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Modern War Studies
The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich
For Frederick the Great, the prescription for warfare was kurz und vives ("short and lively")--wars that relied upon swift, powerful, and decisive military operations. Robert Citino takes us on a dramatic march through Prussian and German military history to show how that primal theme played out time and time again. Citino focuses on operational warfare to demonstrate continuity in German military campaigns from the time of Elector Frederick Wilhelm and his great "sleigh-drive" against the Swedes to the age of Adolf Hitler and the blitzkrieg to the gates of Moscow. Along the way, he underscores the role played by the Prussian army in elevating a small, vulnerable state to the ranks of the European powers, describes how nineteenth-century victories over Austria and France made the German army the most respected in Europe, and reviews the lessons learned from the trenches of World War I. Through this long view, Citino reveals an essential recurrent pattern--characterized by rapid troop movements and surprise attacks, maneuvers to outflank the enemy, and a determination to annihilate the opposition--that made it possible for the Germans to fight armies often larger than their own. He highlights the aggressiveness of Prussian and German commanders--trained simply to find the enemy and keep attacking--and destroys the myth of Auftragstaktik ("flexible command"), replacing it with the independence of subordinate commanders. He also brings new interpretations to well-known operations, such as Moltke's 1866 campaign and the opening campaign in 1914, while intro-ducing readers to less familiar but important battles like Langensalza and the Annaberg. The German way of war, as Citino shows, was fostered by the development of a widely accepted and deeply embedded military culture that supported and rewarded aggression. His book offers a fresh look at one of the most remarkable, respected, and reviled militaries of the past half millennium and marks another sterling contribution to the history of operational warfare. This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.
428 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 2005
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889 people want to read
About the author
Robert M. Citino
21 books112 followersRobert M. Citino is an American history professor, scholar and writer currently teaching at the University of North Texas. He specializes in German military history and has earned acclaim by writing several historical books on the subject. He has appeared as a consultant on the History Channel several times on the subject of World War II and German military tactics.
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
May 1, 2016
Robert Citino is one of the leading historians of the German Army in the period 1919-1945, although he has extended his scope to the study of 'Blitzkrieg' and armoured warfare more generally. His works are always meticulously researched, drawing heavily on primary sources, and provide significant insights. I was therefore very interested to see this work, where he has taken a much longer time period (from the 1650s to the 1940s) in an attempt to capture the essence of 'the German way of war'. The book was of especial interest to me, given that I must confess my knowledge of the Napoleonic wars is only passing and of the wars before that sketchy at best.
Citino starts by noting that the Germans themselves emphatically denied that they had any kind of 'scheme' that enabled them to win wars. There was no magic idea or concept. He therefore explores the actual approach and experience of the Prussian / German Army, from the period of Frederick William, the Great Elector, through Frederick the Great, to the time of Scharnhorst and Bluecher, through to Moltke, Schlieffen, and then Seeckt and the Wehrmacht.
What comes out to Citino is a simple, but powerful picture. Prussia (and then the united Germany) had no natural borders behind which it could shelter. Nor did it have the geographic or economic depth that would enable it to withstand a long drawn out conflict. Success, not to say survival, depended on wars being 'lively and short'. That meant that the army had to move fast, both when moving from one part of the theatre of operations to another, and in the context of battle. Minor victories were insufficient - the enemy needed to be defeated quickly and completely. That required attacks to be made against the flanks and rear of the enemy, and for those attacks to be multiplied in their impact through the factors of surprise and energy.
Citino underlines that these necessities required commanders to act quickly and decisively, making their own rapid assessment of the situation and leading their troops with exceptional aggression, always marching to the sound of the guns and attacking at every opportunity. This would throw the enemy off balance and convince them that the battle was lost. He notes that Prussian / German commanders repeatedly ignored the overall plan set out by the commander-in-chief in favour of the offensive opportunities that opened up in front of them, often threatening the success of that overall plan, yet still securing victory through the overwhelming impact on the enemy. And, rather than be disciplined for this, such commanders were repeatedly promoted.
Citino notes some key factors. First, this independence of command reflected the traditional relationship between the Junkers and the king and so might be considered sui generis rather than generally applicable or transferable. That would help explain the major debate within the German Army during the 1880s and 1890s over whether commanders below battalion level should be accorded the same freedoms - the fact that they ultimately were, and indeed this was further extended to NCOs may suggest that Citino was too cautious over the potential for Auftragstaktik to travel beyond its original cultural context.
Citino ends the book with what he considers the death of the traditional style of command, with the assumption of control of the army by Hitler and the switch to detailed control by both the Fuehrer and senior commanders, in December 1941. While part of this clearly stemmed from Hitler's personal approach to command, Citino argues that it should not be forgotten that much of the actual change was implemented by senior generals within the army itself, arguing that part of this may have been a result of a mismatch between the freedom required for the traditional independence of command and the complexity of battle in a context of coordinated artillery and air support. This would suggest that Auftragstaktik (to use a shorthand) would be unlikely to be valid in the context of modern armoured warfare. I have to say that I am not convinced. The factors of fire support were of huge importance by the end of the First World War, yet in many respects the scope for independent command by junior leaders reached a level never before experienced. While not my own area of expertise, I believe there were numerous examples during the 2003 Iraq War where US commanders operated with significant independence in order to secure critical, though unexpected, victories.
These issues notwithstanding, this must rate as one of the most important books on the German way of warfare to have been published in recent years. I know I will come back to it frequently in order to test and inspire my own writing.
Citino starts by noting that the Germans themselves emphatically denied that they had any kind of 'scheme' that enabled them to win wars. There was no magic idea or concept. He therefore explores the actual approach and experience of the Prussian / German Army, from the period of Frederick William, the Great Elector, through Frederick the Great, to the time of Scharnhorst and Bluecher, through to Moltke, Schlieffen, and then Seeckt and the Wehrmacht.
What comes out to Citino is a simple, but powerful picture. Prussia (and then the united Germany) had no natural borders behind which it could shelter. Nor did it have the geographic or economic depth that would enable it to withstand a long drawn out conflict. Success, not to say survival, depended on wars being 'lively and short'. That meant that the army had to move fast, both when moving from one part of the theatre of operations to another, and in the context of battle. Minor victories were insufficient - the enemy needed to be defeated quickly and completely. That required attacks to be made against the flanks and rear of the enemy, and for those attacks to be multiplied in their impact through the factors of surprise and energy.
Citino underlines that these necessities required commanders to act quickly and decisively, making their own rapid assessment of the situation and leading their troops with exceptional aggression, always marching to the sound of the guns and attacking at every opportunity. This would throw the enemy off balance and convince them that the battle was lost. He notes that Prussian / German commanders repeatedly ignored the overall plan set out by the commander-in-chief in favour of the offensive opportunities that opened up in front of them, often threatening the success of that overall plan, yet still securing victory through the overwhelming impact on the enemy. And, rather than be disciplined for this, such commanders were repeatedly promoted.
Citino notes some key factors. First, this independence of command reflected the traditional relationship between the Junkers and the king and so might be considered sui generis rather than generally applicable or transferable. That would help explain the major debate within the German Army during the 1880s and 1890s over whether commanders below battalion level should be accorded the same freedoms - the fact that they ultimately were, and indeed this was further extended to NCOs may suggest that Citino was too cautious over the potential for Auftragstaktik to travel beyond its original cultural context.
Citino ends the book with what he considers the death of the traditional style of command, with the assumption of control of the army by Hitler and the switch to detailed control by both the Fuehrer and senior commanders, in December 1941. While part of this clearly stemmed from Hitler's personal approach to command, Citino argues that it should not be forgotten that much of the actual change was implemented by senior generals within the army itself, arguing that part of this may have been a result of a mismatch between the freedom required for the traditional independence of command and the complexity of battle in a context of coordinated artillery and air support. This would suggest that Auftragstaktik (to use a shorthand) would be unlikely to be valid in the context of modern armoured warfare. I have to say that I am not convinced. The factors of fire support were of huge importance by the end of the First World War, yet in many respects the scope for independent command by junior leaders reached a level never before experienced. While not my own area of expertise, I believe there were numerous examples during the 2003 Iraq War where US commanders operated with significant independence in order to secure critical, though unexpected, victories.
These issues notwithstanding, this must rate as one of the most important books on the German way of warfare to have been published in recent years. I know I will come back to it frequently in order to test and inspire my own writing.
December 20, 2011
Prussian-German "war machine" has always fascinated historians and military buffs alike. They were either sweeping the battlefield and winning (German wars of unification) or putting up so much of a fight that it took a coalition of most powerful states to finally bring them down (WW1, WW2).
Citino asks himself, "is there a German way of war that makes them such formidable force unlike any other?". "Is there some secret ingredient that makes German armies so strong?" He answers "yes" and identifies 3 key components or principles of German "way of war". "German" here means Brandenburg, Prussia and unified Germany.
1. Wars must be short and sharp, hit the enemy with full force as soon as possible and win a decissive victory as soon as possible as well because economy and population levels can't sustain long attritional wars against bigger, richer states.
2. Operational and strategic mobility of armies. While Citino concentrates on operational level, that is moving your army on the battlefield to hit enemy in flanks or rear, strategic mobility is important as well, as Frederick the Great proved when he moved his armies all over the place.
3. When in doubt, attack. Commanders have to be agressive, their task is to find enemy and destroy it. Commanders have a strong degree of autonomy, specially important later when armies became too big to be commanded by a single person and often operated divided into several parts with spotty and slow communication between them.
Citino then looks at German military history to prove his points. Star performer is of course Frederick the Great, specially during 7 years war. War which ironically was not short, violating 1. principle. He proves that Frederick acted agressively and used mobility to full extent, gaining upper hand. Napoleonic wars and wars of german unification are given same tretment, pointing out where principles were applied and how it lead to success.
Citino tries to answer why Germany failed in WW1, answer being agressiveness was lacking at key moments at key points, which led to loss of mobility (trench warfare) and long, attritional war, which Germany was doomed to loose (1. principle).
One could accuse Citino of cherry picking evidence, e.g. Second Silesian war is given only a passing mention, however he tries to explain defeats (Jena-Ausrstadt, opening phase of WW1-west) as failing to follow the 3 principles. My biggest problem is with conclusion, mostly two key points.
First Citino ends his analysis with German failure at the gates of Moscow in december 1941. On one hand he makes a case that post-WW1 German development rested on regaining mobility on strategic/operational level. Motorization, combined arms doctrine and better communications allowed Germans to advance rapidly, outpacing less motorized enemies and unhinge them, something with which I agree. However failure at Moscow was not a failure of such concept, it was problem of distance, tenacity of Red Army, massive mobilization capability of Soviet Union, weather etc. However in next 2 years Germans tried to regain that ability. Opening phase of 1942 summer offensive (Case Blau) saw Wehrmacht once again advancing rapidly, shocking Soviets. Same with 1943 Kursk offensive, where Germns tried once again to regain mobility, breaking into Soviet rear area and mauling assembled forces. Opening phases of these two offensive show that there was nothing inherently wrong with german doctrine, what doomed them were other factors. These two cases should be included as well, because they showed Germans stuck to their doctrine and also why this doctrine failed in the end. It failed becasue Soviets were able to deny Germans their mobility, first in the ruins of Stalingrad which also hampered combined arms (close air and artillery support was less effective because of close proximity of forces) then next year by throwing so many obstacles in front of Germans they simply ran out of steam. But even so, Kharkov counteroffensive (Manstein't counterstroke) showed that when Germans held the mobility edge and acted agressively they could come on top.
Second is that Citino doesn't, or refuses to, see a direct heir of German approach, Israel. After it was created Israel followed German principles to the letter, that is 1948-49 war does not fall into this cathegory but rest do. Short wars, start with massive blow, battlefield agressivness. And you can even see constant German problem, that is field commanders acting on their own even without or against orders from higher command. Even as late as 1982 Lebanon war Sharon ran his own show, hoodwinking Israeli government and outright lying about his intentions (Israeli defence minsiter has somewhat different position than in other western contries). Even when war opened with Israel on the defensive (1973), battlefield agressiveness was obvious with IDF trying with counter attack right away (at Sinai within hours of war's start), even when situation was far from clear. I can't say if this is due to the fact that Citino focuses so much on "German tree" that he can't see forrest around it, or because he doesn't want to equate anything Israeli with anything German (for obvious reasons) but omission is telling either way and points to Citino's partial failure at final analysis.
Overall a decent, if somewhat superficial analysis. I'd recomend it as a way to aquire understanding of basic currents of German war making, doctrine, thinking and performance and applying them when studying either past conflict in more detail. As I said, Citiono identifies what makes "German Way of War" so special but then fails to apply those elements wider.
Citino asks himself, "is there a German way of war that makes them such formidable force unlike any other?". "Is there some secret ingredient that makes German armies so strong?" He answers "yes" and identifies 3 key components or principles of German "way of war". "German" here means Brandenburg, Prussia and unified Germany.
1. Wars must be short and sharp, hit the enemy with full force as soon as possible and win a decissive victory as soon as possible as well because economy and population levels can't sustain long attritional wars against bigger, richer states.
2. Operational and strategic mobility of armies. While Citino concentrates on operational level, that is moving your army on the battlefield to hit enemy in flanks or rear, strategic mobility is important as well, as Frederick the Great proved when he moved his armies all over the place.
3. When in doubt, attack. Commanders have to be agressive, their task is to find enemy and destroy it. Commanders have a strong degree of autonomy, specially important later when armies became too big to be commanded by a single person and often operated divided into several parts with spotty and slow communication between them.
Citino then looks at German military history to prove his points. Star performer is of course Frederick the Great, specially during 7 years war. War which ironically was not short, violating 1. principle. He proves that Frederick acted agressively and used mobility to full extent, gaining upper hand. Napoleonic wars and wars of german unification are given same tretment, pointing out where principles were applied and how it lead to success.
Citino tries to answer why Germany failed in WW1, answer being agressiveness was lacking at key moments at key points, which led to loss of mobility (trench warfare) and long, attritional war, which Germany was doomed to loose (1. principle).
One could accuse Citino of cherry picking evidence, e.g. Second Silesian war is given only a passing mention, however he tries to explain defeats (Jena-Ausrstadt, opening phase of WW1-west) as failing to follow the 3 principles. My biggest problem is with conclusion, mostly two key points.
First Citino ends his analysis with German failure at the gates of Moscow in december 1941. On one hand he makes a case that post-WW1 German development rested on regaining mobility on strategic/operational level. Motorization, combined arms doctrine and better communications allowed Germans to advance rapidly, outpacing less motorized enemies and unhinge them, something with which I agree. However failure at Moscow was not a failure of such concept, it was problem of distance, tenacity of Red Army, massive mobilization capability of Soviet Union, weather etc. However in next 2 years Germans tried to regain that ability. Opening phase of 1942 summer offensive (Case Blau) saw Wehrmacht once again advancing rapidly, shocking Soviets. Same with 1943 Kursk offensive, where Germns tried once again to regain mobility, breaking into Soviet rear area and mauling assembled forces. Opening phases of these two offensive show that there was nothing inherently wrong with german doctrine, what doomed them were other factors. These two cases should be included as well, because they showed Germans stuck to their doctrine and also why this doctrine failed in the end. It failed becasue Soviets were able to deny Germans their mobility, first in the ruins of Stalingrad which also hampered combined arms (close air and artillery support was less effective because of close proximity of forces) then next year by throwing so many obstacles in front of Germans they simply ran out of steam. But even so, Kharkov counteroffensive (Manstein't counterstroke) showed that when Germans held the mobility edge and acted agressively they could come on top.
Second is that Citino doesn't, or refuses to, see a direct heir of German approach, Israel. After it was created Israel followed German principles to the letter, that is 1948-49 war does not fall into this cathegory but rest do. Short wars, start with massive blow, battlefield agressivness. And you can even see constant German problem, that is field commanders acting on their own even without or against orders from higher command. Even as late as 1982 Lebanon war Sharon ran his own show, hoodwinking Israeli government and outright lying about his intentions (Israeli defence minsiter has somewhat different position than in other western contries). Even when war opened with Israel on the defensive (1973), battlefield agressiveness was obvious with IDF trying with counter attack right away (at Sinai within hours of war's start), even when situation was far from clear. I can't say if this is due to the fact that Citino focuses so much on "German tree" that he can't see forrest around it, or because he doesn't want to equate anything Israeli with anything German (for obvious reasons) but omission is telling either way and points to Citino's partial failure at final analysis.
Overall a decent, if somewhat superficial analysis. I'd recomend it as a way to aquire understanding of basic currents of German war making, doctrine, thinking and performance and applying them when studying either past conflict in more detail. As I said, Citiono identifies what makes "German Way of War" so special but then fails to apply those elements wider.
October 20, 2013
Robert Citino's book is a very good compendium of the art of making war according to the Prussian-Germans, from the 17th century to the 20th. The common thread that links all the wars of the Prussian and later German state during that time period is a basic concept, called "Bewegungskrieg" in German, or more or less translated as "war of movement" in English.
This concept does in fact recovers a number of other aspects, as the war of movement aims at attacking the flank or rear of the enemy, in order to keep the wars short and lively (kurz and vives), and done through Auftragstaktic, or flexible command.
Citino's analyzes highlights of the major Prussian-German wars during three centuries to demonstrate these most important aspects of the German war-making, and also shows how the Germans usually got defeated when they could not fight their wars as per this model. His writing is fluid enough considering the dry topic, and he especially pays attention to the human factor by describing in details the actual impact of specific personalities on the evolution of this art of war, starting from the Great Elector, going through Frederick the Great, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Guderian to name a few.
Recommended reading for anyone with an interest in the history of European wars.
This concept does in fact recovers a number of other aspects, as the war of movement aims at attacking the flank or rear of the enemy, in order to keep the wars short and lively (kurz and vives), and done through Auftragstaktic, or flexible command.
Citino's analyzes highlights of the major Prussian-German wars during three centuries to demonstrate these most important aspects of the German war-making, and also shows how the Germans usually got defeated when they could not fight their wars as per this model. His writing is fluid enough considering the dry topic, and he especially pays attention to the human factor by describing in details the actual impact of specific personalities on the evolution of this art of war, starting from the Great Elector, going through Frederick the Great, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Guderian to name a few.
Recommended reading for anyone with an interest in the history of European wars.
January 12, 2020
At first, I'm sorry to say that I don't like North American authors when they speak about European History. Lots of them do a very shallow job to understand our way of thinking, our cultures, even our languages. Some of them may be too nationalist in their essays when they speak about a nation with not even 250 years of history.
BUT, Citino is probably the best N. American military author I have ever (will, probably) read. His way of writing is very humble, he knows the german language and does a great job trying to emphasize the prussian way of thinking in the middle of a battlefield.
He criticize mainstream authors about WWII, and advocates for an in-depth study of historical events in the past to do an interpretation of the today's reality.
"Historians should think why events happened, instead of *what* they should have done." (ibd.)
I absolutely love him, his writing is great (and even funny sometimes with great jokes!).
Congratulations Citino, this composition is a true virtue of honesty, objectivity and truth. From an european, this book is golden, thank you.
BUT, Citino is probably the best N. American military author I have ever (will, probably) read. His way of writing is very humble, he knows the german language and does a great job trying to emphasize the prussian way of thinking in the middle of a battlefield.
He criticize mainstream authors about WWII, and advocates for an in-depth study of historical events in the past to do an interpretation of the today's reality.
"Historians should think why events happened, instead of *what* they should have done." (ibd.)
I absolutely love him, his writing is great (and even funny sometimes with great jokes!).
Congratulations Citino, this composition is a true virtue of honesty, objectivity and truth. From an european, this book is golden, thank you.
January 3, 2020
A fantastic sweeping overview of the Prussian/German war history of the last 400 years. Insightful, relating the Prussian historical teachings of techniques and strategies to both modern German war efforts and also American admirers of the "German" way of war. An approachable, easy read with plenty of references for those looking to dive deeper into specifics.
July 5, 2020
Es war sehr gut! Er erzählt sehr gut die Gründe warum Deutschland beide Weltkriege verloren hat und warum die OKH, mit ihrem ausreichende Menge preußischen Offizieren, Kesselschlacht so liebte. Meine einzige Beschwerde ist Er könnte mehr Karten verwenden.
Aber ich weiß jetzt warum die Deutschen so oft konzentrische Angriffen machen: Es ist die Preußische Tradition.
Aber ich weiß jetzt warum die Deutschen so oft konzentrische Angriffen machen: Es ist die Preußische Tradition.
April 26, 2019
Kurz und vives, short and lively.
If one had to pick a catchphrase to describe the typical fashion in which German armies tended to wage wars, this is likely the one you would chose. And as author Robert Citino showcases, it would be quite apt.
To be fair, the title is a tad of a misnomer, we can't even properly call it 'German' warfare until 1871, or at the close of the Franco-Prussian War and the creation of the German Empire. Rather, up until then, Citino focuses on the Prussian methodology of war fighting.
And it is Prussia, and her particular doctrinal approach to making war, that formulates the entirety of the future German method of war fighting. Prussia, as Citino describes it, was a small sandbox in the northeastern corner of Central Europe, barely fertile, and surrounded by larger, wealthier, hostile states. The Holy Roman Empire to the south, Denmark and Sweden to the north and west, and Poland to the east.
It was as a consequence both of the geographical circumstances that Prussia found itself in, and the relative impoverished nature of Prussia's infrastructure and agricultural system, that drove the formulation of Prussian military doctrine. Any conflict would have to take into consideration that, as a Prussian, you were likely to be outnumbered, outgunned, poorer, and with a fairly fragile logistical network that couldn't hope to support a long, drawn out conflict.
Therefore, Prussian war fighting was aggressive, highly aggressive, sought out the flanks, and pitched into them with a fury. Speed was placed at a premium, and the independence of commanders in the field, and their ability to make snap judgements on the fly, even if they contradicted orders of the King, were sacrosanct.
All of these elements of Prussian war fighting were absorbed into the German Empire, and carried on through the apocalypse of WW2.
Citino, rather than making his case by detailing and narrating every single conflict in exhaustive detail, prefers the snapshot method: taking a particular scenario, and focusing his historical lens on that moment. His selections read as a who's who of great military commanders, and their battles.
From the Battle of Warsaw in the mid 1600's, through the wars of Frederick the Great, the catastrophe of Napoleon's 1806 victories, the 1813 War of Liberation, the Wars of German Unification (where Citino focuses first on Koniggratz and then the opening stages of the Franco-Prussian War), the First World War, and finally ending with succinct, analytical summaries of the campaigns in Poland, Norway, France-Low Countries, and Barbarossa in WW2.
Throughout all of these examples you see the common theme of the Prussian/German methodology of war making, and largely Citino does a superb job of proving his main thesis.
There are a few quibbles, however.
His treatment of Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, while detailing enough to prove Citino's main point on the unchanging nature of Prussian war making, failed to mention that Frederick failed to settle the war in a short and lively way. The Hapsburg forces and the Russians proved more than capable of bouncing back after repeated drubbings, and in truth, the Allies won (at least tactically) more battles against the Prussians than vice-versa.
In fact, Prussia was utterly exhausted, bled white, and nearly broken entirely by the war. It was only a miracle, divine in its provenance, that rescued Prussia due to a death of a Russian leader, and the subsequent political collapse of the coalition against Prussia.
While none of that disproves Citino's main thesis, it could have been used to draw a parallel to the somewhat similar situation the Germans found themselves in during both World Wars. And why the author didn't make more than passing mention of the Spring Offensives of 1918, was a question I was asking myself as I finished the book.
Regardless of any of that, however, this is a stellar work, and one that should be on any military historians bookshelf.
If one had to pick a catchphrase to describe the typical fashion in which German armies tended to wage wars, this is likely the one you would chose. And as author Robert Citino showcases, it would be quite apt.
To be fair, the title is a tad of a misnomer, we can't even properly call it 'German' warfare until 1871, or at the close of the Franco-Prussian War and the creation of the German Empire. Rather, up until then, Citino focuses on the Prussian methodology of war fighting.
And it is Prussia, and her particular doctrinal approach to making war, that formulates the entirety of the future German method of war fighting. Prussia, as Citino describes it, was a small sandbox in the northeastern corner of Central Europe, barely fertile, and surrounded by larger, wealthier, hostile states. The Holy Roman Empire to the south, Denmark and Sweden to the north and west, and Poland to the east.
It was as a consequence both of the geographical circumstances that Prussia found itself in, and the relative impoverished nature of Prussia's infrastructure and agricultural system, that drove the formulation of Prussian military doctrine. Any conflict would have to take into consideration that, as a Prussian, you were likely to be outnumbered, outgunned, poorer, and with a fairly fragile logistical network that couldn't hope to support a long, drawn out conflict.
Therefore, Prussian war fighting was aggressive, highly aggressive, sought out the flanks, and pitched into them with a fury. Speed was placed at a premium, and the independence of commanders in the field, and their ability to make snap judgements on the fly, even if they contradicted orders of the King, were sacrosanct.
All of these elements of Prussian war fighting were absorbed into the German Empire, and carried on through the apocalypse of WW2.
Citino, rather than making his case by detailing and narrating every single conflict in exhaustive detail, prefers the snapshot method: taking a particular scenario, and focusing his historical lens on that moment. His selections read as a who's who of great military commanders, and their battles.
From the Battle of Warsaw in the mid 1600's, through the wars of Frederick the Great, the catastrophe of Napoleon's 1806 victories, the 1813 War of Liberation, the Wars of German Unification (where Citino focuses first on Koniggratz and then the opening stages of the Franco-Prussian War), the First World War, and finally ending with succinct, analytical summaries of the campaigns in Poland, Norway, France-Low Countries, and Barbarossa in WW2.
Throughout all of these examples you see the common theme of the Prussian/German methodology of war making, and largely Citino does a superb job of proving his main thesis.
There are a few quibbles, however.
His treatment of Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, while detailing enough to prove Citino's main point on the unchanging nature of Prussian war making, failed to mention that Frederick failed to settle the war in a short and lively way. The Hapsburg forces and the Russians proved more than capable of bouncing back after repeated drubbings, and in truth, the Allies won (at least tactically) more battles against the Prussians than vice-versa.
In fact, Prussia was utterly exhausted, bled white, and nearly broken entirely by the war. It was only a miracle, divine in its provenance, that rescued Prussia due to a death of a Russian leader, and the subsequent political collapse of the coalition against Prussia.
While none of that disproves Citino's main thesis, it could have been used to draw a parallel to the somewhat similar situation the Germans found themselves in during both World Wars. And why the author didn't make more than passing mention of the Spring Offensives of 1918, was a question I was asking myself as I finished the book.
Regardless of any of that, however, this is a stellar work, and one that should be on any military historians bookshelf.
November 1, 2024
An excellent survey of the Prussian/German military tradition of aggressive maneuver at the operational level (Bewegungskrieg). Flanking or encircling maneuvers involving entire corps or armies.
The book explains how the geographical and economic position of Prussia led to a preference for short, decisive wars rather than lengthy wars of attrition (Stellungskrieg) which it could not hope to win and which in fact the Germans lost in WW1 and on the Russian front in WW2.
Citino also finds the origins of Auftragstaktik, the flexible mission orders which delegate implementation details down the chain of command, to the relatively autonomous relationship the aristocratic generals had to the king or emperor. He cites instances in every historical episode when a commander in the field ignored or flatly disobeyed orders from above, seizing opportunities to attack opponents within reach. This aggressive behavior is highlighted as characteristic of the German way of war.
The book could have been improved with more maps of the campaigns discussed. It seems to assume that the reader is already familiar with those campaigns and the regions in which they occurred. Keeping a good atlas of Europe and western Russia ready to hand is a must.
The book explains how the geographical and economic position of Prussia led to a preference for short, decisive wars rather than lengthy wars of attrition (Stellungskrieg) which it could not hope to win and which in fact the Germans lost in WW1 and on the Russian front in WW2.
Citino also finds the origins of Auftragstaktik, the flexible mission orders which delegate implementation details down the chain of command, to the relatively autonomous relationship the aristocratic generals had to the king or emperor. He cites instances in every historical episode when a commander in the field ignored or flatly disobeyed orders from above, seizing opportunities to attack opponents within reach. This aggressive behavior is highlighted as characteristic of the German way of war.
The book could have been improved with more maps of the campaigns discussed. It seems to assume that the reader is already familiar with those campaigns and the regions in which they occurred. Keeping a good atlas of Europe and western Russia ready to hand is a must.
February 12, 2019
Citino presents the history of the Prussian Army, small, surrounded, and feudal. Geography left Prussia with fewer resources than it's powerful neighbors and meant that if it was to survive as a nation it needed to be aggressive and fight short wars. It couldn't survive wars of attrition. WWI was just one of the wars, thru Prussia's history, that reinforced this military doctrine.
Why I started this book: Inter-library loan is a fabulous motivator... I have to read and return the book instead of just renewing it.
Why I finished it: Citino is a clear and concise author. I enjoyed his structure and the maps and photographs/paintings were a great help in understanding the action and people. Solid history.
Why I started this book: Inter-library loan is a fabulous motivator... I have to read and return the book instead of just renewing it.
Why I finished it: Citino is a clear and concise author. I enjoyed his structure and the maps and photographs/paintings were a great help in understanding the action and people. Solid history.
October 24, 2019
A little too selective in its choice of battles and ridiculously blinkered in its definition of German.
July 8, 2021
Excellent analytic history; nicely written.
August 1, 2022
This was an incredible overview of Prussian/German military history! It was concise enough but also intriguing with the author's arguments.
February 15, 2024
Superlative. Enough said.
December 26, 2024
The lack of maps showing the areas of German states prior to the wars of unification was disappointing considering the 100 plus pages of notes and bibliography.
January 24, 2025
Excelente estudio de los conflictos de Alemania a lo largo de su historia y de su modo d afrontarlos
October 3, 2015
I'm hit-or-miss with this particular historian. Up-front: there are parts of this book that--unless you are REALLY into pre-20th Century military history--you're skimming. Most of the utility here, in my opinion, is in the big-picture strategic thought recorded by men like Clausewitz, Moltke, and Schlieffen. The rest of the really good stuff is to be found mostly in the initial and concluding pages of each chapter. And--a common gripe of mine--the book could use some more and better maps. From Chapter 8 on, though, I decided to keep this book and put it on the shelf next to Weigley's "American Way of War". I really dug Citino's call to stop the "What ifs" at the beginning of the aforementioned chapter. "Military history," he writes, "is the only area in all of historical scholarship where it is still necessary to devise 'perfect plans,' to tell the historical actors what they 'should have done,' how they 'could have gotten it right.' It is a kind of armchair generalship, interesting and even fun, but pointless." And, frankly, hanging out at parties with the kind of people who wax philosophical on whether LBJ should have mined Haiphong will make your teeth itch; I agree with the author when he argues that "The primary question for historians should never be what someone ought to have done, but why they did what they did." This is a fine pre-amble to telling the reader, on the very next page, WHY the Wehrmacht was on the losing side of WWII. The German forces were not good at either intel or counterintel; logistics was always an afterthought; it deviated from the Prussian "short and lively" war model; their behavior in occupied territory was bound to inspire hatred and vengeance amongst the locals; and, frankly, they sucked at coalition warfare. For years, military scholars--myself included--have extolled Auftragstaktik, described most recently as "Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution," as an essential facet for battlefield success. Here Citino extensively covers its origins in the Prussian Junker nobility's relationship to its sovereign--"they were free agents on campaign" because the king "allowed them near total dominance over the serfs, and later peasants, on their domains." The German General Staff was the natural product of this particular relationship, and took the fight successfully to its enemies until December 1941, when Hitler issued the infamous "stand-fast order" and General Kluge fired Guderian for violating it with a tank maneuver. The author, though, argues that in an age of jointness and formations as large as an Army Group, it is "highly problematic... for a modern army to claim Auftragstaktik as a basis for its system of command." (The fact that an E-4 misusing a thumb drive can now have strategic consequences, in my perspective, only supports this assertion.) In the book's conclusion, the author circles back to those great Prussian "philosophers and theoreticians of war" and our overwhelming emphasis upon them: "It is time to redress that imbalance and to suggest that the man of action played as strong a role, if not stronger, than the thinker. Virtually every great period of Prussian-German military history has a suitable candidate." Just as Jesus needed a Paul and Marx needed a Lenin, men like Guderian and Rommel were needed to implement the vision. In this case, that vision, according to Citino, was hitting the enemy's flanks and rear with the greatest force possible; aggressively taking the action to him; and prosecuting the aforementioned and necessary short and lively campaign to get that decisive battlefield victory quickly. As I said, I'm putting this one on the shelf next to the big pink superlative analysis of U.S. military history; there's a lot in "The German Way of War" worthy of a skim, but when it goes big-picture it gleams.
February 22, 2022
Un must read para entender la metafísica de la bewegungskrieg o guerra de maniobra.
Desde el siglo XVII un pequeño reino le mostraba los dientes a las grandes potencias europeas: Prusia.
El diseño operacional: guerras cortas y enérgicas, empleando maniobras operacionales que hacían converger al schwerpunkt sobre las vulnerabilidades enemigas.
Si bien resulta obvia la receta, existe otro ingrediente fundamental: Comandantes subordinados iluminados por una misión, siendo el método resorte de sus creatividad, espíritu y racionamiento. Por su puesto acompañado por estados mayores altamente intelectuales que frenéticamente diseñaban planes agresivos, rápidos y SIMPLES para dislocar o en este caso aniquilar al enemigo.
La indisciplina fue tónica constante, no desidia , sino que la desobediencia a órdenes que atentaban contra el pilar central del modo alemán de hacer la guerra: la agresividad ofensiva. (i.e. Guderian en la ejecución del Plan Amarillo)
¿Que pasó entonces en las guerras mundiales? Se rompió la tradición de guerras kurz und vives , la stellunkrieg no es soportable para este modo de hacer la guerra , haciéndola logísticamente insostenible (entre varios otros factores).
La segunda Guerra mundial muestra la guerra de maniobra en su esplendor con la integración de las unidades panzer y la aviación a la receta prusiana. La radio también coopera en la coordinación pero hace un flaco favor al mando tipo misión, permitiendo la intromisión de Hitler hasta el nivel táctico. La Segunda Guerra mundial también mostró la peor parte desde la perspectiva humana.
La tradición Prusiana nos deja quizás los más grandes filósofos y Comandantes guerreros como Clausewitz, Möltke, Federico el Grande, Scharnhorst, Seeckt, Guderian, Rommel , von Meinstein y cientos más.
Es muy probable que no volvamos a ver este ímpetu en el corto plazo, ya que el mando tipo misión, llevado al nivel prusiano es difícil de practicar : los ejércitos son activos estatales muy caros y aunque se predique, se opta más bien por el control de cada acción.
Desde el siglo XVII un pequeño reino le mostraba los dientes a las grandes potencias europeas: Prusia.
El diseño operacional: guerras cortas y enérgicas, empleando maniobras operacionales que hacían converger al schwerpunkt sobre las vulnerabilidades enemigas.
Si bien resulta obvia la receta, existe otro ingrediente fundamental: Comandantes subordinados iluminados por una misión, siendo el método resorte de sus creatividad, espíritu y racionamiento. Por su puesto acompañado por estados mayores altamente intelectuales que frenéticamente diseñaban planes agresivos, rápidos y SIMPLES para dislocar o en este caso aniquilar al enemigo.
La indisciplina fue tónica constante, no desidia , sino que la desobediencia a órdenes que atentaban contra el pilar central del modo alemán de hacer la guerra: la agresividad ofensiva. (i.e. Guderian en la ejecución del Plan Amarillo)
¿Que pasó entonces en las guerras mundiales? Se rompió la tradición de guerras kurz und vives , la stellunkrieg no es soportable para este modo de hacer la guerra , haciéndola logísticamente insostenible (entre varios otros factores).
La segunda Guerra mundial muestra la guerra de maniobra en su esplendor con la integración de las unidades panzer y la aviación a la receta prusiana. La radio también coopera en la coordinación pero hace un flaco favor al mando tipo misión, permitiendo la intromisión de Hitler hasta el nivel táctico. La Segunda Guerra mundial también mostró la peor parte desde la perspectiva humana.
La tradición Prusiana nos deja quizás los más grandes filósofos y Comandantes guerreros como Clausewitz, Möltke, Federico el Grande, Scharnhorst, Seeckt, Guderian, Rommel , von Meinstein y cientos más.
Es muy probable que no volvamos a ver este ímpetu en el corto plazo, ya que el mando tipo misión, llevado al nivel prusiano es difícil de practicar : los ejércitos son activos estatales muy caros y aunque se predique, se opta más bien por el control de cada acción.
September 2, 2008
An interesting look into the history of the Prussian Army. This book only includes battles the prove the point the author is trying to make. That is that Prussian and later greater Germany, always tried to fight short and lively wars. I was hoping for a more in depth picture into German military history. But this book is base on more operational planning. So if you are a big fan of Operational planning, this books for you.
April 15, 2010
My interest in this book is biased, as it was written by Dr. Rob Citino, formerly of Eastern Michigan University. Dr. Citino is, for me, the final word on German military history. He covers the subject with a trained eye but writes in a very readable manner. If you're a fan of military history, German history, or the development of tactics through history, this would be an excellent book to pick up.
May 21, 2018
This is a great book for military history buffs. Citino makes a strong case that military leaders have consistently taken the wrong lessens from the successes and failures of the German military, from Prussia through the 3rd Reich. It's a great book. Every time I hear a "Blitzkrieg" in the media or from a politician I cringe now.
July 3, 2012
Brings into perspective the "German Way of War." How Germany made 600 years of quick, short range wars, fought on the cheap, successful. When the conflicts became protracted and distant success was short lived. I read this during the Command and General Staff College and immediatly became a fan of Mr. Citino.
January 23, 2008
An look into the structure and development of operational-level warfare in Prussia and Germany from the age of Fredrick the Elector to the invasion of Russia in 1941.
April 27, 2009
Really good read for history nerds. I am taking a class with this title and the author is my professor.
Read
December 17, 2010Good read. Author is well versed in the subject.
February 17, 2014
Very good look, pulling on strings in Prussian-German military history that I'd probably never notice.
March 18, 2019
Fascinating from beginning to end. If you're into this kind of thing. In the beginning of WW2, was a deserter a "Good German" or a "Bad German?"
For instance, Pastor Bonhoeffer was a good man in the eyes of God and universal Christian. But he was a bad German. (Good thing I'm not on Twitter -- I'd have had to duck)
Think about it.
That's what this book tries to explain. No exoneration -- just what the hell happened to make good people, humble farmers and tradesmen, do incredibly bad things.
For instance, Pastor Bonhoeffer was a good man in the eyes of God and universal Christian. But he was a bad German. (Good thing I'm not on Twitter -- I'd have had to duck)
Think about it.
That's what this book tries to explain. No exoneration -- just what the hell happened to make good people, humble farmers and tradesmen, do incredibly bad things.
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