The Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 was the result of declining active support for the government, and of waste and inefficiency in aid delivery. Yet, while corrosive, these problems were not in themselves sufficient to have brought about a collapse. To a significant degree, they were the result of early failings in institutional design, reflecting an American inclination to pursue short-term policy approaches that created perverse incentives-thus interfering with the long-term objective of stability.
This book exposes the true factors underpinning Kabul's fall. The Afghan Republic came under relentless attack from Taliban insurgents who depended critically on Pakistani support. It also suffered a creeping invasion that put the government on the back foot as the US tried and failed to deal with Pakistan's perfidy. The fatal blow came when bored US leaders naively cut an exit deal with the enemy, fatally compromising the operation of the Afghan army and air force and triggering the final collapse, with top leaders at odds over whether to make a final stand in Kabul.
The Afghan Republic did not simply decline and fall. It was betrayed.
Felt very academically written, rather than an informative novel. This was especially prominent when simple concepts were “defined” by other people/writings. There were some interesting points and the structure of the book meant it was a more thematic look at the fall of Afghanistan rather than a straight historical account.
Quite academic in tone, especially the first chapter or so (reads like it might be adapted from a PhD thesis) but an interesting analysis of the various factors that led to the fall of Republican Afghanistan and a scathing review of US policy in Afghanistan under both Trump and Biden.