Evidential Decision Theory is a radical theory of rational decision-making. It recommends that instead of thinking about what your decisions *cause*, you should think about what they *reveal*. This Element explains in simple terms why thinking in this way makes a big difference, and argues that doing so makes for *better* decisions. An appendix gives an intuitive explanation of the measure-theoretic foundations of Evidential Decision Theory.
This is a short introduction into what the author, Arif Ahmed, calls Evidential Decision Theory. An attempt to formalize the elements that go into making a decision allowing one to analyze preciously what makes a decision rational. Decision theory generally builds on approaches like Game Theory and theories of probability and has been widely discussed in philosophy and other disciplines like economics. The Evidential part is a particular evolution due in large part to the author himself. The point is to formalize the notion that what a rational actor should seek to maximize is their chances of receiving good news (evidence) whatever the direct cause of the news (i.e. even if the actor does not bring about the good). Thus Ahmed formalizes a notion he calls news value as the proper measure of (expected) utility the expectation of which will be the key criterion for justifying decisions.
The volume is a useful introduction to some of the key methods and formalisms of the field and also some of the major controversies. The bibliography and references are useful for those looking for more discussion of various issues. One of the major controversies in decision theory is Newcomb's problem brought to light by Robert Nozick c. 1970. This involves making a decision where a third party has already decided what to do based on an a (relatively) accurate prediction of your decision. Variations on this scenario and reactions to it make up a large part of the book.
Ahmed also spends a good deal of time formalizing the mathematics of his approach. The mathematics is not too complicated, but it can be dense and really understanding it without prior familiarity or natural facility with the methods was beyond me.
One rather pedantic point, Ahmed characterizes Evidential Decision Theory as an alternative to the "orthodoxy" of Causal Decision theory. Causal decision theory prescribes maximizing the expected benefit of the actor's action, thus in cases like Newcomb's problem where maximizing the benefit caused by the actor is at odds with the expected net benefit differences occur in proscribed action. In summary in Newcomb's problem one may either take a certain one or both of two boxes, Evidential Decision Theory proscribes taking the one, Causal Decision Theory proscribes taking both. However philosophers attempting to formalize decision theory took various positions on what to proscribe in Newcomb's problem. Causal decision theory merely represented a concerted attempt to formalize one rationale for taking both boxes, not a victory of that position. So causal decision theory is or was the only game in town, but not actually orthodoxy. One or two other approaches are briefly mentioned.