In this prize-winning book, a renowned political scientist debunks the commonly held myth that the American national government functions effectively only when one political party controls the presidency and Congress. For this new edition, David R. Mayhew has provided a new Preface, a new appendix, and a new concluding chapter that brings the historical narrative up to date. “Important, accessible, and compelling, David Mayhew’s second edition of Divided We Govern takes the best book on the history of US lawmaking and—against all odds—makes it better.”—Keith Krehbiel, Stanford University “In this welcome updating of his agenda-setting classic, David Mayhew cogently defends his original methodology and finds that divided government remains no less productive of important legislation than unified government, although it is now (thanks mainly to Clinton’s impeachment) strongly associated with prominent investigations of the executive branch. Written with Mayhew’s usual clarity and grace, this is a book to be enjoyed by beginning and veteran students of Congress alike.”—Gary Jacobson From reviews of the first edition: "First-rate. . . . Mayhew’s tabulations and analysis are, quite simply, unimpeachable."—Morris Fiorina, Washington Monthly "Will stand for years as a classic."—L. Sandy Maisel, Political Science Quarterly "Should be read by every student of American politics."—Gillian Peele, Times Higher Education Supplement
Mayhew examines congressional investigations and the enactment of important laws to conclude that unified governments are no more productive than divided governments. This book spurred a flurry of work on the subject that disproved this central claim.
An eminently readable, wholly lucid text looking at the (lack of) differences between unified and divided control of American government between 1947 and 2002.
Divided We Govern is a fascinating book, and one that will challenge your assumptions about the way government works. It seems natural and obvious that when our federal government is divided (different parties controlling different houses of Congress and/or the Presidency) that fewer important legislative accomplishments happen. Yet, Mayhew makes a very convincing case that this isn't true, at least for the years of 1946 through 2002.
Mayhew does the painstaking, but relatively straightforward, work of reviewing each Congress within his timespan and adding up the number of major pieces of legislation. He lays out clearly his methods of deciding what counts as "major" and makes no judgments about the virtues or failings of this legislation, only noting that it did or did not become law. And, lo and behold, the numbers tell a story of government that works more or less equally well during periods of divided as well as united government.
In addition to this counter-intuitive finding, there is the added benefit that Divided We Govern is unusually easy to read for a political science book. It does not use unnecessary jargon or take paragraphs to explain an idea if a sentence or two will do just as well.
Lest I come across as too much of evangelist, I should also note that, though the findings are convincing as far as they go, I suspect that the thesis of Divided We Govern is still applicable. The period in question was a time of less ideological, less disciplined parties. If this study were repeated for the last ten years, my guess is that a different picture would emerge. If it weren't for 9/11, you could probably start a little earlier, even.
That's not to detract from Mayhew's book, just to be realistic about its limitations. Divided We Govern challenged and changed the way I think about the period it studies.
Mayhew is brilliant here as he carefully tests the idea that we are unable to govern because of divided government, that is, periods during which the two major political parties in the US control different branches of government. Surely this must lead to more gridlock and less significant policy legislation.
To prove the falsity of the dominant divided government paradigm, Mayhew identifies major policy legislation over a period of decades and arrays the data across periods of divided government and unified control. The answer is clear: major policy is made during periods of divided government and periods of unified control.
Although it seems intuitively obvious that significant public policy would be impossible to pass during divided government, Mayhew convincingly demonstrates that this is just not true.
This is a very important book for American politics and not to be missed by those who aspire to expertise. As with all Mayhew's books, the writing is good and the methodology is elegant.
This is the new edition of an older version that I found quite fascinating. Many contend that divided government worksa against "getting things done." We see gridlock, so the interpretation goes, and government cannot address major issues. Mayhew develops a methodology to explore how this "common wisdom" works in practice.
In fact, his evidence suggests that in periods of divided government, important legislation, in fact, does get passed. Thus, the idea that divided government leads to ineffective decision making is thrown into question.
However, one thing that is clear when one studies American politics. . . . Patterns at one point in time do not necessarily hold during other periods. It would be interesting to test the thesis with the increasingly bitter partisan debate of the last decade or so (and note that I am speaking from the earlier version of this book).