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The Sword And The Olive: A Critical History Of The Israeli Defense Force
Combining razor-sharp analysis with dramatic narrative, vivid portraits of soldiers and commanders with illuminating discussions of battle tactics and covert actions, The Sword and the Olive traces the history of the IDF from its beginnings in Palestine to today. The book also goes beyond chronology to wrestle with the political and ethical struggles that have shaped the IDF and the country it serves—struggles that are manifesting themselves in the recent tragic escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Often revisionist in attitude, surprising in many of its conclusions, this book casts new light on the struggle for peace in the Middle East.
448 pages, Paperback
First published August 1, 1998
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About the author
Martin van Creveld
65 books128 followersMartin Levi van Creveld is an Israeli military historian and theorist.
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.
- wikipedia.org
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.
- wikipedia.org
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
August 19, 2014
On the whole, this was a very good book. The material is interesting and well told.
Van Creveld is one of those historians who looks for popular notions to rebut, and he has many of them here. Perhaps precisely because he is a patriotic Israeli (particularly, a progressive one), he has lot of cheeky things to say about the IDF and Israeli society generally.
For example, van Creveld wants you to know that the early IDF borrowed its tactical doctrine from, as he delicately puts it, "the pre-1945 German military." (In particular, the IDF's preference for night attacks and aggressive small-unit tactics, its preference for deep armored strikes, and its use of airpower for close tactical support are all characteristic of the Wehrmacht.) This is a somewhat interesting parallel, since the IDF had ex-Soviet, ex-British, and ex-American officers to supply expertise, but almost certainly no ex-Germans. But the author does not take the time to explain how this similarity of doctrine came about. Was it a conscious borrowing or merely similar reactions to similar situations? If so, what were the relevant similarities?
Van Creveld is very good at noting points where the IDF either behaved badly or else bungled. He is less interested -- perhaps because the stories are already well known -- in telling you about their successes. Entebbe is discussed only briefly, but the botched defense of the Bar Lev line in 1973 is discussed in exhaustive detail. He discusses the political maneuverings behind the Israeli defense industry. He does not bother to discuss the quality of their output.
Mostly he is rather skeptical about the ability of IDF senior officers -- talking about Dayan's "peasant cleverness", for instance, and scoffing at the lack of deep professional education among most IDF officers. Interestingly, the only officer to receive high praise is Sharon, who is described as a "bona fide tactical and operational genius."
The ending of the book feels a bit dated, since it was published during the Oslo period and the 20 years since then have been eventful for the IDF. The author wants you to know that IDF morale suffered badly due to the first Intifadah. It would be nice to know if it has recovered. It would also be nice to hear a professional's evaluation of their tactical efficacy in the Second Lebanon War and other comparatively high-intensity conflict situations.
Van Creveld is one of those historians who looks for popular notions to rebut, and he has many of them here. Perhaps precisely because he is a patriotic Israeli (particularly, a progressive one), he has lot of cheeky things to say about the IDF and Israeli society generally.
For example, van Creveld wants you to know that the early IDF borrowed its tactical doctrine from, as he delicately puts it, "the pre-1945 German military." (In particular, the IDF's preference for night attacks and aggressive small-unit tactics, its preference for deep armored strikes, and its use of airpower for close tactical support are all characteristic of the Wehrmacht.) This is a somewhat interesting parallel, since the IDF had ex-Soviet, ex-British, and ex-American officers to supply expertise, but almost certainly no ex-Germans. But the author does not take the time to explain how this similarity of doctrine came about. Was it a conscious borrowing or merely similar reactions to similar situations? If so, what were the relevant similarities?
Van Creveld is very good at noting points where the IDF either behaved badly or else bungled. He is less interested -- perhaps because the stories are already well known -- in telling you about their successes. Entebbe is discussed only briefly, but the botched defense of the Bar Lev line in 1973 is discussed in exhaustive detail. He discusses the political maneuverings behind the Israeli defense industry. He does not bother to discuss the quality of their output.
Mostly he is rather skeptical about the ability of IDF senior officers -- talking about Dayan's "peasant cleverness", for instance, and scoffing at the lack of deep professional education among most IDF officers. Interestingly, the only officer to receive high praise is Sharon, who is described as a "bona fide tactical and operational genius."
The ending of the book feels a bit dated, since it was published during the Oslo period and the 20 years since then have been eventful for the IDF. The author wants you to know that IDF morale suffered badly due to the first Intifadah. It would be nice to know if it has recovered. It would also be nice to hear a professional's evaluation of their tactical efficacy in the Second Lebanon War and other comparatively high-intensity conflict situations.
February 15, 2016
A very good single-volume history of the IDF, incorporating the pre-state militias but unfortunately ending before the Second Intifada. It would be great to have an update.
It's very much a 'warts and all' portrayal, with perhaps too much emphasis on the 'warts.' Much attention paid to the blunders and lack of deep military education on the part of many senior officers, the demoralisation post-Lebanon and the First Intifada, and the political intrigue in the defence industry. Then again, the stories of the great victories have been told extensively elsewhere.
As always, it's great to hear Van Creveld shatter some of the sacred cows on the role of women in the IDF, a position he has, alas, suffered for in public life.
It's very much a 'warts and all' portrayal, with perhaps too much emphasis on the 'warts.' Much attention paid to the blunders and lack of deep military education on the part of many senior officers, the demoralisation post-Lebanon and the First Intifada, and the political intrigue in the defence industry. Then again, the stories of the great victories have been told extensively elsewhere.
As always, it's great to hear Van Creveld shatter some of the sacred cows on the role of women in the IDF, a position he has, alas, suffered for in public life.
July 25, 2011
A much-needed corrective to the myth of Israeli military invincibility that has long held sway in the public imagination. A concise, lucid, raw and objective study of its subject by perhaps the world's greatest living writer of military analysis. Mr. van Creveld, in addition to having two of his books on West Point's required reading list, is a life-long resident of Israel, and has been on the faculty of Hebrew University of Jerusalem since 1971.
November 1, 2019
Most of the Books about the Israel Defense Force are written by Adoring Journalists, Proud Former Member, or whining enemies- finally here we get an Academic Review of it's History- warts and all. Van Creveld points out that the IDF of 1997, when this book was written, is not the same dynamic and transformational force that Fought the 1967 or even the 1973 War. Instead, it is a force with more bureaucracy than ever before, a corrosive political force roiling within its officer corps, and deeply scarred by its nightmarish occupation duties- with their predictable damaging effects on its war fighting capability. I loved every minute of it- and wished I had a new update to look at.
The main story is the same as elsewhere- a handful of plucky militias and terrorist groups coming together with an intricate political dance from the Mandate period of secrecy- to the sudden need for an army in 1948. Van Creveld is great at explaining Israel's sometimes arcane politics (we Jews say that if you get two Jews in a Room- You have at least Three opinions)- first as the disparate groups come together to form the Haganah- then as the various Factions effect Policy after 1973. Those who see Israel as a Right Wing state will be reminded that the Labour party was unashamedly Socialist well into the 1970s (remember that Kibbutzes are essentially collective farms)- and then that the Nation is ruled by a wafer thin margin between Right and left since the 80s. When the narrative calls for tactical and strategic appreciations, the Author has good takes, and when its time to look at the organisation- he's even more interesting. I was held in rapt attention for a few days devouring this book.
This is full of adult concepts, politics and frank discussions of all sort of topics, so might be best reserved for junior readers over 12. For the Gamer/Modeller/Military Enthusiast- this book get less useful as it goes on and the Platoons of the Palmach/Hashomer/Hagana give way to the Ugdas(Divisions) of the 70s, 80's and 90s. But there are still lots of good action reports and anecdotes to help Scenario/Diorama developments from all periods and the narrative of the Lebanon campaign in 1982 may interest some who are playing "Oil War". As an overall appreciation to help a non-Israeli get a better sense of the IDF both good and bad- this is a really good read.
The main story is the same as elsewhere- a handful of plucky militias and terrorist groups coming together with an intricate political dance from the Mandate period of secrecy- to the sudden need for an army in 1948. Van Creveld is great at explaining Israel's sometimes arcane politics (we Jews say that if you get two Jews in a Room- You have at least Three opinions)- first as the disparate groups come together to form the Haganah- then as the various Factions effect Policy after 1973. Those who see Israel as a Right Wing state will be reminded that the Labour party was unashamedly Socialist well into the 1970s (remember that Kibbutzes are essentially collective farms)- and then that the Nation is ruled by a wafer thin margin between Right and left since the 80s. When the narrative calls for tactical and strategic appreciations, the Author has good takes, and when its time to look at the organisation- he's even more interesting. I was held in rapt attention for a few days devouring this book.
This is full of adult concepts, politics and frank discussions of all sort of topics, so might be best reserved for junior readers over 12. For the Gamer/Modeller/Military Enthusiast- this book get less useful as it goes on and the Platoons of the Palmach/Hashomer/Hagana give way to the Ugdas(Divisions) of the 70s, 80's and 90s. But there are still lots of good action reports and anecdotes to help Scenario/Diorama developments from all periods and the narrative of the Lebanon campaign in 1982 may interest some who are playing "Oil War". As an overall appreciation to help a non-Israeli get a better sense of the IDF both good and bad- this is a really good read.
May 8, 2021
After reading Steven Pressfield's quasi-novelistic history of the 1967 Six Day War, I picked up this book by the Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld to learn more about the famous Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Van Creveld takes the reader from the birth of the IDF in the 1930s, through the War of Independence in 1948, and the subsequent Israeli wars in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. The book culminates with the first Palestinian Intifada in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Van Creveld's treatment of the IDF is quite even-handed, detailing its well-known triumphs but also highlighting the force's shortcomings. He stresses the reliance of the original IDF on improvisation and ad hoc solutions, and points out that even today senior officers in the IDF do not receive the advanced education expected of officers in most modern armies.
Most interesting is the author's thesis that the IDF's glory days peaked in 1967, followed by a strong but far from flawless performance in 1973. From there, he posits that the quality of the IDF has steadily diminished as Israel gained access to huge amounts of U.S. financial aid and weaponry from 1973 until the present day. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon is painted as an unmitigated disaster for the IDF, despite the fact that it was more prepared for that war than at any other time its history.
In the final chapter van Creveld depicts the IDF as soft, bloated and demoralized, with the shift of its focus from fighting other armies to suppressing civilian uprisings in the Occupied Territories. He suggests that the IDF has fallen into the same no-win trap that France did in Algeria and the U.S. in Vietnam, with a force structure ill-suited to asymmetric warfare.
I give this book 5 stars, merely because the author has done such a good and readable job of demolishing the myth of the Israeli soldier as superman, highlighting that Israel's society and its armed forces suffer from the same malaise that one sees in most major Western armies.
Van Creveld's treatment of the IDF is quite even-handed, detailing its well-known triumphs but also highlighting the force's shortcomings. He stresses the reliance of the original IDF on improvisation and ad hoc solutions, and points out that even today senior officers in the IDF do not receive the advanced education expected of officers in most modern armies.
Most interesting is the author's thesis that the IDF's glory days peaked in 1967, followed by a strong but far from flawless performance in 1973. From there, he posits that the quality of the IDF has steadily diminished as Israel gained access to huge amounts of U.S. financial aid and weaponry from 1973 until the present day. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon is painted as an unmitigated disaster for the IDF, despite the fact that it was more prepared for that war than at any other time its history.
In the final chapter van Creveld depicts the IDF as soft, bloated and demoralized, with the shift of its focus from fighting other armies to suppressing civilian uprisings in the Occupied Territories. He suggests that the IDF has fallen into the same no-win trap that France did in Algeria and the U.S. in Vietnam, with a force structure ill-suited to asymmetric warfare.
I give this book 5 stars, merely because the author has done such a good and readable job of demolishing the myth of the Israeli soldier as superman, highlighting that Israel's society and its armed forces suffer from the same malaise that one sees in most major Western armies.
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July 11, 2024Van Creveld covers the IDF from its origins as a militia to the late 1990s. He describes this later period as a nadir when morale plummeted and the Israeli population lost faith in the army. An interesting thing about the IDF is that it is a citizen-soldier army encompassing a large part of the population (like Prussia), but he notes that many Israelis find ways to dodge the service. The takeaway is that high morale among the population and an existential "en brera" (no choice) attitude have been decisive at different times in Israel's history of wars. But as time passed, the IDF changed from a lean, aggressive and creative force that relied on strength of will to a bloated, bumbling and over-complicated military incapable of dealing with Palestinian uprisings. This book was written 25 years ago though, but I figured I'd give it a read anyways to get a handle on the IDF as the Gaza War is going on. I do think the "en brera" attitude came back following the Hamas attack on Israel. "En brera" is like a compressed spring suddenly being let go, and this book helped me to understand that. Van Creveld is also influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche, and he opens the book with a Nietzsche quote: "What is good? You ask. To be brave is good." I think the Nietzscheanism is similar to the attempt by Zionist intellectuals to fashion "new Jews" with the opposite set of values from the Diaspora. I found the early history of the Haganah to also be more interesting than I expected.
March 8, 2025
I was so excited to read this book and thought it would be super interesting. It turned out to be one of the driest, least appealing books I’ve read this year. The author provides absolutely zero exterior context outside the history of the IDF. Don’t have a working knowledge of Israel’s history? You won’t get it here. The author constantly name drops important Israeli figures and provides zero backstory or context for who they are. He constantly jumps around in the timeline as well, despite the book being supposedly “chronological”. Finally, I found his view of women to be borderline gross. Saying that female IDF soldiers “lived like princesses” on base because they could use sex to get anything they wanted is very likely untrue and borderline derogatory. I quit halfway through despite pushing myself to keep coming back to the book.
August 31, 2020
I definitely enjoyed the book. It is about the history of Israels military and the process its gone through starting from the few Zionist's in the 1860s until the late 20th century. While a tricky read, the book is incredibly informative and also interesting. I don't think it's a book for everyone, because some parts might seem stale because of the many, many facts, however the book is very nuanced so it really makes a clear picture. While the author, being half Israeli half Dutch, and seeming like a patriotic Israeli, bias doesn't get in the way while calling out the IDF's immoral or bad moves nor pointing out the good it's done. A solid read, and a must for anyone into history in the middle east.
May 25, 2021
I found this book to be very informative as to the history of the Israeli Army. It is not a battle history, but one about the army's growth and development. The author is often critical of the military's policies and decisions. His final chapters seem to show and/or imply that the Israeli Army is in decline and the public no longer views with it pride or supports it as before. I found this to be somewhat off putting until I saw the date of publication was over 20 years ago. Some of the author's conclusions should therefor be taken with the current situation of Israel's armed forces in mind.
February 19, 2019
Excellent but dated account of the IDF. It was first published in '98. It is a fascinating rendition of the history of the IDF from the pre-state days to the First Intifada. Dr. van Creveld tells the whole story warts and all. However, he becomes too pessimistic at the end. Israel, in fact, weathered both intifadas and the Hamas and Iranian proxies offensive since the book was written. There is much reason for hope that the IDF can handle any combination of Arab and/or Persian enemies.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews