Death by Design: British Tank Development In The Second World War

by Peter Beale

At the outbreak of war in 1939 British tank crews were ill-equipped, under trained and badly led. As a consequence the lives of hundreds of crewmen were wasted unnecessarily. This was due not only to the poor design and construction of British tanks, but also to the lack of thought and planning on the part of successive pre-war governments and the War Office. Death by Design explores how and why Britain went from leading the world in tank design at the end of the First World War to lagging far behind the design quality of Russian and German tanks in the Second World War. This book is a much-needed warning to governments and military planners; a nation must always be prepared to defend itself and ensure that its soliders are equipped with the tools to do so.

Genres: History

224 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1998

Reviews

[Martin Samuels]

It is well-known that British-designed and -built tanks during the Second World War were almost uniformly inadequate - under-gunned, under-armoured, unreliable, obsolete or obsolescent the day they were issued to the troops (with the notable exception of the Comet and Centurian, which arrived in handfuls in the final weeks of the war). Peter Beale seeks to explain why.

In a series of chapters, Beale sets out the causes for the woeful fact that the country that had invented the tank, and had made greatest and most effective use of them during the First World War, found itself 20 years later seemingly unable to design or use the technology. First, he describes the well-known story of the deleterious impact of the Ten Year Rule and the political view that, if there were to be another major war, the Royal Navy and RAF would form the bulwark of the defence of the United Kingdom. Army funding was therefore heavily restrained, with minimal amounts available for the development and production of tanks. Second, he explores how the limited number of tanks available between the two wars, and the few RTC officers in influential positions, meant that the development of armoured doctrine proceeded slowly and without a clear sense of direction. Third, Beale shows that the design process was fundamentally flawed, with no clear relationship between the teams that designed the armoured vehicles and those that designed the guns to go in them (he is clear that primacy should have gone to the gun designers - the tank is merely the vehicle to move the weapon), such that design effort was wasted on dozens of designs that either never saw production, or were beset by huge practical issues that hindered their operational use. Fourth, he considers how the army's systems seemed almost designed to block out the 'voice of the customer', with feedback from tank regiments rejected as reflecting malingering, while concerns raised by senior officers were buried, in case these reduced the confidence of the men in their equipment. Fifth, he sets out the production arrangements, whereby the people who specified what the tank should be able to do were insulated from those who designed the vehicles, who in turn were separated from those who built them. Only when these divisions were eliminated could the system work, and then it produced the Comet and Centurion. Finally, Beale looks at the training of tank crews and their commanders. Here, he finds that most crews and regimental officers received very little practical training in the use of their vehicles and the deployment of their units, having to learn almost all of their field craft 'on the job', and finding the Germans a very unyielding tutor. Equally, many of the senior commanders had very little experience of manoeuvring armoured formations and had to be replaced quickly - Beale suggests only Roberts and Adair were truly effective armoured commanders.

Taken as a whole, Beale's book provides a comprehensive assessment of the situation. With the system flawed in so many ways, the reader may be left wondering how the British managed to win any armoured engagements at all.

But there are two significant deficiencies in the book, which seriously reduce its value. First, it includes (almost) no references, and the bibliographyis very incomplete. Beale has clearly drawn extensively upon the original sources, but his vagueness about many of these, and the lack of detailed references, will leave any serious reader deeply frustrated. Perhaps more seriously, the narrative is entirely focused on the British. But this means there is no point of comparison. Yes, the British tank design / production system was palpably inefficient, but the Germans managed to produce some superb tanks, even though the Nazi bureaucracy was notoriously complex and splintered. Yes, the British designed poor tanks, but how did the Americans (with even less attention paid to tanks between the wars) manage to come up with such useful vehicles as the Sherman?

In short, a very interesting book, which offers a number of interesting insights, and which ought to offer a useful springboard into a deeper understanding of a key issue - but somehow doesn't quite manage it.

[Jesse Callaghan]

Interesting read but needed a better editor. It is different from your average history book in that the author is very passionate about the topic.

[Russ Spence]

the author, judging by the personal photos in this book, served in tanks in the last war, so is perfectly placed to comment on the subject of this book; namely why did this country for most of the war, send its young men out to fight in tanks that in some cases were little more than death traps. This is the story of how the country that invented the tank and introduced groundbreaking tactics for using them found themselves at the outbreak of war with the wrong tanks with the wrong guns for the wrong war, while preparing to take on the country that learnt the lessons the British taught but failed to take on themselves. It looks at the tanks, their guns & the training of the men who used them & is pretty unflinching in its criticism.
This is an excellent read - I do have a minor gripe in the way it reads; whereas it does deal with the failings of British tanks it also sets the opposing German tanks out as perfect in every way, when they weren't (training & tactics made up for a lot of design problems). This is a common failing of military history books dealing with the British, written by the British (see a lot of World War One histories, accounts of the Bismarck, the list goes on)- you are left feeling "well if we were so bad & they were so good, how did we ever win?". The truth was; there was plenty of fault, & design problems with equipment & training on both sides, it's just a lot of the time you only hear half the story.

[Ravi Rai]

Good overview of the British process of tank design and development after WW1 and through WW2, by someone who served at the sharp end of British tanks during WW2. There is a good examination of the factors that underlay British preferences and thinking, as well as the actual process of design, development, and management of the tank production pipeline. Less attention is paid to the tactical doctrine and its development, but that is not really the thrust of the book.

As the title suggests, blame is placed in appropriate places. The political and social factors behind those poor decisions are not really covered, but others have done so, and the focus of the book is upon the neglected aspects of industrial management and tank design.

[Jen]

An important book for understanding the British army of WWII (despite a few flaws)

This book explores the causes of poor British tank design and ineffective use during WWII. The research of this book seems thorough and many specific details and quotes are cited. It is very clear that the author has an axe to grind and is not completely objective though. Despite this it answers many questions about why British armour was so inadequate. My main criticism is how the book is organized. I had trouble following his narrative. Still I highly recommend this book for an avid WWII history reader.

[Terry]

Decent overview of British tank mis-development from 1919 thru 1945. The author does a good job of unpacking all the parties. However, the author really doesn't really spend that much on the combat uses of the various tanks. I would have liked to see much more about the combat uses and maybe less about the internal disagreements.

[Patrick Haugh]

A technological breakthrough squandered

A good overview of how the UK squandered their early lead in AFV design, development and deployment.

By 1943, fully 75% of UK built tanks that year were obsolete or obsolescent the day they were built, or unfit for purpose.