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Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq
A vivid portrayal of what drove George W. Bush to invade Iraq in 2003--an outcome that was in no way predetermined.
America's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 is arguably the most important foreign policy choice of the entire post-Cold War era. Nearly two decades after the event, it remains central to understanding current international politics and US foreign relations.
In Confronting Saddam Hussein, the eminent historian of US foreign policy Melvyn P. Leffler analyzes why the US chose war and who was most responsible for the decision. Employing a unique set of personal interviews with dozens of top officials and declassified American and British documents, Leffler vividly portrays the emotions and anxieties that shaped the thinking of the president after the shocking events of 9/11. He shows how fear, hubris, and power influenced Bush's approach to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. At the core of Leffler's account is his compelling portrait of Saddam Hussein. Rather than stressing Bush's preoccupation with promoting freedom or democracy, Leffler emphasizes Hussein's brutality, opportunism, and unpredictability and illuminates how the Iraqi dictator's record of aggression and intransigence haunted the president and influenced his calculations. Bush was not eager for war, and the decision to invade Iraq was not a fait accompli. Yet the president was convinced that only by practicing coercive diplomacy and threatening force could he alter Hussein's defiance, a view shared by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other leaders around the world, including Hans Blix, the chief UN inspector. Throughout, Leffler highlights the harrowing anxieties surrounding the decision-making process after the devastating attack on 9/11 and explains the roles of contingency, agency, rationality, and emotion. As the book unfolds, Bush's centrality becomes more and more evident, as does the bureaucratic dysfunctionality that contributed to the disastrous occupation of Iraq.
A compelling reassessment of George W. Bush's intervention in Iraq, Confronting Saddam Hussein provides a provocative reinterpretation of the most important international event of the 21st century.
America's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 is arguably the most important foreign policy choice of the entire post-Cold War era. Nearly two decades after the event, it remains central to understanding current international politics and US foreign relations.
In Confronting Saddam Hussein, the eminent historian of US foreign policy Melvyn P. Leffler analyzes why the US chose war and who was most responsible for the decision. Employing a unique set of personal interviews with dozens of top officials and declassified American and British documents, Leffler vividly portrays the emotions and anxieties that shaped the thinking of the president after the shocking events of 9/11. He shows how fear, hubris, and power influenced Bush's approach to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. At the core of Leffler's account is his compelling portrait of Saddam Hussein. Rather than stressing Bush's preoccupation with promoting freedom or democracy, Leffler emphasizes Hussein's brutality, opportunism, and unpredictability and illuminates how the Iraqi dictator's record of aggression and intransigence haunted the president and influenced his calculations. Bush was not eager for war, and the decision to invade Iraq was not a fait accompli. Yet the president was convinced that only by practicing coercive diplomacy and threatening force could he alter Hussein's defiance, a view shared by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other leaders around the world, including Hans Blix, the chief UN inspector. Throughout, Leffler highlights the harrowing anxieties surrounding the decision-making process after the devastating attack on 9/11 and explains the roles of contingency, agency, rationality, and emotion. As the book unfolds, Bush's centrality becomes more and more evident, as does the bureaucratic dysfunctionality that contributed to the disastrous occupation of Iraq.
A compelling reassessment of George W. Bush's intervention in Iraq, Confronting Saddam Hussein provides a provocative reinterpretation of the most important international event of the 21st century.
368 pages, Kindle Edition
First published February 1, 2023
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340 people want to read
About the author
Melvyn P. Leffler
17 books31 followersMelvyn Paul is an American historian and educator, currently Edward Stettinius Professor of History at the University of Virginia
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Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
January 1, 2025
On CBS news on September 6, 2006 (three years after the invasion of Iraq) Bush admitted "...one of the hardest parts of my job is to connect Iraq to the war on terror..." because there was none, 9/11 and Al-Queada had nothing to do with Saddam Hussein. Mr. Leffler spends a lot of time and effort in the form of very selective quotations trying to construct a version of the history of the USA's involvement in Iraq that somehow reflects, if not glory, then competence on Bush and his toadying side kick Tony Blair (possibly a man of even less moral worth and stature then anyone else in the whole tawdry saga). Of course that is impossible, or at least only possible by constructing a version of history as false and deceptive as the reports proving that Iraq had 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'.
The simple but unattractive story is that Bush threatened and then planned to go to war against Iraq and had absolutely no interest in the causes of 9/11 or the people responsible and even less knowledge about Iraq, the real causes of terrorism, nor in the USA's ability to fight or win a war. on 'terrorism' or anyone or anything else. Trying to construct a different narrative is to neglect so many know facts - like his inability in 2006 to connect Iraq to the war on terror (one of many well known, indeed obvious statements by Bush and his advisers that Leffler ignores or is it forgets? or maybe he is just avoiding it because it doesn't fit in with his version of the truth? Like all that nuclear material Saddam had 'bought' on the black market.
If someone wants to write a partisan history praising the absurdities of Bush's inglorious war then they can do so - what you can't do is pretend to write balanced history and then go about avoiding the truth at every turn. It is absurd and bad history. Everyone from the author through the publishers should be ashamed of this volume of slick half truths pretending to be something worthwhile.
The simple but unattractive story is that Bush threatened and then planned to go to war against Iraq and had absolutely no interest in the causes of 9/11 or the people responsible and even less knowledge about Iraq, the real causes of terrorism, nor in the USA's ability to fight or win a war. on 'terrorism' or anyone or anything else. Trying to construct a different narrative is to neglect so many know facts - like his inability in 2006 to connect Iraq to the war on terror (one of many well known, indeed obvious statements by Bush and his advisers that Leffler ignores or is it forgets? or maybe he is just avoiding it because it doesn't fit in with his version of the truth? Like all that nuclear material Saddam had 'bought' on the black market.
If someone wants to write a partisan history praising the absurdities of Bush's inglorious war then they can do so - what you can't do is pretend to write balanced history and then go about avoiding the truth at every turn. It is absurd and bad history. Everyone from the author through the publishers should be ashamed of this volume of slick half truths pretending to be something worthwhile.
July 10, 2023
Melvyn Leffler attempts to portray a balanced chronicle of acutely unbalanced times.
He weaves a path between one narrative that proposes that George W Bush and his advisors simply used 9/11 as an excuse to carry out an agenda that existed since the beginning of the administration, and a 2nd narrative that the decision to invade Iraq was created in a political hothouse generated by the results of 9/11 and the legitimate fear of a follow up attack.
There are no new facts in this book, but the author does provide some more perspective based on interviews with the decision makers of the time. It seems particularly noteworthy that none of them
seem to “have the impression” that Bush was more obsessed about Iraq in comparison to other national Security concerns. or that he made his decision to attack Iraq before he claimed to. I found these explanations weak and unconvincing.
Even Leffler makes it clear that Bush and his advisors instinctively assumed that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction without regard to what kind of evidence could be unearthed and verified. This assumption was based on Saddam’s historical duplicity and re-enforced by previous US failures to detect significant threats.
It is also clear that Bush and his advisors had no idea of how Iraq would be run after Saddam’s removal and did not even consider this to be an initial concern. It should also be noted that there is no mention of the feedback loop created by Douglas Feith and others that leaked unproven “intelligence” to the media, then pointed to those same media reports as justification for Saddam’s removal to the US public.
While Leffler’s work does provide a balanced analysis of the time, it will probably not satisfy partisans of either narrative.
He weaves a path between one narrative that proposes that George W Bush and his advisors simply used 9/11 as an excuse to carry out an agenda that existed since the beginning of the administration, and a 2nd narrative that the decision to invade Iraq was created in a political hothouse generated by the results of 9/11 and the legitimate fear of a follow up attack.
There are no new facts in this book, but the author does provide some more perspective based on interviews with the decision makers of the time. It seems particularly noteworthy that none of them
seem to “have the impression” that Bush was more obsessed about Iraq in comparison to other national Security concerns. or that he made his decision to attack Iraq before he claimed to. I found these explanations weak and unconvincing.
Even Leffler makes it clear that Bush and his advisors instinctively assumed that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction without regard to what kind of evidence could be unearthed and verified. This assumption was based on Saddam’s historical duplicity and re-enforced by previous US failures to detect significant threats.
It is also clear that Bush and his advisors had no idea of how Iraq would be run after Saddam’s removal and did not even consider this to be an initial concern. It should also be noted that there is no mention of the feedback loop created by Douglas Feith and others that leaked unproven “intelligence” to the media, then pointed to those same media reports as justification for Saddam’s removal to the US public.
While Leffler’s work does provide a balanced analysis of the time, it will probably not satisfy partisans of either narrative.
August 10, 2024
This is an example of what every good historian should do. Gather all the information, talk to as many people as possible, present the information in a straightforward way and minimize editorial comments (which I find different than considered judgments).
There are so many revelations in this book. First, that Bush was in charge and was involved in every part of the decision making process. Second, the immediate reaction to 9/11 was not to plan on going to war with Iraq. Third, that initially the goal was not to bring democracy to Iraq but rather was to protect the U.S. from future attacks. The author does an excellent job of conveying what the leaders were thinking in the days after the attack. They realized they had overlooked things, they were convinced another attack was imminent, and they believed that they had to deal with groups and nations that provided support to terrorist groups.
Fourth, the regime of Saddam Hussein was a murderous regime, that threatened its neighbors, and was led by a leader who, even after he was captured, talked about his desire to acquire WMDs that could be used to intimidate his neighbors and blackmail the U.S. Fifth, no one ever questioned that Iraq still possessed WMDs nor did they question that if Hussein felt he could get away with it he would try to reconstitute his nuclear program.
Sixth, the author does a brilliant job of describing how Bush got into a situation where avoiding war became quite difficult. Bush believed that sanctions were not effective, that there would be more pressure to weaken the sanctions, and that containment was not working. Bush further believed that if Hussein could weaken sanctions he would view it as a victory that would heighten his prestige with rogue elements.
Seventh, the author argues that Bush was open to calling off the war if Hussein would agree to allow inspectors and to allow all his weapons to be confiscated and destroyed. But to make that threat effective it was necessary to build up the threat of war.
Eighth, once troops were assembled Bush was trapped. How long could he keep the troops mobilized? If he backed off without Hussein fulfilling the terms of the UN resolution the U.S. would lose credibility (in a region where many countries wanted Hussein to be gone).
Ninth, the author makes a persuasive argument that while there was no conscious attempt to falsify information, there was confirmation bias--ambiguous information was interpreted to support the beliefs of those who thought Hussein was an existential threat.
Tenth, two major failures. Before Bush moved forward on threatening Hussein, he failed to charge those around him with considering the costs and benefits of a policy that moved us closer to war. No one raised any major objections but, as the author points out, Bush could have asked them to explicitly consider the costs and benefits of going to war. Yes Hussein was a threat. Yes leaving him in power had costs but were the costs less than removing him from power?
Connected to that failure was the failure to plan what to do after the U.S. achieved victory. No one was asking good questions. Bremer was given power to make decisions that turned out to be disastrous and within weeks of the U.S. seizing Baghdad the U.S. was on a course that would lead to the ruinous occupation.
The author, in the last chapter, makes a great point. Many of us think that certain actions that turned out to be disasters were made because people are evil and/or dumb. And that means if you just get the right person in charge everything will be fine. But as the author notes, there was no serious opposition to the course Bush took, even from Democrats. The disaster came from leaders who had too much confidence that what they were doing was right because the U.S. is a force for good in the world.
I have always thought the most dangerous people, right or left, are the people who believe that what they are doing is morally right, not in their self-interest but rather in pursuit of some noble goal. Such people are dangerous because they view opposition as being immoral, they shield themselves from criticisms by pointing out that they are not doing this for any personal gain, and they are willing to do horrible things because the goal is so moral and noble.
A great book.
There are so many revelations in this book. First, that Bush was in charge and was involved in every part of the decision making process. Second, the immediate reaction to 9/11 was not to plan on going to war with Iraq. Third, that initially the goal was not to bring democracy to Iraq but rather was to protect the U.S. from future attacks. The author does an excellent job of conveying what the leaders were thinking in the days after the attack. They realized they had overlooked things, they were convinced another attack was imminent, and they believed that they had to deal with groups and nations that provided support to terrorist groups.
Fourth, the regime of Saddam Hussein was a murderous regime, that threatened its neighbors, and was led by a leader who, even after he was captured, talked about his desire to acquire WMDs that could be used to intimidate his neighbors and blackmail the U.S. Fifth, no one ever questioned that Iraq still possessed WMDs nor did they question that if Hussein felt he could get away with it he would try to reconstitute his nuclear program.
Sixth, the author does a brilliant job of describing how Bush got into a situation where avoiding war became quite difficult. Bush believed that sanctions were not effective, that there would be more pressure to weaken the sanctions, and that containment was not working. Bush further believed that if Hussein could weaken sanctions he would view it as a victory that would heighten his prestige with rogue elements.
Seventh, the author argues that Bush was open to calling off the war if Hussein would agree to allow inspectors and to allow all his weapons to be confiscated and destroyed. But to make that threat effective it was necessary to build up the threat of war.
Eighth, once troops were assembled Bush was trapped. How long could he keep the troops mobilized? If he backed off without Hussein fulfilling the terms of the UN resolution the U.S. would lose credibility (in a region where many countries wanted Hussein to be gone).
Ninth, the author makes a persuasive argument that while there was no conscious attempt to falsify information, there was confirmation bias--ambiguous information was interpreted to support the beliefs of those who thought Hussein was an existential threat.
Tenth, two major failures. Before Bush moved forward on threatening Hussein, he failed to charge those around him with considering the costs and benefits of a policy that moved us closer to war. No one raised any major objections but, as the author points out, Bush could have asked them to explicitly consider the costs and benefits of going to war. Yes Hussein was a threat. Yes leaving him in power had costs but were the costs less than removing him from power?
Connected to that failure was the failure to plan what to do after the U.S. achieved victory. No one was asking good questions. Bremer was given power to make decisions that turned out to be disastrous and within weeks of the U.S. seizing Baghdad the U.S. was on a course that would lead to the ruinous occupation.
The author, in the last chapter, makes a great point. Many of us think that certain actions that turned out to be disasters were made because people are evil and/or dumb. And that means if you just get the right person in charge everything will be fine. But as the author notes, there was no serious opposition to the course Bush took, even from Democrats. The disaster came from leaders who had too much confidence that what they were doing was right because the U.S. is a force for good in the world.
I have always thought the most dangerous people, right or left, are the people who believe that what they are doing is morally right, not in their self-interest but rather in pursuit of some noble goal. Such people are dangerous because they view opposition as being immoral, they shield themselves from criticisms by pointing out that they are not doing this for any personal gain, and they are willing to do horrible things because the goal is so moral and noble.
A great book.
March 4, 2023
Highly informative, precise and clear. For the first time I am reading an account on the Iraq war that doesn’t immediately display blatant bias. Great book, highly recommend!
February 13, 2023
الطريقة المثلي للخطأ
يتوقف ليفلر في سرديته عند دراسة ما كانت الإدارة تتوقع أن تفعله في العراق بعد الفوز في الحرب، فقد ولى بوش المسؤولية لدونالد رامسفيلد وزير الدفاع، لكن رامسفيلد كان يريد أن يخرج الجيش من اللعبة، في حين كان بوش يشعر بمسؤولية تجاه العراق، وبعد أن قام الرئيس بتعيين جيري بريمي لقيادة مشروع بناء عراق جديد، اعترف بريمر بالحاجة إلى مزيد من القوات الأميركية لإقرار الأمن، بينما أراد رامسفيلد أن تنقل الولايات المتحدة السلطة للعراقيين فوراً. ولم يواجه أحد ذلك التناقض الجذري. فلعل الدرس الكبير المستفاد، في رأي ليفلر، من تجربة حرب العراق أن "ما كان داخل الإدارة من احتكاكات وخلافات هو الذي جعل من الاحتلال تلك المأساة التي لم نزل نعيش عواقبها إلى اليوم"، على حد تقدير موقع "أكسفورد أكاديميك". ليس القرار إذاً هو الخاطئ، ولكن الخطأ الأكبر هو في اختلاف وجهة النظر حول الطريقة المثلى لارتكاب الخطأ.
يلقي ليفلر اللوم في الحرب برمتها على تقارير الاستخبارات، التي رسمت صورة مشوهة لأسلحة صدام، وإن "لم يعثر على أمثلة لتشويهات عمدية لأدلة" بحسب ما يكتب زيلوك. "لكن تراكم التقارير الأمنية، بما فيها من أحكام قائمة على اقتراضات وتكهنات، خلقت صورة يقينية زائفة. وفي أواخر ديسمبر 2002، ضغط بوش وكوندوليزا رايس على جورج تينيت مدير الاستخبارات المركزية الأميركية طلباً لدليل ملموس، لكن أحداً لم يستمر في متابعة الضغط".
وفي محاولة لاتباع ليفلر في إلقاء اللوم بعيداً من بوش، على سبيل التفسير طبعاً وليس التبرئة، يضيف زيلوك أنه "لا بد للرؤساء من مديري استخبارات قادرين على طرح الأسئلة الصعبة وقول ما لا يحب الرؤساء أن يسمعوه"، وهذا ما افتقر إليه بوش، وما لم يقتصر على مدير الاستخبارات وحده.
يكتب ليفلر أنه "في عصر يوم 11 سبتمبر في البنتاغون، وبينما النيران لم تنطفئ بعد وسيارات الإسعاف لم تزل تطلق صافراتها، كان وزير الدفاع دونالد رامسفيلد قد رجع إلى الفناء المعبأ بالدخان المفضي إلى مكتبه. وسجل مساعده المقرب ونائبه ستيفن كامبون بلغة مختزلة يصعب فك شيفرتها أفكار رامسفيلد حيال صدام حسين وأسامة بن لادن: "ضرب ص ح [أي صدام حسين] في الوقت نفسه. ليس أ ب ل [أي أسامة بن لادن] فقط. هدف قريب. هائل. محو تام. يجب فعل ذلك. ضرب شيء نافع".
ويسارع ليفلر فيضيف قائلاً "لم يوافق الرئيس. ففي تلك الليلة رجع جورج دبليو بوش إلى واشنطن وهمه الأساس هو طمأنة الأمة وتخفيف معاناتها وبث الأمل. قيل له إن (القاعدة) هي المسؤول الأرجح عن الهجمة، فلماذا يركز على العراق. وفي اليوم التالي، في اجتماع مجلس الأمن الوطني، دعا رامسفيلد ونائبه وولفيتز إلى القيام بعمل ضد صدام حسين. ففي ظل عدم وجود أهداف صالحة في أفغانستان أو خطط حربية للتخلص من (طالبان)، رأى مسؤولو وزارة الدفاع أن العراق قد يمثل الفرصة الأفضل لاستعراض القوة الأميركية، لكن حججهم لم تلق صدى لدى أي من الحاضرين".
ربما لم يزل بعضنا ممن عاصروا أيام ضرب أفغانستان يتذكرون ما كان يعقد من مقارنات بين ثمن الصاروخ الأميركي والخيمة الأفغانية التي يصيبها. صحيح أنه لم يكن لدى العراق أسلحة نووية، لكن كان لديه ما هو أثمن من خيام في الجبال، وما هو أصلح للتحطيم، كانت لديه حضارة، وشعب، ومدن، وتعايش بين طوائف متعددة، وأيضاً كان لديه طاغية ظل جاثماً فوق ذلك كله إلى أن انتهى مشنوقاً على أطلال بلده الذي لم يبرأ بعد من آثامه وآثام جلاديه على السواء.
يتوقف ليفلر في سرديته عند دراسة ما كانت الإدارة تتوقع أن تفعله في العراق بعد الفوز في الحرب، فقد ولى بوش المسؤولية لدونالد رامسفيلد وزير الدفاع، لكن رامسفيلد كان يريد أن يخرج الجيش من اللعبة، في حين كان بوش يشعر بمسؤولية تجاه العراق، وبعد أن قام الرئيس بتعيين جيري بريمي لقيادة مشروع بناء عراق جديد، اعترف بريمر بالحاجة إلى مزيد من القوات الأميركية لإقرار الأمن، بينما أراد رامسفيلد أن تنقل الولايات المتحدة السلطة للعراقيين فوراً. ولم يواجه أحد ذلك التناقض الجذري. فلعل الدرس الكبير المستفاد، في رأي ليفلر، من تجربة حرب العراق أن "ما كان داخل الإدارة من احتكاكات وخلافات هو الذي جعل من الاحتلال تلك المأساة التي لم نزل نعيش عواقبها إلى اليوم"، على حد تقدير موقع "أكسفورد أكاديميك". ليس القرار إذاً هو الخاطئ، ولكن الخطأ الأكبر هو في اختلاف وجهة النظر حول الطريقة المثلى لارتكاب الخطأ.
يلقي ليفلر اللوم في الحرب برمتها على تقارير الاستخبارات، التي رسمت صورة مشوهة لأسلحة صدام، وإن "لم يعثر على أمثلة لتشويهات عمدية لأدلة" بحسب ما يكتب زيلوك. "لكن تراكم التقارير الأمنية، بما فيها من أحكام قائمة على اقتراضات وتكهنات، خلقت صورة يقينية زائفة. وفي أواخر ديسمبر 2002، ضغط بوش وكوندوليزا رايس على جورج تينيت مدير الاستخبارات المركزية الأميركية طلباً لدليل ملموس، لكن أحداً لم يستمر في متابعة الضغط".
وفي محاولة لاتباع ليفلر في إلقاء اللوم بعيداً من بوش، على سبيل التفسير طبعاً وليس التبرئة، يضيف زيلوك أنه "لا بد للرؤساء من مديري استخبارات قادرين على طرح الأسئلة الصعبة وقول ما لا يحب الرؤساء أن يسمعوه"، وهذا ما افتقر إليه بوش، وما لم يقتصر على مدير الاستخبارات وحده.
يكتب ليفلر أنه "في عصر يوم 11 سبتمبر في البنتاغون، وبينما النيران لم تنطفئ بعد وسيارات الإسعاف لم تزل تطلق صافراتها، كان وزير الدفاع دونالد رامسفيلد قد رجع إلى الفناء المعبأ بالدخان المفضي إلى مكتبه. وسجل مساعده المقرب ونائبه ستيفن كامبون بلغة مختزلة يصعب فك شيفرتها أفكار رامسفيلد حيال صدام حسين وأسامة بن لادن: "ضرب ص ح [أي صدام حسين] في الوقت نفسه. ليس أ ب ل [أي أسامة بن لادن] فقط. هدف قريب. هائل. محو تام. يجب فعل ذلك. ضرب شيء نافع".
ويسارع ليفلر فيضيف قائلاً "لم يوافق الرئيس. ففي تلك الليلة رجع جورج دبليو بوش إلى واشنطن وهمه الأساس هو طمأنة الأمة وتخفيف معاناتها وبث الأمل. قيل له إن (القاعدة) هي المسؤول الأرجح عن الهجمة، فلماذا يركز على العراق. وفي اليوم التالي، في اجتماع مجلس الأمن الوطني، دعا رامسفيلد ونائبه وولفيتز إلى القيام بعمل ضد صدام حسين. ففي ظل عدم وجود أهداف صالحة في أفغانستان أو خطط حربية للتخلص من (طالبان)، رأى مسؤولو وزارة الدفاع أن العراق قد يمثل الفرصة الأفضل لاستعراض القوة الأميركية، لكن حججهم لم تلق صدى لدى أي من الحاضرين".
ربما لم يزل بعضنا ممن عاصروا أيام ضرب أفغانستان يتذكرون ما كان يعقد من مقارنات بين ثمن الصاروخ الأميركي والخيمة الأفغانية التي يصيبها. صحيح أنه لم يكن لدى العراق أسلحة نووية، لكن كان لديه ما هو أثمن من خيام في الجبال، وما هو أصلح للتحطيم، كانت لديه حضارة، وشعب، ومدن، وتعايش بين طوائف متعددة، وأيضاً كان لديه طاغية ظل جاثماً فوق ذلك كله إلى أن انتهى مشنوقاً على أطلال بلده الذي لم يبرأ بعد من آثامه وآثام جلاديه على السواء.
October 23, 2023
This book was about a topic I wanted to know more about. There has been so much controversy surrounding this whole situation, and I was eager to pick apart the pieces and learn more.
They layout of the book and the breakdown of information was masterfully done and easy to understand. I enjoyed the way things were presented bit by bit and came together to show the bigger picture. There were some repetitive quotes and passages that began to feel a bit overused, but all in all, I enjoyed the way this one was put together for reader consumption.
They layout of the book and the breakdown of information was masterfully done and easy to understand. I enjoyed the way things were presented bit by bit and came together to show the bigger picture. There were some repetitive quotes and passages that began to feel a bit overused, but all in all, I enjoyed the way this one was put together for reader consumption.
February 29, 2024
I'd give this three-and-a-half stars.
This is an interesting book, but Leffler gets bogged down in the bureaucratic infighting and so the book becomes a chore to read.
(Pet peeve -- Leffler uses the abbreviation OSD, which apparently means "Office of the Secretary of Defense." This is something I have NEVER seen before, and I do read about foreign policy pretty often.)
Leffler reveals how dysfunctional the Bush administration was. Apparently nobody liked anybody, except the President. Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld, their subordinates, all of them couldn't stand each other. Rumsfeld, perhaps, emerges as the villain of the book, insisting that the force used against Iraq be as small as possible, which led to the chaos breaking out there once Saddam was removed. But it appears nobody really had any idea what to do once Saddam was removed.
Leffler makes the point that Saddam was not "a harmless agrarian reformer," but was someone who had come to power by shedding blood, had invaded both Iran and Kuwait, and had used chemical weapons against his own people (assuming he considered himself having any kinship with the Kurds or Shi'a Muslims.) He was determined to get WMD and acted like he had them.
Having said that, "Confronting Saddam Hussein" would have benefitted greatly from a glimpse of what was going on in Iraq in the years between 9/11 and the American invasion, even if only as a relief from the bureaucratic infighting in Washington. This book gets oppressive at times.
A key book to read on this issue, but a difficult one to read.
This is an interesting book, but Leffler gets bogged down in the bureaucratic infighting and so the book becomes a chore to read.
(Pet peeve -- Leffler uses the abbreviation OSD, which apparently means "Office of the Secretary of Defense." This is something I have NEVER seen before, and I do read about foreign policy pretty often.)
Leffler reveals how dysfunctional the Bush administration was. Apparently nobody liked anybody, except the President. Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld, their subordinates, all of them couldn't stand each other. Rumsfeld, perhaps, emerges as the villain of the book, insisting that the force used against Iraq be as small as possible, which led to the chaos breaking out there once Saddam was removed. But it appears nobody really had any idea what to do once Saddam was removed.
Leffler makes the point that Saddam was not "a harmless agrarian reformer," but was someone who had come to power by shedding blood, had invaded both Iran and Kuwait, and had used chemical weapons against his own people (assuming he considered himself having any kinship with the Kurds or Shi'a Muslims.) He was determined to get WMD and acted like he had them.
Having said that, "Confronting Saddam Hussein" would have benefitted greatly from a glimpse of what was going on in Iraq in the years between 9/11 and the American invasion, even if only as a relief from the bureaucratic infighting in Washington. This book gets oppressive at times.
A key book to read on this issue, but a difficult one to read.
July 9, 2023
This study lucidly and quickly offers an account of the factors that led to the invasion of Iraq ordered by George W. Bush. Although written by an academic historian, it reads like something by one of the better journalists who have pondered the Iraq fiasco. Leffler is particularly good at portraying the fissures in the Bush administration that led to the tragic neglect of post-invasion planning. He assigns most of the blame to Rumsfeld, who didn't want troops to hang around in Iraq after toppling Saddam, and he gives Condi Rice credit for trying, but failing, to counteract the consequences of Rumsfeld's views.
There aren't many new findings here, but Leffler offers a number of judgments and interpretations that are useful and important.
He is clear that this was George W. Bush's war. Bush was not pushed into it by neoconservative voices or by Dick Cheney, who was not--in Leffler's view--a neoconservative himself. (Rather, Cheney was and remains a conservative nationalist.) Bush, Leffler argues, decided on regime change when he saw no other way to eliminate what he wrongly thought were Saddam's WMD assets. He and the rest of his administration were haunted by 9/11, did not want another attack on the U.S., and logically--but again, wrongly--concluded that the defiant Iraqi dictator would contribute to another such attack. Hence the invasion.
Leffler's portrait of Bush in general is that of an intelligent, serious man more interested in domestic policy than foreign affairs. This is an accurate but pretty kind way of describing him.
Leffler's portrait of Rumsfeld as a cocksure, aggressive, imperious Secretary of Defense is vivid, but not news.
George Tenant and company (the whole intelligence community) aren't put under the microscope here. A point Leffler makes more than once is that Bush was operating more from a long series of bits and pieces of intelligence than a comprehensive, thoroughly vetted assessment or a "smoking gun." Powell's calamitous UN presentation confirmed the fact that there was no reliable, comprehensive, thoroughly vetted intel assessment. Leffler does not dwell on the misleading way the "source" called Curveball was used to hype the WMD threat.
In the end Bush had painted himself in a corner: Either topple Saddam or live with the fictitious WMD threat that his own administration had sold the American public. He chose toppling Saddam but had no vision of what would follow Saddam, which was predictable chaos and savagery.
There aren't many new findings here, but Leffler offers a number of judgments and interpretations that are useful and important.
He is clear that this was George W. Bush's war. Bush was not pushed into it by neoconservative voices or by Dick Cheney, who was not--in Leffler's view--a neoconservative himself. (Rather, Cheney was and remains a conservative nationalist.) Bush, Leffler argues, decided on regime change when he saw no other way to eliminate what he wrongly thought were Saddam's WMD assets. He and the rest of his administration were haunted by 9/11, did not want another attack on the U.S., and logically--but again, wrongly--concluded that the defiant Iraqi dictator would contribute to another such attack. Hence the invasion.
Leffler's portrait of Bush in general is that of an intelligent, serious man more interested in domestic policy than foreign affairs. This is an accurate but pretty kind way of describing him.
Leffler's portrait of Rumsfeld as a cocksure, aggressive, imperious Secretary of Defense is vivid, but not news.
George Tenant and company (the whole intelligence community) aren't put under the microscope here. A point Leffler makes more than once is that Bush was operating more from a long series of bits and pieces of intelligence than a comprehensive, thoroughly vetted assessment or a "smoking gun." Powell's calamitous UN presentation confirmed the fact that there was no reliable, comprehensive, thoroughly vetted intel assessment. Leffler does not dwell on the misleading way the "source" called Curveball was used to hype the WMD threat.
In the end Bush had painted himself in a corner: Either topple Saddam or live with the fictitious WMD threat that his own administration had sold the American public. He chose toppling Saddam but had no vision of what would follow Saddam, which was predictable chaos and savagery.
May 28, 2023
In a nutshell, you'd think this book was written by George Bush as a defense of his terrible and stubborn decision to invade Iraq no matter what and lying to any extent.
This book is a mouthpiece of the Bush administration to defend itself as having done no wrong in invading Iraq, with the premise based on interviews with the same Bush officials who lied to push the war, like Cheney, Wolfowitz, and others. It's like asking Hitler why he invaded Poland and France and taking his portrayal as the 100% truth and fact. Leffler didn't do this out of terrible incompetent and being incapable of basic understanding. He does it very deliberately because his goal in this book was to be a mouthpiece for these lying, guilty politicians. Apparently Leffler could not get an interview with Bush himself who would have said the same lies to Leffler just like the others did. It is easily the most biased and one of the most propagandized books I've read about the Iraq War.
It repeats every disproven or unproven tall tale lie and character assassination created in the 1990s and 2000s against Saddam Hussein and Saddam-era Iraq and repeats every lie made to justify the war and claim how Bush and his government were completely innocent in the malicious decision-making to invade Iraq. Take everything written in this book, especially about Iraqi history, Saddam Hussein, and Bush not wanting war, with a grain of salt.
The review on this page by Muhammad, with the help of a friend translating for me, is spot-on on why this book is terrible misinformation with extreme political agenda. It's nothing more than false propaganda.
I read the warontherocks article linked by Joseph Stieb, who debunked the book's false premise that the Iraq War was an "innocent mistake" and described it as little more than biased and false pro-war propaganda with false information and conclusions. He deeply condemns Leffler for putting full trust in and repeating the portrayal and self-vindication of the same Bush officials who were proven to have lied and who were the people guilty of pushing the war, who Leffler interviewed for this book. I'm surprised he gave a book 4 stars that gets almost everything wrong and lies to justify one of history's most unjustifiable wars and atrocities.
This book is a mouthpiece of the Bush administration to defend itself as having done no wrong in invading Iraq, with the premise based on interviews with the same Bush officials who lied to push the war, like Cheney, Wolfowitz, and others. It's like asking Hitler why he invaded Poland and France and taking his portrayal as the 100% truth and fact. Leffler didn't do this out of terrible incompetent and being incapable of basic understanding. He does it very deliberately because his goal in this book was to be a mouthpiece for these lying, guilty politicians. Apparently Leffler could not get an interview with Bush himself who would have said the same lies to Leffler just like the others did. It is easily the most biased and one of the most propagandized books I've read about the Iraq War.
It repeats every disproven or unproven tall tale lie and character assassination created in the 1990s and 2000s against Saddam Hussein and Saddam-era Iraq and repeats every lie made to justify the war and claim how Bush and his government were completely innocent in the malicious decision-making to invade Iraq. Take everything written in this book, especially about Iraqi history, Saddam Hussein, and Bush not wanting war, with a grain of salt.
The review on this page by Muhammad, with the help of a friend translating for me, is spot-on on why this book is terrible misinformation with extreme political agenda. It's nothing more than false propaganda.
I read the warontherocks article linked by Joseph Stieb, who debunked the book's false premise that the Iraq War was an "innocent mistake" and described it as little more than biased and false pro-war propaganda with false information and conclusions. He deeply condemns Leffler for putting full trust in and repeating the portrayal and self-vindication of the same Bush officials who were proven to have lied and who were the people guilty of pushing the war, who Leffler interviewed for this book. I'm surprised he gave a book 4 stars that gets almost everything wrong and lies to justify one of history's most unjustifiable wars and atrocities.
March 12, 2023
The al-Qaeda acts of mass murder on 9/11/2001 and the Iraq War of 2003 generated several moments that will live on in the minds of those who witnessed them: "axis of evil," "with us or with the terrorists," "we'll be greeted as liberators," and mission accomplished, etc. It is difficult revisiting these memories, because the U.S. response to 9/11 led to an epic tragedy that ended the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and destroyed the lives of millions more. The U.S. killed, tortured, and kidnapped.
In his new book, Melvyn Leffler argues the invasion of Iraq was not the result of ideological bombast or naivete, nor stupidity, nor sheer incompetence, nor outright lies. The Bush administration, backed by a large percentage of the American people, meant well. But they screwed up. They got the intelligence wrong on WMD and led the nation to war based on fear, excessive confidence in U.S. power, and hubris. But Leffler ends his concise book by suggesting we might also remember Bush was operating in a most difficult atmosphere for statecraft after 9/11. He and his top officials (Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Feith, Libby, Rice, Hadley, Armitage, Wolfowitz) had a tough job. They tried their best but it got tragically wrong.
The road to hell is paved with good intentions, yes? I'm not entirely convinced by Leffler's somewhat soft treatment of Bush and company. Something is missing from his analysis.
And I will bring it up with Leffler himself! When he visits my studio to record a conversation for my podcast this Tuesday. I better do my homework if I'm going to challenge the dean of U.S. foreign policy historians.
In his new book, Melvyn Leffler argues the invasion of Iraq was not the result of ideological bombast or naivete, nor stupidity, nor sheer incompetence, nor outright lies. The Bush administration, backed by a large percentage of the American people, meant well. But they screwed up. They got the intelligence wrong on WMD and led the nation to war based on fear, excessive confidence in U.S. power, and hubris. But Leffler ends his concise book by suggesting we might also remember Bush was operating in a most difficult atmosphere for statecraft after 9/11. He and his top officials (Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Feith, Libby, Rice, Hadley, Armitage, Wolfowitz) had a tough job. They tried their best but it got tragically wrong.
The road to hell is paved with good intentions, yes? I'm not entirely convinced by Leffler's somewhat soft treatment of Bush and company. Something is missing from his analysis.
And I will bring it up with Leffler himself! When he visits my studio to record a conversation for my podcast this Tuesday. I better do my homework if I'm going to challenge the dean of U.S. foreign policy historians.
June 13, 2023
This is an important book that people will be referencing for a long time. Leffler takes a sober look at the run up to the Iraq War. He probes the thought processes of Bush, Cheney, et al. in a way that recognizes their good intentions and, yes, honesty. No one was seeking to lie the country into war. Bush was no warmonger; he truly wished that the greatly increased diplomatic pressure on Hussein would do the trick. But it did not, and in many ways that left the United States unprepared.
One thing that Leffler makes clear is that, despite the military might of the Americans, and the noble reasons for prosecuting the war, the high command gave precious little thought to what would follow the fall of Baghdad. And that's been an oversight with a twenty-year (and counting) bite. Leffler defends many of the administration figures, but isn't afraid to show its faults. The president was overly optimistic and likely over-delegated to others not up to the task. The harshest light falls on Donald Rumsfeld. He was stubborn and territorial. He did not always toe the company line. He ignored negative reports coming from Iraq post-conquest. Ultimately that falls on the president--he should have whipped his SecDef into shape. But he didn't, and the Iraqis (and we) suffered for it.
One thing that Leffler makes clear is that, despite the military might of the Americans, and the noble reasons for prosecuting the war, the high command gave precious little thought to what would follow the fall of Baghdad. And that's been an oversight with a twenty-year (and counting) bite. Leffler defends many of the administration figures, but isn't afraid to show its faults. The president was overly optimistic and likely over-delegated to others not up to the task. The harshest light falls on Donald Rumsfeld. He was stubborn and territorial. He did not always toe the company line. He ignored negative reports coming from Iraq post-conquest. Ultimately that falls on the president--he should have whipped his SecDef into shape. But he didn't, and the Iraqis (and we) suffered for it.
May 28, 2023
A very sympathetic view of George W. Bush and the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Leffler argues that Bush was the decider as he always said, meaning that he, not Cheney or Rumsfeld, determined administration policy. No the administration was not pre-occupied with Iraq. They really had no urgent foreign policy objectives. Their desire to prevent another attack was their primary concern. The anthrax attack really frightened the administration and led them to double down on preventing another terrorist attack. Everyone thought Hussein had WMD and regional allies heckled us asking us what we would do about it. But it was a realistic fear that he had WMD. Hussein’s lying and delay only fueled fears and confirmed the worst suspicions of him. And added to the belief that something had to be done to remove him from power. Leffler faults Bush for not asking enough questions or being skeptical enough or challenging the information that was presented to him.
March 23, 2023
Good history, but a bit repetitive
20 years later, this is a good historical review of how and why we went to war with Hussein in 2003, and also how we bungled the aftermath. It covers good ground, focusing attention on Hussein and Bush, and showing the work and input of Bush's advisors and the international community. And spares nothing in highlighting how monumentally the US screwed up the aftermath and who was responsible for it.
My primary quibble is that there is a LOT of repetition in the first few chapters. This could have very easily been written in about 50% fewer words.
20 years later, this is a good historical review of how and why we went to war with Hussein in 2003, and also how we bungled the aftermath. It covers good ground, focusing attention on Hussein and Bush, and showing the work and input of Bush's advisors and the international community. And spares nothing in highlighting how monumentally the US screwed up the aftermath and who was responsible for it.
My primary quibble is that there is a LOT of repetition in the first few chapters. This could have very easily been written in about 50% fewer words.
May 5, 2023
This book is more like a 3 1/2 star book, while Leffler does a really good job using extensive interviews with Bush admin officials (not GWWB himself though) and others involved in the events leading up to the 2003 invasion to lay out a narrative of events. He also does a good job of debunking some of the dumber myths about why/how the Bush admin went to war. "It was about oil, "W just wanted to finish what his Dad had started", "They knew there were no WMDs"
The issue(s) I have is that Leffler comes across as more of a stenographer, blithely taking his interviewees words at face value. Its more stenography than historical analysis.
The issue(s) I have is that Leffler comes across as more of a stenographer, blithely taking his interviewees words at face value. Its more stenography than historical analysis.
March 1, 2023
I wrote a fairly critical review of this book for War on the Rocks, which I don't think gets the interpretation of the war's causes quite right (see below). However, there's a lot of value in this book, especially with Leffler's extensive access to top policy-makers, and parts of it are very good.
https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/con...
https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/con...
December 26, 2024
A fallacy of freedom
This is an in-depth review of the intelligence and policy approach to justify removing Saddam Hussein. Although, eventually flawed it was a strange terror time and removing terrorist safe havens made sense. You can’t have one without planning for change. What was missing was when you remove everyone in power, assuming someone has the knowledge and ability to rise and lead.
This is an in-depth review of the intelligence and policy approach to justify removing Saddam Hussein. Although, eventually flawed it was a strange terror time and removing terrorist safe havens made sense. You can’t have one without planning for change. What was missing was when you remove everyone in power, assuming someone has the knowledge and ability to rise and lead.
June 13, 2023
An Essential Reminder
A strong critique of the execution of Iraqi Freedom, but a powerful rebuttal of the “Bush lied” narrative. Iraq really was a threat, and there were no good options.
A strong critique of the execution of Iraqi Freedom, but a powerful rebuttal of the “Bush lied” narrative. Iraq really was a threat, and there were no good options.
Read
November 11, 2023good read. The book helped me understand why this war happend. In early 2000s I was just a kid and did not follow US politics, still it was easy to read this book and get contecst on the names mentioned inside.
March 26, 2023
The book is repeating various Bush points from the early 2000's. Designed to white wash the us invasion of iraq and it takes the words of Paul Wolfowitz and Bush Officials at face value. Horrible.
April 18, 2023
"What were they thinking?" Now, I know.
August 12, 2023
Trash. There is no historical value at all. Mere propaganda.
April 3, 2023
I think this book is a propaganda book written to try to justify Bushes bad decisions. I think Bush and Rice is a POS!
December 19, 2025
Whether it was the Bush family, their wealthy cronies or their wealthy fans.
I hope they paid Leffler enough to tarnish his reputation with this ridiculous panegyric.
Brief summary for the lest interested readers:
George W. Bush is number one.
He's the smoothest, kindest, most intelligent president there ever was.
The Iraq war was mandatory for the security of mankind.
Don't believe facts, George Bush and his administration did what any sensible leader would do after stealing an election. His policies had nothing to do with the global financial crisis. His policies had nothing to do with the rise of fundamentalist Islamic extremism. The Middle East is far safer than it has ever been because of President Bush and his administration.
God Bless America! Where we prefer fantasy to reality even if it means destroying the country we claim to love.
I hope they paid Leffler enough to tarnish his reputation with this ridiculous panegyric.
Brief summary for the lest interested readers:
George W. Bush is number one.
He's the smoothest, kindest, most intelligent president there ever was.
The Iraq war was mandatory for the security of mankind.
Don't believe facts, George Bush and his administration did what any sensible leader would do after stealing an election. His policies had nothing to do with the global financial crisis. His policies had nothing to do with the rise of fundamentalist Islamic extremism. The Middle East is far safer than it has ever been because of President Bush and his administration.
God Bless America! Where we prefer fantasy to reality even if it means destroying the country we claim to love.
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