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Dark Waters, Starry Skies: The Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign, March–October 1943
Esteemed Pacific War historian Jeffrey Cox has produced a fast-paced and absorbing read of the crucial New Georgia phase of the Guadalcanal-Solomons Campaign during the Pacific War.
Thousands of miles from friendly ports, the US Navy had finally managed to complete the capture of Guadalcanal from the Japanese in early 1943. Now the Allies sought to keep the offensive momentum won at such a high cost. This is the central plotline running through this page-turning history beginning with the Japanese Operation I-Go and the American ambush of Admiral Yamamoto and continuing on to the Allied invasion of New Georgia, northwest of Guadalcanal in the middle of the Solomon Islands and the location of a major Japanese base. Determined not to repeat their mistakes at Guadalcanal, the Allies nonetheless faltered in their continuing efforts to roll back the Japanese land, air and naval forces.
Using first-hand accounts from both sides, this book vividly recreates all the terror and drama of the nighttime naval battles during this phase of the Solomons campaign and the ferocious firestorm many Marines faced as they disembarked from their landing craft. The reader is transported to the bridge to stand alongside Admiral Walden Ainsworth as he sails to stop another Japanese reinforcement convoy for New Georgia, and vividly feels the fear of an 18-year-old Marine as he fights for survival against a weakened but still determined enemy.
Dark Waters, Starry Skies is an engrossing history which weaves together strategy and tactics with a blow-by-blow account of every battle at a vital point in the Pacific War that has not been analyzed in this level of detail before.
Thousands of miles from friendly ports, the US Navy had finally managed to complete the capture of Guadalcanal from the Japanese in early 1943. Now the Allies sought to keep the offensive momentum won at such a high cost. This is the central plotline running through this page-turning history beginning with the Japanese Operation I-Go and the American ambush of Admiral Yamamoto and continuing on to the Allied invasion of New Georgia, northwest of Guadalcanal in the middle of the Solomon Islands and the location of a major Japanese base. Determined not to repeat their mistakes at Guadalcanal, the Allies nonetheless faltered in their continuing efforts to roll back the Japanese land, air and naval forces.
Using first-hand accounts from both sides, this book vividly recreates all the terror and drama of the nighttime naval battles during this phase of the Solomons campaign and the ferocious firestorm many Marines faced as they disembarked from their landing craft. The reader is transported to the bridge to stand alongside Admiral Walden Ainsworth as he sails to stop another Japanese reinforcement convoy for New Georgia, and vividly feels the fear of an 18-year-old Marine as he fights for survival against a weakened but still determined enemy.
Dark Waters, Starry Skies is an engrossing history which weaves together strategy and tactics with a blow-by-blow account of every battle at a vital point in the Pacific War that has not been analyzed in this level of detail before.
520 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 7, 2023
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May 31, 2025
The Pacific theatre in World War II was a sprawling mess, one which is difficult to describe accurately except in broad brushstrokes. We see the big picture, the main strategic thrusts and the major battles featuring carriers and battleships, but the nitty-gritty of the war fades into the background. To bring out a more detailed view of the theatre, we need to examine it under a magnifying glass. In Dark Waters, Starry Skies, Jeffrey Cox shines a light onto a slice of the Pacific war, the Guadalcanal-Solomons campaign from March to October 1943, revealing an intense tactical conflict on land, air, and sea.
Cox opens with European missionaries held captive then executed on the Japanese destroyer Akikaze, which he then follows into battle on escort duty around Guadalcanal. That widens out into the broader effort by Japan to resupply and seize control of Guadalcanal at the end of 1942. Cox almost gleefully describes the failure of this mission. The Japanese turned to retrenching in the Solomons and New Guinea, building intermediate airfields, which Cox argues should have already been done. The loss of Buna early in 1943 hampered this operation too as the Allies built airbases, which accompanied by rampant US submarines, would wreak havoc on the Japanese. Nowhere was this more true than in the Bismarck Sea that the US had turned into a shooting gallery. Such was the mayhem that the Japanese came to believe that missionaries on the islands were passing information to the Americans. That led to the war crime on the Akikaze, told in horrific detail by Cox.
Cox turns his attention to the US, beginning with their strategic considerations and allocation of commands. From there, Cox narrows in on the island of Guadalcanal and the stranding of the 1st Marine Division for them to protect a vital airfield. Cox notes that the naval and air action around Guadalcanal fluctuated between day and night, with the Japanese controlling the dark; meanwhile on land, the Marines mowed down reckless Japanese infantry assaults. The appointment of Admiral Halsey to command forces in the South Pacific galvanised Americans in all the services, and the war changed. The US navy took on the Japanese, sometimes at point-blank range: the tide was turning.
Having established a platform for both sides in this increasingly chaotic conflict, Cox embarks on a rollercoaster narrative of almost non-stop action, with two themes familiar to students of the Pacific War: Japanese deterioration and the inexorable rise of the US, though not without its complications. In February 1943, the Guadalcanal campaign ended, which was followed by a lull and reorganisation, then the two sides came to grips again in the Solomons. Cox notes that the US relied on airpower while building its naval forces. The Japanese suffered from navy-army infighting, which did not help them in either arena, and their air force suffered from irreplaceable losses. Under the waves, the submarine war did not all go the US’s way either, but again, they could replace losses while Japan increasingly could not. Cox argues that the US did win the intelligence war hands down, calling that the difference between victory and defeat. This dominance showed in the remarkable assassination of Admiral Yamamoto, which had little strategic effect but boosted US morale. Cox continues with blow-by-blow accounts of the fighting on and around New Georgia and New Guinea. Ultimately, the ‘domino’ theory the Japanese employed for its island hopping conquest worked against them, beginning with the loss of Guadalcanal. Cox closes by returning to the Akikaze war crime, who ordered it and why it was never investigated properly.
Jeffrey Cox has written a stirring and authoritative account of the Solomons campaign. His narrative is all-encompassing, from the highest levels of decision making to the bridges of the competing ships to the pilot’s cockpit and the infantryman’s foxhole. Cox is free with his opinions on it all, sometimes, maybe too often, sliding into sarcasm when hindsight reveals what he thinks should have been obvious to those dishing out the orders. That is a good thing because this is never a dry and dusty historical account but an action-packed narrative that puts Cox’s readers into the heart of the combat. For those readers interested in the experience of war, rather than the rivet-counters and tech obsessives, this is a stirring and illuminating book.
Cox opens with European missionaries held captive then executed on the Japanese destroyer Akikaze, which he then follows into battle on escort duty around Guadalcanal. That widens out into the broader effort by Japan to resupply and seize control of Guadalcanal at the end of 1942. Cox almost gleefully describes the failure of this mission. The Japanese turned to retrenching in the Solomons and New Guinea, building intermediate airfields, which Cox argues should have already been done. The loss of Buna early in 1943 hampered this operation too as the Allies built airbases, which accompanied by rampant US submarines, would wreak havoc on the Japanese. Nowhere was this more true than in the Bismarck Sea that the US had turned into a shooting gallery. Such was the mayhem that the Japanese came to believe that missionaries on the islands were passing information to the Americans. That led to the war crime on the Akikaze, told in horrific detail by Cox.
Cox turns his attention to the US, beginning with their strategic considerations and allocation of commands. From there, Cox narrows in on the island of Guadalcanal and the stranding of the 1st Marine Division for them to protect a vital airfield. Cox notes that the naval and air action around Guadalcanal fluctuated between day and night, with the Japanese controlling the dark; meanwhile on land, the Marines mowed down reckless Japanese infantry assaults. The appointment of Admiral Halsey to command forces in the South Pacific galvanised Americans in all the services, and the war changed. The US navy took on the Japanese, sometimes at point-blank range: the tide was turning.
Having established a platform for both sides in this increasingly chaotic conflict, Cox embarks on a rollercoaster narrative of almost non-stop action, with two themes familiar to students of the Pacific War: Japanese deterioration and the inexorable rise of the US, though not without its complications. In February 1943, the Guadalcanal campaign ended, which was followed by a lull and reorganisation, then the two sides came to grips again in the Solomons. Cox notes that the US relied on airpower while building its naval forces. The Japanese suffered from navy-army infighting, which did not help them in either arena, and their air force suffered from irreplaceable losses. Under the waves, the submarine war did not all go the US’s way either, but again, they could replace losses while Japan increasingly could not. Cox argues that the US did win the intelligence war hands down, calling that the difference between victory and defeat. This dominance showed in the remarkable assassination of Admiral Yamamoto, which had little strategic effect but boosted US morale. Cox continues with blow-by-blow accounts of the fighting on and around New Georgia and New Guinea. Ultimately, the ‘domino’ theory the Japanese employed for its island hopping conquest worked against them, beginning with the loss of Guadalcanal. Cox closes by returning to the Akikaze war crime, who ordered it and why it was never investigated properly.
Jeffrey Cox has written a stirring and authoritative account of the Solomons campaign. His narrative is all-encompassing, from the highest levels of decision making to the bridges of the competing ships to the pilot’s cockpit and the infantryman’s foxhole. Cox is free with his opinions on it all, sometimes, maybe too often, sliding into sarcasm when hindsight reveals what he thinks should have been obvious to those dishing out the orders. That is a good thing because this is never a dry and dusty historical account but an action-packed narrative that puts Cox’s readers into the heart of the combat. For those readers interested in the experience of war, rather than the rivet-counters and tech obsessives, this is a stirring and illuminating book.
June 22, 2023
Cox is focused tightly upon the post-Guadalcanal campaign in the Solomons during March-October 1943. The book is comprehensive, detailed almost to the point of tediousness – squadrons, types of aircraft, compositions of task forces and task groups, COs, XOs, damage reports and actual damage assessments, Japanese and Allied land forces, down to company levels and junior officers, and so much more... Cox has invested a vast amount of research into both US and Japanese sources, including individual after action reports, log entries, recollections and official records. It is astounding, and it actually provides incredibly detailed and immersive accounts of the battles, especially the sea battles occurring with regularity throughout this period. It also provides a compelling sense of the scale and persistence of combat throughout this period. A casual reading of the history would leave one thinking there were relative lulls between the accepted major sea battles, when in actuality, there was daily activity often leading to combat encounters, perhaps brief and indecisive, but relatively constant. It contributes to a deeper and fuller appreciation of the constant, chaotic and haphazard nature of so much of the conflict in this time in this relatively confined geography. That is both a compliment and one of the reasons this book needs to be read.
On the negative side, the author narrates his history in a breezy, irreverent tone that frequently devolves into sarcasm and derision. His assessments of decision making, tactics and planning are highly critical, even disdainful. Some of that is perhaps merited by the events examined, a lot of it ignores contributing factors of such as the timeless Clausewitzian factors of friction and fog of war, not to mention the tensions, pressures and uncertainties that accrue in wartime conditions – especially war at sea at night. Clearly, as he documents convincingly, there were serious blunders, at higher levels as well as among those engaged in imminent as well as immediate life and death conflict. The Japanese proclivity for complex plans involving multiple divisions of responsibility with convoluted maneuvers, complex timing and unnecessary division of forces certainly merits criticism, but mistakes in the heat of battle perhaps not so much. Cox tends to paint them all with the same sarcastic, often disdainful brush. He also makes liberal use of sentence fragments – no verb, no structure – just declaratory fragments... some short, some of length. This does not affect the subject matter, but I found it irritating, disruptive of the flow as I read. Appears throughout the text. An annoyance. QED.
On the negative side, the author narrates his history in a breezy, irreverent tone that frequently devolves into sarcasm and derision. His assessments of decision making, tactics and planning are highly critical, even disdainful. Some of that is perhaps merited by the events examined, a lot of it ignores contributing factors of such as the timeless Clausewitzian factors of friction and fog of war, not to mention the tensions, pressures and uncertainties that accrue in wartime conditions – especially war at sea at night. Clearly, as he documents convincingly, there were serious blunders, at higher levels as well as among those engaged in imminent as well as immediate life and death conflict. The Japanese proclivity for complex plans involving multiple divisions of responsibility with convoluted maneuvers, complex timing and unnecessary division of forces certainly merits criticism, but mistakes in the heat of battle perhaps not so much. Cox tends to paint them all with the same sarcastic, often disdainful brush. He also makes liberal use of sentence fragments – no verb, no structure – just declaratory fragments... some short, some of length. This does not affect the subject matter, but I found it irritating, disruptive of the flow as I read. Appears throughout the text. An annoyance. QED.
December 6, 2025
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I also introduce him to my uncle who was suffering from Parkinson’s disease… My uncle is 55 and was diagnosed with Parkinson’s about 2 years ago. He deals with a lot of anxiety, so much so that he doesn’t want to go out, doesn’t want to be with people. he has depends only on the drug levodopa, his meds for the a-fib, and anti depression medicine. Last three months i introduce him to Dr. Ayo. My uncle only used the Dr. Ayo herbal remedy for 6 weeks without levodopa and all his symptoms was completely reversed. My Uncle is now happily living free from Parkinson’s diseases now …. I recommend this Parkinson’s herbal remedy for all Parkinson’s Patients.
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March 6, 2023
Great Booy
An amazing story as told by Mr Cox… Who says historians don’t have a sense of humor? This is definitely not a “dry” read. The authors wit and word play take it to the next level.
An amazing story as told by Mr Cox… Who says historians don’t have a sense of humor? This is definitely not a “dry” read. The authors wit and word play take it to the next level.
May 7, 2023
A very good read. Just what I expect from this author. Others have commented on the author's sarcasm throughout, but I found them to be truthful and entertaining.
June 18, 2023
Not a single map of the land campaigns described in the book. Incredible.
May 10, 2024
Very technical look at this part of the war, The one thing I can appreciate is the author will say what you're thinking about questionable decisions both sides made
October 30, 2023
Dark Waters, Starry Skies is another very solidly rated book on the Pacific War by Jeffrey Cox, if perhaps a tier below the big sellers. This one covers a campaign that has been written about before, but most of the big books about it are getting long in the tooth, so this squeaks by as worthy of interest.
The Long War
The Jintsu drunkenly staggered to starboard and finally stopped, a blazing jumble of metal barely recognizable as the flotilla flagship she had been only five minutes earlier.
Books on the South West Pacific Theatre in 1942-1943 tend to focus on campaigns on the islands of Guadalcanal and New Guinea. Naval books particularly concentrate on actions around Guadalcanal from August-November 1942, which involved aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers. The narrative leads to the emotional climax of the Naval Battles of Guadalcanal of mid-November, with late November’s Tassafaronga acting as a coda about how the wily Japanese could still play a trick or two. The impact on the reader is that the course was set for American victory, notwithstanding the “hard-won” battles to come.
While not incorrect, the issue with that focus is that we end up missing those later hard-won battles that formed Operation Cartwheel, a grinding campaign of attrition where, while neither side could convincingly claim tactical/operational superiority, the Allies definitively played their hand better strategically (if never quite curing their habit of annihilating the first Japanese warship they saw while the rest fired their Long Lances). Dark Waters, Starry Skies is more a refresher than a fresh take on the campaign, but there is a gap in recent publications that I am glad this book fills.
Cox prefers to describe events, with lots of details about destroyer sweeps, bombing raids and submarine patrols. Of less interest is an in-depth soldier/sailor/airman experience, though he’s reasonably good at sprinkling the stories with relevant quotes. Cox is at his best when he applies and investigative focus, such as the massacre of the German missionaries on a Japanese destroyer, or the Yamamoto shootdown. He also provides insight about how a mix-and-match approach to task force composition on both sides had a tendency to backfire. The Japanese viewpoint gets very even treatment considering the relative paucity of records, a strength of Cox’s writing in earlier books as well.
To wit
It seems that after almost two years of war, the Japanese had finally found the Achilles heel of the US Navy: barges.
Lawyers are very clever and witty. I have learnt this from my experience of using lawyers, working with lawyers, and being a lawyer. Lawyers also love to let you know how clever and witty they are.
Cox is good with his wit. Mostly. It’s a point of distinction that can make a book more interesting, particularly in describing a grueling campaign with limited emotional peaks.
It was, perhaps, the best executed torpedo attack by US Navy surface ships so far in the Pacific War. Naturally, all the torpedoes missed.
It is just that occasionally the wit can come across as dismissive of quite detailed debates. As an example, Cox describes the US Navy as stupidly removing torpedoes from their cruisers. The book itself disproves this, with the Japanese Aoba severely damaged by its own exploding torpedo, and the New Zealand Leander risking a similar result. At Midway and Leyte Gulf, Japanese cruisers also appear to have been damaged or sunk by their own exploding torpedoes. I don’t mind if Cox has taken the position that the US Navy cruisers should have carried torpedoes but it's not witty, rather just plain wrong, for the US Navy’s choice to be described as stupid.
I cannot comment on every American or Japanese decision that Cox makes fun of, such as when he writes When you have nothing but bad options, you might as well pick the worst, but I would worry that historiography will not be kind to a number of things that Cox writes. Not so much that he is wrong, more that it appears he has failed to fully consider the reasons behind a decision, such as Japanese artillerymen burying the breech blocks in the dirt rather than the sea – maybe they hoped a swift counter-attack would retake the guns! They may have made the wrong call, but perhaps not a stupid one. There is an obligation to be careful.
You can never really get over commanding the Mogami.
I strongly recommend this book as a campaign guide, as he provides an excellent overview at all levels. As a general recommendation on World War II books, it's less essential for understanding the big picture, but it's a useful corrective to the idea that 1942 was the last time the US was on the back foot at any level.
The Long War
The Jintsu drunkenly staggered to starboard and finally stopped, a blazing jumble of metal barely recognizable as the flotilla flagship she had been only five minutes earlier.
Books on the South West Pacific Theatre in 1942-1943 tend to focus on campaigns on the islands of Guadalcanal and New Guinea. Naval books particularly concentrate on actions around Guadalcanal from August-November 1942, which involved aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers. The narrative leads to the emotional climax of the Naval Battles of Guadalcanal of mid-November, with late November’s Tassafaronga acting as a coda about how the wily Japanese could still play a trick or two. The impact on the reader is that the course was set for American victory, notwithstanding the “hard-won” battles to come.
While not incorrect, the issue with that focus is that we end up missing those later hard-won battles that formed Operation Cartwheel, a grinding campaign of attrition where, while neither side could convincingly claim tactical/operational superiority, the Allies definitively played their hand better strategically (if never quite curing their habit of annihilating the first Japanese warship they saw while the rest fired their Long Lances). Dark Waters, Starry Skies is more a refresher than a fresh take on the campaign, but there is a gap in recent publications that I am glad this book fills.
Cox prefers to describe events, with lots of details about destroyer sweeps, bombing raids and submarine patrols. Of less interest is an in-depth soldier/sailor/airman experience, though he’s reasonably good at sprinkling the stories with relevant quotes. Cox is at his best when he applies and investigative focus, such as the massacre of the German missionaries on a Japanese destroyer, or the Yamamoto shootdown. He also provides insight about how a mix-and-match approach to task force composition on both sides had a tendency to backfire. The Japanese viewpoint gets very even treatment considering the relative paucity of records, a strength of Cox’s writing in earlier books as well.
To wit
It seems that after almost two years of war, the Japanese had finally found the Achilles heel of the US Navy: barges.
Lawyers are very clever and witty. I have learnt this from my experience of using lawyers, working with lawyers, and being a lawyer. Lawyers also love to let you know how clever and witty they are.
Cox is good with his wit. Mostly. It’s a point of distinction that can make a book more interesting, particularly in describing a grueling campaign with limited emotional peaks.
It was, perhaps, the best executed torpedo attack by US Navy surface ships so far in the Pacific War. Naturally, all the torpedoes missed.
It is just that occasionally the wit can come across as dismissive of quite detailed debates. As an example, Cox describes the US Navy as stupidly removing torpedoes from their cruisers. The book itself disproves this, with the Japanese Aoba severely damaged by its own exploding torpedo, and the New Zealand Leander risking a similar result. At Midway and Leyte Gulf, Japanese cruisers also appear to have been damaged or sunk by their own exploding torpedoes. I don’t mind if Cox has taken the position that the US Navy cruisers should have carried torpedoes but it's not witty, rather just plain wrong, for the US Navy’s choice to be described as stupid.
I cannot comment on every American or Japanese decision that Cox makes fun of, such as when he writes When you have nothing but bad options, you might as well pick the worst, but I would worry that historiography will not be kind to a number of things that Cox writes. Not so much that he is wrong, more that it appears he has failed to fully consider the reasons behind a decision, such as Japanese artillerymen burying the breech blocks in the dirt rather than the sea – maybe they hoped a swift counter-attack would retake the guns! They may have made the wrong call, but perhaps not a stupid one. There is an obligation to be careful.
You can never really get over commanding the Mogami.
I strongly recommend this book as a campaign guide, as he provides an excellent overview at all levels. As a general recommendation on World War II books, it's less essential for understanding the big picture, but it's a useful corrective to the idea that 1942 was the last time the US was on the back foot at any level.
August 27, 2024
detailed research
Quite a bit of information about battles and personnel, Japanese and Allies. The author conducted considerable research and includes commentary by the actual participants. I enjoyed the author’s bits of sarcasm at times concerning events and personal involved during the time frame the book revolves around.
Quite a bit of information about battles and personnel, Japanese and Allies. The author conducted considerable research and includes commentary by the actual participants. I enjoyed the author’s bits of sarcasm at times concerning events and personal involved during the time frame the book revolves around.
April 3, 2023
I've always appreciated Mr. Cox and his work. In this book, I did note that his occasional sarcasm and wry wit were allowed quite a bit more free rein than in previous offerings. I found it a bit off-putting and not entirely welcome in an otherwise interesting and informative history.
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