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Beginner's Guide (Oneworld Publications)
The Philosophy of Mind: A Short Introduction
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256 pages, Paperback
First published July 25, 2005
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About the author
Edward Feser
32 books335 followersEdward Feser is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. He has been a Visiting Assistant Professor at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles and a Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California at Santa Barbara, an M.A. in religion from the Claremont Graduate School, and a B.A. in philosophy and religious studies from the California State University at Fullerton.
Called by National Review “one of the best contemporary writers on philosophy,” Feser is the author of On Nozick, Philosophy of Mind, Locke, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism, and Aquinas, and editor of The Cambridge Companion to Hayek and Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics. He is also the author of many academic articles. His primary academic research interests are in the philosophy of mind, moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of religion.
Feser also writes on politics and culture, from a conservative point of view; and on religion, from a traditional Roman Catholic perspective. In this connection, his work has appeared in such publications as The American, The American Conservative, City Journal, The Claremont Review of Books, Crisis, First Things, Liberty, National Review, New Oxford Review, Public Discourse, Reason, and TCS Daily.
He lives in Los Angeles with his wife and six children.
Called by National Review “one of the best contemporary writers on philosophy,” Feser is the author of On Nozick, Philosophy of Mind, Locke, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism, and Aquinas, and editor of The Cambridge Companion to Hayek and Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics. He is also the author of many academic articles. His primary academic research interests are in the philosophy of mind, moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of religion.
Feser also writes on politics and culture, from a conservative point of view; and on religion, from a traditional Roman Catholic perspective. In this connection, his work has appeared in such publications as The American, The American Conservative, City Journal, The Claremont Review of Books, Crisis, First Things, Liberty, National Review, New Oxford Review, Public Discourse, Reason, and TCS Daily.
He lives in Los Angeles with his wife and six children.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 56 reviews
July 14, 2008
As an introduction, this book is excellent. Feser begins with Descartes and two theories of perception - indirect and direct realism. He then offers and introduction to dualism, claiming that the mind is different than the brain just like apples are differant than oranges. In one sense, you shouldn't even need an argument to see that. He shores this claim up by getting more specific about some of the differences. He then moves to materialism about the mind, providing some of the motives they have for being materialists about the mind, and then introduces some of the main features of the mind that any view of the mind must come to grips with - qualia, intentionality, mental causation, unity of consciousness, consciousness, nature of persons, etc. He spends the rest of the book discussing these issues. He does a good job surveying the literature and presents both sides well. Though the book is accessible to the non-specialist, it has a few rough parts. This is mainly due to the challenege of explaining various materialist theories, which are usullly strange and wild to the ears of normal people! Besides serving as a great introduction to the philosophy of mind, many other philosophical issues are discussed throughout the book and so it can serve as a good general introduction to philosophy qua intellectual discipline. Feser ends by endorsing Thomistic (and stands in the tradition of analystic Thomism) dualism. Stated differently, he defends hylomorphic dualism (a person is a soul-body composite). This is opposed to Cartesian or simple dualism. His main argument against simple dualism was not too convincing for me. He says that it has the epistemological problem of not being able to know that the cognizer you interacted with yesterday is the same today - the problem of other minds. It's not clear why this couldn't be a basic belief and be warranted in light of that. It's also not clear to me what Feser would say about how disembodied persons, viz., angels, knew they were speaking to the same being as the day before. And Feser did not speak to the question posed to hylomorphists about who does the thinking. If it is the soul, and the soul is not me but rather the composite is me, then my thinking is done by something numerically distinct from me. If it is the composite that thinks, and if we exist disembodied while we await the resurrection of our bodies, then my disembodied soul does not think. But then why try to defend the intermediate state? Well, I'm sure Feser has answers, but none forthcoming in the book. At any rate, I would highly recommend it as an intro to the philosophy of mind.
December 10, 2017
For a long time, the vogue among intellectuals has been to describe humans in terms of machines or computers. Considering the fact that machines and computers are human inventions, this has always seemed to me wilfully reductionist, as if one were to say that a country is literally a map. In terms of Venn diagrams, a machine, deriving from humans, should be included within the set of humanity, not the other way around.
And now, in the 21st century, those who hold the view that humans are machines seem bent on proving their hypothesis by turning it into literal truth (cf Ray Kurzweil, etc.).
The human mind is perhaps the great battlefield where this struggle is to take place, and it might be just as well for all of us to arm ourselves with some philosophy of mind so that we are not immediately blinded by science when people claim to have explained away the existence of consciousness.
This book, from my very limited knowledge, would appear to be a decent entry point into the philosophy of mind. There is a bias, and it is not the orthodox bias that mind can be explained in purely material terms. (It is the bias - unorthodox in this age - towards a particular kind of hylemorphic dualism.) Nonetheless, since the orthodoxy tends to be presented as the only show in town, such a bias seems more a justifiable corrective than anything else.
For those wishing to explore further, each chapter ends with suggestions for further reading on all sides of the debates addressed.
And now, in the 21st century, those who hold the view that humans are machines seem bent on proving their hypothesis by turning it into literal truth (cf Ray Kurzweil, etc.).
The human mind is perhaps the great battlefield where this struggle is to take place, and it might be just as well for all of us to arm ourselves with some philosophy of mind so that we are not immediately blinded by science when people claim to have explained away the existence of consciousness.
This book, from my very limited knowledge, would appear to be a decent entry point into the philosophy of mind. There is a bias, and it is not the orthodox bias that mind can be explained in purely material terms. (It is the bias - unorthodox in this age - towards a particular kind of hylemorphic dualism.) Nonetheless, since the orthodoxy tends to be presented as the only show in town, such a bias seems more a justifiable corrective than anything else.
For those wishing to explore further, each chapter ends with suggestions for further reading on all sides of the debates addressed.
November 6, 2021
Generally a really good book. I enjoyed the simple break down of complicated concepts in the philosophy of mind, additionally Fesers commitment to rebutting the current dogmatic views of materialism and scientism were refreshing!
Towards the end Fesers own slant towards Aristoteleanism/Thomism certainly came across and this would be my only general critique -- that what is meant to be an introduction to philosophy of mind essentially became a sustained argument leading to Thomistic conclusions!
I would highly recommend this to anyone who is interested in understanding philosophy of mind, it should be accessible to most with a basic grounding in philosophy/metaphysics (if I can read it then you can too).
Towards the end Fesers own slant towards Aristoteleanism/Thomism certainly came across and this would be my only general critique -- that what is meant to be an introduction to philosophy of mind essentially became a sustained argument leading to Thomistic conclusions!
I would highly recommend this to anyone who is interested in understanding philosophy of mind, it should be accessible to most with a basic grounding in philosophy/metaphysics (if I can read it then you can too).
July 10, 2017
A tangle indeed
This was a difficult book that I would only commend to those VERY interested in the subject. I was hoping for a more straightforward, simplistic defense of the metaphysical nature of the mind, but such is evidently not to be had. A quote from the book sums it up best: "Wilfrid Sellars famously wrote that “the traditional mind-body problem is ... a veritable tangle of tangles. At first sight but one of the ‘problems of philosophy,’ it soon turns out, as one picks at it, to be nothing more nor less than the philosophical enterprise as a whole.”"
At the end, I remain committed to the transcendence of mind because it seems intuitively true. The sum of the philosophical arguments in the book seem to me nothing more than one giant Rorschach test.
This was a difficult book that I would only commend to those VERY interested in the subject. I was hoping for a more straightforward, simplistic defense of the metaphysical nature of the mind, but such is evidently not to be had. A quote from the book sums it up best: "Wilfrid Sellars famously wrote that “the traditional mind-body problem is ... a veritable tangle of tangles. At first sight but one of the ‘problems of philosophy,’ it soon turns out, as one picks at it, to be nothing more nor less than the philosophical enterprise as a whole.”"
At the end, I remain committed to the transcendence of mind because it seems intuitively true. The sum of the philosophical arguments in the book seem to me nothing more than one giant Rorschach test.
March 17, 2020
My review is too long to post it, but it was amazing introductory book, really informative, I barely give 4 stars to introductory books!!!
May 5, 2020
Really a 3.5. I found my interest going in and out. I think it had more to do with the subject matter than the writing. A lot of times I struggled to even know why I cared at all. There were times, though, that I found myself quite intrigued.
July 2, 2012
This book is a great introduction to this fascinating and foundational branch of philosophy. Feser fairly presents the case for and against both a naturalistic and a dualistic understanding of the mind. I wish he would have developed the difference between Aristotelian and Cartesian dualism further.
December 28, 2025
It’s not a bad book. It’s good. I enjoyed the beginning more just cuz the initial topics interested me. He spends a vast majority referencing modern or contemporary philosophers. There are several references to Socrates and Plato, and near the end he finally mentions Aristotle and Aquinas. It’s not that I don’t like the book, but rather a lot of it went over my head. It’s supposed to be a beginner’s guide, and I felt especially in the second half…it went beyond me. Perhaps in a few years I will return to the book and get more out of it. Feser does a remarkable job presenting each side with no bias and allows the reader to form their own opinions. I’m grateful for that, but I just found most of the material difficult to comprehend. I very much appreciated his use of humors
October 9, 2010
I really enjoyed this book. Feser's writing is clear and accessible. He does a great job of giving an overview of Philosophy's approach to understanding the mind and especially how the mind relates to the brain.
This is an area I've thought about a lot, but I have done no serious reading on it before now. This book was exactly what I was looking for as an introduction to the topic. I could follow most of it (although a lot of detail went past me), and it really gave me a great deal to think about. I strongly recommend it.
This is an area I've thought about a lot, but I have done no serious reading on it before now. This book was exactly what I was looking for as an introduction to the topic. I could follow most of it (although a lot of detail went past me), and it really gave me a great deal to think about. I strongly recommend it.
June 12, 2014
Having not had the opportunity to take an undergraduate course in philosophy of mind, I don't have a way to gauge how good this book is qua an introduction to the field, however, I can say that it was easily understandable. Especially noteworthy is Feser's discussion of dualism and various non-materialist views. Also, the further reading lists at the end of each chapter are extremely well done and provide more than enough fodder for further research to keep one busy for many months. Also, the glossary of terms at the back is a nice, helpful touch.
June 12, 2017
A really thorough introduction to the philosophy of mind. Much more thorough than one might be expecting (e.g., you'll learn about Russellian Identity Theory and Neutral Monism, Homunculi Decomposition arguments etc.)
Feser's grasp of the subject and his ability to lay it out in an organized and clear manner is top notch.
Feser's grasp of the subject and his ability to lay it out in an organized and clear manner is top notch.
April 3, 2016
Much more complex than I expected it to be from the introductory nature of the work.
That's good if you know a thing or two about philosophy, but I wouldn't recommend this to newcomers. A lot of terminology coming from all the different schools discussed here.
That's good if you know a thing or two about philosophy, but I wouldn't recommend this to newcomers. A lot of terminology coming from all the different schools discussed here.
January 6, 2023
This is a very thorough and well-written introduction to the topic. In part, this is due to his own position as a Thomist in favor of hylomorphism. His treatment of functionalism and other physicalist theories, is fair but very skeptical.
November 15, 2011
A great book, well-deserving of a careful and slow read.
August 25, 2012
A great introduction to philosophy of mind in general and hylemorphism in particular. Edward Feser is turning me into a Thomist.
October 3, 2012
Classic Thomism applied to modern day philosophical issues. A very good read.
November 18, 2017
This book presents an excellent overview of its subject, accessible to beginners who are willing to work (as reading any serious philosophical book usually requires work) but deep enough to be interesting also to the reader who already knows something about the subject. The story begins with Descartes' reflections on knowledge, certainty, and "I think, therefore I exist"; it moves on through early modern theories of dualism and materialism to contemporary discussions regarding qualia (subjective experiences, such as those of smells and colors, pains and pleasures), consciousness, thought (reasoning), and intentionality (the characteristic feature of mental acts of referring to or being directed towards something, as, for example, my thought that Socrates is a man refers to Socrates). The last chapter, "Persons," presents the Aristotelian/Thomist theory of hylomorphic dualism, in which the soul is the form of the body, rather than (as in Cartesian dualism) a substance completely distinct from matter.
I decided to read this book as a refresher and updater; it is my first serious reading in philosophy of mind since about 35 years ago. After that, I abandoned my philosophical roots to work in artificial intelligence and computer science.
The discussion of contemporary theories reminds me of much that I used to know in the 1970s and brings me reasonably up to date, to about 2006.
My main impression from the book is that philosophy of mind is even stranger and weirder than I remembered it from those days. The treatment of dualism and materialism seems mostly balanced and fair. When it comes to computational theories of intelligence, I am not sure that Feser's exposition expresses an adequate understanding of rule-based computations, or the nature of computation in general; on the other hand, I got the impression that Searle's views might have more wisdom than they are generally credited for in the A.I. community.
I am interested in Thomism and, knowing Feser to be a Thomist, was hoping for a good, thorough exposition of the hylomorphic dualist theory which is the subject of the last chapter. Alas, I found that chapter all too short. I still do not understand how the soul (mind) can be the form of the body, largely because I do not understand the term "form."
Feser defines form as follows: "The form of a substance is its organizational structure; the matter is that which is given organizational structure by the form." (p. 220) He gives the example of a chair having a round seat, and says "the roundness is an aspect of the chair's form." This suggests that the form of a physical thing is its shape. But then he says the seat's roundness is not part of the chair's substantial form, because the chair might have a square seat, but it must have some kind of seat, and that is part of its form. In the Glossary, he states: "The form of a thing is its organizational structure; something irreducible to the sum of its parts." (p. 245) The thing having a form is not the sum of its parts, so is the form how the parts are put together -- an assembled chair, for example, as opposed to a collection of chair parts ready to be assembled? That works very well for physical things, given a low-grade sense of "sum of parts" (so that the same "sum of parts" would exist no matter how the parts were configured or arranged) -- but how does it get us out of mechanism and materialism? And how does it apply if the form is subsistent, i.e., having an immaterial operation, so that it is capable of existing without matter, And how, especially, does it apply to the angels, which never have any matter, so no parts needing to be assembled?
He goes on to describe the forms (souls) of living things. The forms of plants ("nutritive souls") are "the sort which informs the matter of which plants are composed, and imparts to them powers of nutrition, growth, and reproduction." (p. 221) The forms of animals ("sensory souls") give them powers of perception and appetite, as well as the powers of the nutritive soul. And finally the forms of human beings ("rational souls") give us the powers of intellect, will, and memory, in addition to the powers of the animal soul. But some would contend that even the rational soul's powers are completely accountable for by means of the composition of the material parts and the laws of physics and chemistry. This contention becomes more plausible if we press it down to the powers of the animal soul being so accountable, and even more plausible if we push it down to the nutritive soul of plants. So it remains very unclear to me how the soul (any of these three kinds) is a form that is clearly distinct from some composition or arrangement of pieces of matter.
Altogether, then, I am happy with most of the book, but disappointed with the last chapter. At least, though, that chapter, like the rest, has a good bibliography.
The next stop in my quest for understanding hylomorphic dualism will be David Oderberg's Real Essentialism. If anyone has any better suggestions, please let me know.
I decided to read this book as a refresher and updater; it is my first serious reading in philosophy of mind since about 35 years ago. After that, I abandoned my philosophical roots to work in artificial intelligence and computer science.
The discussion of contemporary theories reminds me of much that I used to know in the 1970s and brings me reasonably up to date, to about 2006.
My main impression from the book is that philosophy of mind is even stranger and weirder than I remembered it from those days. The treatment of dualism and materialism seems mostly balanced and fair. When it comes to computational theories of intelligence, I am not sure that Feser's exposition expresses an adequate understanding of rule-based computations, or the nature of computation in general; on the other hand, I got the impression that Searle's views might have more wisdom than they are generally credited for in the A.I. community.
I am interested in Thomism and, knowing Feser to be a Thomist, was hoping for a good, thorough exposition of the hylomorphic dualist theory which is the subject of the last chapter. Alas, I found that chapter all too short. I still do not understand how the soul (mind) can be the form of the body, largely because I do not understand the term "form."
Feser defines form as follows: "The form of a substance is its organizational structure; the matter is that which is given organizational structure by the form." (p. 220) He gives the example of a chair having a round seat, and says "the roundness is an aspect of the chair's form." This suggests that the form of a physical thing is its shape. But then he says the seat's roundness is not part of the chair's substantial form, because the chair might have a square seat, but it must have some kind of seat, and that is part of its form. In the Glossary, he states: "The form of a thing is its organizational structure; something irreducible to the sum of its parts." (p. 245) The thing having a form is not the sum of its parts, so is the form how the parts are put together -- an assembled chair, for example, as opposed to a collection of chair parts ready to be assembled? That works very well for physical things, given a low-grade sense of "sum of parts" (so that the same "sum of parts" would exist no matter how the parts were configured or arranged) -- but how does it get us out of mechanism and materialism? And how does it apply if the form is subsistent, i.e., having an immaterial operation, so that it is capable of existing without matter, And how, especially, does it apply to the angels, which never have any matter, so no parts needing to be assembled?
He goes on to describe the forms (souls) of living things. The forms of plants ("nutritive souls") are "the sort which informs the matter of which plants are composed, and imparts to them powers of nutrition, growth, and reproduction." (p. 221) The forms of animals ("sensory souls") give them powers of perception and appetite, as well as the powers of the nutritive soul. And finally the forms of human beings ("rational souls") give us the powers of intellect, will, and memory, in addition to the powers of the animal soul. But some would contend that even the rational soul's powers are completely accountable for by means of the composition of the material parts and the laws of physics and chemistry. This contention becomes more plausible if we press it down to the powers of the animal soul being so accountable, and even more plausible if we push it down to the nutritive soul of plants. So it remains very unclear to me how the soul (any of these three kinds) is a form that is clearly distinct from some composition or arrangement of pieces of matter.
Altogether, then, I am happy with most of the book, but disappointed with the last chapter. At least, though, that chapter, like the rest, has a good bibliography.
The next stop in my quest for understanding hylomorphic dualism will be David Oderberg's Real Essentialism. If anyone has any better suggestions, please let me know.
January 16, 2025
Starting 2025 with this book. I would be honest, this has taken a longer time than I thought it'd have been. Philosophy of mind is a big sub-discipline by itself and a lot of things we don't know of. The problem with the study of mind purely through a materialist lens is that there are many things that elude the reductionism to purely physical processes. Things like qualia and consciousness are taken to be unresolved, and only apparent breakthrough is to concede that there are non-physical properties of the world, which is very unsatisfying by itself to assume by materialists. Nor their accounts of intentionality and rationality are unscathed either, especially the former, which in an intuitive sense is intrinsic and non-physical, and yet have to be explained away as a byproduct of physical processes. The verdict would be, if there was one, that materialism has problems more, or rather on equal footing, than the people who posit the mind and body as separate.
There is another illuminating point which Feser gives: it has been viewed in the history of ideas that, with the rise of modern science, everything superstitious and beyond the realm of the natural can be explained scientifically. The mind is the last holdout, and in the dispute between the materialists and their opponents, the former has a presumption in its favor, i.e. the dualists have the burden of proof. This is not so for Feser. If it is to be more preferred, then they have to account two other metaphysical disputes that science have accounted unsatisfactorily: abstract objects and God. This is the right strategy, for historically materialism has had difficulties to explain them in physical terms, in contrast with the dualists. Then it must be said it must be conceded to the opponent of materialists. "Innocent until proven guilty" has rather been proven guilty.
With all things that have been said, Feser's Philosophy of Mind is a thorough overview of the topics on that field. Though I think his hylomorphic dualism suggestion is rather unsatisfying (in its treatment), it's a good starting point for someone who wants to know the field *and* philosophy in general - like Wilfrid Sellars has said, "the traditional mind-body problem is ... a veritable tangle of tangles. At first sight but one of the "problems of philosophy," it turns out, as one picks at it, to be nothing more nor less than the philosophical enterprise as a whole."
There is another illuminating point which Feser gives: it has been viewed in the history of ideas that, with the rise of modern science, everything superstitious and beyond the realm of the natural can be explained scientifically. The mind is the last holdout, and in the dispute between the materialists and their opponents, the former has a presumption in its favor, i.e. the dualists have the burden of proof. This is not so for Feser. If it is to be more preferred, then they have to account two other metaphysical disputes that science have accounted unsatisfactorily: abstract objects and God. This is the right strategy, for historically materialism has had difficulties to explain them in physical terms, in contrast with the dualists. Then it must be said it must be conceded to the opponent of materialists. "Innocent until proven guilty" has rather been proven guilty.
With all things that have been said, Feser's Philosophy of Mind is a thorough overview of the topics on that field. Though I think his hylomorphic dualism suggestion is rather unsatisfying (in its treatment), it's a good starting point for someone who wants to know the field *and* philosophy in general - like Wilfrid Sellars has said, "the traditional mind-body problem is ... a veritable tangle of tangles. At first sight but one of the "problems of philosophy," it turns out, as one picks at it, to be nothing more nor less than the philosophical enterprise as a whole."
December 31, 2020
A truly excellent introduction to the philosophy of mind that strikes the perfect balance between accessibility and potency. I came to the text with vague sympathies with both substance dualism and neutral monism from previous philosophy classes and reading. I came away from the text with new sympathies for hylomorphism, though holding the same reservations as I had before when it comes to aristotelian and thomist metaphysics. I also find myself far less sympathetic to neutral monism if it truly entails panpsychism. My sympathies to substance dualism remain largely unchanged.
I do have some minor quibbles. While I think the text is probably about as unbiased as it should be (I don't think authors should hide their views or evaluations), I do think it would have been helpful if Feser gave a little bit more about why hylomorphism is a minority view, perhaps how much of a minority view it is, and why. He does address the aversion to positing whole realms of real abstract objects, but a little more space may have been merited.
Feser almost dismisses idealism almost outright, but idealism has been making huge comeback and is likely to become more popular given recent theories in quantum physics and their appropriation by pop culture and pseudo science. My impression is that idealism is now more popular than hylomorphism among both the general populace and among philosophers. I could be wrong, but either way a new edition of this book would definitely need to treat idealism.
All that said, this was probably the best introductory philosophy text I've ever read and among the best pure philosophy texts.
I do have some minor quibbles. While I think the text is probably about as unbiased as it should be (I don't think authors should hide their views or evaluations), I do think it would have been helpful if Feser gave a little bit more about why hylomorphism is a minority view, perhaps how much of a minority view it is, and why. He does address the aversion to positing whole realms of real abstract objects, but a little more space may have been merited.
Feser almost dismisses idealism almost outright, but idealism has been making huge comeback and is likely to become more popular given recent theories in quantum physics and their appropriation by pop culture and pseudo science. My impression is that idealism is now more popular than hylomorphism among both the general populace and among philosophers. I could be wrong, but either way a new edition of this book would definitely need to treat idealism.
All that said, this was probably the best introductory philosophy text I've ever read and among the best pure philosophy texts.
January 31, 2024
4.5/5 (closer to 5 than 4).
This is an eye-opening book regarding philosophy of mind. Feser explains in detail the problems, arguments, objections and responses of the major topics in philosophy of mind. There are some parts of the books, specially the chapters on Consciousness and Qualia, that are quite complex and difficult to grasp, but this isn't a problem of Feser's writing or explanations rather it's just a very hard branch of philosophy. The chapter on Intentionality was easily one of the best ones here and it's worth it.
It's all very well explained and written. The only downside, I think, it has is that you should have at least a bit of background on philosophy before getting into this book since there are some technical aspects, for instance possible worlds semantics, that can be confusing initially. This, of course, doesn't mean that Feser doesn't explain it but if it's not the first time you get in touch with them, it would be really helpful.
Probably the best thing about this book is that it challenges the materialist mainstream worldview that is all over Western culture by providing a whole range of hard problems the materialist has to deal with and that aren't very popular among laymen. Those critiques are very helpful to learn about the problems in this branch since they are the core of several discussions on these topics.
I think I'll need to revisit some of the content of the book because it's so well done.
This is an eye-opening book regarding philosophy of mind. Feser explains in detail the problems, arguments, objections and responses of the major topics in philosophy of mind. There are some parts of the books, specially the chapters on Consciousness and Qualia, that are quite complex and difficult to grasp, but this isn't a problem of Feser's writing or explanations rather it's just a very hard branch of philosophy. The chapter on Intentionality was easily one of the best ones here and it's worth it.
It's all very well explained and written. The only downside, I think, it has is that you should have at least a bit of background on philosophy before getting into this book since there are some technical aspects, for instance possible worlds semantics, that can be confusing initially. This, of course, doesn't mean that Feser doesn't explain it but if it's not the first time you get in touch with them, it would be really helpful.
Probably the best thing about this book is that it challenges the materialist mainstream worldview that is all over Western culture by providing a whole range of hard problems the materialist has to deal with and that aren't very popular among laymen. Those critiques are very helpful to learn about the problems in this branch since they are the core of several discussions on these topics.
I think I'll need to revisit some of the content of the book because it's so well done.
May 13, 2022
Feser outright admits that he rejects materialism in favor of dualism in the preface. This is evident all throughout the book, especially in the last chapter where he pushes and defends Thomistic dualism in the last chapter. In spite of that bias, I still think this book is quite informative and relatively easy to understand. Feser goes through all the arguments in favor and against the major positions in philosophy of mind (Cartesian dualism, logical behaviorism, identity theory, functionalism, etc). He explains all the fundamental concepts and thought experiments in the field (qualia, p-zombies, intentionality, etc). The book doesn't make heavy use of jargon and thoroughly explains all the technical terms in a way for laymen to understand.
Given that a majority of philosophers are materialists, I would recommend reading this book just to get some perspective.
Given that a majority of philosophers are materialists, I would recommend reading this book just to get some perspective.
July 17, 2019
The title of this book is a bit misleading (i.e., specifically, "A Beginner's Guide"). Although it is clearly an excellent source for an explanation of various materialist and non-materialist approaches to the mind-body problem, it delves a bit deeper than one would expect from a "beginner's guide." What makes this book a bit tougher to read than, say, Jonathan Westphal's "The Mind Body Problem," is that the author carefully qualifies his statements and, in so doing, there are many sentences that span paragraph lengths (and sometimes multi-paragraph lengths).
For anyone that wants to dig deep into the ins and outs of the "mind-body problem," I recommend that they put on their thinking-caps and read this book.
For anyone that wants to dig deep into the ins and outs of the "mind-body problem," I recommend that they put on their thinking-caps and read this book.
November 14, 2020
Dr. Feser presented a ton of different viewpoints on eight broad topics, and presented arguments for and against each viewpoint with (generally) clarity and concision. It was definitely challenging to think through each section, but worthwhile. In the end I think the book is too biased toward dualism - Dr. Feser seemed to easily discount problems with dualism, and count any problem with materialism as a victory for dualism. Moreover, it was disappointing that his own view, hylomorphism, was only introduced in one small section at the very end of the book. I don’t think I got a full understanding of it, but I think I would have learned more if it was given some of the same back-and-forth that other viewpoints were subjected to.
October 23, 2024
Good but opinionated (biased?) introduction to philosophy of mind. I don't think he applied the same critical analysis to his own hylemorphic dualism, though, than he did to all other positions (especially materialistic ones). Feser's fundamental argument in this book is that contra contemporary preconceptions, it's not qualia which poses the main obstacle to physicalism about the mind, but intentionality. He handwaves at the interaction problem for substance dualism but doesn't really land the punch, in my opinion, even though I'm a hylemorphist like him.
October 12, 2019
Interesting comprehensive overview, more hylomorphism
Author is very readable and presents all sides. Hylomorphism is very interesting in contrast to mechanical. However, much less clear what it means. Mostly seems to be assertions. One that is hard to understand is purpose being ascribed to everything. But a purposeful robot can be reduced to efficient causes. In what way is this purpose intrinsic, then?
Author is very readable and presents all sides. Hylomorphism is very interesting in contrast to mechanical. However, much less clear what it means. Mostly seems to be assertions. One that is hard to understand is purpose being ascribed to everything. But a purposeful robot can be reduced to efficient causes. In what way is this purpose intrinsic, then?
April 28, 2024
Feser is very good, and this little book is no exception. Particularly, the opening three chapters and the final chapter were magnificent. Feser address the question/problem of the mind by examining the various perspectives presented by dualism and materialism in their multifaceted types and varieties. He ends by commending a Thomistic view of hylomorphism as most satisfactorily answering the questions the problem of the mind raises.
October 31, 2017
Feser Edward does a very good job of covering the arguments between the materialist, the emergent materialist, and the dualist in regards to mind and consciousness. However, his effort to battle the materialist seems overly confident in conclusions about the insufficiency of the non-dualist materialist analysis of mind.
January 3, 2018
Powerful and entertaining
A very detailed introduction to the Mind-Body problem, with a balanced take on the diverse theories and philosophical approaches to the matter. Obviously, the Thomistic-Aristotelian view its the most consistent against the fashionable materialism mechanistic.
A very detailed introduction to the Mind-Body problem, with a balanced take on the diverse theories and philosophical approaches to the matter. Obviously, the Thomistic-Aristotelian view its the most consistent against the fashionable materialism mechanistic.
January 25, 2018
As a philosophy major, I don’t remember such a deep treatment of the mind, and this is just an intro book! Feser does a fantastic job of going through the problems with materialistic and reductionist approaches and concludes with the satisfying answer in Thomistic metaphysics. I am growing to love Aquinas more and more as a powerful guide to reality.
November 2, 2017
I really enjoyed this book, there were times towards the middle of the book where it became a little dizzying - trying to follow along with who’s who and what’s what but overall it was very clear and concise; very approachable.
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