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By All Means Available: Memoirs of a Life in Intelligence, Special Operations, and Strategy
A vivid insider's account of a life in intelligence, special operations, and strategy from the Cold War to the war with al-Qa’ida • "[An] illuminating and richly detailed memoir." —The New York Times Book Review
"Deeply insightful...A sweeping and breathtaking journey that gives the reader unprecedented access to the courage, sacrifice, and bravado of our nation’s finest warriors, in their finest hours." —Admiral William H. McRaven, author of Wisdom of the Bullfrog and #1 New York Times bestseller, Make Your Bed
In 1984, Michael Vickers took charge of the CIA’s secret war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After inheriting a strategy aimed at imposing costs on the Soviets for their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Vickers transformed the covert campaign into an all-out effort to help the Afghan resistance win their war. More than any other American, he was responsible for the outcome in Afghanistan that led to the end of the Cold War.
In By All Means Available, Vickers recounts his remarkable career, from his days as a Green Beret to his vision for victory in Afghanistan to his role in waging America’s war with al-Qa’ida at the highest levels of government. In captivating detail, he depicts his years in the Special Forces—including his training to parachute behind enemy lines with a backpack nuclear weapon in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe—and reveals how those experiences directly influenced his approach to shaping policy. Vickers has played a significant role in most of the military and intelligence operations of the past four decades, and he offers a deeply informed analysis of the greatest challenges facing America today, and in the decades ahead.
Riveting and illuminating, this is a rare and important insider’s account of the modern military and intelligence worlds at every level.
"Deeply insightful...A sweeping and breathtaking journey that gives the reader unprecedented access to the courage, sacrifice, and bravado of our nation’s finest warriors, in their finest hours." —Admiral William H. McRaven, author of Wisdom of the Bullfrog and #1 New York Times bestseller, Make Your Bed
In 1984, Michael Vickers took charge of the CIA’s secret war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After inheriting a strategy aimed at imposing costs on the Soviets for their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Vickers transformed the covert campaign into an all-out effort to help the Afghan resistance win their war. More than any other American, he was responsible for the outcome in Afghanistan that led to the end of the Cold War.
In By All Means Available, Vickers recounts his remarkable career, from his days as a Green Beret to his vision for victory in Afghanistan to his role in waging America’s war with al-Qa’ida at the highest levels of government. In captivating detail, he depicts his years in the Special Forces—including his training to parachute behind enemy lines with a backpack nuclear weapon in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe—and reveals how those experiences directly influenced his approach to shaping policy. Vickers has played a significant role in most of the military and intelligence operations of the past four decades, and he offers a deeply informed analysis of the greatest challenges facing America today, and in the decades ahead.
Riveting and illuminating, this is a rare and important insider’s account of the modern military and intelligence worlds at every level.
565 pages, Kindle Edition
First published June 20, 2023
178 people are currently reading
2747 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 56 reviews
July 2, 2023
I feel bad giving this book ⭐️⭐️⭐️, given the man’s contributions, but as a compiled work, it was really more of a ⭐️⭐️ situation. Didactic, repetitive, opinionated, and focused on self in a way that was somehow grating, this confusing melee of memories really let me down.
The first 5-10% about the author’s early career were really interesting. Even some of the initial CIA covert action stuff was fine, given his unique perspective as the ops officer running something so well-known… but everything after that was confusingly circular, focusing on topics instead of following chronology, providing narrative from a perspective of continuity even when he was in completely different roles.
Overall, it felt like either a case of “if I had more time this would have been shorter” or “I want to get all my opinions and perspectives aligned in a self-reinforcing manner to refute any objections,” not the work of a senior national security advisor recounting his career. I don’t think there’s more than one point where he admits anything he said or did may have been in error, but I would say a solid 20% of the book is riddled with accusations levied at how others did not follow his advice and “look where that got us.”
While I am grateful for his service, the book makes very clear that Mike Vickers was more of an opinionated manager than an inspired leader, someone who cares about doing “the right thing the right way” (without room for alternative views or personal errancy) regardless of the self-contradictions or absurdities. If you took his one-sided views at face value then the defense budget would be 50% of the US GDP and we would have troops deployed in every country in “small forces tamping down insurgencies” or “countering regional hegemonic encroachment” (because global hegemony is somehow the obvious natural state of things).
Maybe this book will get better with age… it’s unlikely I’ll ever find out, as there’s really nothing worth returning for after you’ve a slogged through once. Ironically, that makes Afghanistan a more appealing place to spend some time than between these pages… if Vickers was a true “insurgent at heart” (which seems to be at least partly true) then perhaps some solace will be found in the reader’s immediate need to divest from the overwhelming self-indulgence of this work… an intellectual revolt, if there ever were one.
The first 5-10% about the author’s early career were really interesting. Even some of the initial CIA covert action stuff was fine, given his unique perspective as the ops officer running something so well-known… but everything after that was confusingly circular, focusing on topics instead of following chronology, providing narrative from a perspective of continuity even when he was in completely different roles.
Overall, it felt like either a case of “if I had more time this would have been shorter” or “I want to get all my opinions and perspectives aligned in a self-reinforcing manner to refute any objections,” not the work of a senior national security advisor recounting his career. I don’t think there’s more than one point where he admits anything he said or did may have been in error, but I would say a solid 20% of the book is riddled with accusations levied at how others did not follow his advice and “look where that got us.”
While I am grateful for his service, the book makes very clear that Mike Vickers was more of an opinionated manager than an inspired leader, someone who cares about doing “the right thing the right way” (without room for alternative views or personal errancy) regardless of the self-contradictions or absurdities. If you took his one-sided views at face value then the defense budget would be 50% of the US GDP and we would have troops deployed in every country in “small forces tamping down insurgencies” or “countering regional hegemonic encroachment” (because global hegemony is somehow the obvious natural state of things).
Maybe this book will get better with age… it’s unlikely I’ll ever find out, as there’s really nothing worth returning for after you’ve a slogged through once. Ironically, that makes Afghanistan a more appealing place to spend some time than between these pages… if Vickers was a true “insurgent at heart” (which seems to be at least partly true) then perhaps some solace will be found in the reader’s immediate need to divest from the overwhelming self-indulgence of this work… an intellectual revolt, if there ever were one.
August 27, 2023
Note: I typically don’t add my own commentary, but for this book I wanted to provide a few remarks. I was excited to read this book, but was unimpressed with it overall. The portions regarding the author’s involvement in arming the mujahideen in Afghanistan was fascinating, but the rest of the book wasn’t particularly engaging. The author was involved in numerous operations, but there are better books out there that cover these events. Furthermore, I was at odds with many of the author’s ideas about strategy and policy. He tends to view things entirely through the special forces/CIA/intelligence prism. (Simply put, he is like a hammer that sees every challenge as a nail.)
WHAT IS THIS BOOK ABOUT?
- In 1984, Michael Vickers took charge of the CIA’s secret war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After inheriting a strategy aimed at imposing costs on the Soviets for their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Vickers transformed the covert campaign into an all-out effort to help the Afghan resistance win their war. More than any other American, he was responsible for the outcome in Afghanistan that led to the end of the Cold War.
- Vickers recounts his remarkable career, from his days as a Green Beret to his vision for victory in Afghanistan to his role in waging America’s war with al-Qa’ida at the highest levels of government.
BOOK TITLE
- The book’s title comes from a National Security Council review of the Afghanistan Covert Action Program during the first months of 1985 that led President Reagan to significantly escalate our secret war and seek to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan “by all means available.”
(HOW IS THIS FOR A NEW EQUIPMENT FIELDING PLAN?)
- recommended that we supply key resistance commanders with state-of-the-art, frequency-hopping, tactical radios—advanced communications equipment that hadn’t even been fielded to the U.S. military yet…The program placed a large order for the radios, and we had them in insurgent hands within two months.
CHINA HELPED EQUIP THE MUJAHIDEEN
- Between the beginning of 1985 and the end of 1988, the Chinese would provide nearly $1.5 billion in arms and ammunition to the Afghan resistance. They would also provide nearly two thousand improved SA-7 missiles. We could not have won our secret war without the Chinese.
INSURGENCY FOR (RELATIVELY) CHEAP
- The war had cost the Soviets at least $75 billion in today’s dollars. The cost to the United States for the Afghanistan Covert Action Program barely reached $10 billion.
FROM TACTICAL TO STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS
- My role in the Afghanistan Covert Action Program during its decisive years was the assignment of a lifetime, one that would mark my transition from tactical to strategic and operational leadership.
“THANKS FOR YOUR WORK IN KICKING THE SOVIETS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN BUT YOUR UNCONVENTIONAL PATH HURTS YOU…”
- He informed me that I essentially needed to start over. I needed to do some traditional case officer tours in the field to show that I could recruit and handle assets if I wanted to be promoted to higher grades.
- “Your work on the program doesn’t fit the precepts for a general operations officer.”…“but the precepts are the precepts, and that’s all the promotion boards consider.”
AUTHOR GOT OUT OF THE CIA AND WENT TO SCHOOL
- My seven years of graduate study at Wharton and SAIS furnished me with new analytical tools and a deep appreciation of history and strategic theory that greatly furthered my transition from the world of operations to the world of strategy and policy.
AUTHOR OBLIVIOUS AND/OR UNCONCERNED ABOUT WIDER IMPLICATIONS; ONLY CARES ABOUT HIS OBJECTIVES
- The raid was successful, but it was too much to bear for the Pakistanis who viewed it as a violation of their sovereignty. Kayani, who had been briefed by senior U.S. military leaders before the new campaign began, told us we had undermined his position as Army chief. Predator strikes were acceptable; cross-border raids were not.
“TROOPS NEED PREDATOR COVERAGE? I DON’T CARE…” ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
- I persuaded Secretary Gates in his final months as secretary of defense to transfer six additional Predator orbits to the strategic counterterrorism mission, with these orbits to be used against AQAP in Yemen. Gates had made a very difficult decision. Several of DOD’s top military commanders, Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus among them, were opposed. We were in the midst of a major surge of forces in Afghanistan, and every spare Predator orbit was needed there to support our troops.
“WHY NOT JUST RECOMMEND THEY PRETEND TO BE RED CROSS DURING THE RESCUE…” [SMH]
- An elaborate deception was central to the plan to rescue the hostages. Colombian special forces soldiers would pose as NGO aid workers and fly to Guaviare in an NGO-painted helicopter to move the hostages to another FARC camp.
AUTHOR SUPPORTIVE OF ‘SIGNATURE’ DRONE STRIKES (SEE BONUS SECTION BELOW ON DETAILS OF ‘SIGNATURE’ DRONE STRIKES)
- The Biden administration’s new counterterrorism policy, announced on background to the media in early October 2022, will make matters worse still, with its elimination of signature strikes and its extremely tight restrictions on strikes outside of warzones.
AUTHOR DISMISSIVE OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
- The SEALs, Rangers, Special Forces, and CIA were fighting the war almost single-handedly.
AUTHOR SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS ‘WINNABLE’
- Presidents Trump and Biden turned a stalemate that protected U.S. interests into a defeat that has placed our interests in jeopardy. It was, in my view, a major and completely unnecessary strategic blunder.
- There is no other way to say it: withdrawing from Afghanistan was a major strategic blunder.
- In our own country, the anti–“forever war” politics embraced by both major political parties led to our completely unnecessary defeat in Afghanistan.
[APPARENTLY NO ONE SAID THIS WAS A TERRIBLE, EXPENSIVE IDEA]
- An effort by Central Command to stand up a separate resistance force to go after ISIS in Syria was an unmitigated disaster. The Syrian opposition didn’t want to fight ISIS unless provoked by the group. They wanted to fight the Assad regime. Thus, the CENTCOM force ended up with very few recruits. The plan had been poorly conceived from the start, and the program was eventually terminated after hundreds of millions of dollars had been expended with little to show for it.
AUTHOR HAS THOUGHTS ON THE MARINE CORPS
- For other contingencies, we will need to maintain general-purpose ground forces of a reasonable size, though we will no longer need to maintain the capabilities for forcible entry amphibious operations and protracted stability operations. We will still need capabilities to insert large formations from the sea, but not against adversaries with anti-access/area-denial capabilities. It’s a losing game, and we shouldn’t play it any longer.
[EXCERPTS THAT MADE ME YELL OUT LOUD IN DISAGREEMENT]
- U.S. counterterrorism pressure is the only thing that prevents al-Qa’ida and ISIS from reconstituting in several areas.
- In the western Pacific, we should work with Japan and our other allies and partners, as my former think tank colleague Andy Krepinevich has suggested, to create an “archipelagic defense, developing a large number of hardened, island bases that can evade and withstand China’s growing strike capabilities.”
- We will need to enlist the help of the private sector to combat information influence operations.
- More fully leveraging our venture capital and start-up ecosystem—a key area of U.S. economic and technological advantage—for national security purposes will also be essential.
*** *** *** *** ***
FACTOIDS
- I was a frequent visitor to the base and military occupational specialty libraries. During one such visit, I had a brief conversation with a young female librarian who was signing out the field manuals I had requested. She was just out of college and asked if women could serve in the Special Forces, adding that she spoke French and Spanish. I told her that they couldn’t, but she might consider applying to the CIA. Her name was Gina Haspel, and she would go on to become the agency’s director. (Special Forces is now open to women.)
- The SADM (pronounced “Say-dem”) was a small nuclear weapon, a “backpack nuke.”
- Operations officers, also called case officers, recruit and handle spies and, when directed, conduct covert action to influence events abroad
- prospective agent (a “developmental,” in CIA parlance)
- “Kandahar” is a derivation of “Iskander,” the Afghan name for Alexander the Great, who supposedly founded the city in the fourth century BCE.
GOOD QUOTES
- All men dream: but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their mind wake to find that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dreams with open eyes, to make it possible. —T. E. Lawrence
- A crisis often contains a strategic opportunity within it.
- As George Kennan, the father of the U.S. Cold War strategy of containment, wrote in his “Long Telegram” in 1946, “Much depends on the health and vigor of our own society.”
HAHA
- He then joked that since he had one daughter and I had five, he was confident I had the “low-intensity conflict” part of my job down pat.
*** *** *** *** ***
BONUS
- PBS NewsHour interview with author: https://youtu.be/qX9Dy7eLleU
- Son Tay Raid (1970): https://youtu.be/iMw7apeLS7g
- Col Paris Davis (Retired) gets MoH for 1965 events (saved Billy Waugh and others): https://youtu.be/W7TNYG2Kkhg
- US invasion of Grenada (1983): https://youtu.be/QiqCX2efipc
- Beirut barracks bombing (1983): https://youtu.be/XBSE0JndWeo
- Mi-24 “Hind” attack helicopter: https://youtu.be/qteQGr0WNGY
- Stinger missile in Afghanistan: https://youtu.be/wobG_68P_LE
- MQ-9 Reaper drone: https://youtu.be/XWorG-k6eD0
- Death by “flying Ginsu” missile: https://youtu.be/RtDKFzwXYFQ
- “Signature strike” with drones: https://youtu.be/REgXpGKB2O8
WHAT IS THIS BOOK ABOUT?
- In 1984, Michael Vickers took charge of the CIA’s secret war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. After inheriting a strategy aimed at imposing costs on the Soviets for their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Vickers transformed the covert campaign into an all-out effort to help the Afghan resistance win their war. More than any other American, he was responsible for the outcome in Afghanistan that led to the end of the Cold War.
- Vickers recounts his remarkable career, from his days as a Green Beret to his vision for victory in Afghanistan to his role in waging America’s war with al-Qa’ida at the highest levels of government.
BOOK TITLE
- The book’s title comes from a National Security Council review of the Afghanistan Covert Action Program during the first months of 1985 that led President Reagan to significantly escalate our secret war and seek to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan “by all means available.”
(HOW IS THIS FOR A NEW EQUIPMENT FIELDING PLAN?)
- recommended that we supply key resistance commanders with state-of-the-art, frequency-hopping, tactical radios—advanced communications equipment that hadn’t even been fielded to the U.S. military yet…The program placed a large order for the radios, and we had them in insurgent hands within two months.
CHINA HELPED EQUIP THE MUJAHIDEEN
- Between the beginning of 1985 and the end of 1988, the Chinese would provide nearly $1.5 billion in arms and ammunition to the Afghan resistance. They would also provide nearly two thousand improved SA-7 missiles. We could not have won our secret war without the Chinese.
INSURGENCY FOR (RELATIVELY) CHEAP
- The war had cost the Soviets at least $75 billion in today’s dollars. The cost to the United States for the Afghanistan Covert Action Program barely reached $10 billion.
FROM TACTICAL TO STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS
- My role in the Afghanistan Covert Action Program during its decisive years was the assignment of a lifetime, one that would mark my transition from tactical to strategic and operational leadership.
“THANKS FOR YOUR WORK IN KICKING THE SOVIETS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN BUT YOUR UNCONVENTIONAL PATH HURTS YOU…”
- He informed me that I essentially needed to start over. I needed to do some traditional case officer tours in the field to show that I could recruit and handle assets if I wanted to be promoted to higher grades.
- “Your work on the program doesn’t fit the precepts for a general operations officer.”…“but the precepts are the precepts, and that’s all the promotion boards consider.”
AUTHOR GOT OUT OF THE CIA AND WENT TO SCHOOL
- My seven years of graduate study at Wharton and SAIS furnished me with new analytical tools and a deep appreciation of history and strategic theory that greatly furthered my transition from the world of operations to the world of strategy and policy.
AUTHOR OBLIVIOUS AND/OR UNCONCERNED ABOUT WIDER IMPLICATIONS; ONLY CARES ABOUT HIS OBJECTIVES
- The raid was successful, but it was too much to bear for the Pakistanis who viewed it as a violation of their sovereignty. Kayani, who had been briefed by senior U.S. military leaders before the new campaign began, told us we had undermined his position as Army chief. Predator strikes were acceptable; cross-border raids were not.
“TROOPS NEED PREDATOR COVERAGE? I DON’T CARE…” ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
- I persuaded Secretary Gates in his final months as secretary of defense to transfer six additional Predator orbits to the strategic counterterrorism mission, with these orbits to be used against AQAP in Yemen. Gates had made a very difficult decision. Several of DOD’s top military commanders, Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus among them, were opposed. We were in the midst of a major surge of forces in Afghanistan, and every spare Predator orbit was needed there to support our troops.
“WHY NOT JUST RECOMMEND THEY PRETEND TO BE RED CROSS DURING THE RESCUE…” [SMH]
- An elaborate deception was central to the plan to rescue the hostages. Colombian special forces soldiers would pose as NGO aid workers and fly to Guaviare in an NGO-painted helicopter to move the hostages to another FARC camp.
AUTHOR SUPPORTIVE OF ‘SIGNATURE’ DRONE STRIKES (SEE BONUS SECTION BELOW ON DETAILS OF ‘SIGNATURE’ DRONE STRIKES)
- The Biden administration’s new counterterrorism policy, announced on background to the media in early October 2022, will make matters worse still, with its elimination of signature strikes and its extremely tight restrictions on strikes outside of warzones.
AUTHOR DISMISSIVE OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES
- The SEALs, Rangers, Special Forces, and CIA were fighting the war almost single-handedly.
AUTHOR SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS ‘WINNABLE’
- Presidents Trump and Biden turned a stalemate that protected U.S. interests into a defeat that has placed our interests in jeopardy. It was, in my view, a major and completely unnecessary strategic blunder.
- There is no other way to say it: withdrawing from Afghanistan was a major strategic blunder.
- In our own country, the anti–“forever war” politics embraced by both major political parties led to our completely unnecessary defeat in Afghanistan.
[APPARENTLY NO ONE SAID THIS WAS A TERRIBLE, EXPENSIVE IDEA]
- An effort by Central Command to stand up a separate resistance force to go after ISIS in Syria was an unmitigated disaster. The Syrian opposition didn’t want to fight ISIS unless provoked by the group. They wanted to fight the Assad regime. Thus, the CENTCOM force ended up with very few recruits. The plan had been poorly conceived from the start, and the program was eventually terminated after hundreds of millions of dollars had been expended with little to show for it.
AUTHOR HAS THOUGHTS ON THE MARINE CORPS
- For other contingencies, we will need to maintain general-purpose ground forces of a reasonable size, though we will no longer need to maintain the capabilities for forcible entry amphibious operations and protracted stability operations. We will still need capabilities to insert large formations from the sea, but not against adversaries with anti-access/area-denial capabilities. It’s a losing game, and we shouldn’t play it any longer.
[EXCERPTS THAT MADE ME YELL OUT LOUD IN DISAGREEMENT]
- U.S. counterterrorism pressure is the only thing that prevents al-Qa’ida and ISIS from reconstituting in several areas.
- In the western Pacific, we should work with Japan and our other allies and partners, as my former think tank colleague Andy Krepinevich has suggested, to create an “archipelagic defense, developing a large number of hardened, island bases that can evade and withstand China’s growing strike capabilities.”
- We will need to enlist the help of the private sector to combat information influence operations.
- More fully leveraging our venture capital and start-up ecosystem—a key area of U.S. economic and technological advantage—for national security purposes will also be essential.
*** *** *** *** ***
FACTOIDS
- I was a frequent visitor to the base and military occupational specialty libraries. During one such visit, I had a brief conversation with a young female librarian who was signing out the field manuals I had requested. She was just out of college and asked if women could serve in the Special Forces, adding that she spoke French and Spanish. I told her that they couldn’t, but she might consider applying to the CIA. Her name was Gina Haspel, and she would go on to become the agency’s director. (Special Forces is now open to women.)
- The SADM (pronounced “Say-dem”) was a small nuclear weapon, a “backpack nuke.”
- Operations officers, also called case officers, recruit and handle spies and, when directed, conduct covert action to influence events abroad
- prospective agent (a “developmental,” in CIA parlance)
- “Kandahar” is a derivation of “Iskander,” the Afghan name for Alexander the Great, who supposedly founded the city in the fourth century BCE.
GOOD QUOTES
- All men dream: but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their mind wake to find that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dreams with open eyes, to make it possible. —T. E. Lawrence
- A crisis often contains a strategic opportunity within it.
- As George Kennan, the father of the U.S. Cold War strategy of containment, wrote in his “Long Telegram” in 1946, “Much depends on the health and vigor of our own society.”
HAHA
- He then joked that since he had one daughter and I had five, he was confident I had the “low-intensity conflict” part of my job down pat.
*** *** *** *** ***
BONUS
- PBS NewsHour interview with author: https://youtu.be/qX9Dy7eLleU
- Son Tay Raid (1970): https://youtu.be/iMw7apeLS7g
- Col Paris Davis (Retired) gets MoH for 1965 events (saved Billy Waugh and others): https://youtu.be/W7TNYG2Kkhg
- US invasion of Grenada (1983): https://youtu.be/QiqCX2efipc
- Beirut barracks bombing (1983): https://youtu.be/XBSE0JndWeo
- Mi-24 “Hind” attack helicopter: https://youtu.be/qteQGr0WNGY
- Stinger missile in Afghanistan: https://youtu.be/wobG_68P_LE
- MQ-9 Reaper drone: https://youtu.be/XWorG-k6eD0
- Death by “flying Ginsu” missile: https://youtu.be/RtDKFzwXYFQ
- “Signature strike” with drones: https://youtu.be/REgXpGKB2O8
May 6, 2023
Michael G. Vickers: By all means available. Memoirs of a life in intelligence, special operations, and strategy. (2023). Knopf, Pantheon, Vintage, and Anchor [Uncorrected proof]
Thanks for NetGalley for the opportunity to preview this text! Given that the ARC was labeled “uncorrected proof,” I will not offer any quotations.
Vickers not only describes a long and interesting career, spanning decades and several US presidents, but offers insight into his efforts to expand his understanding of the choice points encountered in international politics. His process of education and training is described in great detail. He consistently sought to enhance his knowledge and skills, taking advantage of the resources provided by the federal government and universities close to his employment.
Details on his experiences are included to assist the reader in seeing connections among the activities of individuals and agencies across the globe. His contributions to achieving US priorities are understandably at the center of the text. He offers extensive analysis of many global areas of conflict (e.g., Afghanistan) and efforts to contain terrorism (e.g., Usama Bin Laden). I was impressed by his success in providing a narrative on world tensions that seldom lagged, even given an extensive presentation of names and activities to fully understand the events under review.
Vickers includes an extensive list of notes, many of which provide additional details pertinent to a segment of the text. Other cited resources include books written by colleagues and various experts on intelligence gathering, special operations, and strategy. Also noted are public (redacted) versions of federal agency reports.
Vickers’ memoir, in closing, focuses on his role in various activities, partnerships with other US-based professionals and representatives from other countries. As might be expected, his critique of decisions made by several US presidents is just that, analysis and support based on his values and experiences. He succeeds in offering information on the internal debates that influenced military and political activities.
Highly recommended for readers who love memoirs and nonfiction history.
Thanks for NetGalley for the opportunity to preview this text! Given that the ARC was labeled “uncorrected proof,” I will not offer any quotations.
Vickers not only describes a long and interesting career, spanning decades and several US presidents, but offers insight into his efforts to expand his understanding of the choice points encountered in international politics. His process of education and training is described in great detail. He consistently sought to enhance his knowledge and skills, taking advantage of the resources provided by the federal government and universities close to his employment.
Details on his experiences are included to assist the reader in seeing connections among the activities of individuals and agencies across the globe. His contributions to achieving US priorities are understandably at the center of the text. He offers extensive analysis of many global areas of conflict (e.g., Afghanistan) and efforts to contain terrorism (e.g., Usama Bin Laden). I was impressed by his success in providing a narrative on world tensions that seldom lagged, even given an extensive presentation of names and activities to fully understand the events under review.
Vickers includes an extensive list of notes, many of which provide additional details pertinent to a segment of the text. Other cited resources include books written by colleagues and various experts on intelligence gathering, special operations, and strategy. Also noted are public (redacted) versions of federal agency reports.
Vickers’ memoir, in closing, focuses on his role in various activities, partnerships with other US-based professionals and representatives from other countries. As might be expected, his critique of decisions made by several US presidents is just that, analysis and support based on his values and experiences. He succeeds in offering information on the internal debates that influenced military and political activities.
Highly recommended for readers who love memoirs and nonfiction history.
March 18, 2024
Hell of a book. From his early career in the Green Berets, to his legendary time at the CIA, and the later decades of his life serving in senior position in the DOD. Michael Vickers tells an entertaining story about intelligence and strategy during the Cold War and War on Terror against Al Qaeda, Taliban, and ISIS. Personally responsible for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 80s and his direct supervision over special operations during the war on terror, he provides one of the most comprehensive understandings of U.S. strategy in dismantling terrorist networks. He gets 4 stars because I think the layout of the book was kind of random at times and his final observations over the challenges we face today in the future is him word vomiting on the page, repeating himself throughout.
April 5, 2024
A dense and engaging memoir.
Vickers describes his role in such events as the invasion of Grenada, the CIA’s Afghan operations in the 1980s, the bin Laden raid, and operations against al-Qaeda and ISIS. Much of the book deals with policy decisions and debates, and much of it deals with Afghanistan, a country he dealt with from many different vantage points. His time at the Pentagon is pretty interesting given the broad range of his responsibilities, his work touching on everything from al-Qaeda, Iran's nuclear program, the FARC in Colombia, and drug cartels in Mexico. He also reveals his role in expanding the CIA’s drone program, in responding to the Snowden leaks, and removing Michael Flynn at the DIA.
There is less detail than I expected on interactions with Congress. The narrative, however, moves along smoothly and engages your interest pretty consistently.
A compelling and gripping work.
Vickers describes his role in such events as the invasion of Grenada, the CIA’s Afghan operations in the 1980s, the bin Laden raid, and operations against al-Qaeda and ISIS. Much of the book deals with policy decisions and debates, and much of it deals with Afghanistan, a country he dealt with from many different vantage points. His time at the Pentagon is pretty interesting given the broad range of his responsibilities, his work touching on everything from al-Qaeda, Iran's nuclear program, the FARC in Colombia, and drug cartels in Mexico. He also reveals his role in expanding the CIA’s drone program, in responding to the Snowden leaks, and removing Michael Flynn at the DIA.
There is less detail than I expected on interactions with Congress. The narrative, however, moves along smoothly and engages your interest pretty consistently.
A compelling and gripping work.
July 24, 2023
I am a HUGE fan of Michael Vickers' new memoir, "By All Means Available: Memoirs of a Life in Intelligence, Special Operations, and Strategy." It is an enthralling and candid account of a distinguished career spent at the forefront of intelligence and strategic operations. From the clandestine world of espionage to the high-stakes realm of special operations, Vickers' memoir offers readers a rare glimpse into the complex and elusive world of intelligence gathering, counterterrorism, and strategic decision-making. In this 500-page book, Vickers chronicles his extensive experience spanning over four decades, holding key roles in both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD). As a seasoned intelligence officer, he played pivotal roles in some of the most critical moments in recent history, from the Soviet-Afghan War to the hunt for Osama bin Laden. One of the most compelling aspects of "By All Means Available" is Vickers' unfiltered narrative. He lays bare the challenges and triumphs of intelligence work, providing readers with a realistic and authentic portrayal of life in the shadows. From the inherent dangers and ethical dilemmas to the pressures of decision-making in high-stress environments, Vickers does not shy away from sharing the emotional toll of his experiences. His honesty and self-reflection make this memoir all the more compelling, allowing readers to empathize with the weighty decisions faced by intelligence professionals. Throughout the book, Vickers weaves together personal anecdotes, historical context, and strategic analysis, offering a comprehensive perspective on the evolution of intelligence and counterterrorism practices. From the CIA's covert operations during the Cold War to the post-9/11 era of counterterrorism, Vickers provides invaluable insights into the inner workings of the intelligence community and its interactions with policymakers. The narrative is both balanced and partisan-neutral despite myriad controversial topics. Vickers navigates sensitive issues such as enhanced interrogation techniques and drone warfare with nuance, acknowledging the complexities and trade-offs involved in these operations. His willingness to engage with these difficult topics without resorting to oversimplification is commendable and serves as a testament to his integrity as an intelligence professional. Moreover, "By All Means Available" is not just a collection of thrilling spy stories; it also delves into the intricacies of strategic thinking and policymaking. Vickers' experiences as an advisor to top-level officials and his role in shaping national security strategies provide a unique perspective on the intersection of intelligence and policy. This aspect of the memoir makes it a must-read for anyone interested in the inner workings of the U.S. government and its approach to global challenges. While the book delves into complex topics, Vickers presents them in a way that is easy to follow, avoiding unnecessary jargon and explaining technical terms when needed. The engaging storytelling and riveting accounts of real-life operations keep readers captivated throughout the journey. If there is one minor drawback, it is that some sections may feel too dense with information for those unfamiliar with intelligence and military jargon. However, Vickers' compelling storytelling more than compensates for this occasional challenge, and the book ultimately succeeds in enlightening and entertaining readers. One other negative in my opinion is that Vickers often describes the poor outcomes of some mission decisions that were outside his purview and under someone else's watch, however, in many cases, he has the benefit of hindsight in making those judgments.
July 15, 2025
Mr. Vickers played a critical role in our nation's covert war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, in the 1980's, as well as other important events, such as the invasion of Grenada. That said, I believe he became part of the problem as he was promoted into senior roles, with increased responsibility. He is very clubby with other leaders, including Brennan and Clapper, who were allegedly involved in criminal activities--No criticism whatsoever. The rare exception is LTG Ret. Mike Flynn--An honorable man and one of our nation's most effective leaders during the Global War on Terror. His criticism is personal; it's obvious Mr. Vickers hates General Flynn. ...Too often, Mr. Vickers speaks in vague generalities. He remains silent on events such as our President who allegedly sent pallets of money to our enemies in Iran. Mr. Vickers retired from the US Government in 2015, so it is understandable that he does not criticize President Biden. He doesn't show the same restraint with President Trump though. Mr. Vickers either writes him out of his story, such as defeating ISIS, or he singles the President out for criticism, such as on page 465, where he blames Trump for appeasing Russia--Failing to point out that Putin attacked Crimea during Obama's presidency and invaded Ukraine while Biden was President. Mr. Vickers is a brilliant man, and parts of this book are well researched and well written. He definitely demonstrates his blind spots and biases though.
March 29, 2025
This was okay and started slow, but did offer some things of interest:
1. Use of Homeric epithet-like introductions for a dizzying array of people that didn’t necessarily play into the narrative although they seemed important.
2. His insider view of arming the afghans in the 80s against Russia, planning and executing the mission that killed Bin Laden, his perspective on our involvement (including successes and failures) in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and our withdrawal from Afghanistan, and our response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In almost all cases, his strategic view of the situation was different and more detailed than what comes through in either left- or right-wing sources and media.
3. His assessment of America’s strategic situation.
My main gripe is probably that for much of the book, he just list strategic concern after strategic concern at the expense of the broader narrative. In short, he can’t necessarily tell a story, but there are a lot of stories here to be told.
Almost didn’t finish it during the first half, but mostly glad I stuck it out.
1. Use of Homeric epithet-like introductions for a dizzying array of people that didn’t necessarily play into the narrative although they seemed important.
2. His insider view of arming the afghans in the 80s against Russia, planning and executing the mission that killed Bin Laden, his perspective on our involvement (including successes and failures) in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and our withdrawal from Afghanistan, and our response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In almost all cases, his strategic view of the situation was different and more detailed than what comes through in either left- or right-wing sources and media.
3. His assessment of America’s strategic situation.
My main gripe is probably that for much of the book, he just list strategic concern after strategic concern at the expense of the broader narrative. In short, he can’t necessarily tell a story, but there are a lot of stories here to be told.
Almost didn’t finish it during the first half, but mostly glad I stuck it out.
July 31, 2023
I enjoyed this book and think it is an important addition to the history of US foreign and defense policies from the 1970s to the 2020s. I do have several comments.
1) I do think that some of his criticisms about past and current US strategies is his hubris - he seems to view many events through his own experiences against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
2) I really enjoyed the portions of the book on his Special Forces experiences, but why so little on his family. All of a sudden he has a wife and 5 daughters. When did he marry? Impact of his work on his family? And why nothing in the book about his first wife, who is now the CEO of General Dynamics?
3) I was surprised about the sheer number of terrorists killed by Predator strikes- literally hundreds of people!
4) I thought he glossed over the subject of enhanced interrogation techniques- was he against that or that it just wasn’t on his watch?
1) I do think that some of his criticisms about past and current US strategies is his hubris - he seems to view many events through his own experiences against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
2) I really enjoyed the portions of the book on his Special Forces experiences, but why so little on his family. All of a sudden he has a wife and 5 daughters. When did he marry? Impact of his work on his family? And why nothing in the book about his first wife, who is now the CEO of General Dynamics?
3) I was surprised about the sheer number of terrorists killed by Predator strikes- literally hundreds of people!
4) I thought he glossed over the subject of enhanced interrogation techniques- was he against that or that it just wasn’t on his watch?
August 13, 2023
The author offers lots of interesting details about special operations and about their importance in general. He offers several examples of why it’s important to have a strategy and supporting policy, so that when something happens, the USA can take action based on an agreed upon framework. I wish his editor had helped eliminate the words that assumed “male” about positions or staff in general - a minor annoyance. Sometimes he referred to something as a victory when I doubt the local populace would agree. Overall I recommend it to peeps who want an insider’s view of special operations the last 35 years or so.
August 11, 2023
Way to long. Thanks for his service. But to me this is a great example of what’s wrong with our government today. GET TO THE POINT. The book could have been much more interesting if he just stuck to the “stories”. The on and on about weapons really ruined the book. After 3 days of reading it I gave up!!
August 10, 2023
Very informative and a balanced recount of geopolitics of concern to the US over the past 40 years. The writing however was laden with bureaucratic-speak and the author indulged in much to much self-aggrandizement.
July 6, 2024
Suppose you found a character who was not a fictional character, and yet this person had all the traits of fictional characters like Rambo, Gunnery Sargeant Thomas Highway and James Bond, would you believe his story? This question was my first impression of “By All Means Available”.
I had never heard of Michael Vickers and yet this author describes how he thrived in an environment that tested his physical strength, emotional strength, and stamina while he endured the rigors of Green Beret, Special Forces, and CIA training. Whether it was weapons training, strategic planning, or covert operations he excelled. With astonishing speed, he rose in the ranks to Under-Secretary for defense for intelligence and Under-Secretary for defense for special Operations and low- intensity conflict under Presidents George W. Bush and President Barrick Obama and this is his story!
The author did not describe his rise to my satisfaction. At one stage of his story, he is a fighting man, and the next he is writing the strategy for the conduct of the fight in Afghanistan, I would have liked a more nuanced account of his rise in government.
I have never been a fan of our CIA; they have missed every important event in the history of the twentieth Century, and by necessity they do things in a covert way that never becomes exposed.
Politicians frustrate me with the decisions made for political reasons and on many occasions not in the best interest of the Country and this is particularly true when we study the history of our involvement in international affairs. This Country has had too few Statesmen who have had the experience and wisdom to navigate the myriad number of complex issues faced in the arena of international diplomacy.
In “By All means Available”, Vickers touts his impact on the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His claim to have developed the strategy that got Russia out of Afghanistan. It is hard to disparage his self-praise because at the highest levels of government he is recognized, and his opinions are sought out even by presidents. This reviewer will seek out other opinions to better gauge his vaunted accomplishments.
Vickers describes the conflicts that he participated in from the aftermath of the killing of 247 marines in Lebanon by Hezbollah, to the invasion of Grenada and to building a fighting force in Afghanistan and then devising a plan to aggressively seek out those responsible for 9/11 and the many other attacks around the world perpetrated by Osama Ben Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban.
The writing style is clear yet a little wordy. His narrative is a tribute to his intelligence, as evidenced by the fact that he mastered over six languages during his military and civilian career. The book flows nicely but does have an abundance of acronyms and military jargon to wade through. This skeptical reader is quite familiar with government bureaucracy, having served for 32 years in Federal service and 12 years in State service. I know that our system of government does not allow for “The Lone Ranger” the levels of bureaucracy and all the egos involved will dilute even the best plans that may have even come directly from heaven. I am sure that the US Defense Department, the State Department, the advisors to the President, the Congress, the head of the CIA and its minions at Langley, as well as our allies in the fight, including the industrial-military complex all felt that their contribution was key to victory in Afghanistan. Vickers takes a huge amount of credit for the expulsion of Russia from Afghanistan, simply based on the recognition he received I am sure he made a substantial contribution to victory. Yet, I continue to wonder if the degree of recognition matches his explanation of events, collaborating testimony is needed.
The words of Winston Churchill come quickly to mind. “The victors in war will always be the judge and the vanquished always the accused. For my part, Churchill continued with, I consider that it will be found much better by all parties to leave the past to history, especially as I propose to write that history myself” is that what Vickers is doing? Vickers was a key player on the winning side, but this short-lived victory only strengthened the opposition and we continued to fight and die in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan.
The first campaign discussed was Beirut, Lebanon in the aftermath of 247 marines being killed by a bomb that entered their compound in a truck. It is acknowledged by Vickers that our intelligence services knew of the Hizballah plan to bomb the Marines, but they failed to share this intelligence, does this sound familiar? Dod advised President Reagan not to house those marines on shore because of the threats coming from Hizballah. They suggested to the President that the marines were a target and should remain on ships in the harbor. President Reagan ignored the request; he wanted those marines on shore to demonstrate our presence and strength. The result of Reagan’s blunder was the death of 247 marines. I have often wondered how Reagan slept at night after his politically motivated disastrous decision. The CIA, with Vickers’ involvement did find out who gave the order and did exact a price, but it was too little and too late.
Granada was another interesting military event. Our armed services are suspicious and competitive with each other. Funding, prestige, and power are at stake in the rivalry between the military branches of our government. They are reluctant to share intelligence with other agencies and are envious of every perceived advantage or success that another branch of service achieves. In little Granada, with about 600 Cuban advisors and soldiers and may be a Grenadians armed force of 300; the US sent units of Navy Seals, Army Special Forces, Marines, Green Beret units and the 82snd airborne, and let’s not forget the CIA, each branch of service insisted on going to that little island for fear of missing out on the glory; at the time it was the only fighting options that existed. One branch of service would not allow another to get all the stardom, so they all went to this littler Island! The pretense was that the American medical students on the island were in jeopardy because of a communist takeover. The facts were that they were safe in their dormitories and were never imprisoned or threatened. But these facts are not the purpose of Vickers narrative. He tells of his exploits in securing the island and setting up a pro- American government.
Afghanistan was his next stop, and he touts that he oversaw the CIA program. He wrote the plan of action that everyone endorsed and adhered to. This plan involved spending huge amounts of money and arming the Afghans with the latest technology weapons to extract the Russian army from Afghanistan. These weapons and the technical training involved were used against the US in the coming years by, Al Qaeda, and Osama Bin laden in the same region of Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan.
It was unclear to this reader why Russia wanted this barren territory because it required a huge commitment in manpower and cost; but they fought for years with little success. Their casualties were huge, and the costs were estimated at 75 billion dollars. The same analyst set the US cost at 10 billion, spent for what? A doctor once said to me, if the funds used to make and enable war were spent on medical research, we would cure all our current incurable diseases!
Vickers left the CIA after the declared victory. He felt underappreciated and under-utilized. As new crises developed, he was called back to help develop a new strategy. He is highly thought of in government and eventually ends up briefing President Bush on how a new strategy should be offensive in nature rather than a defensive fight. Bush appointed him to a post specifically designed for him in the Defense Department.
The reader can relate to the stories told by Vickers because they were dramatic stories that have been documented in newspapers and magazines about killing of prominent Al Qaeda and the Taliban officials. The US with the aid of technology began using weapons that would pinpoint a target for killing. The program was instituted to kill off the leadership of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Osama Bin laden. Vickers and the Bush administration knew that these killings were in violation of the Genva Conventions but rationalized that they were necessary. We can’t forget that Bush claims to be a born-again Christian! The perceived enemies that were captured rather than killed were water boarded, and subjected to torture, another violation of the Genova Conventions, a convention that the US assisted in drafting. With pride Vickers describes the many suspected officers of Al Quada and Taliban that were assassinated. One poignant comment made by Vickers concerned a Sunday when both he and CIA Chief Gates were separately attending religious services at churches in DC when they each got coded messages to call headquarters; they left the ongoing services to answer the call. They were informed that a long sought after target had been located and headquarters asked for permission to kill the target with a rocket attack. Both Vickers and Gates authorized the killing and then went back to church; interesting!
This reader became entranced as the story of the killing of Osama Ben laden was told in such dramatic detail that a fictional cloak and dagger spy novel could not duplicate. Vickers was called to a top-secret meeting and after years of searching and the liberal use of enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT) information was found that enabled the tracking of a courier reporting to Ben laden. After many uses of EIT on captured Al Qaeda fighters a name surfaced. The name was identified as a courier to and from Ben Laden. With the use of innovative technology, they taped the courier’s phone and that lead to Abbottabad Pakistan. Then a spy plane was dispatched that took a photo of a man walking in a walled compound and this man resembled Ben Laden.
Vickers spares no detail regarding the discussions at the highest levels of our government concerning the implications of such a find. Secret meetings took place with the President Barack Obama. Thankfully this President was a highly intelligent, very serious-minded thinker, he was no cowboy! He asked questions, made demands for information, and wanted input from the best minds this Country had. The question of what to do with this information had to be resolved and again he wanted input. The first options were Drop a bomb on the site, the second was to send a seal team in to capture and/or kill Ben laden, and the third was to have the Pakistan special forces cooperate in the capture. After much discussion and analysis, the President and this small select group came to the consensus that only the second option would work.
From this point Admiral McRaven was placed in charge of the mission. This reader also recognizes McRaven as a courageous and brilliant man, I concur with the selection! McRaven selected his best Seal team for the mission including highly regarded specialists in every needed function of the operation. A mockup of the compound was made, and the Seal team practiced their craft until McRaven was convinced that the team could be successful. McRaven added a few wrinkles to the plan that proved brilliant. He had an Arab speaker in front of the compound telling neighbors that it was only a Pakistani exercise and that they should go back to their homes. He also had two huge helicopters as back up in case of a problem, when one of the attack helicopters failed his backup became the salvation of the mission. When the team got into the compound and went to the top floor, they surprised Ben laden, and he quickly used one of his wives as a human shield. I found this to be a cowardly act, A Seal shot over the shield and hit Ben Laden in the head, killing him.
This detailed story is told over two chapters, but it can’t be put down and there is little that I have previously read to be more captivating. For once, our government assembled its best, brightest, and executed magnificently. The killing didn’t end the episode, many intangibles had to be cleared up, but Vickers did an excellent job on this story.
Vickers story continues with the killing and chasing of insurgents. He describes our interactions with the heads of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran and even some of the terrorist organizations. Billions of dollars are thrown at these Countries, we arm them, we train them and for the most part they betray us.
Vickers sums up his efforts with a short narrative on each Country, and after working for years in this arena he is fatalistic about this area of the world. The US made huge mistakes in handling the war efforts and in leaving Afghanistan. He believes that the mistakes by trump and Biden have resulted in the current conflicts. In the case of a know nothing President like trump, his treaty gave away the store and then he freed serious terrorist to continue the fight. while vice-president, Biden had historically been opposed to the continuous war against these Arab terrorists; so as President, he took the remaining 7000 advisors and troops out of Afghanistan in a very awkward manner. This alone brought disgrace on America, but more important the terrorist came back stronger even as we were leaving. It also deprived the US of a base of operations in the Country. Now, we are blind concerning terrorist operations in the region. Vickers states that we have lost this war and spent billions, lost thousands of soldiers, and millions of civilians with no result. This is a very sad commentary.
Vickers provides in this book the history of our incompetence in the Middle East. This detailed history is the definitive narrative written by someone who was involved at the highest level of government. This book should be required reading for all general staff military and Executive office advisors and employees, because it illustrates what not to do!
I had never heard of Michael Vickers and yet this author describes how he thrived in an environment that tested his physical strength, emotional strength, and stamina while he endured the rigors of Green Beret, Special Forces, and CIA training. Whether it was weapons training, strategic planning, or covert operations he excelled. With astonishing speed, he rose in the ranks to Under-Secretary for defense for intelligence and Under-Secretary for defense for special Operations and low- intensity conflict under Presidents George W. Bush and President Barrick Obama and this is his story!
The author did not describe his rise to my satisfaction. At one stage of his story, he is a fighting man, and the next he is writing the strategy for the conduct of the fight in Afghanistan, I would have liked a more nuanced account of his rise in government.
I have never been a fan of our CIA; they have missed every important event in the history of the twentieth Century, and by necessity they do things in a covert way that never becomes exposed.
Politicians frustrate me with the decisions made for political reasons and on many occasions not in the best interest of the Country and this is particularly true when we study the history of our involvement in international affairs. This Country has had too few Statesmen who have had the experience and wisdom to navigate the myriad number of complex issues faced in the arena of international diplomacy.
In “By All means Available”, Vickers touts his impact on the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. His claim to have developed the strategy that got Russia out of Afghanistan. It is hard to disparage his self-praise because at the highest levels of government he is recognized, and his opinions are sought out even by presidents. This reviewer will seek out other opinions to better gauge his vaunted accomplishments.
Vickers describes the conflicts that he participated in from the aftermath of the killing of 247 marines in Lebanon by Hezbollah, to the invasion of Grenada and to building a fighting force in Afghanistan and then devising a plan to aggressively seek out those responsible for 9/11 and the many other attacks around the world perpetrated by Osama Ben Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban.
The writing style is clear yet a little wordy. His narrative is a tribute to his intelligence, as evidenced by the fact that he mastered over six languages during his military and civilian career. The book flows nicely but does have an abundance of acronyms and military jargon to wade through. This skeptical reader is quite familiar with government bureaucracy, having served for 32 years in Federal service and 12 years in State service. I know that our system of government does not allow for “The Lone Ranger” the levels of bureaucracy and all the egos involved will dilute even the best plans that may have even come directly from heaven. I am sure that the US Defense Department, the State Department, the advisors to the President, the Congress, the head of the CIA and its minions at Langley, as well as our allies in the fight, including the industrial-military complex all felt that their contribution was key to victory in Afghanistan. Vickers takes a huge amount of credit for the expulsion of Russia from Afghanistan, simply based on the recognition he received I am sure he made a substantial contribution to victory. Yet, I continue to wonder if the degree of recognition matches his explanation of events, collaborating testimony is needed.
The words of Winston Churchill come quickly to mind. “The victors in war will always be the judge and the vanquished always the accused. For my part, Churchill continued with, I consider that it will be found much better by all parties to leave the past to history, especially as I propose to write that history myself” is that what Vickers is doing? Vickers was a key player on the winning side, but this short-lived victory only strengthened the opposition and we continued to fight and die in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan.
The first campaign discussed was Beirut, Lebanon in the aftermath of 247 marines being killed by a bomb that entered their compound in a truck. It is acknowledged by Vickers that our intelligence services knew of the Hizballah plan to bomb the Marines, but they failed to share this intelligence, does this sound familiar? Dod advised President Reagan not to house those marines on shore because of the threats coming from Hizballah. They suggested to the President that the marines were a target and should remain on ships in the harbor. President Reagan ignored the request; he wanted those marines on shore to demonstrate our presence and strength. The result of Reagan’s blunder was the death of 247 marines. I have often wondered how Reagan slept at night after his politically motivated disastrous decision. The CIA, with Vickers’ involvement did find out who gave the order and did exact a price, but it was too little and too late.
Granada was another interesting military event. Our armed services are suspicious and competitive with each other. Funding, prestige, and power are at stake in the rivalry between the military branches of our government. They are reluctant to share intelligence with other agencies and are envious of every perceived advantage or success that another branch of service achieves. In little Granada, with about 600 Cuban advisors and soldiers and may be a Grenadians armed force of 300; the US sent units of Navy Seals, Army Special Forces, Marines, Green Beret units and the 82snd airborne, and let’s not forget the CIA, each branch of service insisted on going to that little island for fear of missing out on the glory; at the time it was the only fighting options that existed. One branch of service would not allow another to get all the stardom, so they all went to this littler Island! The pretense was that the American medical students on the island were in jeopardy because of a communist takeover. The facts were that they were safe in their dormitories and were never imprisoned or threatened. But these facts are not the purpose of Vickers narrative. He tells of his exploits in securing the island and setting up a pro- American government.
Afghanistan was his next stop, and he touts that he oversaw the CIA program. He wrote the plan of action that everyone endorsed and adhered to. This plan involved spending huge amounts of money and arming the Afghans with the latest technology weapons to extract the Russian army from Afghanistan. These weapons and the technical training involved were used against the US in the coming years by, Al Qaeda, and Osama Bin laden in the same region of Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan.
It was unclear to this reader why Russia wanted this barren territory because it required a huge commitment in manpower and cost; but they fought for years with little success. Their casualties were huge, and the costs were estimated at 75 billion dollars. The same analyst set the US cost at 10 billion, spent for what? A doctor once said to me, if the funds used to make and enable war were spent on medical research, we would cure all our current incurable diseases!
Vickers left the CIA after the declared victory. He felt underappreciated and under-utilized. As new crises developed, he was called back to help develop a new strategy. He is highly thought of in government and eventually ends up briefing President Bush on how a new strategy should be offensive in nature rather than a defensive fight. Bush appointed him to a post specifically designed for him in the Defense Department.
The reader can relate to the stories told by Vickers because they were dramatic stories that have been documented in newspapers and magazines about killing of prominent Al Qaeda and the Taliban officials. The US with the aid of technology began using weapons that would pinpoint a target for killing. The program was instituted to kill off the leadership of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Osama Bin laden. Vickers and the Bush administration knew that these killings were in violation of the Genva Conventions but rationalized that they were necessary. We can’t forget that Bush claims to be a born-again Christian! The perceived enemies that were captured rather than killed were water boarded, and subjected to torture, another violation of the Genova Conventions, a convention that the US assisted in drafting. With pride Vickers describes the many suspected officers of Al Quada and Taliban that were assassinated. One poignant comment made by Vickers concerned a Sunday when both he and CIA Chief Gates were separately attending religious services at churches in DC when they each got coded messages to call headquarters; they left the ongoing services to answer the call. They were informed that a long sought after target had been located and headquarters asked for permission to kill the target with a rocket attack. Both Vickers and Gates authorized the killing and then went back to church; interesting!
This reader became entranced as the story of the killing of Osama Ben laden was told in such dramatic detail that a fictional cloak and dagger spy novel could not duplicate. Vickers was called to a top-secret meeting and after years of searching and the liberal use of enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT) information was found that enabled the tracking of a courier reporting to Ben laden. After many uses of EIT on captured Al Qaeda fighters a name surfaced. The name was identified as a courier to and from Ben Laden. With the use of innovative technology, they taped the courier’s phone and that lead to Abbottabad Pakistan. Then a spy plane was dispatched that took a photo of a man walking in a walled compound and this man resembled Ben Laden.
Vickers spares no detail regarding the discussions at the highest levels of our government concerning the implications of such a find. Secret meetings took place with the President Barack Obama. Thankfully this President was a highly intelligent, very serious-minded thinker, he was no cowboy! He asked questions, made demands for information, and wanted input from the best minds this Country had. The question of what to do with this information had to be resolved and again he wanted input. The first options were Drop a bomb on the site, the second was to send a seal team in to capture and/or kill Ben laden, and the third was to have the Pakistan special forces cooperate in the capture. After much discussion and analysis, the President and this small select group came to the consensus that only the second option would work.
From this point Admiral McRaven was placed in charge of the mission. This reader also recognizes McRaven as a courageous and brilliant man, I concur with the selection! McRaven selected his best Seal team for the mission including highly regarded specialists in every needed function of the operation. A mockup of the compound was made, and the Seal team practiced their craft until McRaven was convinced that the team could be successful. McRaven added a few wrinkles to the plan that proved brilliant. He had an Arab speaker in front of the compound telling neighbors that it was only a Pakistani exercise and that they should go back to their homes. He also had two huge helicopters as back up in case of a problem, when one of the attack helicopters failed his backup became the salvation of the mission. When the team got into the compound and went to the top floor, they surprised Ben laden, and he quickly used one of his wives as a human shield. I found this to be a cowardly act, A Seal shot over the shield and hit Ben Laden in the head, killing him.
This detailed story is told over two chapters, but it can’t be put down and there is little that I have previously read to be more captivating. For once, our government assembled its best, brightest, and executed magnificently. The killing didn’t end the episode, many intangibles had to be cleared up, but Vickers did an excellent job on this story.
Vickers story continues with the killing and chasing of insurgents. He describes our interactions with the heads of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran and even some of the terrorist organizations. Billions of dollars are thrown at these Countries, we arm them, we train them and for the most part they betray us.
Vickers sums up his efforts with a short narrative on each Country, and after working for years in this arena he is fatalistic about this area of the world. The US made huge mistakes in handling the war efforts and in leaving Afghanistan. He believes that the mistakes by trump and Biden have resulted in the current conflicts. In the case of a know nothing President like trump, his treaty gave away the store and then he freed serious terrorist to continue the fight. while vice-president, Biden had historically been opposed to the continuous war against these Arab terrorists; so as President, he took the remaining 7000 advisors and troops out of Afghanistan in a very awkward manner. This alone brought disgrace on America, but more important the terrorist came back stronger even as we were leaving. It also deprived the US of a base of operations in the Country. Now, we are blind concerning terrorist operations in the region. Vickers states that we have lost this war and spent billions, lost thousands of soldiers, and millions of civilians with no result. This is a very sad commentary.
Vickers provides in this book the history of our incompetence in the Middle East. This detailed history is the definitive narrative written by someone who was involved at the highest level of government. This book should be required reading for all general staff military and Executive office advisors and employees, because it illustrates what not to do!
May 13, 2024
Michael G. Vickers memoir, "By All Means Available: Memoirs of a Life in Intelligence, Special Operations, and Strategy" is a book that I purchased, and I am glad that I did, despite that my local New York Public Library branch has its own copy.
I found that right away, Mr. Vickers's memoir spurred questions in my mind, questions that I had studied in another book, of which I also owned a copy, which I then looked at and which facilitated my thought processes.
The question in particular was about Mr. Vickers's motivation to enlist into Army Special Forces right out of high school. I thought of studies of "intrinsic motivation" and how mysterious one's preferences are for what one likes to do, and where these preferences come from. I once asked a CU lacrosse club teammate about why he "picked art history to study," and he answered with an emphatic, "because I like it!"
For me, perhaps as for Mr. Vickers, the liking is in the doing. I was in the Army once, too, and have distinct memories of talking with my battalion commander, when I was a military intelligence First Lieutenant, about going into Special Forces and even asking about Delta Force, which I had no idea about and still don't. My LTC (at the time) described how SF operators think about "how to define success" before acting and that something like Delta Force would be "something you are invited into."
I found that I learned even from that briefest of conversations.
And to be sure, I learned a tremendous amount from Mr. Vickers by reading his memoir, and by borrowing from the NYPL the "Charlie Wilson's War" movie DVD, which was, for me, deeply affecting on many levels, even the meta message coming from the actors and who they are and their careers in Hollywood which came out of the very scenes in the movie that they performed with each other.
Philip Seymour Hoffman, born just eight days before me in 1967, who played Gust L. Avrakotos in the movie, and who died from a heroin overdose in his place in the Village, may you rest in peace.
But for sure, we carry on. And Mr. Vickers makes clear many times over the lessons of "escalation dominance" as a strategy to win and the importance of seizing the advantage when available, while keeping in mind not to "overplay" or "underplay" one's strategy. But surely, the way we do all these things, is right there in the title of the book, namely by using "all means available."
Mr. Vickers's book is 528 pages including the endnotes (and excluding the index), and I read every word in in it, line by line and endnote by endnote. Sometimes it was tough reading because of the intensity of the material, even for me, but I tell you what, when I wrapped up by reading about the "note on the type" on the final written page, I was sorry that Mr. Vickers's book was coming to an end.
I know that Mr. Vickers's discussed "his next adventure" and that he wants to continue to serve, and if I had a say in it, he'd be back in a heartbeat, keeping in mind what he quoted former Goldman Sachs CEO and Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson saying about getting increased responsibilities as one's career progresses.
And, also, if my collection of books by Robert M. Gates is any indication (I have all but his book on leadership), along with the review that I just wrote of Mr. Gates's memoir, "Duty," earlier this year, we both agree that Mr. Gates is our greatest living statesman.
So, thank you, Mr. Vickers's, from a private citizen of the USA, for your incredible service to our country and for your amazing memoir that everyone needs to read because it answers so many questions about our country and our history and our foreign policy, answers that we need now more than ever.
I found that right away, Mr. Vickers's memoir spurred questions in my mind, questions that I had studied in another book, of which I also owned a copy, which I then looked at and which facilitated my thought processes.
The question in particular was about Mr. Vickers's motivation to enlist into Army Special Forces right out of high school. I thought of studies of "intrinsic motivation" and how mysterious one's preferences are for what one likes to do, and where these preferences come from. I once asked a CU lacrosse club teammate about why he "picked art history to study," and he answered with an emphatic, "because I like it!"
For me, perhaps as for Mr. Vickers, the liking is in the doing. I was in the Army once, too, and have distinct memories of talking with my battalion commander, when I was a military intelligence First Lieutenant, about going into Special Forces and even asking about Delta Force, which I had no idea about and still don't. My LTC (at the time) described how SF operators think about "how to define success" before acting and that something like Delta Force would be "something you are invited into."
I found that I learned even from that briefest of conversations.
And to be sure, I learned a tremendous amount from Mr. Vickers by reading his memoir, and by borrowing from the NYPL the "Charlie Wilson's War" movie DVD, which was, for me, deeply affecting on many levels, even the meta message coming from the actors and who they are and their careers in Hollywood which came out of the very scenes in the movie that they performed with each other.
Philip Seymour Hoffman, born just eight days before me in 1967, who played Gust L. Avrakotos in the movie, and who died from a heroin overdose in his place in the Village, may you rest in peace.
But for sure, we carry on. And Mr. Vickers makes clear many times over the lessons of "escalation dominance" as a strategy to win and the importance of seizing the advantage when available, while keeping in mind not to "overplay" or "underplay" one's strategy. But surely, the way we do all these things, is right there in the title of the book, namely by using "all means available."
Mr. Vickers's book is 528 pages including the endnotes (and excluding the index), and I read every word in in it, line by line and endnote by endnote. Sometimes it was tough reading because of the intensity of the material, even for me, but I tell you what, when I wrapped up by reading about the "note on the type" on the final written page, I was sorry that Mr. Vickers's book was coming to an end.
I know that Mr. Vickers's discussed "his next adventure" and that he wants to continue to serve, and if I had a say in it, he'd be back in a heartbeat, keeping in mind what he quoted former Goldman Sachs CEO and Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson saying about getting increased responsibilities as one's career progresses.
And, also, if my collection of books by Robert M. Gates is any indication (I have all but his book on leadership), along with the review that I just wrote of Mr. Gates's memoir, "Duty," earlier this year, we both agree that Mr. Gates is our greatest living statesman.
So, thank you, Mr. Vickers's, from a private citizen of the USA, for your incredible service to our country and for your amazing memoir that everyone needs to read because it answers so many questions about our country and our history and our foreign policy, answers that we need now more than ever.
August 5, 2023
Overall, I thought this book was excellent. Vickers begins by recounting the story of his life, starting from an early age as an athlete and middling student and his desire to enter the US Army Special Forces. He does so in the early 1970s, entering via the Army's then program giving new recruits the opportunity to go directly into SF. After earning the green beret, he mastered his SF skills and learned much about countering the Soviets in Berlin and elsewhere. Along the way, he made many great mentors, several of whom encouraged Vickers to join the CIA. Once in the Agency, and again via his past associations and an excellent mentor network, he is offered the role of a lifetime - being a lead planner and strategist of the ultimately successful US covert action against the USSR in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This book is worth its weight in gold in this section, as Dr. Vickers describes the wide array of planning factors that went into organizing the campaign, plus the great effort he and his chain of command go through in convincing Congress and foreign partners to contribute as much as possible. Of course, he had a fantastic partner in this in the guise of Texas representative Charlie Wilson.
Once he ends his time in Afghanistan, Vickers expands his horizons intellectually, first at the Wharton School of Business, then in a Ph.D. program at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Again, Vickers builds his portfolio of expertise in covert action and counterterrorism, but also in several other issues that will gain significant importance to the Pentagon and White House over the next three decades. In the next section of this book, he recounts his time after re-entering government service in the George W Bush administration as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity COnfolic and Integrated Capabilities. As a personal aside, his description of what fell under the "Integrated Capabilities" portfolio helped me understand what capability the ASD-SOLIC fills in addition to its being the "Secretary of SOF." Vickers's federal service extends into the Obama administration, where he eventually becomes the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, where, leaning on his covert action experience, he plays a leading role in planning Operation Neptune Spear, the mission to kill Osama Bin Laden.
The book drags a bit towards the end as Vickers reflects on the various policies the US should undertake to enable future national security success. This leads to a familiar laundry list of ideas, such as increasing investment in the IC, the US military, and robust research and development while also controlling America's national debt and deficit.
He ends his book with a list of his key principles of career development, which I found to be fantastic. I'm going to list them here in order.
Take only jobs you really like
The importance of expert and referent power (being an expert and having it recognized)
Job enlargement (taking on more responsibilities)
The importance of mentors
Developing deep expertise in one important area, then broaden your expertise to other areas
The importance of building and rebuilding intellectual capital
As a policymaker having deep operational expertise
Recognize when you need to adapt long-held views when confronted with new realities
The Importance of strategic vision and leadership
Leave things better than you found them and make a difference
I'd recommend that anyone interested in reading about the exploits and insights into national security from a key player in that realm in the last several decades should buy this book. Five stars.
Once he ends his time in Afghanistan, Vickers expands his horizons intellectually, first at the Wharton School of Business, then in a Ph.D. program at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Again, Vickers builds his portfolio of expertise in covert action and counterterrorism, but also in several other issues that will gain significant importance to the Pentagon and White House over the next three decades. In the next section of this book, he recounts his time after re-entering government service in the George W Bush administration as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity COnfolic and Integrated Capabilities. As a personal aside, his description of what fell under the "Integrated Capabilities" portfolio helped me understand what capability the ASD-SOLIC fills in addition to its being the "Secretary of SOF." Vickers's federal service extends into the Obama administration, where he eventually becomes the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, where, leaning on his covert action experience, he plays a leading role in planning Operation Neptune Spear, the mission to kill Osama Bin Laden.
The book drags a bit towards the end as Vickers reflects on the various policies the US should undertake to enable future national security success. This leads to a familiar laundry list of ideas, such as increasing investment in the IC, the US military, and robust research and development while also controlling America's national debt and deficit.
He ends his book with a list of his key principles of career development, which I found to be fantastic. I'm going to list them here in order.
Take only jobs you really like
The importance of expert and referent power (being an expert and having it recognized)
Job enlargement (taking on more responsibilities)
The importance of mentors
Developing deep expertise in one important area, then broaden your expertise to other areas
The importance of building and rebuilding intellectual capital
As a policymaker having deep operational expertise
Recognize when you need to adapt long-held views when confronted with new realities
The Importance of strategic vision and leadership
Leave things better than you found them and make a difference
I'd recommend that anyone interested in reading about the exploits and insights into national security from a key player in that realm in the last several decades should buy this book. Five stars.
July 15, 2023
This excellent book is very much an insider's view of the several related topics he discusses: military special operations forces, intelligence, counter terrorism, strategy, and leadership in these fields. His fascinating forty year career saw him involved in a number of highly significant operations, from setting the strategy for "Charlie Wilson's War" that drove the Soviets from Afghanistan, to involvement in planning the operation that eliminated Usama Bin Ladin. His was a career that saw him rise from an enlisted special forces soldier, to officer, to CIA agent, to administrator and eventually top intelligence appointments in the Department of Defense under presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. He includes a discussion of the ten principles he followed in building his career; these may provide useful guidance for others.
Vickers' memoir includes interactions with many familiar names in the worlds of military, international, and political activity. He credits Reagan for his resolve in moving the operations in Afghanistan from making the Soviets pay a price for their occupation of the country to the richer prize of defeating them and driving them out. He lauds Bush for the decision to surge forces in Iraq to counteract growing terrorism activity, and Obama for the decision to send the SEAL team to dispose of Bin Ladin. He faults Obama, however for his strong language and non-action in Syria. He faults Trump for his deal with the Taliban on withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, and Biden for his bungled implementation of that decision. He notes that maintaining the small force there would have prevented the Taliban from retaking control and would have kept a vital forward operating position for our Predator assets. These assets he praises for their ability to both observe and punish terrorists.
Vickers 0ffers that one of his reasons for writing the book is to provide a guide for those who in the future will face America's security challenges. This rich record and compelling read will indeed be a useful resource for those people. It is also an intimate look into the shadowy realm of intelligence operations and national defense policy for concerned readers today.
Vickers' memoir includes interactions with many familiar names in the worlds of military, international, and political activity. He credits Reagan for his resolve in moving the operations in Afghanistan from making the Soviets pay a price for their occupation of the country to the richer prize of defeating them and driving them out. He lauds Bush for the decision to surge forces in Iraq to counteract growing terrorism activity, and Obama for the decision to send the SEAL team to dispose of Bin Ladin. He faults Obama, however for his strong language and non-action in Syria. He faults Trump for his deal with the Taliban on withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan, and Biden for his bungled implementation of that decision. He notes that maintaining the small force there would have prevented the Taliban from retaking control and would have kept a vital forward operating position for our Predator assets. These assets he praises for their ability to both observe and punish terrorists.
Vickers 0ffers that one of his reasons for writing the book is to provide a guide for those who in the future will face America's security challenges. This rich record and compelling read will indeed be a useful resource for those people. It is also an intimate look into the shadowy realm of intelligence operations and national defense policy for concerned readers today.
September 28, 2023
Vickers biography is engaging and at its best when he talks about his experience in the Special Forces, as a CIA paramilitary officer, and in helping lead US special operations forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Bush and Obama Administrations. Vickers offers excellent insight into commitment and strategy, particularly regarding the use of military force and covert action.
Unfortunately, Vickers does not take the opportunity to offer much new insight that is not already covered in depth and detail in other books on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Vickers insight into arming the Afghan militia in the 1980s and in returning to government in the late 2000's is fascinating, but lacks the depth that an operator with a PhD should be able to provide.
Vickers' narrative is less interesting when he takes tangents to offer his thoughts on great power conflict, economic competition, or international security, resulting in many ironies. Vickers fails to consider the classic security dilemma that would arise in East Asia if the US were to reinforce its forward deployed forces to counter China or consider how ISIS and the Taliban used counterinsurgency tactics to achieve success in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Vickers shows great respect Obama, Bush, and the professionals in those Administrations, he often blames the Administrations for policy failures that Vickers that he should have been a part of. It would have been fascinating to hear from Vickers why the National Security Counsel opted for ultimately failed policies against his own advice.
Readers interested in specific aspects of the Iraq or Afghanistan wars should look to other books to fill their knowledge gaps. Despite this, Vickers biography is a quick and enjoyable read and offers much to think and debate about for readers who have followed these events closely.
Unfortunately, Vickers does not take the opportunity to offer much new insight that is not already covered in depth and detail in other books on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Vickers insight into arming the Afghan militia in the 1980s and in returning to government in the late 2000's is fascinating, but lacks the depth that an operator with a PhD should be able to provide.
Vickers' narrative is less interesting when he takes tangents to offer his thoughts on great power conflict, economic competition, or international security, resulting in many ironies. Vickers fails to consider the classic security dilemma that would arise in East Asia if the US were to reinforce its forward deployed forces to counter China or consider how ISIS and the Taliban used counterinsurgency tactics to achieve success in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Vickers shows great respect Obama, Bush, and the professionals in those Administrations, he often blames the Administrations for policy failures that Vickers that he should have been a part of. It would have been fascinating to hear from Vickers why the National Security Counsel opted for ultimately failed policies against his own advice.
Readers interested in specific aspects of the Iraq or Afghanistan wars should look to other books to fill their knowledge gaps. Despite this, Vickers biography is a quick and enjoyable read and offers much to think and debate about for readers who have followed these events closely.
July 24, 2023
By All Means Available provides an insider's perspective on the most significant military and intelligence activities in which the United States has engaged during the past four decades. Written with meticulous attention to detail and in an engaging style, Michael Vickers chronicles his rough-and-tumble origins as an enlisted Green Beret, his "job of a lifetime" as a young CIA officer entrusted to design the covert war strategy that enabled Afghanistan to defeat the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and his critical leadership positions in the Department of Defense from 2007-2015 that allowed him to apply his strategic skills in ways that influenced nearly all aspects of the Global War on Terror. This memoir also offers inspirational lessons in quiet leadership, as Vickers shows how developing and demonstrating rare competencies and pushing the boundaries of each position will earn you a seat at the table for matters of increasing importance and open the doors to greater opportunities. Vickers also uses his memoir as a platform to make valuable recommendations for restructuring our military and intelligence agencies, incorporating cutting-edge technology into our future defense strategy, and making societal changes that will position the United States to prevail in the New Cold War with China and Russia. Whether you are a fan of espionage stories, a history buff, a military strategist, a futurist, or someone looking for an inspirational case study in quiet leadership, this fascinating read will be well worth your time.
July 14, 2023
This book was very well written. If you are looking for a window into a life of power and military might, Vickers is the person to open it up to you. This man has seen it all, having worked as a Green Beret and has since served as a leader and policy-maker in the special forces, the military at large, and the intelligence community. Over four decades of insider experience at the highest levels, he has had a role like few others have.
I did find it ironic that his experience trying to drive out the invaders of Afghanistan in the 1980's (the Soviets) came full circle to being one of the leaders of another invading force mere decades later. I also have serious moral issues with much of what Vickers did and with what the CIA and the US Government do in general. Intelligence and Military Operations are carried out without a moral compass and often against the law (both ours and international law to which we are signatories). But I approached this book trying to learn more about what they do, and I have to say that it really delivered in a quality way.
Thank you to Knopf Publishing for my copy. All opinions expressed are my own.
I did find it ironic that his experience trying to drive out the invaders of Afghanistan in the 1980's (the Soviets) came full circle to being one of the leaders of another invading force mere decades later. I also have serious moral issues with much of what Vickers did and with what the CIA and the US Government do in general. Intelligence and Military Operations are carried out without a moral compass and often against the law (both ours and international law to which we are signatories). But I approached this book trying to learn more about what they do, and I have to say that it really delivered in a quality way.
Thank you to Knopf Publishing for my copy. All opinions expressed are my own.
August 21, 2023
Mr. Vickers had a fascinating career of service to the United States. Early in his life, he decided he wanted to be a CIA Officer and then he intelligently and methodically turned himself into the nations foremost expert in conducting insurgent revolution. Ten years as a Green Beret and then a CIA Officer and then as the expert within the Department of Defense. He was the hand behind the CIA's great victory in destroying the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, that was a prime factor in the collapse of the Soviet empire.
I learned the significance of "Escalation Dominance", necessary for victory in any insurgency, counterinsurgency or war. (Pg. 139). He successfully argues the case for thoughtful and vigorous covert action (Pg. 450) and praised Robert Mueller for his transformation of the FBI from a primarily law enforcement agency into "one with significant national security capabilities" (Pg. 449).
Mr. Vickers persuasively makes the case for our presidents to be pragmatic and actionable leaders, willing to expertly use our extremely capable Intelligence and Specialty Military in covert and non covert actions that further the interests of the United States.
I learned the significance of "Escalation Dominance", necessary for victory in any insurgency, counterinsurgency or war. (Pg. 139). He successfully argues the case for thoughtful and vigorous covert action (Pg. 450) and praised Robert Mueller for his transformation of the FBI from a primarily law enforcement agency into "one with significant national security capabilities" (Pg. 449).
Mr. Vickers persuasively makes the case for our presidents to be pragmatic and actionable leaders, willing to expertly use our extremely capable Intelligence and Specialty Military in covert and non covert actions that further the interests of the United States.
September 29, 2023
Mike Vickers is the ultimate CIA guy: he is smart (speaks Russian and Czech and has a PhD), trained in special forces (can use all weapons, parachute with nuclear bomb backpack, fight in high altitudes), spycraft (CIA suit and sunglasses). Some type of maxed out Deus Ex character. You don’t want this guy fighting against you.
So he described how he chased the Soviets out of Afghanistan (lots of money early, worked with local forces) with clandestine operations; how he planned the killing of Osama Bin Laden, became the senior leader in the intelligence agency.
Some of the long term suggestions: make sure America is economically strong (cut Medicaid), use cheap drones and unmanned submarines and let go of aircraft carriers (use land bases instead), develop space force further. Prepare to fight China and Russia at the same time.
However, Vickers is fully CIA. So he believes torture is necessary and invaluable in intelligence gathering. Snowden described phone hacking but he said it was only ‘meta-data’. And CIA cannot be judged by the civilian press because they don’t know everything…
Overall a fascinating read!
So he described how he chased the Soviets out of Afghanistan (lots of money early, worked with local forces) with clandestine operations; how he planned the killing of Osama Bin Laden, became the senior leader in the intelligence agency.
Some of the long term suggestions: make sure America is economically strong (cut Medicaid), use cheap drones and unmanned submarines and let go of aircraft carriers (use land bases instead), develop space force further. Prepare to fight China and Russia at the same time.
However, Vickers is fully CIA. So he believes torture is necessary and invaluable in intelligence gathering. Snowden described phone hacking but he said it was only ‘meta-data’. And CIA cannot be judged by the civilian press because they don’t know everything…
Overall a fascinating read!
January 12, 2024
Michael Vickers is a real life Jack Ryan. He went from special forces to intelligence to national security advisor. His memoir takes the reader from his high school years when a teacher handed him an article about the Green Berets to his pseudo-retirement from public service. It's not a very personal memoir; it's more "here's what I did... here's what the army or CIA did... here's what we should do." He discusses his training, his experience at various levels of intelligence, major US operations from the 1980s to the Russo-Ukrainian War, and the current and future challenges to national security. It is very informative. At times, it is surprising how much he reveals about the world of intelligence. And at the end, the discussion of current and future technologies is stunning. Vickers is one of the world's foremost experts on cold wars, hot wars, and everything in between, and every current and future political leader needs to read this book and learn from him.
September 17, 2023
Vickers won't earn any merit medals for personality, but he's an American hero.
But let's call it like it is: this book is not a memoir, it's a bureaucrat who is rushing his narrative out after the fall of Kabul, knowing history will judge senior US govt officials harshly for Iraq and especially Afghanistan.
This book is his attempt to get on the good side of public opinion before historians review his contributions. Knowing this going in, you'll become aware that 90% is how he shapes every situation to prove how he always knew best and always blames others for things that went wrong. Seems he left his SF squad leader lessons behind...
Nonetheless, relevant and useful as a national security professional seeking to learn from others' hard earned experience... just take his narrative and spin for what it is.
But let's call it like it is: this book is not a memoir, it's a bureaucrat who is rushing his narrative out after the fall of Kabul, knowing history will judge senior US govt officials harshly for Iraq and especially Afghanistan.
This book is his attempt to get on the good side of public opinion before historians review his contributions. Knowing this going in, you'll become aware that 90% is how he shapes every situation to prove how he always knew best and always blames others for things that went wrong. Seems he left his SF squad leader lessons behind...
Nonetheless, relevant and useful as a national security professional seeking to learn from others' hard earned experience... just take his narrative and spin for what it is.
August 3, 2024
I read this book as part of a leadership development program. Michael Vickers is clearly an exceptional person with remarkable life experiences. Since I read this as part of a development program, I do wish he was able to tie how his personal experiences can either be replicated or better highlight the leadership lessons learned. The majority of the book felt like him talking about his experiences and harping on how unique and non-traditional they are. This book felt about 150 pages too long and I often lost interest while reading, which is why it took me so long to finish. As a whole, it was a good book and I most enjoyed his origin story, the UBL assassination story, and his FUOPs perspectives at the end of the book. I’m looking forward to incorporating more non-fiction books into my daily reads.
July 10, 2023
Excellent book. Vickers was the right man in the right place on numerous occasions, from the 1970s to recent years. His strongest sections are on his leadership of the US covert operation to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan. He also later played key roles as a senior Pentagon policymaker. For anyone interested in national security or intelligence operations, the book is a must. Only two small quibbles: first, there is a lot of "I" in the narrative. Events such as he described are never that simple. A few more "we's" would have helped. Second, Chapter 23--how to win the new Cold War--is too detailed for the casual reader and I suspect national security wonks already know most of the material.
April 5, 2024
Great book with deep insights on how the intelligence community has evolved and adapted to global change. It was fascinating seeing the author's journey. I was especially impressed with how versatile a leader he is and how he leveraged his past experience to benefit subsequent US global action.
Be forewarned that the book is extremely granular and at some points becomes repetitive. Given its length, I was tempted at points to put it down (for good or to come back to), but it was well worth pushing through and getting a view on how the intelligence community needs to adapt towards changing future demands.
Thank you for all your service to our country, Mr. Vickers.
Be forewarned that the book is extremely granular and at some points becomes repetitive. Given its length, I was tempted at points to put it down (for good or to come back to), but it was well worth pushing through and getting a view on how the intelligence community needs to adapt towards changing future demands.
Thank you for all your service to our country, Mr. Vickers.
July 6, 2024
A fine book with an insiders look at some very key events in the past 40 years. Mostly balanced politically which is refreshing. Main criticism is a bit of excess in use of ‘I’ vs ‘we’ and clear use of SOF and intel as the hammer with every possible problem a nail. If one did not know how military plans are developed, vetted, and presented he will come away with a different view than those who have been involved. Not sure whether this overstatement is hubris or poor editing…. Ultimately, a good book that is highly recommended but take some of the “I was in the right place to single-handedly change the course of history” with a grain of salt.
December 15, 2024
Really really long and fairly ego bloated. I zoned out a lot when the narrative turned to descriptions of weapons bought by the US, manufactured by a foreign (ally?) and provided to questionable parties.
The extent of my knowledge of middle-eastern geopolitics comes from Jack Ryan adaptations, so I will let history and more knowledgeable judge whether this career of arming the less bad guys to overthrow the really bad guys is a strategy that does more harm or good. I can only speak as a mother of four, and say that this is not a winning strategy.
I found his equal bashing of current US leaders (Trump & Biden) really interesting and partially redemptive.
The extent of my knowledge of middle-eastern geopolitics comes from Jack Ryan adaptations, so I will let history and more knowledgeable judge whether this career of arming the less bad guys to overthrow the really bad guys is a strategy that does more harm or good. I can only speak as a mother of four, and say that this is not a winning strategy.
I found his equal bashing of current US leaders (Trump & Biden) really interesting and partially redemptive.
July 8, 2025
I found this to be a slow read, as the author tends to get into the weeds a lot. He seemingly name drops everyone he ever dealt with, both American and foreign. For a book about spies and spying, it's pretty dry stuff.
He takes credit for orchestrating and implementing the US covert war in the 1980's, successfully aiding various insurgent groups in Afghanistan as they fought the Russian invaders. Again, he gets into the weeds detailing the types and quantities of weapons he procured and where they came from. I couldn't help but thinking, given the ongoing struggles in Afghanistan, if the CIA shouldn't have just stepped back and let the Afghans and Russians duke it out.
He takes credit for orchestrating and implementing the US covert war in the 1980's, successfully aiding various insurgent groups in Afghanistan as they fought the Russian invaders. Again, he gets into the weeds detailing the types and quantities of weapons he procured and where they came from. I couldn't help but thinking, given the ongoing struggles in Afghanistan, if the CIA shouldn't have just stepped back and let the Afghans and Russians duke it out.
October 21, 2025
The least deceptive way to read this endless, muddled and minutia-laden memoir would be to view it as a very long piece of propaganda: a type of limited hangout of all of the covert (and overt) things the United States does globally in its attempts to project power. It can also be read as an attempt at an extended--and I mean extended--defense of the CIA and all of its meddlings all over the world.
This is if you actually read the book. Don't. Pi... [see the rest on my book review site.]
This is if you actually read the book. Don't. Pi... [see the rest on my book review site.]
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