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The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War
In this classic work which analyzes the context in which thirty years of war and revolution wracked the European continent, the great historian Arno Mayer emphasizes the backwardness of the European economies and their political subjugation by aristocratic elites and their allies. Mayer turns upside down the vision of societies marked by modernization and forward-thrusting bourgeois and popular social classes, thereby transforming our understanding of the traumatic crises of the early twentieth century.
384 pages, Paperback
First published March 20, 1981
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About the author
Arno J. Mayer
16 books31 followersA specialist in modern Europe, diplomatic history, and the Holocaust, Arno Joseph Mayer was Dayton-Stockton Professor of History, Emeritus, at Princeton University. A self-proclaimed "left dissident Marxist", Mayer's major interests were in modernization theory and what he called "The Thirty Years' Crisis" between 1914 and 1945.
After fleeing the Nazi conquest of Europe in 1940, Mayer became a naturalized citizen of the United States and enlisted in the United States Army. During his time in the Army, he was trained at Camp Ritchie, Maryland and was recognized as one of the Ritchie Boys. He served as an intelligence officer and eventually became a morale officer for high-ranking German prisoners of war. He was discharged in 1946. He received his education at the City College of New York, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva and Yale University. He was professor at Wesleyan University (1952–53), Brandeis University (1954–58) and Harvard University (1958–61). He taught at Princeton University beginning in 1961.
After fleeing the Nazi conquest of Europe in 1940, Mayer became a naturalized citizen of the United States and enlisted in the United States Army. During his time in the Army, he was trained at Camp Ritchie, Maryland and was recognized as one of the Ritchie Boys. He served as an intelligence officer and eventually became a morale officer for high-ranking German prisoners of war. He was discharged in 1946. He received his education at the City College of New York, the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva and Yale University. He was professor at Wesleyan University (1952–53), Brandeis University (1954–58) and Harvard University (1958–61). He taught at Princeton University beginning in 1961.
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
April 22, 2019
Worthwhile to read alongside Christopher Hill's and Immanuel Wallerstein's analyses of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, in which a portion of the landed elite under bastard feudalism reinvented themselves as agrarian capitalists, navigated the transition, and became the core of the capitalist ruling elite. See also Wallerstein's warning that the post-capitalist successor system may amount to "barbarism" rather than "socialism" if a portion of the capitalist ruling class similarly reinvents itself and becomes the ruling elite under some form of bureaucratic collectivism.
June 4, 2019
Edward Said referenced this book in Culture and Imperialism, writing in a footnote: "Mayer's book, which deals with the reproduction of the old order from the 19th to the early 20th century, should be supplemented by a work that details the passing on of the old colonial system, and trusteeship, from the British empire to the United States, during World War II: William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945."
September 26, 2014
A classic now out in new edition.. Verso World History Series. Mayer pushes against the emphasis in historical writing that places the burden of cause for the Great Power sleepwalk to the Great War in 1914 on modernizing industrializing stresses and strains on brittle monarchies. Instead, as the title indicates , he finds the Old Regime of landed aristocrats, noble public service, and military tradition still quite in charge. Chapters on economy, social structure, and politics follow a comprehensive introduction to much of the other literature. Best, though is final chapter.. an intellectual history of the (mis)use that elites made of the ideas of Darwin and Nietzsche to keep the power.
January 29, 2026
I need better expectation management skills. This was supposed to be the book that would convince me of an argument on WWI that I always resisted: that it were premodern - not modern - forces that started WWI. I recall debates where I defended with passion that WWI grew out of capitalist growht of the 19th century when others just referred to aristocratic elites stuck in their premodern thinking. Now, after having read much more on the debate, I was excited to read a book that would convince me of just that. To my dissapointment, it didn't really.
To be fair, Mayer did try to give some expectation management to the reader in the preface: he says that his argument has shifted from trying to give an "internalist" explanation of the WWI (meaning: focus on domestic matters rather than the international, diplomatic game) to an argument that the Old Regime persisted up until 1914. That's exactly what he does, but it does make the overall argument quite underwhelming. Not up until the last chapter does he actually talk about WWI, making up for an interesting hypothesis which, in my opinion, falls short.
Mayer does have a nice buildup of chapters, from the economy, to politics, to ideology - showing his materialist view. Chapter 1 focuses, ofcourse, on the economic basis of the persistence of the old regime. He basically says that agriculture was still very important, production of consumer goods was still done in small workshops, that capital goods were industrial but were only small parts of the overall economy, and that private banks remained important over modern investment banks (to which this last point I really disagree if you look at Belgium and Germany).
Chapter 2 then focuses on classes. Mayer argues that the postfeudal aristocrats remained highly influential because they were tightly knit together, cohesive, and self-confident, while the new aspiring bourgeoisie lacked the qualities of a unified class with a clear program. It tied its fate to the landowning class and imitated its cultures and habits. The aristocrats also increasingly reproduced themselves through government careers, while the bourgeoisie was focused on making money in the private sector.
Chapter 3 then focuses on politics. Mayer convincingly summarizes that Europe was still politically dominated by the postfeudal elites, who had increasingly claimed political power as their economic power was stagnating. European states still had some kind of a monarch (except France in the Third Republic), most had granted universal male suffrage only very recently (Britain in stages between 1867 and 1918, Germany in 1871, France in 1875, Italy in 1912, Austria in 1907), voting systems were skewed towards overrepresenting rural areas, and often had a bicameral democracy in which the postfeudal interests had much power (through blocking legislation, for example the House of Lords in Britain, or the Senate in Belgium). Moreover, the postfeudal elites held important positions over the administration and... the military!
Chapter 4 then focuses on the arts, which is boring to me.
Chapter 5, the last one, is probably the best addition to the overall argument, for it makes the only bridge to WWI. Here, Mayer discusses the philosophy of these postfeudal elites. He summarizes that these elites, being increasingly paranoid over losing ground to the new classes and forces unleashed in society, became drawn to elitist theories of social Darwinism and Nietzsche. They lashed out at philistines for ruining their societies, but being careful not to pinpoint the bourgeoisie as enemy as they were more afraid of the masses. Increasingly, the idea was entertained that only war could wash away the sins of modern society and bring back the lost paradise. The crisis was an "overreaction of old elites to overperceived dangers of their overprivileged positions" (304). The cult of war was not a plebeian affair!
In sum, thus, his book should argue that WWI was a consequence of the old order fighting to prolong its life rather than industrial capitalism pushing forward. But the only chapter in which he makes the bridge between a persisting old regime and the cause of WWI is when he is talking about ideology, the premodern being fearful of the modern and losing itself in warmongering reactionary thought, but that is just not convincing enough. The book sure gives an important building block to use in any explanation of WWI, being that European societies were not fully "modern" at all, and were combining elements of the premodern and modern era. But this is only to state the obvious. The more important question is how the premodern and modern combined and resulted in catastrophe.
An important omission of the "modern" element to it, is that "Weltpolitik"/imperialism was pursued by industrialising nations of Europe, and that there seems to be an increasing competitive drive for imperialist conquest in those countries which were rapidly growing. Similarly, British foreign policy changed character in response to the competitive pressures of these newly industrialising countries pushing the boundaries of the imperial world. It were exactly these forces that produced the diplomatic unstable situation in 1914, which actually resulted in WWI. To push this counterargument even further: for Schroeder, the premodern elites ruling societies were actually a balancing force in international politics. It was when this new "modern" force of imperialism joined the diplomatic calculations that the international system slowly deteriorated. I don't think there's a way around this argument. If Mayer wants to incorporate this new frenzy of increasing international tensions, it can only be explained because "modern" elements grew too much and scared the postfeudal elites too much. But the industrialisation/imperialism nexus is stronger than just connected through the minds of paranoid elites.
PS: apparently, Engels said at Marx' grave in his eulogy in 1883 that "Just as Darwin had discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx had discovered the law of evolution in human history."
To be fair, Mayer did try to give some expectation management to the reader in the preface: he says that his argument has shifted from trying to give an "internalist" explanation of the WWI (meaning: focus on domestic matters rather than the international, diplomatic game) to an argument that the Old Regime persisted up until 1914. That's exactly what he does, but it does make the overall argument quite underwhelming. Not up until the last chapter does he actually talk about WWI, making up for an interesting hypothesis which, in my opinion, falls short.
Mayer does have a nice buildup of chapters, from the economy, to politics, to ideology - showing his materialist view. Chapter 1 focuses, ofcourse, on the economic basis of the persistence of the old regime. He basically says that agriculture was still very important, production of consumer goods was still done in small workshops, that capital goods were industrial but were only small parts of the overall economy, and that private banks remained important over modern investment banks (to which this last point I really disagree if you look at Belgium and Germany).
Chapter 2 then focuses on classes. Mayer argues that the postfeudal aristocrats remained highly influential because they were tightly knit together, cohesive, and self-confident, while the new aspiring bourgeoisie lacked the qualities of a unified class with a clear program. It tied its fate to the landowning class and imitated its cultures and habits. The aristocrats also increasingly reproduced themselves through government careers, while the bourgeoisie was focused on making money in the private sector.
Chapter 3 then focuses on politics. Mayer convincingly summarizes that Europe was still politically dominated by the postfeudal elites, who had increasingly claimed political power as their economic power was stagnating. European states still had some kind of a monarch (except France in the Third Republic), most had granted universal male suffrage only very recently (Britain in stages between 1867 and 1918, Germany in 1871, France in 1875, Italy in 1912, Austria in 1907), voting systems were skewed towards overrepresenting rural areas, and often had a bicameral democracy in which the postfeudal interests had much power (through blocking legislation, for example the House of Lords in Britain, or the Senate in Belgium). Moreover, the postfeudal elites held important positions over the administration and... the military!
Chapter 4 then focuses on the arts, which is boring to me.
Chapter 5, the last one, is probably the best addition to the overall argument, for it makes the only bridge to WWI. Here, Mayer discusses the philosophy of these postfeudal elites. He summarizes that these elites, being increasingly paranoid over losing ground to the new classes and forces unleashed in society, became drawn to elitist theories of social Darwinism and Nietzsche. They lashed out at philistines for ruining their societies, but being careful not to pinpoint the bourgeoisie as enemy as they were more afraid of the masses. Increasingly, the idea was entertained that only war could wash away the sins of modern society and bring back the lost paradise. The crisis was an "overreaction of old elites to overperceived dangers of their overprivileged positions" (304). The cult of war was not a plebeian affair!
In sum, thus, his book should argue that WWI was a consequence of the old order fighting to prolong its life rather than industrial capitalism pushing forward. But the only chapter in which he makes the bridge between a persisting old regime and the cause of WWI is when he is talking about ideology, the premodern being fearful of the modern and losing itself in warmongering reactionary thought, but that is just not convincing enough. The book sure gives an important building block to use in any explanation of WWI, being that European societies were not fully "modern" at all, and were combining elements of the premodern and modern era. But this is only to state the obvious. The more important question is how the premodern and modern combined and resulted in catastrophe.
An important omission of the "modern" element to it, is that "Weltpolitik"/imperialism was pursued by industrialising nations of Europe, and that there seems to be an increasing competitive drive for imperialist conquest in those countries which were rapidly growing. Similarly, British foreign policy changed character in response to the competitive pressures of these newly industrialising countries pushing the boundaries of the imperial world. It were exactly these forces that produced the diplomatic unstable situation in 1914, which actually resulted in WWI. To push this counterargument even further: for Schroeder, the premodern elites ruling societies were actually a balancing force in international politics. It was when this new "modern" force of imperialism joined the diplomatic calculations that the international system slowly deteriorated. I don't think there's a way around this argument. If Mayer wants to incorporate this new frenzy of increasing international tensions, it can only be explained because "modern" elements grew too much and scared the postfeudal elites too much. But the industrialisation/imperialism nexus is stronger than just connected through the minds of paranoid elites.
PS: apparently, Engels said at Marx' grave in his eulogy in 1883 that "Just as Darwin had discovered the law of evolution in organic nature, so Marx had discovered the law of evolution in human history."
September 9, 2022
The book gives a forceful argument that until WW1 the landed elite maintained strong political control through an assymetric symbiosis with the bourgeoisie, aristocratising the bourgeoisie more than the aristocracy was bourgeoisified - with the strength of industrial capitalism often being overstated, being more like an "archipelago surrounded by vast oceans of agriculture and traditional manufacture" (p. 20), while politically the monarchy often continued with the political and shared identity of landed elites compared to the disunited bourgeoisie allowing its continuation. However, this symbosis - "the old order" - was still threatened by the slow rise of the proletarian masses, which while initially bolstered through nationalism only engulfed Europe into its First World War, as ultraconservatives took power at expense of national conservatives.
Very enlightening (though the failing of any sourcing beyond a bibliography is annoying sometimes) - it cannot makes its head up, if the landed elites were a "feudal element" (p. 11), while at other moments they are stated to have adopted and embraced capitalism while maintaing their aristocratic world-view, maintaing some of the teleology of it as simply 'backwards' that he decries. However, the book's strength is it very well fits the argument of Immanuel Wallerstein's Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy 1600-1750, where he states there was a merger of aristocracy and bourgeoisie, however it was never finished and there was continued conflicts within the ruling elites, without some of the issues of the framework of Mayer - who also, in my view, at times overstates just how strong the aristocratic hold was, as he often has to make an economical exception for the UK and a political exception for France, which I think he is not able to simply dismiss that effectively in the book. Nonetheless, a very valuable reading.
Very enlightening (though the failing of any sourcing beyond a bibliography is annoying sometimes) - it cannot makes its head up, if the landed elites were a "feudal element" (p. 11), while at other moments they are stated to have adopted and embraced capitalism while maintaing their aristocratic world-view, maintaing some of the teleology of it as simply 'backwards' that he decries. However, the book's strength is it very well fits the argument of Immanuel Wallerstein's Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy 1600-1750, where he states there was a merger of aristocracy and bourgeoisie, however it was never finished and there was continued conflicts within the ruling elites, without some of the issues of the framework of Mayer - who also, in my view, at times overstates just how strong the aristocratic hold was, as he often has to make an economical exception for the UK and a political exception for France, which I think he is not able to simply dismiss that effectively in the book. Nonetheless, a very valuable reading.
December 31, 2025
Arno Mayer's conception of 1914-1945 as a single conflict, Europe's second Thirty Years War, beginning with WWI as the dying gasp of the European ancien regimes is so incredibly smart that its insane that it is not the general status-quo historical interpretation of the era.
February 19, 2012
As the book went on, my patience decreased and so did its rating. The author started out at a four—he had an interesting argument that the old regime lasted longer than given credit for and did so in part because it co-opted competitors. Then the repetitiousness started to get to me. He felt the need in each chapter to repeat his arguments over and over again—once at least for each country. “Here’s how it was true in Italy.” “Here’s how it was true AGAIN in Germany.” Etc etc etc. Down to a “3.”
It was when he moved to cultural matters that he really lost me (and I occasionally lost my temper). The book reveals a remarkably simplistic notion of the connection between politics and culture as well as a tendency to project political motives onto people just bumbling around as they are wont to do.
Three examples (with my ever-so-rational commentary):
“The spineless bourgeoisie, in the meantime, invested in certified ‘classical’ art instead of sponsoring the modernist experiments of contemporary art and artists.”
Those spineless bourgeoisie. They didn’t just like classical art; they were investing in it from fear that modernist art would cause the overthrow of their own economic system.
“The Gothic revival, in particular, endowed this city and others with a cultural legacy calculated to reconcile the accomplishments and ravages of capitalism with the old order.” 197
And those sinister people who populated a city with Gothic revival architecture…they knew that doing so would keep the populace from revolt.
“Clearly, the Third Republic settled into a public environment that was built and ‘furnished’ by previous regimes. It behaved, not like a proud master commissioning his own buildings and testimonials, but like the dutiful curator and tenant of an old patrimony.” 221
So, according to said author, if a new regime fails to tear down the entirety of public architecture and build anew, it is simply clinging to the old political ways.
So, a “2”—I’m lucky the book ended when it did since there are no negative numbers in the rating system.
It was when he moved to cultural matters that he really lost me (and I occasionally lost my temper). The book reveals a remarkably simplistic notion of the connection between politics and culture as well as a tendency to project political motives onto people just bumbling around as they are wont to do.
Three examples (with my ever-so-rational commentary):
“The spineless bourgeoisie, in the meantime, invested in certified ‘classical’ art instead of sponsoring the modernist experiments of contemporary art and artists.”
Those spineless bourgeoisie. They didn’t just like classical art; they were investing in it from fear that modernist art would cause the overthrow of their own economic system.
“The Gothic revival, in particular, endowed this city and others with a cultural legacy calculated to reconcile the accomplishments and ravages of capitalism with the old order.” 197
And those sinister people who populated a city with Gothic revival architecture…they knew that doing so would keep the populace from revolt.
“Clearly, the Third Republic settled into a public environment that was built and ‘furnished’ by previous regimes. It behaved, not like a proud master commissioning his own buildings and testimonials, but like the dutiful curator and tenant of an old patrimony.” 221
So, according to said author, if a new regime fails to tear down the entirety of public architecture and build anew, it is simply clinging to the old political ways.
So, a “2”—I’m lucky the book ended when it did since there are no negative numbers in the rating system.
September 29, 2025
This is a book that really sticks with you and warrants precise rereading. Mayer is a deeply incisive historian who marshals compelling data to rethink Belle Epoque Europe. He challenges the view of Europe in this period which contends that the forces of progress—economic and cultural—were on the advance prior to the war, surreptitiously ending Europe’s golden age. In arguing contrariwise—that the social and economic forces traditionally associated with the ancien regime persisted—Mayer challenges orthodoxies for historians of the left and right.
The final two chapters are particularly strong, but the first chapter really lays the foundation for Mayer’s entire argument; he himself admits as much in the introduction.
No matter how myopic the thesis may appear, it is well written and documented. For stirring the pot and adding a thought-provoking interpretation of the lead up to WW1, it is worth the read. Mayer is one of the greats
The final two chapters are particularly strong, but the first chapter really lays the foundation for Mayer’s entire argument; he himself admits as much in the introduction.
No matter how myopic the thesis may appear, it is well written and documented. For stirring the pot and adding a thought-provoking interpretation of the lead up to WW1, it is worth the read. Mayer is one of the greats
October 29, 2014
The European feudal nobility maintained their grip on power through the Industrial Revolution to 1914 by co-opting the most talented and wealthy of the bourgeoisie, maintaining the agrarian economic sector's traditional political over-empowerment, and promoting themselves into the "steel frames" of civil service and the military. They showed notable flexibility in adapting to social change. Co-optation of bourgeois aspirations included controlling education access and curriculum, dangling the possibility of intermarriage and ennoblement, and resisting avant-garde cultural innovation.
Seems applicable to an examination of our reliance on non-profits to provide civil service, and of ruling class attacks on our education system. Also, Hogwarts (and most of the fantasy genre?) begs to be deconstructed using Mayer's toolkit.
Seems applicable to an examination of our reliance on non-profits to provide civil service, and of ruling class attacks on our education system. Also, Hogwarts (and most of the fantasy genre?) begs to be deconstructed using Mayer's toolkit.
March 10, 2015
Mayer states at the outset that this is not an even-handed work - he is in lawyer mode, not judge mode, attempting to present a brief to the effect that in late 19th century Europe it was the aristocracy, not the bourgeoisie, who held pride of place economically, politically, and culturally. While I'm far from convinced, he does lay out a fascinating panoramic picture of upper-echelon Europe between 1848 and the Great War that would easily make this a 4-star book - if not for the lack of citations, or, in the statistics-heavy first chapters, tables (which would have made international comparisons infinitely easier.) As such, 2.5 stars, rounding up to three.
August 20, 2023
Espectacular. No es lo mismo saber de la existencia de este libro y conocer a grandes rasgos su tesis como una más del gran bazar de la historiografía que lograr hacerte al fin con él por azar en una librería de viejo como apoyo en principio de otra lectura y volarte de golpe todos los esquemas sobre el origen de nuestra hoy vapuleada modernidad con una inteligencia casi insoportable.
Tres premisas lo sostienen.
- La Guerra Mundial de 1939-1945 estaba unida umbilicalmente a la Gran Guerra de 1914-1918 y esos dos conflictos fueron nada menos que la Guerra de los Treinta años de la crisis general del siglo XX.
- La Gran Guerra de 1914, o fase primigenia y protogénica de esta crisis general, fue producto de la movilización de última hora de los Anciens Régimens de Europa. La Gran Guerra fue una expresión de la decadencia y caída de un antiguo orden que luchaba por prolongar su vida, más bien que de la ascensión explosiva de un capitalismo industrial empeñado en imponer su primacía.
- El Antiguo Régimen en Europa era totalmente industrial y preburgués. Los historiadores llevan demasiado tiempo centrándose excesivamente en los progresos de la ciencia y la tecnología, del capitalismo industrial y mundial, de la burguesía y de la clase media profesional, de la sociedad política democrática y del modernismo cultural. Se han ocupado mucho más de estas fuerzas innovadoras y de la formación de la nueva sociedad que de las fuerzas de la inercia y la resistencia que frenaron la caída del Antiguo orden.
Se ha dado, pues, una clara tendencia a descuidar o quitar importancia y valor a la resistencia de las fuerzas y de las ideas antiguas y a su genio astuto para asimilar, retrasar, neutralizar y domeñar a la modernización capitalista.
Tres premisas lo sostienen.
- La Guerra Mundial de 1939-1945 estaba unida umbilicalmente a la Gran Guerra de 1914-1918 y esos dos conflictos fueron nada menos que la Guerra de los Treinta años de la crisis general del siglo XX.
- La Gran Guerra de 1914, o fase primigenia y protogénica de esta crisis general, fue producto de la movilización de última hora de los Anciens Régimens de Europa. La Gran Guerra fue una expresión de la decadencia y caída de un antiguo orden que luchaba por prolongar su vida, más bien que de la ascensión explosiva de un capitalismo industrial empeñado en imponer su primacía.
- El Antiguo Régimen en Europa era totalmente industrial y preburgués. Los historiadores llevan demasiado tiempo centrándose excesivamente en los progresos de la ciencia y la tecnología, del capitalismo industrial y mundial, de la burguesía y de la clase media profesional, de la sociedad política democrática y del modernismo cultural. Se han ocupado mucho más de estas fuerzas innovadoras y de la formación de la nueva sociedad que de las fuerzas de la inercia y la resistencia que frenaron la caída del Antiguo orden.
Se ha dado, pues, una clara tendencia a descuidar o quitar importancia y valor a la resistencia de las fuerzas y de las ideas antiguas y a su genio astuto para asimilar, retrasar, neutralizar y domeñar a la modernización capitalista.
February 10, 2024
The book is an excellent read. I felt immersed in the social conditions of Europe before the Great War. The book isn’t so much a history of Europe, as an explanation of the social structures of Europe at the time. The main thrust of the book is how the nobility of various European nations (France, Germany, Austria-Hungary) managed to incorporate the rising bourgeois of Europe into their social structures. There was a love-hate relationship. The rising bourgeois had money, but they were not noble, and at their worst, they could be … liberal. The aristocrats and elites of all these nations were desperately trying to prevent the rise of liberalism.
There were a few things I learned in this book. One thing I learned in this book is just simply how much European elites at the turn of the 20th century hated modern art. Even Impressionism, with artists like Manet, was controversial! It seemed that artistic elites were trying very hard to marginalize modern types of art. The other was with Social Darwinism. I did not realize how common those types of views were in pre-war Europe. Their worldview reminded me of BAP and vitalist types.
Overall, the book felt dated, less in the arguments but more in the fact the arguments have become common to other histories of Europe in this period. I have to recommend the book however, it was a well-researched social history of how the nobility and rising bourgeois interacted, and how up until World War One, the nobility was relatively successful in incorporating the rising groups into the traditional power structures, to prevent the creation of a counter-elite. The Persistence of the Old Regime was a rewarding read.
There were a few things I learned in this book. One thing I learned in this book is just simply how much European elites at the turn of the 20th century hated modern art. Even Impressionism, with artists like Manet, was controversial! It seemed that artistic elites were trying very hard to marginalize modern types of art. The other was with Social Darwinism. I did not realize how common those types of views were in pre-war Europe. Their worldview reminded me of BAP and vitalist types.
Overall, the book felt dated, less in the arguments but more in the fact the arguments have become common to other histories of Europe in this period. I have to recommend the book however, it was a well-researched social history of how the nobility and rising bourgeois interacted, and how up until World War One, the nobility was relatively successful in incorporating the rising groups into the traditional power structures, to prevent the creation of a counter-elite. The Persistence of the Old Regime was a rewarding read.
November 1, 2019
In this very interesting book Mayer convincingly argues that the societies of the European powers (Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, France, and Italy), between 1848 and 1914, were deeply dominated by the Old Regime social and political forces and values, much more so than what is usually acknowledged. In five carefully argued chapters the author examines the economy, the ruling classes, the political society and the governing classes, the official high culture and the vanguards, and the world view of the European powers. The basic structure used by the author, starting each topic by an European overview followed by a detailed examination of the situation in each of the different powers, allow us to gain a general understanding without leaving aside the necessary details upon which such a panoramic view must be built. This is indeed a remarkable and challenging book, by a great historian, that I found very enlightening in order to proper understand the general political, social, and cultural background to one of the most calamitous periods of European history: the Thirty Years war of the twentieth century (1914-1945) that finally dislodged the Old Regime.
February 1, 2018
From the preface - “...a work of interpretation based almost exclusively on secondary sources. The bibliography... lists the books and articles I found most useful and pillaged mercilessly”. Wish every historian was as forthcoming. A very enjoyable and provocative book.
And he makes a great case as summarized on p.186 - “Down to 1914 the ‘steel frame’ of Europe’s political societies continued to be heavily feudal and nobilitarian.”
Sent from my iPhone
And he makes a great case as summarized on p.186 - “Down to 1914 the ‘steel frame’ of Europe’s political societies continued to be heavily feudal and nobilitarian.”
Sent from my iPhone
January 18, 2019
I read this decades ago but no longer remember it very well. At the time I read it, I thought the work incisive and important. It probably was and is. Professor Myer is a major critical historical who deserves my rereading this work and reading other of his work.
February 4, 2026
I’m honestly pretty surprised that this thesis was considered revolutionary in 1981 because today it seems, dare I say, common sense. On the other hand, if this book is the precise reason this is common sense, then… cool.
June 22, 2013
An interesting analysis of how Europe was agricultural and ruled by nobles and kings up to World War I.
Yes, even France. Well, not a king, but the nobles had disproportionate clout despite having no legal positions. Elsewhere the nobles and kings were extremely powerful -- partly because they were able to co-opt the rising classes, partly because the middle classes were not united, partly because they set the standards to which the others tried to rise.
Lots of discussion and distinction about manufacturing and what was really being manufactured -- even in Great Britain and Germany, where the Industrial Revolution was the most powerful, the extent of small-scale craftsmanship was large.
Agriculture was big, and so were landowners. In the census, Tsar Nicholas had no objections to being described as a landowner. All the monarchs owned lots of land.
How they kept political power. Germany had a voting system that even Bismarck described as perverse, but it helped put the power in the hands of the upper classes. New nobles were usually created from people of noble descent, and land-owners -- even if they made a mint in industry, they would become landowners, often, before the title came.
And their control of high culture. This gets a little weak because while he opens with the observation that "pre-industrial" presupposes a natural evolution, he has a tendency to throw around "progressive" as if it were obvious what is progress in the art. And it goes on a little too long about the difficulties of the avant-garde, when we tend to be more ignorant of academic artists of the time.
Still, an interesting look at the social structure of 19th century Europe.
Yes, even France. Well, not a king, but the nobles had disproportionate clout despite having no legal positions. Elsewhere the nobles and kings were extremely powerful -- partly because they were able to co-opt the rising classes, partly because the middle classes were not united, partly because they set the standards to which the others tried to rise.
Lots of discussion and distinction about manufacturing and what was really being manufactured -- even in Great Britain and Germany, where the Industrial Revolution was the most powerful, the extent of small-scale craftsmanship was large.
Agriculture was big, and so were landowners. In the census, Tsar Nicholas had no objections to being described as a landowner. All the monarchs owned lots of land.
How they kept political power. Germany had a voting system that even Bismarck described as perverse, but it helped put the power in the hands of the upper classes. New nobles were usually created from people of noble descent, and land-owners -- even if they made a mint in industry, they would become landowners, often, before the title came.
And their control of high culture. This gets a little weak because while he opens with the observation that "pre-industrial" presupposes a natural evolution, he has a tendency to throw around "progressive" as if it were obvious what is progress in the art. And it goes on a little too long about the difficulties of the avant-garde, when we tend to be more ignorant of academic artists of the time.
Still, an interesting look at the social structure of 19th century Europe.
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