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The Metacritique of Kant and the Possibility of Metaphysics
This short study introduces and evaluates the most fundamental paradox at the core of Kant's philosophy. This is the 'metacritical' problem of whether Kant's critical project is itself possible, a possibility that the same project has made it its mission to deny to traditional metaphysics. Kant himself held that his conclusions were merely the impartial result of an examination of the 'instrument' by means of which that metaphysics claims to have established its conclusions, human cognition itself. Yet did Kant see the implied need to subject his own critical philosophy to such a test, since it equally presupposes 'human cognition'?Although this problem has been deemed one of the most fundamental, and indeed critical, in all Kant's philosophy by several prominent Kant exegetes, devoted treatments of the question are extremely scarce. Drawing on Platonic philosophy and the philosophical system outlined in the author's Things As They Are (2021), the study concludes that the metacritical problem is indeed fatal to Kant's anti-metaphysical aspirations, and that this elimination of such a fundamental obstacle to the practice of traditional philosophy further opens up the real possibility of a renewed metaphysics for our time.
84 pages, Paperback
Published January 31, 2022
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October 13, 2024
“The essence of a thing is its existence, and both are inseparable in created things, for creation is the very bestowal of existence. Existence and quiddity coincide in everything that exists in the created world.” — Al-Attas
This excellent treatise provides a meta-critique of Kant’s critical philosophy. Its treatment of essential aspects of Kantian philosophy reflects the author’s deep understanding and respect for this body of knowledge. The author felt that in order to do justice to critiquing such a great philosophy, he himself had to master it.
Kant’s largest contribution lies in his self-proclaimed “Copernican revolution” in philosophy. However, what this revolution entails is a matter of debate among Kant’s readers. One interpretation, which I term the “abolitionist” reading, holds that Kantian philosophy denies the possibility of metaphysics entirely. This view is confusingly held by both some of his followers and opponents. Both sides believe that Kant detested metaphysics, and they are subsequently confused when they realize that Kant used metaphysics to dethrone metaphysics.
The second way of reading Kant is the “constrained” method, which posits that Kant’s goal wasn’t to demolish metaphysics outright, but rather to provide a secure foundation for any future discussion of it, based on a grounded theory of reality. This is evident from the work of many of his immediate successors, such as Schopenhauer, Cassirer, and Husserl, who expanded metaphysics using Kant’s method rather than abandoning it. It wouldn’t make sense that Kant intended to destroy metaphysics, yet his followers continued applying it in axiology, ethics, and anthropology.
Kant’s ideas focus on investigating the conditions that make experience possible. His acute observation is that there is a blend or synthesis between the application of universal laws and the real occurrences in experience. We do not see a random and chaotic universe—we can predict and calculate minute details of events as they unfold in reality. Kant proposed that this synthetic a priori knowledge constitutes both the foundation of experience and its objective expansion. Knowledge, according to Kant, consists of the synthesis between sensibility (raw data from the world) and understanding (a priori laws that organize the raw data into coherent, distinct entities, and subsequently an objective reality).
Kant also argues that these a priori laws, while universally true, are for humans only equipped for sensible intuition. Thus, while a priori laws such as succession or magnitude can be applied independently of sensible data, they will never result in distinct entities and will remain unproven and empty conceptions. According to Kant, we can never conceive anything beyond the sensible world due to our limited cognitive apparatus. He hints that what is presented to our mind is essentially re-manufactured data about reality, rather than reality itself. We receive input through our sense organs, then reintegrate and reinterpret it according to the laws of understanding, yielding a “re-presentation” of the world or things as they appear to us, rather than things as they truly are. This implies the utter unknowability of objects independent of our minds, or even the objects themselves when we interact with them. We can only form subjective yet valid conceptions of objects, but not the objects themselves, as they are beyond our cognitive abilities.
This is a quintessential summary of Kant’s philosophy, often called the “critical philosophy” because it critiques the traditional foundation of metaphysics. The abolitionists interpret Kant’s project as an attack on metaphysics and, by extension, religion. In contrast, the constrained view sees Kant as providing a robust foundation in epistemology, though he was ultimately unequipped with a sufficient theory of objects—answers to which can be found in Islamic philosophy of being.
Hasan Spiker adopts the abolitionist position and sets out to critique Kant’s critical philosophy, hence the title of his work as a metacritique of Kant.
Several key points Spiker raises against Kant include:
1. Kant’s dictum that “experience can only be possible with the synthesis between sensibility and intuition” is itself presented without any of that synthesis. This is a paradox, as Kant claimed that the study of non-sensible being (metaphysics) is impossible due to the same dictum.
2. Spiker critiques Kant’s misunderstanding of the Platonic model. Kant believed that the Platonic model used a deus ex machina to explain the creation of the world, appealing to a God that was accessible only during the creation event. Spiker argues that the Platonic model never viewed the divine’s role as discontinuous after creation but rather as ever-present and dynamic. Man’s role is to recollect and meditate on the continuous, perpetual act of creation by God. Spiker hints that intellectual intuition is possible and should not be dismissed as a deus ex machina.
3. A key paradox in Kant’s thought is his denial of metaphysics while simultaneously embracing the noumenal world. He insists that our cognition only deals with forms of sensibility, and that these forms, when synthesized with understanding, create representations of objects. But this enterprise doesn’t make sense if the representation arises without a really existing object transcendent to our cognition. Kant, upon realizing this, lamented the unknowability of the noumenon without offering any further positive account, leaving his vision of the world truncated.
4. Aristotle begins his philosophy with self-evident first principles, universally accepted through metaphysical reasoning. By denying this objective apparatus, Kant opens the door to relativism and skepticism.
5. Kant’s philosophy restricts the objects of possible knowledge to only those that can be synthesized by intuition and understanding. This leads to the conclusion that, while the laws of understanding are objective and universal, they serve only to organize subjective experiences for the Ego. They have no independent role beyond that, and Kant insists that we can only know the world of appearances. Without a sufficient theory of the noumenon, Kant’s philosophy remains limited, unable to move beyond the subjective interface of experience.
6. Early critics like Hamann saw Kant’s dualism between appearances and noumenon as unnecessary. Hamann argued that reason and its so-called transcendental illusions (like the concept of God) are part of a unitary stream of consciousness, which Kant dissected for the sake of dispelling traditional metaphysics.
7. The Wolffians rebutted Kant by arguing that if the forms of understanding are universally valid, they must apply not only to appearances but also to the noumenon, which is the substrate of appearances.
8. Hegel and Platner noted that Kant’s negative statements about the noumenon, such as time and space not applying to it, conflict with his claim that we can only discuss objects of experience from the sensible world. This reveals inner inconsistencies in Kant’s philosophy.
As an alternative to Kant’s “quasi-Magian dualism” between sensibility and understanding, Spiker proposes a neo-Platonic model. Neo-Platonism rejects such dualism, viewing being as purely mental in nature.
In the al-Attas system, the distinction between particular existences or phenomena exists only in the discerning mind. In reality, there is only a unitary reality where both the immanent quiddity (the a priori laws within understanding) and the transcendental quiddity (the portion of existence dynamically determined in time) coincide.
This is an erudite and satisfying book, successfully dismantling a giant like Kant and pointing out his internal inconsistencies.
This excellent treatise provides a meta-critique of Kant’s critical philosophy. Its treatment of essential aspects of Kantian philosophy reflects the author’s deep understanding and respect for this body of knowledge. The author felt that in order to do justice to critiquing such a great philosophy, he himself had to master it.
Kant’s largest contribution lies in his self-proclaimed “Copernican revolution” in philosophy. However, what this revolution entails is a matter of debate among Kant’s readers. One interpretation, which I term the “abolitionist” reading, holds that Kantian philosophy denies the possibility of metaphysics entirely. This view is confusingly held by both some of his followers and opponents. Both sides believe that Kant detested metaphysics, and they are subsequently confused when they realize that Kant used metaphysics to dethrone metaphysics.
The second way of reading Kant is the “constrained” method, which posits that Kant’s goal wasn’t to demolish metaphysics outright, but rather to provide a secure foundation for any future discussion of it, based on a grounded theory of reality. This is evident from the work of many of his immediate successors, such as Schopenhauer, Cassirer, and Husserl, who expanded metaphysics using Kant’s method rather than abandoning it. It wouldn’t make sense that Kant intended to destroy metaphysics, yet his followers continued applying it in axiology, ethics, and anthropology.
Kant’s ideas focus on investigating the conditions that make experience possible. His acute observation is that there is a blend or synthesis between the application of universal laws and the real occurrences in experience. We do not see a random and chaotic universe—we can predict and calculate minute details of events as they unfold in reality. Kant proposed that this synthetic a priori knowledge constitutes both the foundation of experience and its objective expansion. Knowledge, according to Kant, consists of the synthesis between sensibility (raw data from the world) and understanding (a priori laws that organize the raw data into coherent, distinct entities, and subsequently an objective reality).
Kant also argues that these a priori laws, while universally true, are for humans only equipped for sensible intuition. Thus, while a priori laws such as succession or magnitude can be applied independently of sensible data, they will never result in distinct entities and will remain unproven and empty conceptions. According to Kant, we can never conceive anything beyond the sensible world due to our limited cognitive apparatus. He hints that what is presented to our mind is essentially re-manufactured data about reality, rather than reality itself. We receive input through our sense organs, then reintegrate and reinterpret it according to the laws of understanding, yielding a “re-presentation” of the world or things as they appear to us, rather than things as they truly are. This implies the utter unknowability of objects independent of our minds, or even the objects themselves when we interact with them. We can only form subjective yet valid conceptions of objects, but not the objects themselves, as they are beyond our cognitive abilities.
This is a quintessential summary of Kant’s philosophy, often called the “critical philosophy” because it critiques the traditional foundation of metaphysics. The abolitionists interpret Kant’s project as an attack on metaphysics and, by extension, religion. In contrast, the constrained view sees Kant as providing a robust foundation in epistemology, though he was ultimately unequipped with a sufficient theory of objects—answers to which can be found in Islamic philosophy of being.
Hasan Spiker adopts the abolitionist position and sets out to critique Kant’s critical philosophy, hence the title of his work as a metacritique of Kant.
Several key points Spiker raises against Kant include:
1. Kant’s dictum that “experience can only be possible with the synthesis between sensibility and intuition” is itself presented without any of that synthesis. This is a paradox, as Kant claimed that the study of non-sensible being (metaphysics) is impossible due to the same dictum.
2. Spiker critiques Kant’s misunderstanding of the Platonic model. Kant believed that the Platonic model used a deus ex machina to explain the creation of the world, appealing to a God that was accessible only during the creation event. Spiker argues that the Platonic model never viewed the divine’s role as discontinuous after creation but rather as ever-present and dynamic. Man’s role is to recollect and meditate on the continuous, perpetual act of creation by God. Spiker hints that intellectual intuition is possible and should not be dismissed as a deus ex machina.
3. A key paradox in Kant’s thought is his denial of metaphysics while simultaneously embracing the noumenal world. He insists that our cognition only deals with forms of sensibility, and that these forms, when synthesized with understanding, create representations of objects. But this enterprise doesn’t make sense if the representation arises without a really existing object transcendent to our cognition. Kant, upon realizing this, lamented the unknowability of the noumenon without offering any further positive account, leaving his vision of the world truncated.
4. Aristotle begins his philosophy with self-evident first principles, universally accepted through metaphysical reasoning. By denying this objective apparatus, Kant opens the door to relativism and skepticism.
5. Kant’s philosophy restricts the objects of possible knowledge to only those that can be synthesized by intuition and understanding. This leads to the conclusion that, while the laws of understanding are objective and universal, they serve only to organize subjective experiences for the Ego. They have no independent role beyond that, and Kant insists that we can only know the world of appearances. Without a sufficient theory of the noumenon, Kant’s philosophy remains limited, unable to move beyond the subjective interface of experience.
6. Early critics like Hamann saw Kant’s dualism between appearances and noumenon as unnecessary. Hamann argued that reason and its so-called transcendental illusions (like the concept of God) are part of a unitary stream of consciousness, which Kant dissected for the sake of dispelling traditional metaphysics.
7. The Wolffians rebutted Kant by arguing that if the forms of understanding are universally valid, they must apply not only to appearances but also to the noumenon, which is the substrate of appearances.
8. Hegel and Platner noted that Kant’s negative statements about the noumenon, such as time and space not applying to it, conflict with his claim that we can only discuss objects of experience from the sensible world. This reveals inner inconsistencies in Kant’s philosophy.
As an alternative to Kant’s “quasi-Magian dualism” between sensibility and understanding, Spiker proposes a neo-Platonic model. Neo-Platonism rejects such dualism, viewing being as purely mental in nature.
In the al-Attas system, the distinction between particular existences or phenomena exists only in the discerning mind. In reality, there is only a unitary reality where both the immanent quiddity (the a priori laws within understanding) and the transcendental quiddity (the portion of existence dynamically determined in time) coincide.
This is an erudite and satisfying book, successfully dismantling a giant like Kant and pointing out his internal inconsistencies.
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