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Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence
In this gripping chronicle of America's struggle for independence, award-winning historian John Ferling transports readers to the grim realities of that war, capturing an eight-year conflict filled with heroism, suffering, cowardice, betrayal, and fierce dedication. As Ferling demonstrates, it was a war that America came much closer to losing than is now usually remembered. General George Washington put it best when he said that the American victory was "little short of a standing miracle."
Almost a Miracle offers an illuminating portrait of America's triumph, offering vivid descriptions of all the major engagements, from the first shots fired on Lexington Green to the surrender of General Cornwallis at Yorktown, revealing how these battles often hinged on intangibles such as leadership under fire, heroism, good fortune, blunders, tenacity, and surprise. Ferling paints sharp-eyed portraits of the key figures in the war, including General Washington and other American officers and civilian leaders. Some do not always measure up to their iconic reputations, including Washington himself. The book also examines the many faceless men who soldiered, often for years on end, braving untold dangers and enduring abounding miseries. The author explains why they served and sacrificed, and sees them as the forgotten heroes who won American independence.
Almost a Miracle offers an illuminating portrait of America's triumph, offering vivid descriptions of all the major engagements, from the first shots fired on Lexington Green to the surrender of General Cornwallis at Yorktown, revealing how these battles often hinged on intangibles such as leadership under fire, heroism, good fortune, blunders, tenacity, and surprise. Ferling paints sharp-eyed portraits of the key figures in the war, including General Washington and other American officers and civilian leaders. Some do not always measure up to their iconic reputations, including Washington himself. The book also examines the many faceless men who soldiered, often for years on end, braving untold dangers and enduring abounding miseries. The author explains why they served and sacrificed, and sees them as the forgotten heroes who won American independence.
704 pages, Hardcover
First published April 22, 2007
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5584 people want to read
About the author
John Ferling
22 books203 followersJohn E. Ferling is a professor emeritus of history at the University of West Georgia. A leading authority on American Revolutionary history, he is the author of several books, including "A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic", "Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence", and his most recent work, "The Ascent of George Washington: The Hidden Political Genius of an American Icon". He has appeared in television documentaries on PBS, the History Channel, C-SPAN Book TV, and the Learning Channel.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 191 reviews
December 26, 2021
“When the regulars were at fifty yards, and near the point where they would deploy and charge, the Americans opened fire. The volley blew apart the redcoats’ line. When the back rows stepped into the breach, they, too, were cut down by the salvos that followed. What the British were attempting, wrote historian Christopher Ward, was akin to ‘pushing a wax candle against a red-hot plane.’ Lead units disintegrated. Men fell where they had stood. Others were driven backward or were spun around by the force of the shot that struck them, and some toppled mortally wounded into the nearby water. Still, the regulars regrouped and came again, and again, stumbling over their fallen comrades. But they, too, were stopped with heavy losses…”
- John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence
When it comes to the American Revolution, I’m more interested in the ideas that animated it than the battles that decided it. Partly, this is because the ideas are really important, and are being debated to this very day.
Another part is that the battles of the Revolutionary War simply never captured my imagination the way – for example – that the Civil War has. Maybe it’s a childhood thing. I visited a lot of Civil War battlefields as a kid, and nary a single one of the Revolutionary War. Or maybe it’s just easier to imagine the great armies of the Civil War, locked in mortal combat over the biggest issues the nation ever faced, than to conjure up the Continentals of the Revolution, lost in the haze of foundational mythology, their hair queued, their pantaloons a bit too tight, their letters filled with idiosyncratic capitalizations, fighting over principles of parliamentary representation and tax rates.
The battles are important, though, at least in the sense that the ideas would not have mattered if the revolting American colonists had lost militarily. Of course, when you look at the military picture, you realize that the Americans lost as many battles as they won, and that ultimate victory came from sticking around long enough for the French to tip the scales.
If you’re looking for a rock-solid one-volume military review of the American Revolution, John Ferling’s Almost a Miracle is a wonderful choice. An acknowledged expert in this field, Ferling has delivered a well-researched narrative that is tidily organized, ably presented, and occasionally quite vivid.
Almost a Miracle does not take long to warm up. The prologue is a brief, rather affecting vignette of the short American service of Irish-born Captain William Glanville Evelyn, who fell at Pell’s Point in 1776, relatively certain that the American Revolution was soon to fail. From there, Ferling circles back, quickly sets up the reasons for the war, then dives into battle. His descriptions of battle are very good, intertwining muscular prose with the words of participants and other commentators.
Due to the relatively small number of men involved, the encounters of the Revolutionary War were not overly complicated affairs to follow, at least tactically speaking. This isn’t like World War I where the battlefields went on for miles and there were hundreds of individual units involved. Still, Ferling ensures that the major clashes are crisply explained, with helpful maps that make things all the more easier to grasp.
Almost a Miracle has a broad sweep, and touches on just about everything, though the level of detail varies according to subject matter. He incorporates the war at sea, and spends a good deal of time in the South, where he has high praise for Nathaniel Greene and Daniel Morgan. Less time is given to the frontier, with the Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois – one of the larger, more multifaceted schemes of the entire war – getting only about a page.
It’s not all blood and thunder, either. Ferling structures the book in four parts, each dealing with a discrete time period. At the end of each part, he has a chapter called “Choices,” in which he analyzes the context of events he has just narrated, providing further amplification for the actions and decisions made by both the British and American leadership.
As noted above, Ferling is a respected authority on the War of Independence, making it interesting to see his take on the characters of this drama. He is not nearly as harsh toward the demi-traitor Charles Lee as might be expected, and also displays a fair amount of dispassion towards Horatio Gates, who put himself in the historical doghouse by scheming against George Washington. In Ferling’s hands, Gates’s disastrous defeat at Camden almost seems reasonable.
The most fascinating figure is – of course – George Washington. Ferling has complex views of this most towering of Founding Fathers. Eschewing those who believe that Washington executed a brilliant Fabian strategy against the overwhelming might of the British Army, Ferling deprecates Washington’s military talents as rather middling. Indeed, going back to the French and Indian War, Washington’s win-loss record was pretty bad, and during the Revolution he made especially egregious blunders at Long Island and Brandywine. During the War’s endgame, it was Greene and Morgan who – after Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse – maneuvered Lord Cornwallis into his untenable corner at Yorktown.
Instead of a great general, Ferling sees Washington as the consummate politician. While this appears at first blush to be an insult, especially to a soldier, Ferling seems to view it as a specific kind of genius. He was cunning, even Machiavellian in his actions, a gifted player in the high-stakes game of nation-creating, a man who consciously built a myth around himself, which allowed him to get others to make the decisions he wanted made, all while thinking it was their own idea. Whether this portrait is true, or even the best interpretation, is a matter of debate. An argument can be made that Washington’s generalship was perfect for the type of attritional war that England – 3,000 miles away, and stretched thin around the world – simply could not win. In any event, it gives you something to ponder.
Every country and culture has its own creation myth. People being what they are, things seldom start clean or bloodlessly. With the passage of time, the ugliness gets prettified, the points of friction smoothed over, and a single “truth” emerges, chosen from among the multitude of tangled storylines. That’s how we end up with the belief that a war won by a homegrown professional army – aided by a European professional navy – was actually decided by yeoman farmers who dropped their plows and picked up their muskets. Myths play an important part in any nation, forging connections and unities that might otherwise not exist. In the end, though, the dense, knotty, sometimes unpleasant realities are far more fascinating and resonant.
- John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence
When it comes to the American Revolution, I’m more interested in the ideas that animated it than the battles that decided it. Partly, this is because the ideas are really important, and are being debated to this very day.
Another part is that the battles of the Revolutionary War simply never captured my imagination the way – for example – that the Civil War has. Maybe it’s a childhood thing. I visited a lot of Civil War battlefields as a kid, and nary a single one of the Revolutionary War. Or maybe it’s just easier to imagine the great armies of the Civil War, locked in mortal combat over the biggest issues the nation ever faced, than to conjure up the Continentals of the Revolution, lost in the haze of foundational mythology, their hair queued, their pantaloons a bit too tight, their letters filled with idiosyncratic capitalizations, fighting over principles of parliamentary representation and tax rates.
The battles are important, though, at least in the sense that the ideas would not have mattered if the revolting American colonists had lost militarily. Of course, when you look at the military picture, you realize that the Americans lost as many battles as they won, and that ultimate victory came from sticking around long enough for the French to tip the scales.
If you’re looking for a rock-solid one-volume military review of the American Revolution, John Ferling’s Almost a Miracle is a wonderful choice. An acknowledged expert in this field, Ferling has delivered a well-researched narrative that is tidily organized, ably presented, and occasionally quite vivid.
Almost a Miracle does not take long to warm up. The prologue is a brief, rather affecting vignette of the short American service of Irish-born Captain William Glanville Evelyn, who fell at Pell’s Point in 1776, relatively certain that the American Revolution was soon to fail. From there, Ferling circles back, quickly sets up the reasons for the war, then dives into battle. His descriptions of battle are very good, intertwining muscular prose with the words of participants and other commentators.
Due to the relatively small number of men involved, the encounters of the Revolutionary War were not overly complicated affairs to follow, at least tactically speaking. This isn’t like World War I where the battlefields went on for miles and there were hundreds of individual units involved. Still, Ferling ensures that the major clashes are crisply explained, with helpful maps that make things all the more easier to grasp.
Almost a Miracle has a broad sweep, and touches on just about everything, though the level of detail varies according to subject matter. He incorporates the war at sea, and spends a good deal of time in the South, where he has high praise for Nathaniel Greene and Daniel Morgan. Less time is given to the frontier, with the Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois – one of the larger, more multifaceted schemes of the entire war – getting only about a page.
It’s not all blood and thunder, either. Ferling structures the book in four parts, each dealing with a discrete time period. At the end of each part, he has a chapter called “Choices,” in which he analyzes the context of events he has just narrated, providing further amplification for the actions and decisions made by both the British and American leadership.
As noted above, Ferling is a respected authority on the War of Independence, making it interesting to see his take on the characters of this drama. He is not nearly as harsh toward the demi-traitor Charles Lee as might be expected, and also displays a fair amount of dispassion towards Horatio Gates, who put himself in the historical doghouse by scheming against George Washington. In Ferling’s hands, Gates’s disastrous defeat at Camden almost seems reasonable.
The most fascinating figure is – of course – George Washington. Ferling has complex views of this most towering of Founding Fathers. Eschewing those who believe that Washington executed a brilliant Fabian strategy against the overwhelming might of the British Army, Ferling deprecates Washington’s military talents as rather middling. Indeed, going back to the French and Indian War, Washington’s win-loss record was pretty bad, and during the Revolution he made especially egregious blunders at Long Island and Brandywine. During the War’s endgame, it was Greene and Morgan who – after Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse – maneuvered Lord Cornwallis into his untenable corner at Yorktown.
Instead of a great general, Ferling sees Washington as the consummate politician. While this appears at first blush to be an insult, especially to a soldier, Ferling seems to view it as a specific kind of genius. He was cunning, even Machiavellian in his actions, a gifted player in the high-stakes game of nation-creating, a man who consciously built a myth around himself, which allowed him to get others to make the decisions he wanted made, all while thinking it was their own idea. Whether this portrait is true, or even the best interpretation, is a matter of debate. An argument can be made that Washington’s generalship was perfect for the type of attritional war that England – 3,000 miles away, and stretched thin around the world – simply could not win. In any event, it gives you something to ponder.
Every country and culture has its own creation myth. People being what they are, things seldom start clean or bloodlessly. With the passage of time, the ugliness gets prettified, the points of friction smoothed over, and a single “truth” emerges, chosen from among the multitude of tangled storylines. That’s how we end up with the belief that a war won by a homegrown professional army – aided by a European professional navy – was actually decided by yeoman farmers who dropped their plows and picked up their muskets. Myths play an important part in any nation, forging connections and unities that might otherwise not exist. In the end, though, the dense, knotty, sometimes unpleasant realities are far more fascinating and resonant.
December 3, 2008
Despite my professor's view that this is not "truly" a history text (whatever that means), I really loved this book. It is a military history which I didn't think would be my thing, but I really enjoyed it. Ferling's book is more of a concrete time-line type rather than the ideological type of texts that my professor prefers. I found Ferling very refreshing after the large doses of ideology and Marxism of my other class readings. As a fan of George Washington, I also appreciated Ferling's approach to the good General. I dislike the seemingly current trend of tearing down our founding fathers--I don't mind learning of their flaws; they were just regular people after all, but I prefer to learn of their flaws balanced with some mention of their contributions. After all, if flawed men can do great things, there is hope for all of us.
February 17, 2011
All history books should be this well written and as fun to read. I own about 25 books on the American Revolution and this is absolutely the best. If you have to read one book only on the American War for Independence then this is the one! This was required reading for a course I had on that subject in the Spring of 2010 at Temple University - Ambler.
edited (2/4/11) **** now re-reading
Even better the second time through.
edited (2/4/11) **** now re-reading
Even better the second time through.
February 24, 2025
A comprehensive, suspenseful and very readable history of the Revolution.
Military aspects, politics, and diplomacy are covered well. Most of the book is told from the perspectives of the American rebels, the British, and the French, and he argues that French aid was the single most decisive factor in Britain’s defeat. Washington’s experience is also given a lot of space. There’s lots of detail, but not presented in a way that bogs you down.
The book is clear and evenhanded, and moves along at a fast pace. Ferling succeeds in providing balanced and human portraits of the major players without much hagiography or demonization. He’s critical of commanders on both sides, and he does a good job explaining the enormous challenges faced by the colonists and the British; if you were contemporary, you probably found yourself constantly wondering who would lose the war first, or what victory would look like. “The only predictable thing about this war,” he writes, “was the unpredictability of every campaign.” The descriptions of battles are detailed and accompanied by good maps. Ferling very much succeeds in ramming home how desperate the American situation was at so many points.
The writing is elegant, though Ferling sometimes uses terms like “fall guy” or “young women to date.” Elsewhere he writes that “had Las Vegas existed at the time, its odds makers surely would have favored the Franco-Spanish side.” Some readers may wish for more analysis at times,or more coverage of certain topics like the war in the western territories or the Indian experience.It’s a little rambling in a few sections. There’s a few typos. The conclusion also seems a bit inadequate for such a long tome.
Still, a well-researched and well-written work.
Military aspects, politics, and diplomacy are covered well. Most of the book is told from the perspectives of the American rebels, the British, and the French, and he argues that French aid was the single most decisive factor in Britain’s defeat. Washington’s experience is also given a lot of space. There’s lots of detail, but not presented in a way that bogs you down.
The book is clear and evenhanded, and moves along at a fast pace. Ferling succeeds in providing balanced and human portraits of the major players without much hagiography or demonization. He’s critical of commanders on both sides, and he does a good job explaining the enormous challenges faced by the colonists and the British; if you were contemporary, you probably found yourself constantly wondering who would lose the war first, or what victory would look like. “The only predictable thing about this war,” he writes, “was the unpredictability of every campaign.” The descriptions of battles are detailed and accompanied by good maps. Ferling very much succeeds in ramming home how desperate the American situation was at so many points.
The writing is elegant, though Ferling sometimes uses terms like “fall guy” or “young women to date.” Elsewhere he writes that “had Las Vegas existed at the time, its odds makers surely would have favored the Franco-Spanish side.” Some readers may wish for more analysis at times,or more coverage of certain topics like the war in the western territories or the Indian experience.It’s a little rambling in a few sections. There’s a few typos. The conclusion also seems a bit inadequate for such a long tome.
Still, a well-researched and well-written work.
June 24, 2008
John Ferling has done excellent service as a writer and historian in this volumn. It is an excellent and extremely readable survey of the military history of the American Revolution, and in particular is maybe the best treatment of the late war years you'll encounter. It is a thick book, but not as thick as advertised. It runs only 575 pages - the remainder of the book being extensive bibliography and indexes. I enjoyed it immensely.
For a new student of American history, much of what Ferling writes will be revelatory. For those more studied, it will offer fresh takes and insights. There is nothing here however revisionist or driven by churlish motivations. The men and women of the period are made to appear simply as they were, both good and bad, without hypocritical judgment or a too reverent and unskeptical awe. As such, those looking for contriversy or self-serving validation of one modern belief system or the other will need to look elsewhere, as Ferling does not bother endulging his audiences prejudices.
If there is one point on which Ferling departs from orthodox interpretation of the documents, it seemed to me that it was in his portrayal of the relative skills of Franklin and Adams as diplomatic envoys to France. Ferling reverses the usual role of Franklin as the cunning and skilled diplomat, and Adams as the bumbling, niave, and abrasive fool. Instead Ferling portrays Franklin as the all too pliable dupe of his cunning French hosts whose charisma never persuades the French to provide anything that they had not already planned to give anyway to further thier own interests. Adams he paints as the far seeing and wise statesman who enrages the French principally by refusing to sacrifice his nation's interests in the futherance of thier imperial scheming. Since I'm a great admirer of both Franklin and Adams, but hitherto had held the French posting to be unsuitable to Adams temperment this left me much to think about and desiring to do further research.
There are only two things which prevent 'Almost a Miracle' from garnering from me five stars, and in fairness both of these are personal preferences rather than serious attacks on Ferling's methods or scholarship. The first is that Ferling is I think too loathe to employ the long quotation in his narrative. His short quotations - rarely more than sentense fragments - greatly reduce the burden of reading such a tome and keep up the brisk pace of the text, but at the same time a certain amount of weight to me seems proper in a history text. A richer experience of the characters in thier own words is I think at times proper.
The second is even more minor. Having read several other accounts, I am acquainted with a bit more of the details of certain events in Ferling's narrative which Ferling is content to pass over in a sentense or two. While he is quite willing to admit in passing that "No one was as lucky as Washington" and that "the gods of war" were on the side of Greene, had Ferling stopped to explore those occassions in greater detail, he might readily have dropped the 'Almost' from the title. Still, since I'd much rather our secular brothers and sisters read this book than discount it or be offended by it, I'll be content with the excellent work as it is.
For a new student of American history, much of what Ferling writes will be revelatory. For those more studied, it will offer fresh takes and insights. There is nothing here however revisionist or driven by churlish motivations. The men and women of the period are made to appear simply as they were, both good and bad, without hypocritical judgment or a too reverent and unskeptical awe. As such, those looking for contriversy or self-serving validation of one modern belief system or the other will need to look elsewhere, as Ferling does not bother endulging his audiences prejudices.
If there is one point on which Ferling departs from orthodox interpretation of the documents, it seemed to me that it was in his portrayal of the relative skills of Franklin and Adams as diplomatic envoys to France. Ferling reverses the usual role of Franklin as the cunning and skilled diplomat, and Adams as the bumbling, niave, and abrasive fool. Instead Ferling portrays Franklin as the all too pliable dupe of his cunning French hosts whose charisma never persuades the French to provide anything that they had not already planned to give anyway to further thier own interests. Adams he paints as the far seeing and wise statesman who enrages the French principally by refusing to sacrifice his nation's interests in the futherance of thier imperial scheming. Since I'm a great admirer of both Franklin and Adams, but hitherto had held the French posting to be unsuitable to Adams temperment this left me much to think about and desiring to do further research.
There are only two things which prevent 'Almost a Miracle' from garnering from me five stars, and in fairness both of these are personal preferences rather than serious attacks on Ferling's methods or scholarship. The first is that Ferling is I think too loathe to employ the long quotation in his narrative. His short quotations - rarely more than sentense fragments - greatly reduce the burden of reading such a tome and keep up the brisk pace of the text, but at the same time a certain amount of weight to me seems proper in a history text. A richer experience of the characters in thier own words is I think at times proper.
The second is even more minor. Having read several other accounts, I am acquainted with a bit more of the details of certain events in Ferling's narrative which Ferling is content to pass over in a sentense or two. While he is quite willing to admit in passing that "No one was as lucky as Washington" and that "the gods of war" were on the side of Greene, had Ferling stopped to explore those occassions in greater detail, he might readily have dropped the 'Almost' from the title. Still, since I'd much rather our secular brothers and sisters read this book than discount it or be offended by it, I'll be content with the excellent work as it is.
July 28, 2011
John Ferling examines the American War of Independence in a compelling, interesting and intellectuallly perceptive manner. He is a fine historian, whose knowledge is enhanced by his ability as a writer to craft a compelling narrative. I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the strategy and personal stories behind the leadership that is so important for American success against the British during our war of Independence. After you have finished John Ferling's fine history, most likely you will agree with him, that the American success is very close to being, "Almost a Miracle". I found one of the most interesting aspects of Ferling's book his examination into the leadership and thinking of many of the key decision makers who helped set the strategy and direction for the entire campaign. Especially interesting was his insights into George Washington, and how he developed as a leader and military strategist. Equally as fascinating is his examination of the British commanders and their lack of mutual support for each other during the war, resulting in a flawed strategy. The British Army was led by men who were essentially competing for the attention of their King and their own positions of power within their society.
March 31, 2008
I am about half-way through this book and enjoy it immensely. It is shaping up to be the best single volume history of the American Revolution that I have read. John Ferling does an excellent job of humanizing the many mythical leaders of that time period. Readers are introduced to General Washington's legendary temper and jealousy of potential rivals, General Howe's desire to resolve the crisis on favorable terms for Britain with as little bloodshed as possible, and King George III's absolute intransigence when it came to reconciliation in the early stages of the war. So far this is a great book and well worth the read.
I just finished the book this morning and the second half was as great as the first. The well known characters, who have become demi-gods with the passage of time, are revealed as what they truly were; ordinary men and women who accomplished extraordinary things. I also appreciated the emphasis on other, less well known individuals (in particular General Nathaniel Greene) and their vital contributions to the American cause. A very easy-to-read history that I highly recommend.
I just finished the book this morning and the second half was as great as the first. The well known characters, who have become demi-gods with the passage of time, are revealed as what they truly were; ordinary men and women who accomplished extraordinary things. I also appreciated the emphasis on other, less well known individuals (in particular General Nathaniel Greene) and their vital contributions to the American cause. A very easy-to-read history that I highly recommend.
August 13, 2019
Good, but overly detailed and dry in places.
August 23, 2017
An excellent one volume narrative of the War for Independence. The British were stuck with a terrible task: repacify a region an ocean away, with more expanse than all of Europe, with an Army smaller than Frederick's in the Seven Years War. Part of the fascination with the tale is how close they came regardless.
However, the British made several key mistakes that doomed their efforts.
Firstly they underutilized the large numbers of Loyalists in America. Torie regiments wouldn't be built till the last year's of the war, and in few numbers. The British only late in the game recognized the disruption to the rebel economy that taking their slaves represented. Typical of British decision making, it was too little far too late.
The Crown and the Commandery in the field routinely undercut their own efforts by underestimating their foes, especially the rural militias. While the American militias did not always stand up well in main line engagements, they often did, and at Cowpens, King's Mountain and Guilford Courthouse were instrumental in turning the war against the British.
Perhaps the greatest failing of the Crown's efforts were their inability to hold Generals to a rigid chain of command and to force them to adhere to a grand strategy. Time and again the best of London's intentions were frustrated and ruined by bull headed, ambitious, and contentious men in the field who preferred a shot at glory, irregardless of wether or not said personal ambition rhymed with the prospect of winning the war. Howe routing the Continental's at Brandywine and seizing Philadelphia came at the cost of allowing his strategic rival Johnny Burgoyne's invasion of New York to end in disaster at Saratoga.
When Washington struck Howe, at Germantown, although the British tactically were triumphant, strategically Washington had all but blockaded Howe and his army in Philadelphia, making their presence there a liability.
And lastly, the British displayed a daft dilatory nature that doomed them.
This was especially problematic with the Royal Navy, which time and again showed up too late to stop French squadrons sailing to America and the Caribbean. Armies tended to wait weeks before marching after orders were set, and campaigns were rarely persecuted with vigor.
The Americans, although winning the war, also had their share of troubles.
Washington was not a great Captain. He was overly cautious, indecisive, inept tactically and had a truly unhealthy fixation on New York City that nearly doomed the Southern campaigns in the last year's of the war. He was jealous of his own perogatives, rarely sending help to other commanders, and far too often played favorites and politics within his command, and with other senior officers (Horatio Gates his biggest victim).
Still, he kept his army together by sheer force of will, and earned his mens respect if he was never as well loved as a McClellan or a Lee. He was a terrific logistician, and though he tended to lose his battles, his willingness to fight for territory, even in defeat, tended to diffuse British efforts.
The Americans made a nearly fatal mistake by clinging to the defense of cities and large urban areas. They are hard to defend, harder still to take by force, and yet an occupier loses much in strategic consumption by trying to hold them and, if the enemy controls the surrounding rural areas, the holder of a city is at their mercy for food and provendor. Leningrad and Stalingrad are exceptions in war, not the norm.
American persistence in clinging to cities lead to disaster in New York, Charleston, Savannah, and Philadelphia. And yet holding those cities were ruinous to British plans as they became lodestones around their strategic necks.
John Ferling tells all of this in a moving, detailed narrative that goes into the totality of the war. His showcasing of the British strategy sessions are worth the price of the book alone as many times this gets ignored.
He is not overly fond of Washington as a General, then again Ferling does a good job of showcasing everyone's faults as a commander, and their really was little in the realm of true genius in this long, frustrating war.
Although he skimps on tactical details, Ferling does an excellent job on the operational and strategic level, and all the while he reminds you of the human cost of this war.
This is an astoundingly excellent book on a war that, frankly, is largely ignored now a days.
Very highly recommended.
However, the British made several key mistakes that doomed their efforts.
Firstly they underutilized the large numbers of Loyalists in America. Torie regiments wouldn't be built till the last year's of the war, and in few numbers. The British only late in the game recognized the disruption to the rebel economy that taking their slaves represented. Typical of British decision making, it was too little far too late.
The Crown and the Commandery in the field routinely undercut their own efforts by underestimating their foes, especially the rural militias. While the American militias did not always stand up well in main line engagements, they often did, and at Cowpens, King's Mountain and Guilford Courthouse were instrumental in turning the war against the British.
Perhaps the greatest failing of the Crown's efforts were their inability to hold Generals to a rigid chain of command and to force them to adhere to a grand strategy. Time and again the best of London's intentions were frustrated and ruined by bull headed, ambitious, and contentious men in the field who preferred a shot at glory, irregardless of wether or not said personal ambition rhymed with the prospect of winning the war. Howe routing the Continental's at Brandywine and seizing Philadelphia came at the cost of allowing his strategic rival Johnny Burgoyne's invasion of New York to end in disaster at Saratoga.
When Washington struck Howe, at Germantown, although the British tactically were triumphant, strategically Washington had all but blockaded Howe and his army in Philadelphia, making their presence there a liability.
And lastly, the British displayed a daft dilatory nature that doomed them.
This was especially problematic with the Royal Navy, which time and again showed up too late to stop French squadrons sailing to America and the Caribbean. Armies tended to wait weeks before marching after orders were set, and campaigns were rarely persecuted with vigor.
The Americans, although winning the war, also had their share of troubles.
Washington was not a great Captain. He was overly cautious, indecisive, inept tactically and had a truly unhealthy fixation on New York City that nearly doomed the Southern campaigns in the last year's of the war. He was jealous of his own perogatives, rarely sending help to other commanders, and far too often played favorites and politics within his command, and with other senior officers (Horatio Gates his biggest victim).
Still, he kept his army together by sheer force of will, and earned his mens respect if he was never as well loved as a McClellan or a Lee. He was a terrific logistician, and though he tended to lose his battles, his willingness to fight for territory, even in defeat, tended to diffuse British efforts.
The Americans made a nearly fatal mistake by clinging to the defense of cities and large urban areas. They are hard to defend, harder still to take by force, and yet an occupier loses much in strategic consumption by trying to hold them and, if the enemy controls the surrounding rural areas, the holder of a city is at their mercy for food and provendor. Leningrad and Stalingrad are exceptions in war, not the norm.
American persistence in clinging to cities lead to disaster in New York, Charleston, Savannah, and Philadelphia. And yet holding those cities were ruinous to British plans as they became lodestones around their strategic necks.
John Ferling tells all of this in a moving, detailed narrative that goes into the totality of the war. His showcasing of the British strategy sessions are worth the price of the book alone as many times this gets ignored.
He is not overly fond of Washington as a General, then again Ferling does a good job of showcasing everyone's faults as a commander, and their really was little in the realm of true genius in this long, frustrating war.
Although he skimps on tactical details, Ferling does an excellent job on the operational and strategic level, and all the while he reminds you of the human cost of this war.
This is an astoundingly excellent book on a war that, frankly, is largely ignored now a days.
Very highly recommended.
October 23, 2009
Almost a Miracle is a very well written, one volume, and strategic history of the military action in the American War of Independence. In a little over 600 pages of text, Ferling attempts to show how and why the American forces won a war that at the beginning was beyond reasonable to expect. Being a strategic history, the book begins from 1775 onwards, toward the settling of peace in 1783. Many Revolutionary War histories include almost a prelude, with lengthy sections on the causes of the war, and the political consequences of the actions of those on the Imperial and the Patriot sides. By sticking to a strict military retelling of the conflict, Ferling avoids any distractions from the thesis of his book, which is that the American forces simply made the fewest mistakes over the eight years of conflict.
A long time professor at West Georgia University, Ferling presents the familiar course of the war, from Lexington to New York, and ending up in the south at Yorktown, as a matter of difficult military choices. His conclusion for the British side that they were severely hindered by a decentralized command, on the front and at home, an ocean away, along with a total disregard for how to fight and win a conflict; stopped them from actually achieving any goal. His conclusion for the American side, that good leadership, geography and a willing populace led to the desire to see the war out, even beyond the economic ruin that the nation faced.
Ferling shows that he has been immersed in the subject for years with good research. The maps are excellent for a book of this nature, as the reader will be able to follow every major battle and campaign visually, and understand why they happened the way they did. In telling a strategic history, Ferling uses character profiles of every major military officer, on both sides. General Washington is his central figure, and in a sense, Ferling shows why he became the embodiment for the American resolve to continue the war. Yet Ferling makes, what seem to be, fair critiques of the major characters. British General Clinton is heavily criticized for being slow. Lafayette and Hamilton for being syncopates. Most of all, since Washington is the central actor, Ferling critiques to extents perhaps not usual for books of this period, showing how Washington’s strengths and weaknesses contributed to how the conflict turned.
For this book, the Battle of New York City is really a turning point, for both sides changed their strategy, and committed to them, after this battle. About a third of the book is about the Southern campaign of 1779 – 1781. The strategy that Ferling emphasizes is that the British believed they had already lost the northern colonies by this point, and were simply trying to take as much territory as possible before peach talks began. I am not sure if the decentralized command structure of the Crown realized that was their strategy in 1779, but it makes sense in retrospect.
This is simply a very well written, and enjoyable to read military history of the War for Independence. The general reader should come away with a definite feel for the horrors of that war, why it was fought the way it was, and with definite conclusions about why the militaries acted the way they did. Almost a Miracle is highly recommended.
A long time professor at West Georgia University, Ferling presents the familiar course of the war, from Lexington to New York, and ending up in the south at Yorktown, as a matter of difficult military choices. His conclusion for the British side that they were severely hindered by a decentralized command, on the front and at home, an ocean away, along with a total disregard for how to fight and win a conflict; stopped them from actually achieving any goal. His conclusion for the American side, that good leadership, geography and a willing populace led to the desire to see the war out, even beyond the economic ruin that the nation faced.
Ferling shows that he has been immersed in the subject for years with good research. The maps are excellent for a book of this nature, as the reader will be able to follow every major battle and campaign visually, and understand why they happened the way they did. In telling a strategic history, Ferling uses character profiles of every major military officer, on both sides. General Washington is his central figure, and in a sense, Ferling shows why he became the embodiment for the American resolve to continue the war. Yet Ferling makes, what seem to be, fair critiques of the major characters. British General Clinton is heavily criticized for being slow. Lafayette and Hamilton for being syncopates. Most of all, since Washington is the central actor, Ferling critiques to extents perhaps not usual for books of this period, showing how Washington’s strengths and weaknesses contributed to how the conflict turned.
For this book, the Battle of New York City is really a turning point, for both sides changed their strategy, and committed to them, after this battle. About a third of the book is about the Southern campaign of 1779 – 1781. The strategy that Ferling emphasizes is that the British believed they had already lost the northern colonies by this point, and were simply trying to take as much territory as possible before peach talks began. I am not sure if the decentralized command structure of the Crown realized that was their strategy in 1779, but it makes sense in retrospect.
This is simply a very well written, and enjoyable to read military history of the War for Independence. The general reader should come away with a definite feel for the horrors of that war, why it was fought the way it was, and with definite conclusions about why the militaries acted the way they did. Almost a Miracle is highly recommended.
September 18, 2016
A comprehensive, factual and fascinating account of the dramatic years of the American Revolution.
George Washington remarked that it was almost a miracle that the Americans had won the war and Ferling has used these words as the title for this book. He attempts to explain why America won the war, and why the British lost it.
War almost invariably encompasses terrible suffering, and the American Revolution was no exception; for the population near the eastern seaboard whose homes and lands were often destroyed, for the half-starved and nearly naked Continental soldiers and militia who lacked ammunition, and for the British (and Hessian) regulars fighting a ghastly war so far from home.
A fascinating and in-depth study of the American victory in the war of Independence.
July 29, 2012
Another fantastic history book about the American Revolution. I could read about this time period all day. Ferling does an outstanding job covering the entire military history of the Revolutionary War. He presents both sides with the positives and negatives, and he does not shy away from giving his opinion and the opinion of historians in general on the action of the decision makers during the war. He mixes in chapters he titles "choices" for each year of the war that looks at the military strategic decisions that had to be made, but also keeps us up to date on the political happenings that impacted the war. I could recommend this book enough and it has become an instant favorite.
June 14, 2015
My first in-depth exposure to the American Revolution. Got interested in the topic after David McCullough's 1776. The book does a fantastic job of setting up the key characters, following the plot through years from North to South, ending in Yorktown, highlighting the role of luck and providence at every step.
Since the book is from a History Professor and he probably needs to stay true to the details, it does get a bit tedious at times. But kept me interested throughout.
Since the book is from a History Professor and he probably needs to stay true to the details, it does get a bit tedious at times. But kept me interested throughout.
October 15, 2013
Ferling, John. Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
…T.S. reading the letter that Renee wrote to break up with Brodie…“Whoa, she calls you callow in here.”
Brodie—“You say that like it’s a bad thing.”
T.S.—“Well, it means frightened and weak-willed.”
Brodie—“Oh, I thought it was the only part of the letter that was complimentary.”
---from the movie Mallrats directed by Kevin Smith.
A rather unusual start to a book review of a military history, I know. Normally I would not begin a review with a criticism, but Ferling’s overuse of the word “callow” was egregious. I lost count of how often the word came up in the text, and the book is a whopping 575 pages. However, at least Ferling used the word correctly, unlike the screenwriter for Mallrats. Callow does not mean “frightened and weak-willed,” rather it means immature or unseasoned. It is a wonderful adjective, but its continual presence was a little distracting, even if I laughed remembering a vulgar yet funny movie from my college days. My biggest question in its use is how, in a war that lasted eight years, could the soldiers on either side not move past their callowness, even granting new enlistments over the years? This is my biggest criticism of the book; and it’s not really one against Ferling, but rather his editors, who should have corrected the problem. In the end it is a minor critique. Now on to the rest of the review…
John Ferling’s military history of the American Revolution is the companion volume to his 2003 political history of the time, A Leap in the Dark. Both volumes are excellent. Ferling was wise to divide his coverage. Many general histories of the period cram both areas into one book the size of just one of these two. The result is that inevitably the battles get short shrift in favor of the politics and intellectual history. There are histories of one theater or another, for example the Southern Strategy late in the war, and plenty more of single battles such as Bunker Hill or Saratoga, but I can’t think of many that cover the whole scope of the fighting from 1775 to 1783. Thus Almost a Miracle fills a real void in the study of the Revolution as a fine overview of the subject.
Ferling proceeds chronologically through the war, beginning with the buildup to Lexington and Concord in April 1775. Chronological arrangement is not always easy in military affairs that cross wide swaths of land as well as oceans. The movement of the war aided Ferling’s arrangement because the Revolution was not World War Two. In the latter war, battles raged concurrently on multiple fronts. During the War for Independence, the war began in New England and was waged in the North before moving to the South later. The war at sea had its most influential events in the years 1778 and 1779, so Ferling was able to place his coverage of that theater in that time. Of course events occur in the South earlier than 1780, and the North re-enters the narrative after, but Ferling tucks these intrusions into the broader story quite well. He begins each year with a chapter entitled Choices. These set the military decisions for each year in the broader political and diplomatic happenings of the Revolution. These chapters are important because while battlefield events don’t always play out as the result of the decisions made by politicians, many times they do.
Ferling covers all the major battles in every theater: Bunker Hill, the Canadian campaign, New York, Trenton and Princeton, Saratoga, Philadelphia, Monmouth, Charleston, Camden, Cowpens, and Yorktown. Some highlights from the book have nothing to do with the actual events described in the book. The author's preface offers a personal account of how he came to write this book—how he discovered through his studies that his generation was not the only one profoundly influenced by wars. I found this short reflection to be a nice introduction. At the other end of the book is Ferling’s superb bibliography. It is organized by subject, such as biographies, battles, general histories and documentary collections, unit histories, and diplomacy. One whole section is devoted to biographies of George Washington. If anyone is looking for a list of books on the Revolution, this bibliography is a fantastic place to begin.
Going back to the preface, Ferling mentions that in writing the book he came to recognize the importance of the war in the South in bringing about America’s ultimate victory. I found this a bit odd, since I think that many historians of the War of Independence came to see how vital that theater was much earlier. Buchanan’s Road to Guilford Courthouse and Lawrence Babits’ study of Cowpens came out in 1997 and 1998 respectively. I think it safe to say that these books definitely brought the South Strategy to the forefront of historical opinion a full ten years before Almost a Miracle was published. Of course, Ferling used both texts as sources for his work, so I’m sure they helped influence his opinion.
Another important aspect that Ferling refers to in his preface is George Washington’s generalship. He says he “came to see more flaws and greater virtues in Washington’s leadership” (page xii). Indeed, both of these points are played out in the text of the book to great effect. One sees Washington’s unreasonable obsession with New York even to the end of the war, and his disdain for moving South. Many realize that Washington lost many battles, but won the important ones like Trenton. More than that though, one sees Washington’s charisma holding an army together through the darkest days of the war. The great thing about a book that covers the whole scope of the conflict is that the reader gets to see Washington improve as a general both in strategy and battlefield tactics. Certainly his bravery is always on display. Washington’s warts are exposed, but his character shines through even in his weakest moments. He learns from his mistakes and grows over the eight years of the war.
If there is one weakness in the book, it is Ferling’s coverage of the war in the backcountry against the Indians. He does cover it some, particularly the American campaigns against Joseph Brant and the Iroquois in the 1777 and 1778. The casual reader may not realize more could be said on the subject. However I spent a semester in an Early American Frontiers class and we dwelt a great deal on the War in Indian Country. Thankfully Ferling’s bibliography gives the reader more sources to delve deeper into this section of the Revolution. I appreciate the fact that Almost a Miracle is quite lengthy at almost 600 pages, and sacrifices must be made so that a book should not become unwieldy; but it would have been nice in a military history to read something of the actual final battle of the war—the Battle of Blue Licks which took place in Kentucky in 1782, almost a year after Yorktown. Granted it had little strategic significance on the whole, but it was the true final battle of the Revolution.
Ferling closes the book with a couple of excellent concluding chapters which account for America’s victory. On page 541 he mentions that British General Henry Clinton believed the Battle of Kings Mountain to be the turning point in the war. While there are a few excellent histories of the Southern theater as a whole, the last full length study of Kings Mountain came out in 1881. I find this a big hole in the scholarship of the war. Certainly Ferling’s coverage of the 1780 battle was exciting and made me want to drive the three hours to the battlefield to get the lay of the land!
More interesting than that gap in the chronicles of America’s historians is idea that Britain wrote off New England as lost by 1779 and turned to the Southern Strategy in order to keep the remainder of the colonies. Ferling’s final chapter is a brilliant analysis of why Britain could not win, and why, in the end, America could not lose. The book reads well, and while it gets bogged down in the dreariness of 1779, one feels that since America and Britain were both mucking around in the mire during that time, perhaps the reading should go slowly at that point as well. I truly enjoyed making my way through Ferling’s history. It gave me ideas of study to pursue further. I happily recommend the book to other readers—and those same readers should pick up A Leap in the Dark as well.
…T.S. reading the letter that Renee wrote to break up with Brodie…“Whoa, she calls you callow in here.”
Brodie—“You say that like it’s a bad thing.”
T.S.—“Well, it means frightened and weak-willed.”
Brodie—“Oh, I thought it was the only part of the letter that was complimentary.”
---from the movie Mallrats directed by Kevin Smith.
A rather unusual start to a book review of a military history, I know. Normally I would not begin a review with a criticism, but Ferling’s overuse of the word “callow” was egregious. I lost count of how often the word came up in the text, and the book is a whopping 575 pages. However, at least Ferling used the word correctly, unlike the screenwriter for Mallrats. Callow does not mean “frightened and weak-willed,” rather it means immature or unseasoned. It is a wonderful adjective, but its continual presence was a little distracting, even if I laughed remembering a vulgar yet funny movie from my college days. My biggest question in its use is how, in a war that lasted eight years, could the soldiers on either side not move past their callowness, even granting new enlistments over the years? This is my biggest criticism of the book; and it’s not really one against Ferling, but rather his editors, who should have corrected the problem. In the end it is a minor critique. Now on to the rest of the review…
John Ferling’s military history of the American Revolution is the companion volume to his 2003 political history of the time, A Leap in the Dark. Both volumes are excellent. Ferling was wise to divide his coverage. Many general histories of the period cram both areas into one book the size of just one of these two. The result is that inevitably the battles get short shrift in favor of the politics and intellectual history. There are histories of one theater or another, for example the Southern Strategy late in the war, and plenty more of single battles such as Bunker Hill or Saratoga, but I can’t think of many that cover the whole scope of the fighting from 1775 to 1783. Thus Almost a Miracle fills a real void in the study of the Revolution as a fine overview of the subject.
Ferling proceeds chronologically through the war, beginning with the buildup to Lexington and Concord in April 1775. Chronological arrangement is not always easy in military affairs that cross wide swaths of land as well as oceans. The movement of the war aided Ferling’s arrangement because the Revolution was not World War Two. In the latter war, battles raged concurrently on multiple fronts. During the War for Independence, the war began in New England and was waged in the North before moving to the South later. The war at sea had its most influential events in the years 1778 and 1779, so Ferling was able to place his coverage of that theater in that time. Of course events occur in the South earlier than 1780, and the North re-enters the narrative after, but Ferling tucks these intrusions into the broader story quite well. He begins each year with a chapter entitled Choices. These set the military decisions for each year in the broader political and diplomatic happenings of the Revolution. These chapters are important because while battlefield events don’t always play out as the result of the decisions made by politicians, many times they do.
Ferling covers all the major battles in every theater: Bunker Hill, the Canadian campaign, New York, Trenton and Princeton, Saratoga, Philadelphia, Monmouth, Charleston, Camden, Cowpens, and Yorktown. Some highlights from the book have nothing to do with the actual events described in the book. The author's preface offers a personal account of how he came to write this book—how he discovered through his studies that his generation was not the only one profoundly influenced by wars. I found this short reflection to be a nice introduction. At the other end of the book is Ferling’s superb bibliography. It is organized by subject, such as biographies, battles, general histories and documentary collections, unit histories, and diplomacy. One whole section is devoted to biographies of George Washington. If anyone is looking for a list of books on the Revolution, this bibliography is a fantastic place to begin.
Going back to the preface, Ferling mentions that in writing the book he came to recognize the importance of the war in the South in bringing about America’s ultimate victory. I found this a bit odd, since I think that many historians of the War of Independence came to see how vital that theater was much earlier. Buchanan’s Road to Guilford Courthouse and Lawrence Babits’ study of Cowpens came out in 1997 and 1998 respectively. I think it safe to say that these books definitely brought the South Strategy to the forefront of historical opinion a full ten years before Almost a Miracle was published. Of course, Ferling used both texts as sources for his work, so I’m sure they helped influence his opinion.
Another important aspect that Ferling refers to in his preface is George Washington’s generalship. He says he “came to see more flaws and greater virtues in Washington’s leadership” (page xii). Indeed, both of these points are played out in the text of the book to great effect. One sees Washington’s unreasonable obsession with New York even to the end of the war, and his disdain for moving South. Many realize that Washington lost many battles, but won the important ones like Trenton. More than that though, one sees Washington’s charisma holding an army together through the darkest days of the war. The great thing about a book that covers the whole scope of the conflict is that the reader gets to see Washington improve as a general both in strategy and battlefield tactics. Certainly his bravery is always on display. Washington’s warts are exposed, but his character shines through even in his weakest moments. He learns from his mistakes and grows over the eight years of the war.
If there is one weakness in the book, it is Ferling’s coverage of the war in the backcountry against the Indians. He does cover it some, particularly the American campaigns against Joseph Brant and the Iroquois in the 1777 and 1778. The casual reader may not realize more could be said on the subject. However I spent a semester in an Early American Frontiers class and we dwelt a great deal on the War in Indian Country. Thankfully Ferling’s bibliography gives the reader more sources to delve deeper into this section of the Revolution. I appreciate the fact that Almost a Miracle is quite lengthy at almost 600 pages, and sacrifices must be made so that a book should not become unwieldy; but it would have been nice in a military history to read something of the actual final battle of the war—the Battle of Blue Licks which took place in Kentucky in 1782, almost a year after Yorktown. Granted it had little strategic significance on the whole, but it was the true final battle of the Revolution.
Ferling closes the book with a couple of excellent concluding chapters which account for America’s victory. On page 541 he mentions that British General Henry Clinton believed the Battle of Kings Mountain to be the turning point in the war. While there are a few excellent histories of the Southern theater as a whole, the last full length study of Kings Mountain came out in 1881. I find this a big hole in the scholarship of the war. Certainly Ferling’s coverage of the 1780 battle was exciting and made me want to drive the three hours to the battlefield to get the lay of the land!
More interesting than that gap in the chronicles of America’s historians is idea that Britain wrote off New England as lost by 1779 and turned to the Southern Strategy in order to keep the remainder of the colonies. Ferling’s final chapter is a brilliant analysis of why Britain could not win, and why, in the end, America could not lose. The book reads well, and while it gets bogged down in the dreariness of 1779, one feels that since America and Britain were both mucking around in the mire during that time, perhaps the reading should go slowly at that point as well. I truly enjoyed making my way through Ferling’s history. It gave me ideas of study to pursue further. I happily recommend the book to other readers—and those same readers should pick up A Leap in the Dark as well.
August 12, 2013
This is the second work that I have read from John Ferling, and I have found both works to be fantastic. The history of the American Revolution can become muddied by what Dr. Bernstein calls "founders chic." It can also become burdened by an over-critical, harsh assessment of the founders which fails to interpret them in the light of their own time or world. Dr. Ferling avoids both pitfalls and while he does not shy away from the weaknesses of the characters he is writing about, he does not vilify them either. He is a moderate in his approach which makes him come across as a very even-handed historian; I think this adds to his credibility as well. Before reviewing this work it should be clarified that this book focuses for the most part on the military aspects of the revolution. I have never been a great fan of military history, strategy, and tactics, but Dr. Ferling does a great job enlivening this story. This is a great book and here are just a few thoughts on the merits of this work.
The title of the book is called "Almost a Miracle" and this is the premise that Dr. Ferling sets out to explore. How the Americans actually won the war for independence is in many ways inexplicable. We had great military leaders but they were met by formidable opponents who had superior numbers and experience. George Washington was a great commander but he spent much of the war on the run using what is a known as "Fabian tactics." This war of attrition placed him in peril that for some reason never turned against him. At least three times Washington could have easily been killed, and numerous times he could have been replaced. The decisions made by the British, the turn of the weather in Washington's favor, the downright lucky breaks of his junior officers all contributed to the big win that turned the war into the favor of the Americans. Much of the war had the Americans on the ropes and the army was always under threat of breaking down, dismantling, and mutiny. Certainly, Dr. Ferling is quick to point out the successful and genius strokes of American leaders in this war. When credit is due, he is quick to ascribe credit. However, the war did not really go very well for the Americans throughout its 7 years. The french were also a big asset to us and we could not have won it without their help; yet, it was not the French alone that turned the war. In fact, the winning of the American revolution was "almost a miracle" just as Washington had said.
Dr. Ferling moves in a very linear pattern. He starts in 1776 and discusses the campaigns as well as decisions that were made by congress during that year. Each year he stops to discuss choices that had to be made by those in power and the various possibilities that they were faced with. He gives a clear picture what the founders had to consider before waging the war on Great Britain and the decisions that had to be made were sometimes staggering. Washington lived in constant threat that his job would be taken and given to another. General Gates and General Lee were both considered, but somehow Washington hung on. While both men might have been able to out-general Washington, I am not sure that both men would have been able to out-lead him. He had to make practical decisions that did not always lend himself to favorable public opinion. General Lee might have acted on his vanity more than his good sense. Washington could be indecisive but it was when his leaders turned on him that he discovered that he must follow his own instincts. As the book continues one finds himself or herself thinking that the war is a lost cause. Large and small British victories tax the continental army to breaking point.
Dr. Ferling does a great job drawing the readers into the suspense of the story. As battles are occurring one might discover that he or she is finding themselves emotionally and mentally invested in the outcome of the story. I got swept up in the story many times and found myself feeling like I was dragging when the war progressed slow and uncertain. That is a testimony to the writing style of author in that he captures the imagination. There were moments in the book where it seemed to be dragging and that is generally to be expected in any book of its size. There is no doubt that this is a very large work on the revolution and it takes a great deal of time to make any progress. By the end of the war I was so glad that things came to an end. The Americans were literally hanging on by "a wing and a prayer." When it comes to a close he really paints the characters of the story as a little bewildered. The British had a sizable army in the north and could have easily prosecuted the war in New York. The mistake of General Clinton in not bringing Cornwallis' army to the north was the decisive blow that ultimately determined the fate of the war.
While the book focuses a great deal on Washington and his actions, there is also a fair amount about the British generals as well. Howe lost the war, in my opinion, due to being indolent and not pursuing victory more aggressively. Cornwallis was in fact the most aggressive of the generals and achieved the greatest success in his southern campaign. General Clinton was a little too cautious but overall he was a good military leader. His biggest failing seems to be that there was a breach in the leadership between he and Cornwallis. In a war of this size it is important that the leaders like each other and agree to work together for the common good. Clinton had been there so long that he likely should have been recalled and replaced by another general. Washington's strategy of wearing out the opposition took its toll on the generals who fought on the American front. You gain a real sense of the stress and exhaustion that goes along with pressing a campaign in sultry swampland of South Carolina and Georgia. The soldiers marched for days on end in the sweltering heat and faced danger on every side. The war was difficult on the Americans who were more adjusted to the climate so you can imagine what it is was like for the redcoats. Cornwallis waged the right kind of war but he was little overconfident in his abilities.
Overall, this was a great read and I can't recommend it enough. The first book I read by Dr. Ferling was entitled "Independence" and it is a great companion to the this piece. In fact that would be a great book to start with so that the background of congress will set the stage for the military campaigns that are discussed in this book. I have another work of his that I will soon be reading and I am excited about it. If you are looking to analyzes the causes of the American victory, the people who were behind it's success, and the strategies employed to win, then this book is probably for you. Again, I appreciate the even-handed way that Dr. Ferling treated the war and those involved in it. There is no hero worship but it is clear that he does genuinely respect the genius and ability of the American leaders who spearheaded the military successes of the continental army. If you are only buying a couple of books on the American War of Independence then I would strongly recommend that this be one of those books. It is not a small work so it is not for the faint of heart. It is well worth the time that you will invest in it and I look forward to taking the material I have learned and using to teach American history to my future students.
The title of the book is called "Almost a Miracle" and this is the premise that Dr. Ferling sets out to explore. How the Americans actually won the war for independence is in many ways inexplicable. We had great military leaders but they were met by formidable opponents who had superior numbers and experience. George Washington was a great commander but he spent much of the war on the run using what is a known as "Fabian tactics." This war of attrition placed him in peril that for some reason never turned against him. At least three times Washington could have easily been killed, and numerous times he could have been replaced. The decisions made by the British, the turn of the weather in Washington's favor, the downright lucky breaks of his junior officers all contributed to the big win that turned the war into the favor of the Americans. Much of the war had the Americans on the ropes and the army was always under threat of breaking down, dismantling, and mutiny. Certainly, Dr. Ferling is quick to point out the successful and genius strokes of American leaders in this war. When credit is due, he is quick to ascribe credit. However, the war did not really go very well for the Americans throughout its 7 years. The french were also a big asset to us and we could not have won it without their help; yet, it was not the French alone that turned the war. In fact, the winning of the American revolution was "almost a miracle" just as Washington had said.
Dr. Ferling moves in a very linear pattern. He starts in 1776 and discusses the campaigns as well as decisions that were made by congress during that year. Each year he stops to discuss choices that had to be made by those in power and the various possibilities that they were faced with. He gives a clear picture what the founders had to consider before waging the war on Great Britain and the decisions that had to be made were sometimes staggering. Washington lived in constant threat that his job would be taken and given to another. General Gates and General Lee were both considered, but somehow Washington hung on. While both men might have been able to out-general Washington, I am not sure that both men would have been able to out-lead him. He had to make practical decisions that did not always lend himself to favorable public opinion. General Lee might have acted on his vanity more than his good sense. Washington could be indecisive but it was when his leaders turned on him that he discovered that he must follow his own instincts. As the book continues one finds himself or herself thinking that the war is a lost cause. Large and small British victories tax the continental army to breaking point.
Dr. Ferling does a great job drawing the readers into the suspense of the story. As battles are occurring one might discover that he or she is finding themselves emotionally and mentally invested in the outcome of the story. I got swept up in the story many times and found myself feeling like I was dragging when the war progressed slow and uncertain. That is a testimony to the writing style of author in that he captures the imagination. There were moments in the book where it seemed to be dragging and that is generally to be expected in any book of its size. There is no doubt that this is a very large work on the revolution and it takes a great deal of time to make any progress. By the end of the war I was so glad that things came to an end. The Americans were literally hanging on by "a wing and a prayer." When it comes to a close he really paints the characters of the story as a little bewildered. The British had a sizable army in the north and could have easily prosecuted the war in New York. The mistake of General Clinton in not bringing Cornwallis' army to the north was the decisive blow that ultimately determined the fate of the war.
While the book focuses a great deal on Washington and his actions, there is also a fair amount about the British generals as well. Howe lost the war, in my opinion, due to being indolent and not pursuing victory more aggressively. Cornwallis was in fact the most aggressive of the generals and achieved the greatest success in his southern campaign. General Clinton was a little too cautious but overall he was a good military leader. His biggest failing seems to be that there was a breach in the leadership between he and Cornwallis. In a war of this size it is important that the leaders like each other and agree to work together for the common good. Clinton had been there so long that he likely should have been recalled and replaced by another general. Washington's strategy of wearing out the opposition took its toll on the generals who fought on the American front. You gain a real sense of the stress and exhaustion that goes along with pressing a campaign in sultry swampland of South Carolina and Georgia. The soldiers marched for days on end in the sweltering heat and faced danger on every side. The war was difficult on the Americans who were more adjusted to the climate so you can imagine what it is was like for the redcoats. Cornwallis waged the right kind of war but he was little overconfident in his abilities.
Overall, this was a great read and I can't recommend it enough. The first book I read by Dr. Ferling was entitled "Independence" and it is a great companion to the this piece. In fact that would be a great book to start with so that the background of congress will set the stage for the military campaigns that are discussed in this book. I have another work of his that I will soon be reading and I am excited about it. If you are looking to analyzes the causes of the American victory, the people who were behind it's success, and the strategies employed to win, then this book is probably for you. Again, I appreciate the even-handed way that Dr. Ferling treated the war and those involved in it. There is no hero worship but it is clear that he does genuinely respect the genius and ability of the American leaders who spearheaded the military successes of the continental army. If you are only buying a couple of books on the American War of Independence then I would strongly recommend that this be one of those books. It is not a small work so it is not for the faint of heart. It is well worth the time that you will invest in it and I look forward to taking the material I have learned and using to teach American history to my future students.
September 20, 2022
Ferling's narrative of the American Revolution is very well done overall. The author's writing style is smooth, easy to read, and surprisingly free from the pretentious drivel so often prevalent in academic writing. The research is exhaustive, and Ferling brings details to light on many of the events of the war of which I was not aware - particularly on guerilla warfare in the South and the Battle of King's Mountain. While I found the book a pleasure to read, I found Ferling to be too cynical in some of his assessments - especially those relating to General George Washington and his generalship. To balance that out, his assessments on the importance of the guerilla fighting in the South were spot on, and his praise of General Nathanael Greene is deserved. Ferling's book is one which will give even the seasoned reader of books on the American Revolution much to think about, and it is among the very best narratives of the conflict.
January 26, 2021
I came looking for a book that would take me, unfamiliar with the entire war, through the crucial moments, twists and turns of the US war of independence. That much the book delivered. However, it’s far from the riveting narrative the official description makes it out to be, instead rolling out an endless cavalcade of names and characters the author assumes the reader is familiar with and able to track. The narrative also frequently sidetracks into irrelevant anecdotes and meaningless off-hand remarks, so a concise summary for beginners this volume isn’t.
September 14, 2019
Wow. This was...at times, a bit rough to get through. Still, a fascinating account of the Revolutionary War and the many trials and tribulations that both the British and the Americans faced. Just a masterpiece.
May 10, 2018
Enjoyed the broad overview of the war. After reading biographies of several founding fathers, it was helpful to get the whole picture. Bogged down in a few places in the second half going into details cataloguing numbers of supplies and such, but was just a minor inconvenience.
April 16, 2020
A wonderful book! Excellent narrative that provides sufficient, but not overwhelming, detail while providing the necessary broader view of the conflict.
September 13, 2021
This author has always done great research, and astute analysis of what happened, and why, but now he has dramatically upped his story telling skills, without compromising his other talents. This was an exciting page turner. His previous books that I've read have always been worth reading, but sounded too much like college history textbooks, so getting through them was a bit of a slog.
In this book, Ferling did an admirable job of balancing the American & French perspectives vs. the British perspective in addressing the questions about how & why the American Revolution played out as it did.
The focus on the second half of the war, after Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, was really interesting, and I learned a lot that I hadn't known much about before. As usual, Ferling's reliance on original source material made his analysis & conclusions all the more relevant to understanding what was going on from an 18th century perspective. I will happily recommend this book to any history buff who wants to learn more about the American Revolution.
In this book, Ferling did an admirable job of balancing the American & French perspectives vs. the British perspective in addressing the questions about how & why the American Revolution played out as it did.
The focus on the second half of the war, after Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, was really interesting, and I learned a lot that I hadn't known much about before. As usual, Ferling's reliance on original source material made his analysis & conclusions all the more relevant to understanding what was going on from an 18th century perspective. I will happily recommend this book to any history buff who wants to learn more about the American Revolution.
July 14, 2012
I do not dislike historiography. In fact, I enjoy historiography tremendously, since I love books such as "The Tsar's Last Armada". In my opinion, while the author should try to stick to the truth, he or she should be bold at the same time, creating suspense and solving climax like no tomorrow. After all, historical anecdotes should read like an account of our daily life, with our fear, our worry, our relief and our happiness above all things. Hidden under the story should lie the historical discourses of the time, so that historiography would not treck upon slippery grounds into the forgotten realm. Because of my expectation, I found this book an utter disappointment.
The author targets this book for an American audience, no doubt. And alas, a lot of Americans have familiarized themselves with the characters in this book so well, that the author felt no need to brush the portraits of these heroes more carefully. Indeed, the author just throws some details here and there, and before I could memorize about a certain historical person, he has already moved on to the next. The stories are lackluster at best, because the author could not create a sense of contingency, a situation that I could redeem the American victory "almost a miracle". The author focuses more on the battles, while in my case I want to know more about WHY Americans decided to conduct these battles.
Should I be to blame for I expected more? Should I be to blame for I am not the targetted audience? Or should I be to blame for I have read Professor Ellis's books on the same subject, albeit on more political and historical grounds? Nevertheless, this book is not too bad. I just cannot enjoy it.
The author targets this book for an American audience, no doubt. And alas, a lot of Americans have familiarized themselves with the characters in this book so well, that the author felt no need to brush the portraits of these heroes more carefully. Indeed, the author just throws some details here and there, and before I could memorize about a certain historical person, he has already moved on to the next. The stories are lackluster at best, because the author could not create a sense of contingency, a situation that I could redeem the American victory "almost a miracle". The author focuses more on the battles, while in my case I want to know more about WHY Americans decided to conduct these battles.
Should I be to blame for I expected more? Should I be to blame for I am not the targetted audience? Or should I be to blame for I have read Professor Ellis's books on the same subject, albeit on more political and historical grounds? Nevertheless, this book is not too bad. I just cannot enjoy it.
June 9, 2013
unfortunately a new low in ebook descriptions-- book is 1/3rd footnotes and references. so it is not 700 pages, but a solid 450. however, the amazon.com special price of 1.99 erases most of any ill feeling.
crisply written; well-researched; flowing text. about as good as an eighteenth century war book can be, given that modern war books feature people who are more similar to us, whereas in the 18th century there's a bit of 'good sirr, if you woold bee so kindd as to resrain your troops from looting, I would be most obliged' going on.
plenty of month-by-month information on the course of the war, featuring the various mood shifts as Saratoga, New Jersey battles, Charleston (little discussed in US history texts; a patriot defeat) switches the sense of who is prevailing.
many uncanny parallels to modern nation building in iraq; same dilemmas of civilian sentiment vs. military efficacy.
4/5
23 June 2013 reread: reconfirm 4/5 with nice, professional, smooth prose lacking only the absolute 'heart-stopping' quality of Hastings or eyes-glued-to-the-page of Atkinson. good nice professional work, but I'm just not running to buy every Ferling. a good read for war buffs; and very readable despite the fact the war is 240 years old.
fun facts:
New York clearly Tory / Loyalist compared to rebel capital Philly; radical hotbed Boston. (I sorta suspected this already, but several acccounts in this book more or less confirm).
quebec/saratoga illustrating of people's support determining victory. clearly the americans wanted independence; clearly quebec was a bit too far.
charleston was clearly important battle.
crisply written; well-researched; flowing text. about as good as an eighteenth century war book can be, given that modern war books feature people who are more similar to us, whereas in the 18th century there's a bit of 'good sirr, if you woold bee so kindd as to resrain your troops from looting, I would be most obliged' going on.
plenty of month-by-month information on the course of the war, featuring the various mood shifts as Saratoga, New Jersey battles, Charleston (little discussed in US history texts; a patriot defeat) switches the sense of who is prevailing.
many uncanny parallels to modern nation building in iraq; same dilemmas of civilian sentiment vs. military efficacy.
4/5
23 June 2013 reread: reconfirm 4/5 with nice, professional, smooth prose lacking only the absolute 'heart-stopping' quality of Hastings or eyes-glued-to-the-page of Atkinson. good nice professional work, but I'm just not running to buy every Ferling. a good read for war buffs; and very readable despite the fact the war is 240 years old.
fun facts:
New York clearly Tory / Loyalist compared to rebel capital Philly; radical hotbed Boston. (I sorta suspected this already, but several acccounts in this book more or less confirm).
quebec/saratoga illustrating of people's support determining victory. clearly the americans wanted independence; clearly quebec was a bit too far.
charleston was clearly important battle.
April 30, 2011
"Almost A Miracle" is probably the most thorough look at the military history of the US War for Independence that I've ever read. John Ferling has done an excellent job of covering all aspects that went into the US victory. He has categorized the different aspects of the war well and has done a good job of tying the political maneuvering into the overall story. It has illustrations and maps scattered throughout the book that I found very useful in following along as he carried me to the victory. I particularly enjoyed how thoroughly he covered the mid-war period. It's often left out of discussions as if we jumped from Valley Forge to Yorktown! He does a masterful job of painting a more complete picture of Washington as a military leader and a man than we normally see. It also includes naval history. It may not be perfect or complete, but many overviews of the war ignore it completely.
I've read in other reviews complaints about typos and spelling errors, but I didn't notice an excessive amount of them. Maybe I just didn't pay much attention, but I think that might not be as bad as some other readers noted. Either that or I was just too busy enjoying the story. I recommend this book to anyone that wants a good overview of the military history of the American Revolution. I don't think there's a better, more compact one out there. It is quite thorough for one volume.
I've read in other reviews complaints about typos and spelling errors, but I didn't notice an excessive amount of them. Maybe I just didn't pay much attention, but I think that might not be as bad as some other readers noted. Either that or I was just too busy enjoying the story. I recommend this book to anyone that wants a good overview of the military history of the American Revolution. I don't think there's a better, more compact one out there. It is quite thorough for one volume.
November 4, 2015
Ferling seems almost passive aggressive at times, particularly towards General Washington. It maybe that he has a high esteem of the man, but feels compelled to correct a few centuries of misrepresentation.
Additionally while he is pretty good with his footnotes, there are a few times when I wanted to look up his source, but it was nowhere to be found. A few times his critique of military affairs leaves me wondering what his military qualifications are. This book came highly recommended, but left me feeling greatly disappointed.
There was value in his comprehensive look at the war, but at times he simplified way too much. For example, in talking about Benedict Arnold's role at Saratoga, he just talked about a man in a blue coat who was seen riding across a field.
At times Ferling's language is very casual and full of slang, which is unusual for a book which is to be considered a serious academic work.
Additionally while he is pretty good with his footnotes, there are a few times when I wanted to look up his source, but it was nowhere to be found. A few times his critique of military affairs leaves me wondering what his military qualifications are. This book came highly recommended, but left me feeling greatly disappointed.
There was value in his comprehensive look at the war, but at times he simplified way too much. For example, in talking about Benedict Arnold's role at Saratoga, he just talked about a man in a blue coat who was seen riding across a field.
At times Ferling's language is very casual and full of slang, which is unusual for a book which is to be considered a serious academic work.
August 24, 2011
I really enjoyed this book. I really like history, but have never really studied the American Revolution much. I must say, this book was a very good start. The author presents a lot of information in a very readable way. This book kept me interested through out. He presents politics, battles, personalities, social conditions, tories, and many other facts. It was like reading a really good story, and didn't bog down at all. I learned a lot of good information from this account and how it was presented. He sums it all up at the end of the book, giving his thoughts on why the British lost and the colonies won. I never knew what a big part France played in saving the Revolution. The title is a very good choice indeed. It was almost a miracle that the Revolution succeded. I would highly recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the American Revolution.
June 18, 2010
I love reading about the American Revolution, and John Ferling does a good job pointing out the many times things didn't quite work out the way circumstances seemed to indicate they would, and why the American victory was, in many ways, a miracle. This particular book is good, but not my favorite. If you are looking for well-researched, accurate information with a slight bit of human interest thrown in, then this one is for you as long as you don't mind long books. Different battles and battlefield strategies are covered in great detail, so I ended up finding parts of it kind of dry. It is not as easy to read or as interesting as "1776" by David McCullough, but probably contains more historical details.
March 6, 2013
Ferling's "Almost a Miracle" is a relatively straight forward military history of the American Revolution. As far as covering the fact of the revolutions, and providing portraits of the major players, it succeeds. The major battle and generals are covered in sufficient detail that I finished the book with a much greater understanding of how the war was fought. However, the author's style left something to be desired in my opinion. His writing was more conversational and colloquial than I like, and his word choices and commentaries on the actions and justifications of major players left something desired. In the end, the book just wasn't sufficiently engaging. I set it aside to read 3 other books before I finished and found my self wanting the book over sooner, the more I read.
November 4, 2008
This book was a great book! Everyone should read this and be able to come away with a better understanding of just how amazing it was that we won the American Revolution and to have a greater appreciation for those leaders, soldiers, and civilians who fought and sacrificed for the hope of a better country. John Ferling writes beautifully and you stay interested throughout the whole book. It was not your typical history book and it makes you realize that history is intersting can be enjoyable to read about. I loved it and every American citizen should read this book!
March 29, 2019
In the final analysis, this is a pretty balanced single volume history of the Revolutionary War. Fitting the history of that war into one book means 1) it's a long, dense book, and 2) it's not as detailed an account as you could find elsewhere. It felt pretty biased towards Britian at points, but in the end I think it was historically harsh on both sides, probably deservedly so. He was hard on Washington, but I get it, with all the myth and revisionist history surrounding such a monumental figure in American history. Good book, glad I read it.
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