Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome

Hellenistic Culture and Society

by Arthur M. Eckstein

This ground-breaking study is the first to employ modern international relations theory to place Roman militarism and expansion of power within the broader Mediterranean context of interstate anarchy. Arthur M. Eckstein challenges claims that Rome was an exceptionally warlike and aggressive state—not merely in modern but in ancient terms—by arguing that intense militarism and aggressiveness were common among all Mediterranean polities from ca 750 B.C. onwards.

In his wide-ranging and masterful narrative, Eckstein explains that international politics in the ancient Mediterranean world was, in political science terms, a multipolar international law was minimal, and states struggled desperately for power and survival by means of warfare. Eventually, one state, the Republic of Rome, managed to create predominance and a sort of peace. Rome was certainly a militarized and aggressive state, but it was successful not because it was exceptional in its ruthlessness, Eckstein convincingly argues; rather, it was successful because of its exceptional ability to manage a large network of foreign allies, and to assimilate numerous foreigners within the polity itself. This book shows how these characteristics, in turn, gave Rome incomparably large resources for the grim struggle of states fostered by the Mediterranean anarchy—and hence they were key to Rome's unprecedented success.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Ancient History, Roman History, Classics, International Relations, Politics

389 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2007

Reviews

[Jordan (Forever Lost in Literature)]

Read this for a grad seminar course and appreciated Eckstein's application of the Realist approach to Roman imperialist expansion. Particularly appreciated his coverage of the Classical and Hellenistic periods before moving into Rome and surrounding territories. Some areas felt slightly repetitive in reiterative how Rome *isn't* as exceptional and militarized/aggressively warlike as perceived in comparison to other states of the period, but felt he did a good job of underlining his points. Great mix of political science ideologies with classics.

[James Hogan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fine book on international relations in the ancient Mediterranean, specifically focusing on the nature of anarchy as defined by realist political theory and how this had a major constraining effect on the actions of individual agents (i.e., political units or states) and furthermore examining the rise of the Republic of Rome and the ways it was and was not like its fellow actors and how its decisions and eventual succession to system-wide hegemony might best be explained. That all being said, this was an utterly fascinating and entirely worthwhile read. I have had this on my shelf for quite some time and will confess that its title intimidated me and that I was a bit wary of picking it up. Thankfully I one day mustered up the courage to start this one, and I am oh so glad I did. First and foremost, apart from being a work of political theory (and one that has a most strong and well-supported thesis on state action and power in the ancient Mediterranean), this is a history book. This is a book talking about real states and real people and does not shy away from the grim realities of the ancient world in describing the way things were done. I think I didn't quite understand how much of a historical work this one would be. I also confess my ignorance, as I have not done a great deal of study in either the realm of Classical Greece or the Republic period of Rome, so much of the history laid out here (while probably very familiar to most reading it) was a bit hazy for me. How much did I know of the actions and attributes of the Seleucids, Antigonids, Ptolemaics and the Grecian city-states/leagues? Very, very little. I suppose maybe I should have known more about the rise of Rome and their tussles with both Phillip V and Antiochus III as they ascended to the status of major power, but much of the details of this were unknown to me prior to reading this book. That all being said, even though my historical knowledge of this period is shockingly little, I much enjoyed this book and reading this scholar's analysis of the ancient Mediterranean and his attempts to explain much of the decisions taken by states being very much influenced by the dictates of the system in which they lived, namely - interstate anarchy. This realist theory of international relations is one that - to me - makes a good deal of sense and one that the author in this work does a very capable job of explaining actual history according to its tenets. This whole book is highly recommended to anyone that wants to know more about the ancient world and come to a little better understanding of how states interact, particularly in cases where there is no greater power to mediate. This system is brutal, as states simply must maintain their power and prestige in the eyes of the rest of the actors, other-wise their power is seen to (and actually does) diminish. Any state seeking to merely survive (for there were many, many states that did not survive in the ancient Mediterranean world) must do all it can to maximize its own power and influence. By choosing to not act or by choosing to let an opportunity pass by, a state is deciding to slit its own throat. The author gives many details and many citations from ancient historical works to show that even back in the ancient world, this was understood. States operated primarily out of fear, not out of the desire for imperialism and glory. It is easy now to look back at the decisions of leaders and states in the ancient world and determine that their warmongering was almost certainly driven by their own arrogance and vanity, and while there are certainly leaders who took steps that indicated an abnormally high level of aggression, as a whole, states' decisions can be explained by the realist theory.

I have rambled on too long about this book, and I shall soon cease, but I wanted to spend a few more words appreciating the structure of this book. The author first takes a good deal of time to explain his thesis and political theory. He is particularly keen to point out the intricacies of political science to the historians in the room, and vice-versa. Well heeded. He then takes us on a tour through the fifth century in Greece, to demonstrate the utility of the realist theory in describing interstate action between the various city-states of the day. Following that, we jump to the third century and are given a big picture understanding of the Hellenistic world and the state of the major powers of the day (post-Alexander). This sets the stage for us to now learn about Rome. Where did Rome come from, how did it rise? Was it really Rome's brutality and naked aggression that was responsible for its success time after time? The author states resoundingly that this was not the case. According to the author (and seemingly quite well-supported in my judgment), Rome was not measurably more brutal, aggressive or vicious than the other states in the Mediterranean. This was a brutal blood-soaked era, and Rome was not unique in its penchant for war and maximization of power. The author guides us on a whirl-wind tour of Rome's history, and we are now primed to see how Rome's actions with the greater Hellenistic powers in the late 3rd century, early 2nd century BC are dictated by system-level constraints. While it is commonly thought that Rome rose to hegemony because of its superior battlefield tactics and increased levels of aggression and brutality, this author goes to great lengths to prove that this was not the case. Rome was not always superior on the battlefield and in fact lost many battles. But, Rome tended to not lose many wars. Why was this? The author attempts to prove (successfully in my admittedly limited view) that Rome entered wars for reasons that can almost always be shown to be flowing from the demands of the tense world of interstate anarchy and that Rome won wars because of its ability to levy greater forces over time from its own realm and supporting states. Rome's increased manpower was a result of its somewhat-unique attributes of having a much less exclusive view of citizenship and a greatly superior ability to assimilate other states and people into the broader Roman whole. Rome had a very defined hierarchy of rights and statuses, but Rome was very generous in distributing these to those in their sphere. So whereas some of the other major powers were much more affected by significant battlefield defeats, Rome was able to suffer great losses and just keep rolling. For the most part. The last few sentences are highly broad and (of necessity) leaves out many of the details, as well as some of the times in which Rome was in grave danger (particularly in the earlier days of the Republic). But by and large, I believe the author does a good job of supporting his thesis and shows that the ancient Mediterranean world can indeed be explained by the realist theory as well as demonstrating that Rome's rise to dominance of the Mediterranean was not due to an abnormally high level of brutality and aggression. There is much more I could say, but I will end by simply saying this. While I do feel that the author repeats himself quite a bit, maybe that is not a bad thing as I feel I have quite a firm grasp on his thesis at this point! And finally, this was both an educational and a highly interesting read. Yes, this was a book about ancient kingdoms and broad sweeping movements, but the author does not deny that there are still individual people involved who make individual choices based on individual emotions and passions. Think on the fact that Rome almost did not make the decision to go east to challenge Philip V of Macedon in 200 BC. Yet Rome changed its mind and decided to cast the die after all, for reasons that can be explained by realist theory, but can also be shown to come from the actions and words of individuals. Yes, there was a power vacuum caused by the near-collapse of the Ptolemaic Dynasty which led to the increased aggression of both Philip V and Antiochus III (both extremely capable and brilliant conquerors), which then led to frightened mid-level powers calling for the assistance of Rome. The beginning of the end of interstate anarchy in the Mediterranean, for soon there would be one power who could cow all others and dictate events as it saw fit. But the rise of Rome was not inevitable. Only highly probable. Yet, we do our best to understand the world and the shape of all things, and I believe this author does a most capable job of making sense of the actions of states and kings.

[AskHistorians]

This book brought up an idea of why Rome came to be the preeminent Mediterranean power that hadn't really been explored extensively yet. Eckstein chose to explain it in modern Realist terms of political relations and alliances, rather than the raw brutality and tendencies towards violence which characterized the period - something he argues was not unique to Rome at all, nor were they "better" at it than anyone, as was the prevailing theory.

[Toby Paterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting application of modern IR theory. Further, Eckstein makes useful criticisms of Harris' argument that imperialism was pathological in Rome's character

[Ryan Patrick · Rating 3 out of 5]

Eckstein makes a strong argument about the nature of Roman imperialism in the face of what has become the standard view of the question since William V. Harris's seminal work published back in 1979. Was Rome culturally militaristic, driven to fight against its neighbors year after year? Yes, but, argues Eckstein, drawing upon Realist international relations theory, so too were all its neighbors--such militarism was not unique and does not explain Roman success, first in Italy, then in the western Mediterranean, and finally in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ultimate success must be attributed to Rome's unique alliance system in which it assimilated its former rivals through a sharing of its citizenship. This put Rome in a position to take on first Philip V of Macedon and then Antiochus III when a power-transition crisis erupted with the collapse of Ptolemaic Egypt as a force to be reckoned with in the interstate anarchy of the ancient Mediterranean.

This is not a book for beginners. Eckstein does not provide much of a narrative of the events leading to the final Roman triumph in the Mediterranean world. This is pure, highly footnoted, analysis that only really makes sense if you know the general narrative of the Middle Roman Republic and ideally have read the work of earlier historians of Roman imperialism (this isn't essential, as Eckstein does a nice job of presenting the positions he wants to argue against).

[Brian · Rating 5 out of 5]

How often do you think about the Roman Empire? Is it enough to think "Why exactly was Rome so aggressive? So expansionist?" If so, this is the book for you! I don't know what prompted the question in my brain, but upon looking for some answers I found this book and what a good one it is.

Eckstein frames this question in the realm of International Relations, which I found quite interesting as a I personally am not used to political science being applied to history of Rome. The theoretical foundation enhances the historical evidence and vice versa, providing a very unique understanding of the situation. You do not need to know any political science/international relations, Eckstein explains everything clearly and has a readable style. Using this historical plus IR framework, he very methodically makes a compelling case for his theory:

Rome was not unusually aggressive, imperialistic, or militarized for the time and place nor were they as a people any more brutal or their military particularly superior (often it was not). This may be surprising if you, like myself, had the impression Romans were simply just more aggressive. Yet Eckstein makes a very solid case for his stance and discusses what about Rome WAS unique and critical from their rise from nondescript city-state to the famous empire it became.

An interesting, readable, not terribly long book that sheds a very different light on one of the biggest topics in history.

Five Stars

[Brendan Sheehan · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a wonderful monograph applying realism, the predominant 20th century international relations theory to the rise of Rome in the 3rd century BC arguing that Rome was able to survive and expand from Latium all the way to Hellenistic kingdoms of the eastern Mediterranean. Eckstein does a layered analysis focusing on internal Roman actors but defined by the international analysis. There are some aspects that I was not entirely persuaded by but it was well-sourced and well-argued. As I haven’t read international relations theory or Roman academic works in years, it was very readable for a lay person.

[Ross · Rating 2 out of 5]

Promising approach but disappointing execution - way too repetitive and dogmatically 'realist', hardly deviating at all from the Word of Waltz.

I should note that I gave up on it around 120 pages in because I didn't feel like I had learned anything new up 'til then. I guess the rest of it might be more enlightening.