many domestic industries. Critics argued that trade agreements favored corporations and neglected workers, leading to economic insecurity in many communities.
By the 2010s, trade had become a politically explosive issue. Long-standing assumptions about the benefits of free trade were openly challenged by both major parties. The Trans-Pacific Partnership faced intense opposition and was ultimately abandoned. In 2016, trade became a defining issue in the presidential campaign, with candidates on both sides questioning the value of globalization. What had once been a technocratic domain of economists and diplomats became a central arena for debates over economic justice, identity, and the future of American capitalism.
In "Clashing over Commerce", Irwin demonstrates that trade policy has always been a reflection of broader societal struggles—over power, prosperity, and the direction of the nation. Far from being a dry policy area, trade has repeatedly ignited some of the most intense conflicts in American politics. By examining the history of trade debates over more than two centuries, Irwin shows how economic decisions are shaped not just by markets but by the competing visions of what America is, and what it should become. Understanding that long and contested history is essential to making sense of the trade debates that continue to define the country today.
August 13, 2018
With this timely book, Prof. Irwin offers a comprehensive history of U.S. trade policy, starting from even before the inception of the republic to the present day. It mostly concerns itself with tariff policy, although the gradual shift toward administrative measures toward the end of the last century is also discussed in quite detail, as are the various attempts at multilateral cooperation that took place over time.
The author does quite a good job at underlining how U.S. trade policy evolved over time with the goal of serving various regional interests, often with little regard to those of others. Up until around the 1930s, at a very high level the trade battle was fought between the industrial "protectionist" north and the agrarian "free-trade" south, with the nation's western states often holding the decisive swing vote. In this context, one faction usually managed to obtain a politically dominating position and impose its preferred trade policy on the country. (For most the time, it was the north dominating the south, which itself wasn't exactly a bona fide force for free-trade either, so that tariffs were generally at a much higher level than today. This leads to the possible interpretation that the success of U.S. industrialization was due to high tariff barriers, which is also discussed in the book.) After WW2, this divide blurred significantly and both parties were (also for foreign policy reasons) much more receptive to trade promoting measures, which again changed toward the end of the century, however. As a result, tariff barriers mostly vanished and other questions became more important in directing trade policy.
However, Prof. Irwin also makes the point that the history of trade policy shouldn't be understood as purely an outcome of cold, impersonal economic forces either. At times, individual politicians could make a meaningful contribution in changing how policymakers approached the trade question. Perhaps the best example is Cordell Hull, who was a driving force in shifting policy toward the multilateral, rules-based system that we have today. Another example (and my favorite episode in the book) is the infamous "Tariff of Abominations" of 1828, which is a comical example of political scheming gone wrong. And, as mentioned before, foreign policy considerations also played an important role at times, as have broader questions about the nature of the republic itself.
Overall, the book is written clearly and important themes are often repeated for emphasis, which I found helpful. I particularly liked the discussions of what the actual impact of certain policy regimes might have been in reality (and not only in the often colorful fantasy of policymakers), although there could have been more of those. As an interested reader with only a superficial knowledge of many details, I feel much more knowledgable about trade policy having read the book. However, given its length and the fact that it is a piece of scholarly work after all, not everybody will enjoy it likewise.
The author does quite a good job at underlining how U.S. trade policy evolved over time with the goal of serving various regional interests, often with little regard to those of others. Up until around the 1930s, at a very high level the trade battle was fought between the industrial "protectionist" north and the agrarian "free-trade" south, with the nation's western states often holding the decisive swing vote. In this context, one faction usually managed to obtain a politically dominating position and impose its preferred trade policy on the country. (For most the time, it was the north dominating the south, which itself wasn't exactly a bona fide force for free-trade either, so that tariffs were generally at a much higher level than today. This leads to the possible interpretation that the success of U.S. industrialization was due to high tariff barriers, which is also discussed in the book.) After WW2, this divide blurred significantly and both parties were (also for foreign policy reasons) much more receptive to trade promoting measures, which again changed toward the end of the century, however. As a result, tariff barriers mostly vanished and other questions became more important in directing trade policy.
However, Prof. Irwin also makes the point that the history of trade policy shouldn't be understood as purely an outcome of cold, impersonal economic forces either. At times, individual politicians could make a meaningful contribution in changing how policymakers approached the trade question. Perhaps the best example is Cordell Hull, who was a driving force in shifting policy toward the multilateral, rules-based system that we have today. Another example (and my favorite episode in the book) is the infamous "Tariff of Abominations" of 1828, which is a comical example of political scheming gone wrong. And, as mentioned before, foreign policy considerations also played an important role at times, as have broader questions about the nature of the republic itself.
Overall, the book is written clearly and important themes are often repeated for emphasis, which I found helpful. I particularly liked the discussions of what the actual impact of certain policy regimes might have been in reality (and not only in the often colorful fantasy of policymakers), although there could have been more of those. As an interested reader with only a superficial knowledge of many details, I feel much more knowledgable about trade policy having read the book. However, given its length and the fact that it is a piece of scholarly work after all, not everybody will enjoy it likewise.
June 22, 2019
I was surprised to learn that this is the first comprehensive overview of US trade policy written since before the Great Depression, which is a lot of weight for one book to carry, but I think that Irwin rises to the task. The most thrilling insights in this book are the ones that reexamine economic trends or occurrences that have been attributed to trade policy and assign a more accurate confluence of historical (and often monetary) factors as the primary culprit instead. The overview of international political developments during the Great Depression and World War II are also fascinating.
To me, the revelation most relevant to our current times was that foreign capital inflows are responsible for the trade deficits that arose in the 1970s and 80s, which have long been errantly attributed to a lack of "competitiveness" of American firms, and have been a contentious political rallying cry ever since. ("[The current administration] also viewed trade deficits as very bad for the country, taking them as indication that the United States was "losing" from trade. Yet such deficits were not the result of previous trade deals, but foreign capital inflows, and it was not clear what the administration would do about it," p. 687).
Given the growing proportion of foreign capital flows as a sector of trade, it would have been nice to see more discussion of what effect, if any, the growth of the financial services sector since the 1980s has had on the briefly mentioned phenomena of stagnant real wages and wealth inequality (which again have been errantly attributed to specific trade policies) in the same time period. However, at nearly 700 pages, Irwin can hardly be faulted for a lack of thoroughness and this topic could probably constitute a tome of its own.
Having neglected to look at the page count before ordering the book online, I was a bit surprised when it arrived and will admit that it has taken me a couple of months to get through. But Irwin's sharp writing and aptitude for nuance made it very enjoyable. It's the kind of scholarship that I have missed since graduating from college.
To me, the revelation most relevant to our current times was that foreign capital inflows are responsible for the trade deficits that arose in the 1970s and 80s, which have long been errantly attributed to a lack of "competitiveness" of American firms, and have been a contentious political rallying cry ever since. ("[The current administration] also viewed trade deficits as very bad for the country, taking them as indication that the United States was "losing" from trade. Yet such deficits were not the result of previous trade deals, but foreign capital inflows, and it was not clear what the administration would do about it," p. 687).
Given the growing proportion of foreign capital flows as a sector of trade, it would have been nice to see more discussion of what effect, if any, the growth of the financial services sector since the 1980s has had on the briefly mentioned phenomena of stagnant real wages and wealth inequality (which again have been errantly attributed to specific trade policies) in the same time period. However, at nearly 700 pages, Irwin can hardly be faulted for a lack of thoroughness and this topic could probably constitute a tome of its own.
Having neglected to look at the page count before ordering the book online, I was a bit surprised when it arrived and will admit that it has taken me a couple of months to get through. But Irwin's sharp writing and aptitude for nuance made it very enjoyable. It's the kind of scholarship that I have missed since graduating from college.
March 20, 2018
Irwin's book is nothing if not thorough in its tracing of tariff policies in the US from Hamilton's financial and commercial proposals through Trump's ending of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. Irwin's prose and workman-like march through facts, figures, charts, and political vote-counting and analysis is both admirable and daunting in scope, and perhaps a bit too dry in terms of style. However, the book is ceaselessly objective and allows the numerous political and economic tumults over the tariff to remain at the forefront throughout the many, many pages.
At a time when President Trump is proposing steel and aluminum tariffs, a history of tariff policy is not only prescient, but vital to thinking of Trump-ism in the context of previous protectionist iterations in American politics. One of Irwin's greatest analyses is that, despite changing party allegiances, tariff promoters and detractors largely remained static due to the placement of certain industries throughout the country. The South, as an exporter of agricultural and commodity products, was often dead-set against tariffs, while Northerners strove for higher tariffs to protect fledgling industrial and manufacturing concerns. Until the rusting of the Rust Belt, this pattern held firm in tariff negotiations for over a century, despite changes in party make-up and presidential administrations.
Irwin's chronicling of the RTAA negotiations and Cordell Hull's crusade for free trade under the Franklin Roosevelt administration in the 1930s is one of the livelier parts of this work, and brings to life the tedious political wrangling and idealism that Hull espoused on the eve of WWII. Hull, who served as FDR's Secretary of State, was perhaps the prime mover in America's embrace of free trade in the 20th Century.
In the spirit of Thomas Piketty and Joe Stiglitz, this book allows economic facts to shine and paints an objective portrait of how tariffs have shaped American history.
At a time when President Trump is proposing steel and aluminum tariffs, a history of tariff policy is not only prescient, but vital to thinking of Trump-ism in the context of previous protectionist iterations in American politics. One of Irwin's greatest analyses is that, despite changing party allegiances, tariff promoters and detractors largely remained static due to the placement of certain industries throughout the country. The South, as an exporter of agricultural and commodity products, was often dead-set against tariffs, while Northerners strove for higher tariffs to protect fledgling industrial and manufacturing concerns. Until the rusting of the Rust Belt, this pattern held firm in tariff negotiations for over a century, despite changes in party make-up and presidential administrations.
Irwin's chronicling of the RTAA negotiations and Cordell Hull's crusade for free trade under the Franklin Roosevelt administration in the 1930s is one of the livelier parts of this work, and brings to life the tedious political wrangling and idealism that Hull espoused on the eve of WWII. Hull, who served as FDR's Secretary of State, was perhaps the prime mover in America's embrace of free trade in the 20th Century.
In the spirit of Thomas Piketty and Joe Stiglitz, this book allows economic facts to shine and paints an objective portrait of how tariffs have shaped American history.
September 27, 2018
Irwin covers the history of US trade and trade policy from the founding of the nation to the election of Donald Trump. He usefully divides that history into three periods based on the primary theme of trade policy during the time: revenue (founding to Civil War), restriction (Reconstruction to Great Depression), and reciprocity (post-Great Depression).
Some key points:
- Trade was an important contributor to revolutionary sentiments. A large motive for the "Tea Party" was that Britain reduced import duties on tea, which undercut Colonial smugglers. They didn't like that.
- Alexander Hamilton's reputation as a protectionist is unearned. His concerns were (a) helping infant industries (for which he actually preferred subsidies to trade protection) and (b) ensuring government revenue (which required finding optimal tariff rates, not high tariffs that would have Laffer Curve-like revenue-reducing effects). Stop invoking Hamilton to justify trade restrictions.
- From the very earliest days, we see that enforcing trade restrictions has always required draconian, heavy government intervention in markets. A good example is Jefferson's ill-fated embargo of 1807. "'It is important to crush every example of forcible opposition to the law,' he instructed Gallatin" (108).
- We stole intellectual property from Britain (p132), just like China is (sort of) doing to us now.
- The argument, frequently made by slavery apologists, that the Civil War was about tariffs is bogus. The Tariff of Abominations that the South so hated was in 1828. But by the late 1850s, tariffs were at their lowest point of the 19th century. The Morrill Tariff of 1861 did not cause secession; secession caused the Morrill Tariff of 1861 (literally; if southern legislators had not abandoned Congress after Lincoln's election, the Morrill Tariff probably would not have passed). For the Nth time, the Civil War was about slavery.
- The evidence does not support the claim that 19th century protectionism was the cause of the nation's rapid economic growth. The rise in capital/labor ratios that drove labor productivity was stronger in services sectors (like railroads) that weren't protected by tariffs, and total factor productivity (TFP) growth was similar to that of the UK.
- Central planning, as if we needed any reminder, is hard (see, e.g., pages 226, 358, 562, 584, or the Trump Administration's difficulties with exemption requests and industry lists). It's a game of whack-a-mole (a great example is cotton--price supports killed exports leading to export subsidies (511)).
- Hawley Smoot didn't cause the Great Depression but it did contribute to the implementation of the UK's imperial preferences system that shut the U.S. out of commonwealth markets and took *decades* to roll back. Decades. Trade barriers can be erected quickly but take a long time to reduce. The path dependence here is profound and cautionary. We still have a 25% tariff on light trucks that was originally designed as retaliation against European poultry tariffs that were imposed in 1962 and lifted shortly thereafter.
- Cordell Hull is a great American hero and patriot. I knew little about him before this, but more than any other American he had the vision of, and laid the groundwork for, the tremendous improvement in the global trading environment that followed WWII.
- Keynes, as always, is overrated. He was wrong about postwar trade architecture (or, as he called it, "lunatic proposals of Mr. Hull" (458)).
- The economic costs of bad trade policy are probably less important than the political dysfunction that inevitably ensues. "We are legislating in the dark, distributing the national funds by a species of State lottery. ... We are opening a Pandora's box of political evils" (144). "[David A.] Wells was shocked to see that powerful special interests operating behind the scenes were having an inordinate influence on government policy" (224). "Let us be to each other instruments of reciprocal rapine. Michigan steals on copper; Maine on lumber, Pennsylvania on iron; North Carolina on peanuts; Massachusetts on cotton goods; Connecticut on hair pints; New Jersey on spool thread; Louisiana on sugar, and so on. Why not let the gentleman from Maryland steal coal from them?" (245). "[Woodrow] Wilson argued that tariffs were simply a way for politicians to dispense the largess of the government to special interests in exchange for political favors" (331). "We farm now in Washington corridors and Congressional committee-rooms" (511). And so on.
- Whatever decline has occurred in American steel's health in recent decades has occurred *in spite of*, not because of, US trade policy. Steel has been a perennial beneficiary of trade protection. Every president since Lyndon Johnson, except Clinton, has given steel special protection. And yet here we are, doing it again in 2018. Textiles also received a lot of protection during its decline.
- NAFTA was luck. Congress passed "fast track" legislation giving the president wide trade policy discretion for the purpose of negotiating the Uruguay GATT round. Bush and Clinton were able to use it to do NAFTA. Congress ratified NAFTA by a hair's width. It was luck, we got lucky. Which brings me to my general thoughts:
As I've noted in other reviews, I increasingly think that the WWII aftermath and the Cold War were unique environments that delivered uniquely good American leadership and policy. There were lots of problems and so on; but in broad terms, foreign policy and economic policy were generated by a bipartisan consensus. We had serious presidents who cared, to some extent at least, about getting policy right. And Cold War concerns motivated even Congress to make good trade policy. You can see this consensus weakening in the 1990s, where NAFTA--a very good trade agreement--barely passed. Bush 43 had to resort to piecemeal bilateral trade deals. Obama failed to wrap up TPP in time. And now we have a presidency that in many ways--not just trade--resembles administrations of the post-Civil War 19th century much more than it resembles the Roosevelt through Obama years. I think a lot of us have wanted to think that the current period is an aberration and that America will get back to being America once this all blows over. I am not so sure. The conditions of the Cold War may have been unique and may have produced a unique policymaking and national media framework that cannot be replicated in other environments. It's too early to tell where trade policy is headed, but we can be sure that the campaign attacks on trade were not just bluster; we're doing the protection thing. And history doesn't provide a lot of reason for hope that this kind of path will work out well. And there is no reason to assume that the next president will bring a return to the Cold War normal.
Some key points:
- Trade was an important contributor to revolutionary sentiments. A large motive for the "Tea Party" was that Britain reduced import duties on tea, which undercut Colonial smugglers. They didn't like that.
- Alexander Hamilton's reputation as a protectionist is unearned. His concerns were (a) helping infant industries (for which he actually preferred subsidies to trade protection) and (b) ensuring government revenue (which required finding optimal tariff rates, not high tariffs that would have Laffer Curve-like revenue-reducing effects). Stop invoking Hamilton to justify trade restrictions.
- From the very earliest days, we see that enforcing trade restrictions has always required draconian, heavy government intervention in markets. A good example is Jefferson's ill-fated embargo of 1807. "'It is important to crush every example of forcible opposition to the law,' he instructed Gallatin" (108).
- We stole intellectual property from Britain (p132), just like China is (sort of) doing to us now.
- The argument, frequently made by slavery apologists, that the Civil War was about tariffs is bogus. The Tariff of Abominations that the South so hated was in 1828. But by the late 1850s, tariffs were at their lowest point of the 19th century. The Morrill Tariff of 1861 did not cause secession; secession caused the Morrill Tariff of 1861 (literally; if southern legislators had not abandoned Congress after Lincoln's election, the Morrill Tariff probably would not have passed). For the Nth time, the Civil War was about slavery.
- The evidence does not support the claim that 19th century protectionism was the cause of the nation's rapid economic growth. The rise in capital/labor ratios that drove labor productivity was stronger in services sectors (like railroads) that weren't protected by tariffs, and total factor productivity (TFP) growth was similar to that of the UK.
- Central planning, as if we needed any reminder, is hard (see, e.g., pages 226, 358, 562, 584, or the Trump Administration's difficulties with exemption requests and industry lists). It's a game of whack-a-mole (a great example is cotton--price supports killed exports leading to export subsidies (511)).
- Hawley Smoot didn't cause the Great Depression but it did contribute to the implementation of the UK's imperial preferences system that shut the U.S. out of commonwealth markets and took *decades* to roll back. Decades. Trade barriers can be erected quickly but take a long time to reduce. The path dependence here is profound and cautionary. We still have a 25% tariff on light trucks that was originally designed as retaliation against European poultry tariffs that were imposed in 1962 and lifted shortly thereafter.
- Cordell Hull is a great American hero and patriot. I knew little about him before this, but more than any other American he had the vision of, and laid the groundwork for, the tremendous improvement in the global trading environment that followed WWII.
- Keynes, as always, is overrated. He was wrong about postwar trade architecture (or, as he called it, "lunatic proposals of Mr. Hull" (458)).
- The economic costs of bad trade policy are probably less important than the political dysfunction that inevitably ensues. "We are legislating in the dark, distributing the national funds by a species of State lottery. ... We are opening a Pandora's box of political evils" (144). "[David A.] Wells was shocked to see that powerful special interests operating behind the scenes were having an inordinate influence on government policy" (224). "Let us be to each other instruments of reciprocal rapine. Michigan steals on copper; Maine on lumber, Pennsylvania on iron; North Carolina on peanuts; Massachusetts on cotton goods; Connecticut on hair pints; New Jersey on spool thread; Louisiana on sugar, and so on. Why not let the gentleman from Maryland steal coal from them?" (245). "[Woodrow] Wilson argued that tariffs were simply a way for politicians to dispense the largess of the government to special interests in exchange for political favors" (331). "We farm now in Washington corridors and Congressional committee-rooms" (511). And so on.
- Whatever decline has occurred in American steel's health in recent decades has occurred *in spite of*, not because of, US trade policy. Steel has been a perennial beneficiary of trade protection. Every president since Lyndon Johnson, except Clinton, has given steel special protection. And yet here we are, doing it again in 2018. Textiles also received a lot of protection during its decline.
- NAFTA was luck. Congress passed "fast track" legislation giving the president wide trade policy discretion for the purpose of negotiating the Uruguay GATT round. Bush and Clinton were able to use it to do NAFTA. Congress ratified NAFTA by a hair's width. It was luck, we got lucky. Which brings me to my general thoughts:
As I've noted in other reviews, I increasingly think that the WWII aftermath and the Cold War were unique environments that delivered uniquely good American leadership and policy. There were lots of problems and so on; but in broad terms, foreign policy and economic policy were generated by a bipartisan consensus. We had serious presidents who cared, to some extent at least, about getting policy right. And Cold War concerns motivated even Congress to make good trade policy. You can see this consensus weakening in the 1990s, where NAFTA--a very good trade agreement--barely passed. Bush 43 had to resort to piecemeal bilateral trade deals. Obama failed to wrap up TPP in time. And now we have a presidency that in many ways--not just trade--resembles administrations of the post-Civil War 19th century much more than it resembles the Roosevelt through Obama years. I think a lot of us have wanted to think that the current period is an aberration and that America will get back to being America once this all blows over. I am not so sure. The conditions of the Cold War may have been unique and may have produced a unique policymaking and national media framework that cannot be replicated in other environments. It's too early to tell where trade policy is headed, but we can be sure that the campaign attacks on trade were not just bluster; we're doing the protection thing. And history doesn't provide a lot of reason for hope that this kind of path will work out well. And there is no reason to assume that the next president will bring a return to the Cold War normal.
March 11, 2018
Douglas Irwin cuenta en un volumen muy largo la historia de los debates sobre la política comercial de Estados Unidos desde su independencia hasta la fecha. No es una lectura sencilla, la escritura es un poco árida en momentos. De trabajo de Irwin se desprenden muchas lecciones que pueden ser incorporadas al análisis presente de la política comercial de Estados Unidos en aspectos como el TPP, la renegociación del TLCAN o las muy recientes tarifas al acero y al aluminio. Por ejemplo lo de las tarifas es un asunto muy parecido a los debates de la década de 1980.
Es un libro que es muy útil para poner en perspectiva el trasfondo de las decisiones de apertura o proteccionismo que ocurren en Estados Unidos y su realidad política, a lo largo de su historia pocas son las veces que consideraciones puramente económicas dictaron la política comercial, siempre ha sido más una mezcla de realidad políticas locales con intereses geopolíticos e intereses económicos.
Por lo anterior es un libro valioso para erradicar algunas nociones falsas en los debates contemporáneos y para entender las causas históricas de algunas de las fuertes divisiones políticas de Estados Unidos en estos temas. No es una lectura sencilla y por lo árido del texto no le doy 5 estrellas, no obstante, si es un libro recomendable si se tiene interés en estos asuntos.
Es un libro que es muy útil para poner en perspectiva el trasfondo de las decisiones de apertura o proteccionismo que ocurren en Estados Unidos y su realidad política, a lo largo de su historia pocas son las veces que consideraciones puramente económicas dictaron la política comercial, siempre ha sido más una mezcla de realidad políticas locales con intereses geopolíticos e intereses económicos.
Por lo anterior es un libro valioso para erradicar algunas nociones falsas en los debates contemporáneos y para entender las causas históricas de algunas de las fuertes divisiones políticas de Estados Unidos en estos temas. No es una lectura sencilla y por lo árido del texto no le doy 5 estrellas, no obstante, si es un libro recomendable si se tiene interés en estos asuntos.
May 11, 2025
Yes, another book on trade and the US. I can thank that bum, Trump, for my interest in trade.
This is a wonderful book. Since it is a history of trade and the US, it is US history from a trade perspective. From the beginning with the founding fathers, we've been fighting over trade. There's money, jobs, power, etc. Irwin is a very good writer, able to make the march of arguments over a lot of mundane info/date interesting. No small feat.
I'll be honest, I probably read 3/4s of this door stopper. It's nearly 700 pages., must weigh 3 pounds. I read up though the civil war then jumped to WWII onward. Not much on Trump because this book was published in 2017, just as his first term began.
Trade is important to different areas of the country because different areas of the country create different things. In the 1800s, the south wanted to export tobacco and rice and import British manufactured goods, while New England and mid-Atlantic colonies wanted protection from British manufacturing. Thus, the tensions.
Trade policy is about three things: revenue, restriction and reciprocity. That's it.
Highlights or just interesting stuff
- In the early days, the only way for the federal government to raise money was with tariffs.
- ... real per capita income in the colonies (early 1800s) was at least 50% higher than in England!
- Thomas Jefferson, as president, signed a TOTAL TRADE embargo in the spring of 1808. No US ships could leave port! The embargo last until March 1809 and was a failure, inflicting large losses on fishermen, farmers, merchants and ship owners.
- Tariffs have been high throughout US history. Sometimes as high as 60%.
- Eventually the northern states became manufacturing powerhouses and were able to get the trade policy they wanted. The south felt that they were getting a bad deal and some of these tensions and discontent was there before the Civil War.
- China has become the world's manufacturing source. This is a very big problem for the US because it will take years, if ever, that the US can become a competitive manufacturing country. Millions of US jobs were sent overseas in the 1980s and after because US companies figured out that they could move jobs to countries with low-coast labor. I say that it's those companies that benefited and no one else. Cheap labor.
This is a very interesting book.
This is a wonderful book. Since it is a history of trade and the US, it is US history from a trade perspective. From the beginning with the founding fathers, we've been fighting over trade. There's money, jobs, power, etc. Irwin is a very good writer, able to make the march of arguments over a lot of mundane info/date interesting. No small feat.
I'll be honest, I probably read 3/4s of this door stopper. It's nearly 700 pages., must weigh 3 pounds. I read up though the civil war then jumped to WWII onward. Not much on Trump because this book was published in 2017, just as his first term began.
Trade is important to different areas of the country because different areas of the country create different things. In the 1800s, the south wanted to export tobacco and rice and import British manufactured goods, while New England and mid-Atlantic colonies wanted protection from British manufacturing. Thus, the tensions.
Trade policy is about three things: revenue, restriction and reciprocity. That's it.
Highlights or just interesting stuff
- In the early days, the only way for the federal government to raise money was with tariffs.
- ... real per capita income in the colonies (early 1800s) was at least 50% higher than in England!
- Thomas Jefferson, as president, signed a TOTAL TRADE embargo in the spring of 1808. No US ships could leave port! The embargo last until March 1809 and was a failure, inflicting large losses on fishermen, farmers, merchants and ship owners.
- Tariffs have been high throughout US history. Sometimes as high as 60%.
- Eventually the northern states became manufacturing powerhouses and were able to get the trade policy they wanted. The south felt that they were getting a bad deal and some of these tensions and discontent was there before the Civil War.
- China has become the world's manufacturing source. This is a very big problem for the US because it will take years, if ever, that the US can become a competitive manufacturing country. Millions of US jobs were sent overseas in the 1980s and after because US companies figured out that they could move jobs to countries with low-coast labor. I say that it's those companies that benefited and no one else. Cheap labor.
This is a very interesting book.
July 27, 2025
First, this is not for the faint of heart. Second, definitely read the reviews so you know what you're getting into. Third, I read the intro first, the conclusion second and the section 3 'From Globalization to Polarization' last. I didn't attempt sections 1/revenue and 2/restriction at this time.
James Madison 'Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and public good . . . It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.' pg 1.
And my favorite - Daniel Webster . . .' a tedious disagreeable subject.'
Lots of detail here. What's not here is a concise set of charts that shows the ebb/flow of tariff percentage, revenue, impact on specific sectors of manufacture/agriculture over the last 40 years. Nor is there a lot of discussion/statements by the actual farmer/textile worker/auto assembly line worker re the actual impact. There are several pertinent paragraphs re China's devaluation of their currency with the negative impact on our 'balance' of trade. Making it look worse than it actually is. Nor is there a discussion of the end Glass-Steagal in 1998 and the impact that has had on inflation/loss of spending power by everyone but the superrich.
I'm moving this to the 'on pause' shelf for the moment.
James Madison 'Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and public good . . . It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.' pg 1.
And my favorite - Daniel Webster . . .' a tedious disagreeable subject.'
Lots of detail here. What's not here is a concise set of charts that shows the ebb/flow of tariff percentage, revenue, impact on specific sectors of manufacture/agriculture over the last 40 years. Nor is there a lot of discussion/statements by the actual farmer/textile worker/auto assembly line worker re the actual impact. There are several pertinent paragraphs re China's devaluation of their currency with the negative impact on our 'balance' of trade. Making it look worse than it actually is. Nor is there a discussion of the end Glass-Steagal in 1998 and the impact that has had on inflation/loss of spending power by everyone but the superrich.
I'm moving this to the 'on pause' shelf for the moment.
April 10, 2025
This is a comprehensive history of American trade policy. Irwin has a slant towards liberal trade policies, but he has done his research and brought together the most complete book of its kind. That must be commended. While my initial interest was focused on the economics around trade policies, the book also had a lot of insight around the tensions between various regions, the changing nature of politics and democracy in America, and the balance of power between different branches of government. The domain of trade policy was one of the first where the new federal government cut its teeth in terms of exercising national sovereignty and it still remains a point of public interest for this reason today.
January 26, 2021
An authoritative and exhaustive examination of how the intent, application, and post hoc perception of trade policy shaped commercial relations since the inception of the United States. In this work, Irwin has produced the most thoroughgoing and masterful probe of both American tariff and non-tariff trade policy, including the political, social, and historical circumstances that cultivated them, to date.
August 8, 2018
Very comprehensive review of U.S. trade activities.
Although rather dry subject matter, this book is extremely well written and researched. A lot of detail but excellent analysis of the data and unbiased presentation. Highly recommended for those interested in the subject.
Although rather dry subject matter, this book is extremely well written and researched. A lot of detail but excellent analysis of the data and unbiased presentation. Highly recommended for those interested in the subject.
October 29, 2019
A tour de force of the history of American trade policy.
March 26, 2020
I loved this!! Highly recommend
March 19, 2021
A great history book of the US trade policy!
December 9, 2023
Fantastic book that changed my perspective on trade policy but perhaps more significantly on US history and the role of economics as a driving factor in political conflict and evolution
December 30, 2024
It’s dense and it’s long, but it will give you a complete history of IS trade policy.
Read
January 29, 2025I definitely disagree with Irwin's perspective, but it's hard to argue with a history this comprehensive and also helpful for writing my thesis.
July 31, 2025
treat it more like a textbook, very dense but super well-organized and informative!
May 21, 2020
Covering a 200-year period in a 700-page book is way too ambitious. But the book could be 10 times longer if more backgrounds were included and well studied.
July 5, 2025
Very interesting reading, even if a little dry. It's like a secret history of foreign relations. Overall, quite a useful read if you intend to comment on the structure of international trade and how international politics reacts to abrupt changes in domestic U.S. policy.
Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews