The book makes some good points, however there were too many over-simplifications.
What I liked about the book is that it made some absolutely apposite criticisms of the New Atheists, especially where it identified an excessive dogmaticism within a Scientism (72%). Its criticism of the book ‘Universe from Nothing’ also made some very pertinent points about how the nothingness in that account is not actually nothingness (32%), so that particular atheist argument is smuggling its conclusion into its premises.
Another helpful feature of this book was its breadth of knowledge of Islam, and the way it provided informative explanations of ideas such as the 3 types of scepticism: Inadiyya, Indiyya and La-adriyya (25%).
However, when it came to actually engaging atheists in detailed argument, the book made too many assumptions which it did not defend. This can be seen with an analogy cited in the text, which suggests that we can know the existence of a camel by observing a dung trail (4%). But that is not quite right. All that dung can evidence is a ‘dung-dropper.’ To get from dung to a camel requires a lot more evidence and argument.
Another example occurs when the book explains the capacity to draw conclusions which have certainty, by appealing to an example. The book says: ‘it can be stated with certainty that where there are grey clouds, it is because of rain’ (27%). But that isn’t right. We can only draw that kind of conclusion when we make an additional background assumption that ‘all things are equal’ ie that the circumstances of ‘this’ observation are appropriately similar enough to the circumstances of ‘other’ observations.
The book correctly identified the fact that atheist arguments often turn upon rejecting premises which theists take to be obvious. One cited example is the Law of Excluded Middle, which states that every claim must be either true or false (34%). But when the book claims that these kinds of principles are ‘common sense,’ and when it thus implies that atheists are being (to some extent) less rational, it makes assumptions about the content of common sense which it does not defend.
Common sense is not as obvious as it is sometimes assumed to be. For example, Mathematicians are divided over the obviousness of the law of excluded middle, with Intuitionists denying it. These are arguments about what is rational and what is common sense. They have nothing to do with theism or atheism. If even mathematicians cannot agree among themselves about what is common sense, how can the book be so sure that what it takes as common sense is in fact a genuine common sense?
When the book engaged with specific points of doctrine it often seemed to move too quickly and it gave ‘rushed’ explanations which were not always very clear. For example the idea of eternal punishment was defended by telling us that the ‘realities and dimensions’ of post-death worlds are different, and so eternal hell fires will make sense in that context (51%). That explanation did not seem to explain much at all.
When the book dealt with allegations that there are variant Quranic texts, it responded by saying that there are variant words but the meaning is the same (77%). But that explanation only deals with noun-like variants. What about verb variants which arguably change the meaning when they refer to different persons (eg making reference to I, you, he, they)? But the book does not deal with that issue.
The section on evolution seemed particularly unclear. It said that evolution is just an uncertain hypothesis, which conflicts with the Quran because the Quran teaches that humans come from soil, not from primates (73%). This means that the book rejects the science of evolution, but it was not clear what the actual evidence was, to justify such a rejection.
And what of the alternative argument that the Quran is being misread when it is interpreted in such a way to rule out evolution? The book acknowledges that people can misinterpret the Quran (7%). But it gives no argument for insisting on a specific reading which puts the Quran into direct conflict with the science of evolution.
Another specific criticism which the book tried to resolve is the allegation that the prophet married Aisha at 6 and consummated the marriage when she was 9. The book states that ‘by the human conventions of that time the marriage was fine’ (91%). But is that really solving the problem? Isn’t it effectively admitting that there was something wrong in the prophet’s actions, and that they can only be justified by appealing to the standards of that age? Is that really the most appropriate way to explain this issue?
Overall, this is a book which makes some good points, but it is trying to do too much in a single book, and so it ends up over-simplifying many of the issues and only dealing with limited aspects of critics’ allegations.