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Osprey Essential Histories #61
The Chinese Civil War 1945-49
Out of the ashes of Imperial China arose two new contenders to lead a reformed nation; the Chinese Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communist Party. In 1927, the inevitable clash between these two political parties led to a bitter civil war that would last for 23 years, through World War II and into the Cold War period. The brutal struggle finally concluded when Communist forces captured Nanjing, capital of the Nationalist Republic of China, irrevocably altering the course of China's future. Dr. Michael Lynch sheds light on the cruel civil war that ultimately led to the establishment of the People's Republic of China.
96 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
May 20, 2020
I have nothing to compare it to, no knowledge base at all besides this book, but it was ok I'm glad I read it.
1. I didn't know that the current govt in taiwan was the result of the nationalists losing this conflict and saying "we don't lose, we quit!", evicting an indigenous population and setting up on a nearby island. I knew the current chinese government doesn't recognize taiwan's legitimacy, but I only had some vague wrong guesses as to why.
2. It was really anyone's game, and it's a strong reminder about how easily history could have been different. Starkest example I'm aware of of tactical skill and choices driving outcome (i'm not any kind of war nerd, tho)
3. The author tried to say that both sides were equally bad toward the peasants, but also included that peasants were often enthusiastic in communist hazing rituals without any such analogue with nationalist occupation. This came across as weird, like there was an elephant in the room.
4. The effective case for bothsidesism comes at torture and execution, of course -- but even there, different flavors need to be specified. Nationalist torture and execution was methodical "just following orders" style, while Communist torture and execution primarily used mobs. The result is that nationalists come across as US in Afghanistan, at least as it was portrayed in that brad pitt movie-- unable to keep straight who they're liberating vs. who they're oppressing. While the communists crushed it on propaganda and had mobs of peasants doing the work of their army (not to mention easy recruitment while the nationalists resorted to brutal conscription). It stands to reason-- if moral responsibility for torture and execution can be distributed widely to nonenlisted folk, is nationalist and communist torture and execution morally equivalent? I would venture to say "of course not"-- I think it's barbaric to hold mobs and armies to the same standards, unless you have a rigorous way of comparing mobs to armies and vice versa. It's such a short book that I don't fault the author for not getting into this.
5. The author said that communist rituals were successful because peasants seized upon them opportunities to settle disputes, but didn't acknowledge that it was sort of proof that commie propaganda had a basis in reality. The reason landlords were targeted is a specific argument about the structure of occupancy & rent that runs deeply in communist theory. I think anyone who's going to acknowledge that peasants were enthusiastic meting out justice has to acknowledge that some tension was building up, therefore has to acknowledge that there's a grain of truth in the communist theory.
6. the commie ideal of internationalism is a huge joke-- the commie ideal of internationalism would predict that stalin would want chinese communists to win. This was not remotely the case. Soviets scarcely called into question the legitimacy of the nationalist side of the dispute, and didn't even give the communists the assistance that the US gave the nationalists. I like that the author stated that a simplistic cold war projection was a dominant theory for a while, but it breaks down under scrutiny. You can't at all say "the west behind nationalists and communists behind communists", though I'm sure a ton of idiots do.
I often say that americans are a disgrace to anticommunism, that anticommunism needs to be far stronger than cold war propaganda. I think this book is an example of that, because it leaves a huge open question: besides them being tactically smarter in this instance, why is their propaganda salient? Why can communists use mobs, while others have to use disciplined hierarchies?
1. I didn't know that the current govt in taiwan was the result of the nationalists losing this conflict and saying "we don't lose, we quit!", evicting an indigenous population and setting up on a nearby island. I knew the current chinese government doesn't recognize taiwan's legitimacy, but I only had some vague wrong guesses as to why.
2. It was really anyone's game, and it's a strong reminder about how easily history could have been different. Starkest example I'm aware of of tactical skill and choices driving outcome (i'm not any kind of war nerd, tho)
3. The author tried to say that both sides were equally bad toward the peasants, but also included that peasants were often enthusiastic in communist hazing rituals without any such analogue with nationalist occupation. This came across as weird, like there was an elephant in the room.
4. The effective case for bothsidesism comes at torture and execution, of course -- but even there, different flavors need to be specified. Nationalist torture and execution was methodical "just following orders" style, while Communist torture and execution primarily used mobs. The result is that nationalists come across as US in Afghanistan, at least as it was portrayed in that brad pitt movie-- unable to keep straight who they're liberating vs. who they're oppressing. While the communists crushed it on propaganda and had mobs of peasants doing the work of their army (not to mention easy recruitment while the nationalists resorted to brutal conscription). It stands to reason-- if moral responsibility for torture and execution can be distributed widely to nonenlisted folk, is nationalist and communist torture and execution morally equivalent? I would venture to say "of course not"-- I think it's barbaric to hold mobs and armies to the same standards, unless you have a rigorous way of comparing mobs to armies and vice versa. It's such a short book that I don't fault the author for not getting into this.
5. The author said that communist rituals were successful because peasants seized upon them opportunities to settle disputes, but didn't acknowledge that it was sort of proof that commie propaganda had a basis in reality. The reason landlords were targeted is a specific argument about the structure of occupancy & rent that runs deeply in communist theory. I think anyone who's going to acknowledge that peasants were enthusiastic meting out justice has to acknowledge that some tension was building up, therefore has to acknowledge that there's a grain of truth in the communist theory.
6. the commie ideal of internationalism is a huge joke-- the commie ideal of internationalism would predict that stalin would want chinese communists to win. This was not remotely the case. Soviets scarcely called into question the legitimacy of the nationalist side of the dispute, and didn't even give the communists the assistance that the US gave the nationalists. I like that the author stated that a simplistic cold war projection was a dominant theory for a while, but it breaks down under scrutiny. You can't at all say "the west behind nationalists and communists behind communists", though I'm sure a ton of idiots do.
I often say that americans are a disgrace to anticommunism, that anticommunism needs to be far stronger than cold war propaganda. I think this book is an example of that, because it leaves a huge open question: besides them being tactically smarter in this instance, why is their propaganda salient? Why can communists use mobs, while others have to use disciplined hierarchies?
October 17, 2019
Excellent introduction to this rather ambiguous and really complex subject, its no the definitive book, but I'ts the perfect book for starters.
June 12, 2019
I've completed about half of the book, and I'm sure it's not too early to provide a pretty accurate review. Actually, I started the book from the middle instead of the beginning, just wanted to see how the author described the war itself. It's incredibly bad, and I was ready to give it a one star. Then I read the earlier sections, and decided to give it 2 stars, mainly because the introduction was much better than I exprected. Compared to the sections about the war itself, I couldn't believe they were from the same author. The other early parts were pretty good as well. Also, I want to give him some credit for mentioning Su Yu was the planner of the Huaihai Campaign. Regrettably, it seems that he never put enough effort there. Otherwise, he might be able to reach the conclusion that Su Yu is the real reason that CCP won the war so soon and so completely.
I'll just randomly list a few things, some minor, some major:
1. In the beginning of Chronology, he mentioned the date of the signing of Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, but I can't believe why not listing when the Soviet Union declared war against Japan and started to attack Japanese forces in Manchuria. This is minor.
Nov. 22, 1948, the NRA 7th army destroyed at Nianzhuang, not Zhanzhuan (really sloppy).
Jan. 10, 1949, Xuzhou falls to PLA. Unbelievable! GMD forces withdraw secretly on Dec. 1, 1948, so there were no fighting for Xuzhou city itself at all.
2. There are so many errors in the maps, which are almost a joke. For example, using current provincial borders instead of the ones at that time.
3. The author overemphasized Manchuria way too much. Contrary to traditional wisdom, CCP won the war despite of, not because of, Lin Biao's performance in Manchuria. It's relatively isolated from the rest of the country. During most of the time in the war, CCP forces in other regions received limited help from Manchuria.
4. On page 38, the author talked about Mao (along with Lin Biao, Chen Yi, He Long) developing a strategy that sought to increase the CCP's hold in Manchuria and northern China while withdrawing from most of central China above the Yangtze River. This was after talking about Harbin, apparently in middle 1946. CCP indeed moved quite some forces to Manchuria from northern and eastern China (some of the best units), along with many civil and military officials, eyeing expansion. But this was mainly in late 1945, NOT afterwards. In addition, Chen and He lacked the authority to make strategic decisions. The strategy of "be defensive in the southern front and on attack in the northern front (Manchuria)" was decided in September 1945, based on a commander of a division in eastern China (he later moved to Manchuria). The area CCP gave up in central China was encircled by GMD forces by middle 1946, and CCP lost most of its forces there while trying to escape (but no loss in senior leadership from that region). More importantly, it's only a small portion of CCP forces.
5. On page 39, the fight of Siping happened in June 1947. Lin Biao had overwhelming advantage, but failed to capture Siping (and suffered heavy losses in the process). Then the author said "[D]espite their reverses in Manchuria, the Nationalists had not suffered defeat." This is completely wrong. Just one example here: In middle May, 1947, hundreds of thousands troops from each side fought the Menglianggu Campaign, which can no way be described as a guerrilla war. In this campaign, NRA's no. 1 crack unit, the 74th re-organized division (corps, with over 30K), was completely wiped out.
6. On page 41, about spy inside Hu Zongnan's office. It's well-known the spy was Xiong Xianghui, Hu's secretary, who later became deputy foreign minister of PRC.
7. On page 42, Mao used Zhangjiakou as a new base to direct the war. This is completely wrong. Because the text mentioned Xibaipo later, so it's possible it's a typo. After losing (giving up) Yan'an in March 1947, Mao stayed in northern Shaanxi for over a year, before moving to Xibaipo, a small village in Hebei, to the southwest of Beijing (Beiping then). Zhangjiakou is to the northwest of Beijing. On this, the entry in Chronology was correct. And incredibly, on page 53, he mentioned that GMD was considering of withdrawing from Zhangjiakou in December, 1948. These two items directly contradict with each other.
8. On page 47, he mentioned that GMD withdrew forces from Shandong in the early days of Huaihai Campaign (early Nov. 1948). That's totally wrong. Two months earlier, the commander of GMD forces in Jinan, the capital of Shandong, asked to withdraw, since it had been isolated after the Yudong Campaign and related fights. However, wary of possible bad publicity and its impact on morale, Chiang refused. In the Jinan Campaign, the city was captured with all defensive forces annillated in just over a week. From that point on, GMD no longer had much presence in Shandong (other than a few coastal cities).
On the same page, Deng turned GMD POWs into CCP armies. Again, this is completely wrong. Deng played no role in Shandong military affairs. That's Su Yu's domain. In additional, such policy was not new at all, it started no later than 1946.
Again on the same page, GMD lost a lot of airplanes in the Liaoshen Campaign. This is almost sure another fabrication.
9. On page 49, the author mentioned that the 7th army of GMD left Xuzhou in an attempt to link up NRA from the coast. In fact, the force from the coast WAS the 7th army itself, and it never reached Xuzhou at all before its destruction in later Nov. 1948.
If I want, I can list many more, but no point continuing.
I reached page 51, and just couldn't and wouldn't continue. It's a waste of time. The author didn't get the whole picture and process at all, and didn't get the details right either. This is really a poorly researched and written book. Unfortunately, he seems to be the rule, not the exception.
I'll just randomly list a few things, some minor, some major:
1. In the beginning of Chronology, he mentioned the date of the signing of Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, but I can't believe why not listing when the Soviet Union declared war against Japan and started to attack Japanese forces in Manchuria. This is minor.
Nov. 22, 1948, the NRA 7th army destroyed at Nianzhuang, not Zhanzhuan (really sloppy).
Jan. 10, 1949, Xuzhou falls to PLA. Unbelievable! GMD forces withdraw secretly on Dec. 1, 1948, so there were no fighting for Xuzhou city itself at all.
2. There are so many errors in the maps, which are almost a joke. For example, using current provincial borders instead of the ones at that time.
3. The author overemphasized Manchuria way too much. Contrary to traditional wisdom, CCP won the war despite of, not because of, Lin Biao's performance in Manchuria. It's relatively isolated from the rest of the country. During most of the time in the war, CCP forces in other regions received limited help from Manchuria.
4. On page 38, the author talked about Mao (along with Lin Biao, Chen Yi, He Long) developing a strategy that sought to increase the CCP's hold in Manchuria and northern China while withdrawing from most of central China above the Yangtze River. This was after talking about Harbin, apparently in middle 1946. CCP indeed moved quite some forces to Manchuria from northern and eastern China (some of the best units), along with many civil and military officials, eyeing expansion. But this was mainly in late 1945, NOT afterwards. In addition, Chen and He lacked the authority to make strategic decisions. The strategy of "be defensive in the southern front and on attack in the northern front (Manchuria)" was decided in September 1945, based on a commander of a division in eastern China (he later moved to Manchuria). The area CCP gave up in central China was encircled by GMD forces by middle 1946, and CCP lost most of its forces there while trying to escape (but no loss in senior leadership from that region). More importantly, it's only a small portion of CCP forces.
5. On page 39, the fight of Siping happened in June 1947. Lin Biao had overwhelming advantage, but failed to capture Siping (and suffered heavy losses in the process). Then the author said "[D]espite their reverses in Manchuria, the Nationalists had not suffered defeat." This is completely wrong. Just one example here: In middle May, 1947, hundreds of thousands troops from each side fought the Menglianggu Campaign, which can no way be described as a guerrilla war. In this campaign, NRA's no. 1 crack unit, the 74th re-organized division (corps, with over 30K), was completely wiped out.
6. On page 41, about spy inside Hu Zongnan's office. It's well-known the spy was Xiong Xianghui, Hu's secretary, who later became deputy foreign minister of PRC.
7. On page 42, Mao used Zhangjiakou as a new base to direct the war. This is completely wrong. Because the text mentioned Xibaipo later, so it's possible it's a typo. After losing (giving up) Yan'an in March 1947, Mao stayed in northern Shaanxi for over a year, before moving to Xibaipo, a small village in Hebei, to the southwest of Beijing (Beiping then). Zhangjiakou is to the northwest of Beijing. On this, the entry in Chronology was correct. And incredibly, on page 53, he mentioned that GMD was considering of withdrawing from Zhangjiakou in December, 1948. These two items directly contradict with each other.
8. On page 47, he mentioned that GMD withdrew forces from Shandong in the early days of Huaihai Campaign (early Nov. 1948). That's totally wrong. Two months earlier, the commander of GMD forces in Jinan, the capital of Shandong, asked to withdraw, since it had been isolated after the Yudong Campaign and related fights. However, wary of possible bad publicity and its impact on morale, Chiang refused. In the Jinan Campaign, the city was captured with all defensive forces annillated in just over a week. From that point on, GMD no longer had much presence in Shandong (other than a few coastal cities).
On the same page, Deng turned GMD POWs into CCP armies. Again, this is completely wrong. Deng played no role in Shandong military affairs. That's Su Yu's domain. In additional, such policy was not new at all, it started no later than 1946.
Again on the same page, GMD lost a lot of airplanes in the Liaoshen Campaign. This is almost sure another fabrication.
9. On page 49, the author mentioned that the 7th army of GMD left Xuzhou in an attempt to link up NRA from the coast. In fact, the force from the coast WAS the 7th army itself, and it never reached Xuzhou at all before its destruction in later Nov. 1948.
If I want, I can list many more, but no point continuing.
I reached page 51, and just couldn't and wouldn't continue. It's a waste of time. The author didn't get the whole picture and process at all, and didn't get the details right either. This is really a poorly researched and written book. Unfortunately, he seems to be the rule, not the exception.
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May 3, 2026The Chinese have been described as natural dialecticians, believers that life is essentially a struggle between opposites. Both Chiang and Mao were firm in their conviction that compromise was not a solution to any of China’s major problems. […] Whatever the subtleties of the ideas that separately espoused, Chiang and Mao each acted on the belief that ultimately force was the only arbiter in public affairs, hence the savagery of the Civil War of 1946–49.”
- The Great Protagonists
Decent 4. Succinct study on one of China’s biggest what-ifs, with illuminating notes, images, and maps on its three major campaigns and those involved — who knew Chiang “unwittingly infected his new wife with the gonorrhoea he had contracted in a drunken orgy in a Shanghai brothel?”
- The Great Protagonists
Decent 4. Succinct study on one of China’s biggest what-ifs, with illuminating notes, images, and maps on its three major campaigns and those involved — who knew Chiang “unwittingly infected his new wife with the gonorrhoea he had contracted in a drunken orgy in a Shanghai brothel?”
May 19, 2026
Perfect primer for understanding not only Chinese Civil war but also the roots of modern China & Taiwan, and their relations with US & Russia.
I love how objective & balanced the history analysis was & was constantly engaged with the contents of the book. The author was able to aptly quote from the protagonists of this episode to make the key parts of history stick.
10/10!
I love how objective & balanced the history analysis was & was constantly engaged with the contents of the book. The author was able to aptly quote from the protagonists of this episode to make the key parts of history stick.
10/10!
January 28, 2018
Although it's short and omits a great deal of detail, this is a good high-level summary/introduction to a subject that seems barely covered in American history classes.
February 11, 2018
Not great
BTW, Beijing was not "renamed" from Peking - its the same name with different romanization
author lacks knowledge, not a great book
BTW, Beijing was not "renamed" from Peking - its the same name with different romanization
author lacks knowledge, not a great book
March 20, 2022
First English book about Chinese history. I've read many Chinese books about chinese history.
Good. A good book for starterf
Good. A good book for starterf
April 28, 2024
A very strong short overview on the Chinese Civil War that ends on a concerning note regarding Taiwan and the likely future intervention that China will forge. Very good.
October 29, 2014
A good introductory overview of a hugely complicated and significant conflict that is woefully underrepresented in scholarly literature in Western languages. In attempting to cover both the global context and the specifically Chinese factors determnining the outcome, it can occasionally lack detail, but offers excellent suggestions for further reading on the military and political aspects. One weakness of the analysis is a certain laziness in describing every signifcant event as "crucial" or a "turning point", without doing more to give nuance to the judgment. Its greatest merit, however, lies in dispelling common misconceptions such as unswerving Soviet and American support for their respective sides, the inevitability of either side winning, and especially the disingenuous Communist half-truth of "popular revolution" in the villages leading to victory. Highly recommended for anyone interested in 20th-century history.
September 30, 2016
I imagine I share a common ignorance within many people of my age in the West who are told lamentably little about China. This 'birth of a nation' explains the coming to power of Mao and the emergence of the People's Republic of China after the 2nd World War and occuption by the Japanese.
Cocentrating on the military movements of the civil war, with the usual spattering of history, legacy and the bits in between, there is too much in here to mean any meaningful descriptions of the battles. However this leads to an easy to follow book with no complicated leaps - although no doubt some simplifications.
Very interesting, and a lot of new information in there including the 'ah...' moment over Taiwan!
Cocentrating on the military movements of the civil war, with the usual spattering of history, legacy and the bits in between, there is too much in here to mean any meaningful descriptions of the battles. However this leads to an easy to follow book with no complicated leaps - although no doubt some simplifications.
Very interesting, and a lot of new information in there including the 'ah...' moment over Taiwan!
August 26, 2011
Really useful for taking notes and as a general overview. Very easy to read, straight to the point, unlike many other books on the subject that I started and failed to finish. It was a bit sparse on foreign influence and the masses though with a heavy lean on military tactics.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews