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Iran, L'irrésistible Ascension
Depuis trente ans l'Iran s'affirme comme le pays le plus puissant et le plus stable du Moyen-Orient, le seul qui ait la capacité de résister à l'Amérique. L'auteur explique comment Téhéran a planifié et réussi cette conquête du monde musulman.
392 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2008
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1045 people want to read
About the author
Robert B. Baer
13 books234 followersRobert B. Baer is a former Middle East intelligence specialist for the CIA, and a winner of the Career Intelligence Medal. He is the author of four New York Times bestsellers, including See No Evil—the basis for the acclaimed film Syriana, which earned George Clooney an Oscar for his portrayal of Baer. He is considered one of the world’s foremost authorities on the Middle East and frequently appears on all major news outlets. Baer writes regularly for Time.com and has contributed to Vanity Fair, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post. He is the current national security affairs analyst for CNN.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 115 reviews
March 30, 2023
Robert Baer - Image from Penguin Random House
Nearly everything the average American has been told about Iran is wrong.
This is a compelling analysis of one of the major players on the world stage. For those who have read much about the Middle East there is not a whole lot of new information here, but Baer has the ability to gather the strings of information and weave them together into a coherent tapestry. Iran has been growing as a regional power. This will continue and there is pretty much nothing we can do about it. This raises serious questions about how the USA should proceed. Baer is insightful and fact-based. There is no screaming here about islamo-fascists, but a reasoned view of an extant reality. He offers interesting suggestions on how we can best cope with the inevitable change. As a former (can one really ever be a completely former?) spook, with deep experience in these parts of the world, (Middle East and South Asia) his analysis carries additional weight. One may agree or disagree with his take, but it is an informed and compelling one. It has been about fifteen years (in 2023) since Baer's book was published. But his analysis and conclusions remain insightful and relevant. This is a must-read for anyone with any interest in events in the Middle East.
Baer on Twitter
October 16, 2008
It is of vital importance that we, as Americans, understand our bitter history with the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979-current), and there is no more important time than now to get down to it. With the war drums beating in Washington and Jerusalem it is imperative that every citizen take a good look at who Iran is, what they were and what they are now, and be able to differentiate the early Republic which took US hostages, blew up US military installations and fomented attacks on Israelis and Americans, and the more pragmatic nation-state it is today.
Terrorism-cum-military struggle.
Robert Baer, a former CIA operative, knows his material. While I wouldn't agree with all his conclusions - especially some of the suggestions in the epilogue about tossing out the borders drawn almost a century ago (Sykes-Picot Agreement) - he brings about the case in compelling fashion that Iran is already a de facto Superpower; the first hydrocarbon empire. And the point is that the West is at a crossroads. We can either pursue war or détente.
Before one jumps to the reflexive conclusion that there is no one to deal with in a terrorist state run by crazy Mullahs and that only a good solid thrashing is in order to bring this devil to bear, this book will clearly make you rethink your position - that is, if you're a rational individual who is willing to look at a few facts. If you're hell-bent on war with Iran, then this book will be of little value (but that would be true of most books). However, if you have a mind to learn about a nation that we in the West know very little about - a nation that has been a nation for over a thousand years, with a destiny and national vision to match, and deserves a critical, honest look - then this book is a fantastic starting point.
We learn that American's traditional backing of Sunni Arabs in the region has brought us no closer to peace and prosperity, no closer to a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli problem and in fact to a more dangerous place which threatens our hegemonic destiny. This book makes a compelling argument for not only détente, but possibly a one-day alliance. And before you scoff, read why.
This is a well-written, easy to understand book. Its author recognizes that Iran is dangerous, that its history isn’t something to gloss over, but then again, neither is US history. They have burned us, and we have burned them too. But there is a way past this animosity, and past the worthless pursuit of UN sanctions and the march to war. With an open mind, one can actually see a potentially better future for both our nations and that surely is better than the alternative.
Read this book.
Terrorism-cum-military struggle.
Robert Baer, a former CIA operative, knows his material. While I wouldn't agree with all his conclusions - especially some of the suggestions in the epilogue about tossing out the borders drawn almost a century ago (Sykes-Picot Agreement) - he brings about the case in compelling fashion that Iran is already a de facto Superpower; the first hydrocarbon empire. And the point is that the West is at a crossroads. We can either pursue war or détente.
Before one jumps to the reflexive conclusion that there is no one to deal with in a terrorist state run by crazy Mullahs and that only a good solid thrashing is in order to bring this devil to bear, this book will clearly make you rethink your position - that is, if you're a rational individual who is willing to look at a few facts. If you're hell-bent on war with Iran, then this book will be of little value (but that would be true of most books). However, if you have a mind to learn about a nation that we in the West know very little about - a nation that has been a nation for over a thousand years, with a destiny and national vision to match, and deserves a critical, honest look - then this book is a fantastic starting point.
We learn that American's traditional backing of Sunni Arabs in the region has brought us no closer to peace and prosperity, no closer to a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli problem and in fact to a more dangerous place which threatens our hegemonic destiny. This book makes a compelling argument for not only détente, but possibly a one-day alliance. And before you scoff, read why.
This is a well-written, easy to understand book. Its author recognizes that Iran is dangerous, that its history isn’t something to gloss over, but then again, neither is US history. They have burned us, and we have burned them too. But there is a way past this animosity, and past the worthless pursuit of UN sanctions and the march to war. With an open mind, one can actually see a potentially better future for both our nations and that surely is better than the alternative.
Read this book.
March 19, 2012
With the current political situation today, and the politicians beating the war drums about Iran, Robert Baer seems to be a very drowned out voice of reason, but also a speaker of truth. His experience as a CIA agent who is extremely familiar with Iran, it's culture and history, he lays out a very very well reasoned analysis as to why our positions toward Iran are counterproductive, and why war with Iran would be an absolutly terrible idea.
Even thought it was written in 2008, the general truths remain the same as to the nature of the threats coming from Iran, their attitudes, our attitudes, and exactly how dangerous the nation can be. He explains with a lot of facts and analysis as to why Iran is not run by a bunch of religious wackos, but rather by a group of extremely intelligent, calculating, dangerous people, who are also very rational actors. He analyzes Iran's defensive strategies, their investments in people and partners, their ability to act through proxies, and just how dangerous they can be if they are not approached properly.
This is not just a good read, it's a must read for any politican or anyone interested in foreign affairs with respect to the Middle East.
Even thought it was written in 2008, the general truths remain the same as to the nature of the threats coming from Iran, their attitudes, our attitudes, and exactly how dangerous the nation can be. He explains with a lot of facts and analysis as to why Iran is not run by a bunch of religious wackos, but rather by a group of extremely intelligent, calculating, dangerous people, who are also very rational actors. He analyzes Iran's defensive strategies, their investments in people and partners, their ability to act through proxies, and just how dangerous they can be if they are not approached properly.
This is not just a good read, it's a must read for any politican or anyone interested in foreign affairs with respect to the Middle East.
June 7, 2015
When I ordered my copy from Amazon of The Devil We Know, Robert Baer’s 2008 book on Iran, I was surprised but delighted the book was on back order. This meant there were readers eager to acquire a copy of this gem of an introduction to Iran, its ambitions and perspectives.
Though some facts and figures require updating, the work still provides a compelling account, informed by Baer’s seasoned observations and insights of Iran’s present circumstances. Baer, a former CIA operative, fluent in several of the critical languages, mines his contacts and leverages his decades-long experience to provide a cogent, part anecdotal, part analytical account of the transformative period following the 1979 revolution.
Reading the book is prompted by the present disproportionate preoccupation with the current nuclear arms agreement negotiations, as this myopic focus displaces consideration of broader more fundamental issues about our relationship with Iran. One is the recognition that entirely apart from the potential danger of a nuclear Iran, are the immediate challenges arising from a non-nuclear Iran. It is this vacant space the Obama administration and Congress have ignored, failing to even entertain discussion of the formation of a comprehensive and coherent foreign policy. Baer’s book provides a point of departure for consideration of the broader issues, which by implication should enlighten any discourse on the merits of the proposed nuclear agreement as well.
The Devil We Know rectifies this distortion by identifying Iran’s historical perception of itself as an ancient civilization, an empire for sustained periods of time, and presently a modern nation state with imperial imperatives. Baer explains Iran’s ambition to assert significant influence in the Middle East and the regime’s craving for recognition, realistic objectives justifiably consistent with its military power, strategic geography, size, and political stability.
The book’s second major contribution is Baer’s nuanced description of Iran’s transformation from a radical, revolutionary terrorist entity to a stable, calculating rational state actor. Baer posits that if we do not adjust our perception of our adversary and appreciate the changes that have occurred; if we continue to demonize Iran, we deprive ourselves of the objectivity necessary to evaluate existing dangers more accurately, and as importantly, seize opportunities for improved relations.
Baer believes that as long as we characterize Iran as an implacable and permanent enemy and avoid broad engagement, and cling to the view that military action is the best prescription for the region’s problems, we will remain enthralled in a cycle of squandered resources and needless destruction, and consequentially thwart our viable political objectives.
The work contrasts Iran favorably with our vulnerable Sunni allies, Saudi Arabia, and others and the fragile Gulf states with whom we are enmeshed; and whose interests we unquestioningly promote while eschewing engagement with the pivotal actor in the region.
This is not to suggest in any Panglossian way that Iran is a sheep not a wolf, but as the chapter, “Memories That Don’t Fade: What Iran Really Wants,” demonstrates, Iran’s aims are rooted in what they consider its core national interests (a perspective we share, in terms of creating our own foreign policy). Baer distinguishes Iran’s behavior, as a state certainly ready to use military force when necessary and one quintessentially manipulative, from the irrational and nihilistic conduct of the Sunni outliers such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, and the enabling Sunni state sponsors who have provided the support and encouragement that have spawned numerous acts of terror against the U.S. and other Western targets.
Before prematurely concluding that a process of normalization and détente is not an option, Baer urges we examine each of the objectives adumbrated in the chapter, evaluating them on their merits to see if there is enough daylight to begin talking.
Finally, as a corollary, the Epilogue articulates in broad terms the policy choices available to the U.S. in dealing with Iran, which range from aggressive and hostile actions that would involve the U.S. in protracted military conflict, to the politically unpalatable but rationally compelling possibility of “holding one’s nose”, and “settling” by negotiating on a number of issues, where a potential exists for compromise and agreement.
Baer supports his position by nine specific steps that could be taken to diminish tensions with Iran that would be mutually beneficial bilaterally and for the region at large. Several are controversial and will spark immediate objection, but should be examined and considered nonetheless.
While this book provides an advantaged starting point for those trying to work through the fog obfuscating an understanding of the present climate of hostility and distrust, my hope is that Baer will soon revise this fine work, and bring current his well seasoned and pragmatic insights, as they will certainly contribute to a more intelligent and enlightened appreciation of our critical relationship with this regional hegemon.
Though some facts and figures require updating, the work still provides a compelling account, informed by Baer’s seasoned observations and insights of Iran’s present circumstances. Baer, a former CIA operative, fluent in several of the critical languages, mines his contacts and leverages his decades-long experience to provide a cogent, part anecdotal, part analytical account of the transformative period following the 1979 revolution.
Reading the book is prompted by the present disproportionate preoccupation with the current nuclear arms agreement negotiations, as this myopic focus displaces consideration of broader more fundamental issues about our relationship with Iran. One is the recognition that entirely apart from the potential danger of a nuclear Iran, are the immediate challenges arising from a non-nuclear Iran. It is this vacant space the Obama administration and Congress have ignored, failing to even entertain discussion of the formation of a comprehensive and coherent foreign policy. Baer’s book provides a point of departure for consideration of the broader issues, which by implication should enlighten any discourse on the merits of the proposed nuclear agreement as well.
The Devil We Know rectifies this distortion by identifying Iran’s historical perception of itself as an ancient civilization, an empire for sustained periods of time, and presently a modern nation state with imperial imperatives. Baer explains Iran’s ambition to assert significant influence in the Middle East and the regime’s craving for recognition, realistic objectives justifiably consistent with its military power, strategic geography, size, and political stability.
The book’s second major contribution is Baer’s nuanced description of Iran’s transformation from a radical, revolutionary terrorist entity to a stable, calculating rational state actor. Baer posits that if we do not adjust our perception of our adversary and appreciate the changes that have occurred; if we continue to demonize Iran, we deprive ourselves of the objectivity necessary to evaluate existing dangers more accurately, and as importantly, seize opportunities for improved relations.
Baer believes that as long as we characterize Iran as an implacable and permanent enemy and avoid broad engagement, and cling to the view that military action is the best prescription for the region’s problems, we will remain enthralled in a cycle of squandered resources and needless destruction, and consequentially thwart our viable political objectives.
The work contrasts Iran favorably with our vulnerable Sunni allies, Saudi Arabia, and others and the fragile Gulf states with whom we are enmeshed; and whose interests we unquestioningly promote while eschewing engagement with the pivotal actor in the region.
This is not to suggest in any Panglossian way that Iran is a sheep not a wolf, but as the chapter, “Memories That Don’t Fade: What Iran Really Wants,” demonstrates, Iran’s aims are rooted in what they consider its core national interests (a perspective we share, in terms of creating our own foreign policy). Baer distinguishes Iran’s behavior, as a state certainly ready to use military force when necessary and one quintessentially manipulative, from the irrational and nihilistic conduct of the Sunni outliers such as ISIS and Al Qaeda, and the enabling Sunni state sponsors who have provided the support and encouragement that have spawned numerous acts of terror against the U.S. and other Western targets.
Before prematurely concluding that a process of normalization and détente is not an option, Baer urges we examine each of the objectives adumbrated in the chapter, evaluating them on their merits to see if there is enough daylight to begin talking.
Finally, as a corollary, the Epilogue articulates in broad terms the policy choices available to the U.S. in dealing with Iran, which range from aggressive and hostile actions that would involve the U.S. in protracted military conflict, to the politically unpalatable but rationally compelling possibility of “holding one’s nose”, and “settling” by negotiating on a number of issues, where a potential exists for compromise and agreement.
Baer supports his position by nine specific steps that could be taken to diminish tensions with Iran that would be mutually beneficial bilaterally and for the region at large. Several are controversial and will spark immediate objection, but should be examined and considered nonetheless.
While this book provides an advantaged starting point for those trying to work through the fog obfuscating an understanding of the present climate of hostility and distrust, my hope is that Baer will soon revise this fine work, and bring current his well seasoned and pragmatic insights, as they will certainly contribute to a more intelligent and enlightened appreciation of our critical relationship with this regional hegemon.
Read
November 11, 2023A somewhat dated book, about Iran after the revolution, and how the West has them all wrong, and they're really very rational, kind and gentle.
I didn't believe it for a second.
I didn't believe it for a second.
October 3, 2014
First thing to note is that this book is ~5 years old and during that time there have been substantial shifts in both the Middle East and domestic US politics. Unfortunately, many of these shifts counter Baer's assertions and thereby undercut a substantial amount of the faith that you can put into the predictive capability of the rest of the text.
The first 90% of this book was an interesting, albeit somewhat formulaic counter-intuitive 'smart take' on US policy towards Iran. While there were portions to agree with in this section, there was also huge tracts where I was mentally saying, "Well, I guess that's one way to look at it, but...." Unfortunately, I never felt like Baer gave equal time to the other (often larger and more compelling) conventional-wisdom side of the equation. While not entirely wrong, through this portion, the whole thing read like it was written as a comically simplistic rebuttal to history; a way to look at all the things that have gone wrong throughout the Middle East and 'tsssk, tsssk' the silly policy decisions of the US (with a lion's share of the blame going to Bush's invasion of Iraq). While this isn't a hard exercise, its also not particularly productive when it comes to putting together policy recommendations for the future. The whole book also suffers from an overuse of the 'Man on the Street' narrative and seemingly infinite variations of the phrase, "My time with the CIA..."
Unfortunately, when it comes to the policy recommendations section (i.e., the last 10% of the book), Baer goes full Chomsky (FTR, you never go full-Chomsky). Establish an international consortium to set the price of oil, redraw the borders from Sykes-Picot, pull American forces out of the ME entirely, Allow Iran to develop their nuclear weapon program (but immediately place all M.E. nukes under the control of a regional authority???), Allow Tehran to govern Mecca and Medina, and lastly, everybody gets a pony.
In general, I would imagine there are better ways to spend your time. 2 stars feels pretty generous.
The first 90% of this book was an interesting, albeit somewhat formulaic counter-intuitive 'smart take' on US policy towards Iran. While there were portions to agree with in this section, there was also huge tracts where I was mentally saying, "Well, I guess that's one way to look at it, but...." Unfortunately, I never felt like Baer gave equal time to the other (often larger and more compelling) conventional-wisdom side of the equation. While not entirely wrong, through this portion, the whole thing read like it was written as a comically simplistic rebuttal to history; a way to look at all the things that have gone wrong throughout the Middle East and 'tsssk, tsssk' the silly policy decisions of the US (with a lion's share of the blame going to Bush's invasion of Iraq). While this isn't a hard exercise, its also not particularly productive when it comes to putting together policy recommendations for the future. The whole book also suffers from an overuse of the 'Man on the Street' narrative and seemingly infinite variations of the phrase, "My time with the CIA..."
Unfortunately, when it comes to the policy recommendations section (i.e., the last 10% of the book), Baer goes full Chomsky (FTR, you never go full-Chomsky). Establish an international consortium to set the price of oil, redraw the borders from Sykes-Picot, pull American forces out of the ME entirely, Allow Iran to develop their nuclear weapon program (but immediately place all M.E. nukes under the control of a regional authority???), Allow Tehran to govern Mecca and Medina, and lastly, everybody gets a pony.
In general, I would imagine there are better ways to spend your time. 2 stars feels pretty generous.
August 9, 2013
Baer argues for recognizing Hezbollah and a reapprochement with Iran, inevitably including a downgrading of relations with Israel. I'm not sure how realistic this is; a country's foreign relations are not a Risk-game of picking and choosing partners, they reflect economic and social relationships. To the degree that the "Israel lobby" exerts influence over Congress, any Congressperson suggesting the US switch its Middle-East alliance to Iran over Saudi Arabia and Israel is probably going to commit political suicide--at least until 2030.
now in the year 2030, when--according to Baer--the Saudi Arabian oil fields are exhausted and by which time the entire Persian Gulf will be ringed with Iranian antiship missiles, there is some very slight possibility a sort of complicated detente will arise, but I'm sort of the apocalypse school of futurology-- we're probably heading for an apocalypse, and there's at least even odds the 21st century will include at least two nuclear strikes.
the book is very readable. you may or may not agree with all of Baer's politics, but he clearly truly believes what he is saying, and if I had more time and the inclination, I'd actually be curious to see what arguments have already erupted on this thesis
now in the year 2030, when--according to Baer--the Saudi Arabian oil fields are exhausted and by which time the entire Persian Gulf will be ringed with Iranian antiship missiles, there is some very slight possibility a sort of complicated detente will arise, but I'm sort of the apocalypse school of futurology-- we're probably heading for an apocalypse, and there's at least even odds the 21st century will include at least two nuclear strikes.
the book is very readable. you may or may not agree with all of Baer's politics, but he clearly truly believes what he is saying, and if I had more time and the inclination, I'd actually be curious to see what arguments have already erupted on this thesis
November 8, 2015
The Devil We Know reads mostly like an opinion piece from top to bottom; the book’s complete lack of any footnotes or references underscores this point. I suppose that the author, Robert Baer, holding significant credibility, having spent two dozen years with the CIA, might be an acceptable basis to skimp on citations. Still, the author’s ulterior motive of painting Iran as a new, and potentially dangerous, world power is clear. The “history” within (remember, facts are not cited here) is always delivered with subjective takes and retorts. The first quarter of the book, in fact, is downright alarmist in its portrayal of the rise in Iranian political stature. Without a basic working knowledge of the subject, a reader might even consider a few early sections to be borderline revisionist in its presentation.
Early chapters aside, the book eventually mellows out and culminates in a very respectable Epilogue that outlines several relevant points the West should consider in its future dealings with Iran, not least of which includes reassessing our relationship, tenuous at best, with the Saudis and their Jihadi cohort. Baer very correctly points out that negotiating with Iran (and its militant Shia networks throughout the region) is at least a tenable alternative, whereas even communicating with the conservative Sunni sect seems impossible, at best. Keep in mind, too, that Baer’s strategic points were written long before the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq or the advancing developments in the Iran Nuclear Deal, which lends credibility to his outline.
I’d be hard pressed to recommend The Devil We Know as any sort of objective history of Iran or a study of its people, but I do think the book does a good job of modeling what the future of Iran may look like and, especially considering Baer’s strategy as outlined in the Epilogue, how the US and its allies might shift their strategy in the Middle East over the next several decades.
Early chapters aside, the book eventually mellows out and culminates in a very respectable Epilogue that outlines several relevant points the West should consider in its future dealings with Iran, not least of which includes reassessing our relationship, tenuous at best, with the Saudis and their Jihadi cohort. Baer very correctly points out that negotiating with Iran (and its militant Shia networks throughout the region) is at least a tenable alternative, whereas even communicating with the conservative Sunni sect seems impossible, at best. Keep in mind, too, that Baer’s strategic points were written long before the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq or the advancing developments in the Iran Nuclear Deal, which lends credibility to his outline.
I’d be hard pressed to recommend The Devil We Know as any sort of objective history of Iran or a study of its people, but I do think the book does a good job of modeling what the future of Iran may look like and, especially considering Baer’s strategy as outlined in the Epilogue, how the US and its allies might shift their strategy in the Middle East over the next several decades.
February 1, 2009
Robert Baer has an answer for you in his latest book, the Devil We Know. The good news is that he has a good, if difficult to achieve, answer. The bad news is that he often buries it with digressions and some sweeping assertions. Still, he has proposed something I doubt the Obama administration will do, but I greatly hope they consider, which is to ally with Iran.
Sounds crazy, yes? Baer spends a good number of pages arguing that Iran is not some addled theocracy run by maniacs, but is in fact a forward looking, modern society that is ruled by pragamitists and not the delusional madmen we are led to believe. He also argues that it is the dominant power in the region, thanks to our activities in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf, and that it will only get stronger. Confronting them will be costly and will likely fail.
So the realpolitik answer is simple, alleviate their security concerns with the United States and become a partner, or even an ally. This will ensure that the oil supply remains protected, which is the principal interest of the United States in the region. To do so comes with costs, such as letting Iran run, behind the scenes at least, Iraq and most of the Gulf States. He also argues that they should be allowed to become the stewards of Mecca and Medina, which sounds fine except that it means the abandonment of the House of Saud.
The tricky thing with all of this is that it will make all but our closest allies believe that we are unreliable. As Baer notes, this happened before, when the US dumped Taiwan to start a new relationship with Mainland China, and it was a challenge, but it was done. Baer lays out a rather grand plan to ally with Iran that comes with quite a few costs. The US should mend relations with Iran, as it gains little from opposing it, but should try to do it for less than Baer asks.
Sounds crazy, yes? Baer spends a good number of pages arguing that Iran is not some addled theocracy run by maniacs, but is in fact a forward looking, modern society that is ruled by pragamitists and not the delusional madmen we are led to believe. He also argues that it is the dominant power in the region, thanks to our activities in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf, and that it will only get stronger. Confronting them will be costly and will likely fail.
So the realpolitik answer is simple, alleviate their security concerns with the United States and become a partner, or even an ally. This will ensure that the oil supply remains protected, which is the principal interest of the United States in the region. To do so comes with costs, such as letting Iran run, behind the scenes at least, Iraq and most of the Gulf States. He also argues that they should be allowed to become the stewards of Mecca and Medina, which sounds fine except that it means the abandonment of the House of Saud.
The tricky thing with all of this is that it will make all but our closest allies believe that we are unreliable. As Baer notes, this happened before, when the US dumped Taiwan to start a new relationship with Mainland China, and it was a challenge, but it was done. Baer lays out a rather grand plan to ally with Iran that comes with quite a few costs. The US should mend relations with Iran, as it gains little from opposing it, but should try to do it for less than Baer asks.
March 25, 2011
This book surprised me. Given the title, I expected Baer to delve into the true evil lurking behind the mysterious nation of Iran. Instead, he exposed the true rationality in much of their foreign policy. That being said, this book was written before much of the upheaval caused by the democracy movement in Iran. I would be very interested in Baer's take on Iran given those events.
That being said, the book gives a very different picture of Iran than I epxected, certainly based on my own memories of the 1979 hostage crisis. Baer is a breezy at times, but that makes the book more readable. He mixes his foreign policy views with anecdotes about the Middle East that are usually fascinating. He takes the reader on a tour of the Middle East, showing how Iran is affecting each region.
Whether or not you agree with his specific conclusions, in the end he makes some very salient points: 1. We don't really understand Iran; 2. Iran has changed and is acting (somewhat) rationally; 3. Iraq and Afghanistan are untenable areas for the U.S. to hold in the long run and therefore, 4. We ought to explore adding Iran as a partner rather than maintaining it as an enemy. We did that with Russia and China and it is worth exploring with Iran, although, again, the brutal response to the Iranian elections sets Baer's argument back a bit. Still, a very interesting read.
That being said, the book gives a very different picture of Iran than I epxected, certainly based on my own memories of the 1979 hostage crisis. Baer is a breezy at times, but that makes the book more readable. He mixes his foreign policy views with anecdotes about the Middle East that are usually fascinating. He takes the reader on a tour of the Middle East, showing how Iran is affecting each region.
Whether or not you agree with his specific conclusions, in the end he makes some very salient points: 1. We don't really understand Iran; 2. Iran has changed and is acting (somewhat) rationally; 3. Iraq and Afghanistan are untenable areas for the U.S. to hold in the long run and therefore, 4. We ought to explore adding Iran as a partner rather than maintaining it as an enemy. We did that with Russia and China and it is worth exploring with Iran, although, again, the brutal response to the Iranian elections sets Baer's argument back a bit. Still, a very interesting read.
March 28, 2012
Bob Baer is to geopolitics what Stephen J. Gould was to evolutionary biology: easily accessible with only an introduction to the relations at hand, while giving the reader a thorough dousing of the complexities hidden behind the headlines. Baer was a CIA operative for a classified number of years, gathering information in some of the most remote and inhospitable places on the planet who now consults for movies, books, business ventures and probably the CIA and other intelligence services as well.
For anyone concerned about US sabre rattling in the ME, and especially for those not concerned, Baer distills some of the inner workings of the Persian hierarchy and lays bare the fact that Iran is playing a different game than our policy makers would have us believe. Although Baer is still an outsider, a westerner to the Persians, his fluency in Farsi and Arabic allows him an anthropologist's insight into the psychologies of people we normally paint with our own motivations. If you want to understand what the future of US relations entails in the ME, this is an indispensable piece of writing.
For anyone concerned about US sabre rattling in the ME, and especially for those not concerned, Baer distills some of the inner workings of the Persian hierarchy and lays bare the fact that Iran is playing a different game than our policy makers would have us believe. Although Baer is still an outsider, a westerner to the Persians, his fluency in Farsi and Arabic allows him an anthropologist's insight into the psychologies of people we normally paint with our own motivations. If you want to understand what the future of US relations entails in the ME, this is an indispensable piece of writing.
April 23, 2009
While I found his examination and commentary enlightening, I found myself skeptical of a lot of his assumptions. I base this on the fact that, while he has a great deal of first-hand experience in the Middle East and Iran, he is not an accomplished or recognized scholar on the subject. Baer does paint a pretty complicated picture of Iranian foreign policy and modus operandi. Something tells me that it's even _MORE_ complicated than he has boiled it down in 260 pgs.
In short, his recommendation is that the US make some sort of peace with Iran. Given the alternatives, this seems like the best solution. However, until we change the way we treat Israel (like they can do no wrong), Iran is going to be difficult to work with.
Hillary's got her work cut out for her.
I gave it 3 stars b/c it was educational for me; sort-of an Intro to Iranian Political and Foreign Affairs and Western Responses. But, it's editorialized, as you would expect. I really liked his CIA book which had more of a narrative to it. He should really stick with memoirs.
In short, his recommendation is that the US make some sort of peace with Iran. Given the alternatives, this seems like the best solution. However, until we change the way we treat Israel (like they can do no wrong), Iran is going to be difficult to work with.
Hillary's got her work cut out for her.
I gave it 3 stars b/c it was educational for me; sort-of an Intro to Iranian Political and Foreign Affairs and Western Responses. But, it's editorialized, as you would expect. I really liked his CIA book which had more of a narrative to it. He should really stick with memoirs.
January 6, 2013
Excellent book about the middle east, and in particular, Iran. Talks about the growth of Iran's power, and how our failures in Iraq have strengthened Iran into the new super power of the east. However, despite the media's portrayal of Iran as a bunch of crazy terrorists, the truth is that Iran is one of the more moderate countries in the middle east (especially when compared to the dictatorial regimes that are our official allies, like Saudi Arabia). Iran is not like the rest of the middle east, for two main reasons. One is that it is not Arab, and does not have the same historical hate of Europeans. Two is that Iran is Shia, and Shia are not terrorists (they're pretty much all Sunni). Overall conclusion is that we would be better off trying to get along with Iran than fighting it. The conflict seems to be though, that Iran wants to assert itself as a superpower; we want their respect. Therefore, neither party wants to be seen as subordinate.
Note: I might be confusing some of the conclusions about Iran with The Ayatollah Begs to Differ, since I read both books a while ago.
Note: I might be confusing some of the conclusions about Iran with The Ayatollah Begs to Differ, since I read both books a while ago.
October 29, 2017
One of the better books I've read about the interplay between Middle Eastern and United States politics and aggression. This was written while the Iraq War was still in full swing, Bush II was on his way out of the picture, and neocons were setting policy. So I'd love to get his take on where the Obama Administration took things because most of his prescriptions for better relations with Iran line up with where things wound up (only to now be under threat of disavowal). There's a perfect smattering of personal anecdotes, long-view history, political / economic analysis, and even a few moments of levity to make this a continually engaging and informative read about Iran. He's realistic and nuanced about the good and evil all parties have engaged in; one of the best quotes in here is that there are no moral absolutes in the Middle East, just lesser evils. Definitely read this if you want to get up to speed on tensions between Iran, its neighbors, and the US and how we could best alleviate them.
April 16, 2020
Where do I start. While I acknowledge the book is dated, even that doesn't provide an excuse for how egregious and erroneous this book is. First off, it is abundantly clear the author has no clue what the definition of "superpower" is when analyzing a nation, and it definitely shows throughout this tilted piece of propaganda. It reads like a poor bachelor's degree international relations paper and is so blatantly pro-Iran that I can count on one hand how many words are dedicated to the vulnerabilities and cons of dealing with Iran.
The author tries to make the Iranian regime out to be more glorious and powerful than the mightiest empires of history. He might as well wrote lines like this: "Alexander the Great - pssh have you ever heard of Hassan Nasrallah?" or "Cyrus the Great - nah let me tell you about Ayatollah Khomeini." And so on.
You will be hard pressed to find a more one-sided book in the international affairs realm, and that isn't a good thing. Strongly recommend AGAINST reading this.
The author tries to make the Iranian regime out to be more glorious and powerful than the mightiest empires of history. He might as well wrote lines like this: "Alexander the Great - pssh have you ever heard of Hassan Nasrallah?" or "Cyrus the Great - nah let me tell you about Ayatollah Khomeini." And so on.
You will be hard pressed to find a more one-sided book in the international affairs realm, and that isn't a good thing. Strongly recommend AGAINST reading this.
November 28, 2008
This book is quite interesting and its central thesis--that we can and should do business with Iran as a regional power in the Middle East--is worth exploring. In particular, he says, the Shia are disciplined because they have a clerical hierarchy, and the Iranians have an imperial tradition. The Sunni, on the other hand, are undisciplined and unreliable.
Baer, and ex-CIA agent, has some interesting stories to tell, but the analysis is infuriatingly inconsistent and often superficial.
In short, he may be right, but the way he gets there is unsatisfying.
Baer, and ex-CIA agent, has some interesting stories to tell, but the analysis is infuriatingly inconsistent and often superficial.
In short, he may be right, but the way he gets there is unsatisfying.
February 11, 2009
it lacks a strong thesis and is forced to rely on digressing anecdotes that aren't really compelling enough to save it. and the prose is generally pretty obnoxious.
also, with no central character or narrative to follow its really hard to keep reading.
also, with no central character or narrative to follow its really hard to keep reading.
April 23, 2011
Baer doesn't know much about Iran
The New York Times
The Devil We Know Dealing With the New Iranian Superpower By Robert Baer 279 pages. Crown Publishers. $25.95.
As the end of the Bush era draws near, it is clear that its policy of treating Iran as a country that must be weakened, punished and perhaps even overthrown has failed. Suddenly it has become fashionable to say that Iran must be recognized, respected and dealt with as the increasingly powerful nation that it is.
Earlier this month Henry Kissinger, who as secretary of state helped arm and prop up Iran's monarchy in the 1970s, said there was "no reason for the United States to resist a strong Iran" today. The goal should be to restore the old regional balance of power based on the pillars of two countries friendly to the United States, Israel and Iran, he added.
In his new book, "The Devil We Know," Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer turned author, goes further. He paints a picture of Iran as a disciplined, strategic, monolithic "police state" and military power driven by imperial ambitions. "At the bottom of Iran's soul is a newfound taste for empire," he states.
Baer, who is fluent in Arabic and says he has rusty Persian, spent years in the Middle East. He certainly knows places like Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia well. But Arabia is not Persia, and the lens of the Arab world can distort Iran rather than bring it into sharp focus.
Baer's Iran doesn't care about international boundaries or accept Western definitions of how the world should be organized. His Iran has "effectively annexed" the entire south of Iraq and could gain control of Iraqi oil. His Iran wants control of Islam's holiest sites, Mecca and Medina.
"I witnessed firsthand Iran's seismic shift, its rise from anarchy to statist power," Baer writes. But most of his eye-witnessing was done from afar. Baer says he was in Iran for a week in late 1978, just before the victory of the revolution. He visited again in 2005 - he doesn't say for how long - as part of a British television documentary team.
On that visit, he laments, he "couldn't find a single good restaurant in Tehran." He was invited to parties, which he heard were as "wild and hip" as anything in the West, but worried that he had "pressed his luck" and stayed away. Anyway, he adds, "I couldn't stay up that late."
Readers who enjoyed George Clooney's performance in "Syriana" (the character was modeled on Baer) might be disappointed that in real life Baer was too timid and tired to go to a party in a private Iranian home. He might have met some real Iranians there. And did he really have so few sources on the ground in Tehran that he could not find a good restaurant? (There are many.)
Perhaps Baer is unaware that Iranians operate in two worlds, the public and the private, and that just about everything meaningful in social and political life happens behind closed doors. Some of the best conversations - and the best meals - are in private homes.
"Iran is a culture completely alien to ours," he writes. But behind those walls are a lot of regular people from different backgrounds who want much the same things Americans do: a decent standard of living and secure futures for their children.
At times Baer describes Iran in sweeping absolutes. "For the last 15 years, Iran has demonstrated a consistent, coherent strategy: It tests its strategy, vets it proxies, judges who is serious and who isn't, and makes plans accordingly," he writes.
The statement ignores the fact that Iran's leadership sometimes behaves in unpredictable ways. Iran is a country of raw, often raucous politics where different points of view - within the ruling elite - are expressed, debated and accepted or rejected.
Then he shifts course, saying that Iran's lines of power and authority are "almost impossible to follow."
"They seem to change between morning and night," he continues.
Baer correctly points out that Iran is a place of checks and balances, where the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, "rules by a consensus obscure even to outsiders." But then he says with authority that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is merely a "figurehead," ignoring that he is an important player whose public declarations that Iran will never bow to the will of others in its nuclear program have been accepted as policy.
One of Baer's most honest assertions in "The Devil We Know" is toward the end, when he finally admits, "At all levels Iran is never what it seems."
Throughout the book readers may find themselves asking, "How does he know?" How does he know that in a secret address to Iran's National Security Council in October 2000, Ayatollah Khamenei put both hands on the conference table, looked around the room and announced, "Lebanon is Iran's greatest foreign policy success" and said that success would be repeated "until all of Islam was liberated."
Did the CIA have a secret video camera in the room? A spy?
How does he know that Iran's military is still a formidable, combat-hardened fighting force because of its experience on the battlefield in the Iran-Iraq war? That conflict ended 20 years ago.
Just because Iran thinks of itself as the pre-eminent power of the Gulf (look at its size, population and location) doesn't mean that it is bent on establishing an empire from the Middle East to South Asia. Just because Iran has based its military doctrine on a defensive strategy of asymmetrical warfare doesn't mean that it has expansionist designs.
Baer calls Iran "the only stable, enduring state in the gulf" and "a rational actor with fixed reasonable demands." The only real option, he adds, is to sit down together at the negotiating table, treat Iran as the power it has become and see what it has to offer.
The United States should also guarantee Iranian international security, conduct joint patrols in the Gulf, establish direct military-to-military communications there, ease sanctions so that Iran will not lust after Saudi oil and give Iran a defined security role in Iraq and Afghanistan, he writes.
Many of these ideas sound reasonable. Indeed, Iran is the most powerful and stable country in the Gulf, and the United States has for too long often treated it as an unruly child to be ignored or a criminal to be punished. But Baer undercuts the force of his argument when he throws out a list of more ambitious recommendations that would require the reshaping of the Middle East.
The United States should leave Iraq and "drop the mess" into Iran's lap. The partition of Iraq should happen as quickly as possible. Iran should not be prevented from being allowed to administer the holiest sites of Islam with Saudi Arabia. Jordan should be turned into a Palestinian state. Why not hold a referendum in Bahrain to determine whether it wants to return to its status as an Iranian island? Why not redraw the borders of the Middle East in both Israel's and Iran's favor?
These proposals could be the subject of Baer's next book. Perhaps he could begin it by explaining why he seems to hold the Iranians in such awe and the Arabs in such contempt. As he writes at one point, the Arabs "lack the spiritual and intellectual depth of Iranians." How does he know?
The New York Times
The Devil We Know Dealing With the New Iranian Superpower By Robert Baer 279 pages. Crown Publishers. $25.95.
As the end of the Bush era draws near, it is clear that its policy of treating Iran as a country that must be weakened, punished and perhaps even overthrown has failed. Suddenly it has become fashionable to say that Iran must be recognized, respected and dealt with as the increasingly powerful nation that it is.
Earlier this month Henry Kissinger, who as secretary of state helped arm and prop up Iran's monarchy in the 1970s, said there was "no reason for the United States to resist a strong Iran" today. The goal should be to restore the old regional balance of power based on the pillars of two countries friendly to the United States, Israel and Iran, he added.
In his new book, "The Devil We Know," Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer turned author, goes further. He paints a picture of Iran as a disciplined, strategic, monolithic "police state" and military power driven by imperial ambitions. "At the bottom of Iran's soul is a newfound taste for empire," he states.
Baer, who is fluent in Arabic and says he has rusty Persian, spent years in the Middle East. He certainly knows places like Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia well. But Arabia is not Persia, and the lens of the Arab world can distort Iran rather than bring it into sharp focus.
Baer's Iran doesn't care about international boundaries or accept Western definitions of how the world should be organized. His Iran has "effectively annexed" the entire south of Iraq and could gain control of Iraqi oil. His Iran wants control of Islam's holiest sites, Mecca and Medina.
"I witnessed firsthand Iran's seismic shift, its rise from anarchy to statist power," Baer writes. But most of his eye-witnessing was done from afar. Baer says he was in Iran for a week in late 1978, just before the victory of the revolution. He visited again in 2005 - he doesn't say for how long - as part of a British television documentary team.
On that visit, he laments, he "couldn't find a single good restaurant in Tehran." He was invited to parties, which he heard were as "wild and hip" as anything in the West, but worried that he had "pressed his luck" and stayed away. Anyway, he adds, "I couldn't stay up that late."
Readers who enjoyed George Clooney's performance in "Syriana" (the character was modeled on Baer) might be disappointed that in real life Baer was too timid and tired to go to a party in a private Iranian home. He might have met some real Iranians there. And did he really have so few sources on the ground in Tehran that he could not find a good restaurant? (There are many.)
Perhaps Baer is unaware that Iranians operate in two worlds, the public and the private, and that just about everything meaningful in social and political life happens behind closed doors. Some of the best conversations - and the best meals - are in private homes.
"Iran is a culture completely alien to ours," he writes. But behind those walls are a lot of regular people from different backgrounds who want much the same things Americans do: a decent standard of living and secure futures for their children.
At times Baer describes Iran in sweeping absolutes. "For the last 15 years, Iran has demonstrated a consistent, coherent strategy: It tests its strategy, vets it proxies, judges who is serious and who isn't, and makes plans accordingly," he writes.
The statement ignores the fact that Iran's leadership sometimes behaves in unpredictable ways. Iran is a country of raw, often raucous politics where different points of view - within the ruling elite - are expressed, debated and accepted or rejected.
Then he shifts course, saying that Iran's lines of power and authority are "almost impossible to follow."
"They seem to change between morning and night," he continues.
Baer correctly points out that Iran is a place of checks and balances, where the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, "rules by a consensus obscure even to outsiders." But then he says with authority that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is merely a "figurehead," ignoring that he is an important player whose public declarations that Iran will never bow to the will of others in its nuclear program have been accepted as policy.
One of Baer's most honest assertions in "The Devil We Know" is toward the end, when he finally admits, "At all levels Iran is never what it seems."
Throughout the book readers may find themselves asking, "How does he know?" How does he know that in a secret address to Iran's National Security Council in October 2000, Ayatollah Khamenei put both hands on the conference table, looked around the room and announced, "Lebanon is Iran's greatest foreign policy success" and said that success would be repeated "until all of Islam was liberated."
Did the CIA have a secret video camera in the room? A spy?
How does he know that Iran's military is still a formidable, combat-hardened fighting force because of its experience on the battlefield in the Iran-Iraq war? That conflict ended 20 years ago.
Just because Iran thinks of itself as the pre-eminent power of the Gulf (look at its size, population and location) doesn't mean that it is bent on establishing an empire from the Middle East to South Asia. Just because Iran has based its military doctrine on a defensive strategy of asymmetrical warfare doesn't mean that it has expansionist designs.
Baer calls Iran "the only stable, enduring state in the gulf" and "a rational actor with fixed reasonable demands." The only real option, he adds, is to sit down together at the negotiating table, treat Iran as the power it has become and see what it has to offer.
The United States should also guarantee Iranian international security, conduct joint patrols in the Gulf, establish direct military-to-military communications there, ease sanctions so that Iran will not lust after Saudi oil and give Iran a defined security role in Iraq and Afghanistan, he writes.
Many of these ideas sound reasonable. Indeed, Iran is the most powerful and stable country in the Gulf, and the United States has for too long often treated it as an unruly child to be ignored or a criminal to be punished. But Baer undercuts the force of his argument when he throws out a list of more ambitious recommendations that would require the reshaping of the Middle East.
The United States should leave Iraq and "drop the mess" into Iran's lap. The partition of Iraq should happen as quickly as possible. Iran should not be prevented from being allowed to administer the holiest sites of Islam with Saudi Arabia. Jordan should be turned into a Palestinian state. Why not hold a referendum in Bahrain to determine whether it wants to return to its status as an Iranian island? Why not redraw the borders of the Middle East in both Israel's and Iran's favor?
These proposals could be the subject of Baer's next book. Perhaps he could begin it by explaining why he seems to hold the Iranians in such awe and the Arabs in such contempt. As he writes at one point, the Arabs "lack the spiritual and intellectual depth of Iranians." How does he know?
August 22, 2024
Dur de comprendre comment fonctionne l’Iran d’un point de vue occidental. C’est pourtant ce qu’apporte ce livre et il permet de mieux comprendre les différents enjeux dans la région. La complexité des rapports de force et la diversité des acteurs rendent cependant complexe la totale compréhension pour des novices dans la découverte du pays.
January 2, 2023
An exceptional piece of work
April 15, 2009
The premise of this book is that Iran has come out of their 1979 revolution as a regional power, and the US is in a position in which it must deal with this in one way or another. I was temped to give the book two stars for making this point. However a good portion of the book is dominated by meaningless similes, vague notions, over simplifications, contradictions, and anecdotes. And the remaining pages are a love letter to Shiism.
Some examples:
Page 156- "The Palestinians' embrace of Shia Iran was as if Ireland woke up one morning and abandoned the pope for the Anglican Church."
Page 196- "Making the Koran the sole constitution for Muslims is like Christians taking the Old Testament as their sole source of law."
The state of relations between the US and Middle Eastern states is presented in this false dichotomy: "Who would America rather negotiate with as the Middle East spirals deeper into violence- a Shia mujtahid? Or a Sunni takfiri who would as soon cut your head off?"
Page 234:
As if bringing enough weapons into Lebanon to start 'WWIII' weren't enough of an action for the author to consider it something Iranians do.
The author also makes the claim that Ahmadinejad's call for Israel's destruction is just a veiled reference to the dualism of Zoroastrianism.
My favorite though was when Mr. Baer referred twice to America's 'addiction to oil.' To be fair, the second time it was mentioned it was "the West's hydrocarbon addiction."
So, yeah, our 'addiction' to oil causes America to deal with countries that it might prefer not to deal with.
Solution: lessen American's dependence on petroleum- because Iran will have a harder time building an empire on the profits of pistachio exports.
Some examples:
Page 156- "The Palestinians' embrace of Shia Iran was as if Ireland woke up one morning and abandoned the pope for the Anglican Church."
Page 196- "Making the Koran the sole constitution for Muslims is like Christians taking the Old Testament as their sole source of law."
The state of relations between the US and Middle Eastern states is presented in this false dichotomy: "Who would America rather negotiate with as the Middle East spirals deeper into violence- a Shia mujtahid? Or a Sunni takfiri who would as soon cut your head off?"
Page 234:
It's impossible to know exactly what the Iranians have in mind. But if the United States were to go by the standard of what the Iranians do rather than say there's no evidence they'll start World War III. With all the weapons Iran has brought into Lebanon, it could have done that a long time ago.(emphasis in the original)
As if bringing enough weapons into Lebanon to start 'WWIII' weren't enough of an action for the author to consider it something Iranians do.
The author also makes the claim that Ahmadinejad's call for Israel's destruction is just a veiled reference to the dualism of Zoroastrianism.
My favorite though was when Mr. Baer referred twice to America's 'addiction to oil.' To be fair, the second time it was mentioned it was "the West's hydrocarbon addiction."
So, yeah, our 'addiction' to oil causes America to deal with countries that it might prefer not to deal with.
Solution: lessen American's dependence on petroleum- because Iran will have a harder time building an empire on the profits of pistachio exports.
June 11, 2010
Robert Baer’s The Devil We Know is the most original and riveting documentary on the Middle East this decade has seen. As a former CIA agent operating deep within the bowels of the Persian Gulf, perhaps none will be as qualified to make the commentary and observations that he espouses in this timely classic-in-the-making.
Baer comes with a dire message in this book: Iran is growing to be a world superpower and America is too helpless to do anything about it.
According to the author, the invasion of Iraq by American forces in 2003 is exactly what Iran has been hoping for. With the Sunni regime in tatters and the Americans too weary of war to do anything more in the Middle East, the Shiites are poised to fill in the power vacuum in the Persian Gulf.
While Iran’s current President has been portrayed as an anti-Semitic loon by the Western media, the author argues that his erratic behaviour is a deliberate façade by the real rulers of the country- the Ayatollahs. The concept of making facades and throwing the enemy of-guard is very much a mainstay of the Shiite culture, says the author. Indeed, the West has been very much kept in the dark with regards to what is happening in Iran and how it has progressed as a military power in the Middle East thus far.
The book also comes with detailed analysis on the wealth and reach of this elusive Persian nation and how it has secured billions of dollars in arms deals with China and Russia in return for its vast arsenal of oil. History buffs will also be please with the complete chronicle of the nation from the point it emerged as a hard liner in the Islamic revolution of 1979. Iran will never be as you have seen it from Western eyes.
Baer comes with a dire message in this book: Iran is growing to be a world superpower and America is too helpless to do anything about it.
According to the author, the invasion of Iraq by American forces in 2003 is exactly what Iran has been hoping for. With the Sunni regime in tatters and the Americans too weary of war to do anything more in the Middle East, the Shiites are poised to fill in the power vacuum in the Persian Gulf.
While Iran’s current President has been portrayed as an anti-Semitic loon by the Western media, the author argues that his erratic behaviour is a deliberate façade by the real rulers of the country- the Ayatollahs. The concept of making facades and throwing the enemy of-guard is very much a mainstay of the Shiite culture, says the author. Indeed, the West has been very much kept in the dark with regards to what is happening in Iran and how it has progressed as a military power in the Middle East thus far.
The book also comes with detailed analysis on the wealth and reach of this elusive Persian nation and how it has secured billions of dollars in arms deals with China and Russia in return for its vast arsenal of oil. History buffs will also be please with the complete chronicle of the nation from the point it emerged as a hard liner in the Islamic revolution of 1979. Iran will never be as you have seen it from Western eyes.
July 21, 2011
I had my doubts in the beginning of the book. It seemed to me that the author was making sweeping generalizations without statistical data or even flimsy facts to back it up. And while his inferences continued throughout the book, his experiences in the Middle East allow him to interpret actions and words of other players in the Middle East.
His view of Iran and how the US should deal with it is alarming, then insightful, then so obvious I wanted to write my congressman AND senator to share my 'new' opinion on Iran. I'm looking forward to more books on Iran and Shia Islam to help me formulate my own opinion and better understand the region.
My understanding of the difference e between Shia and Sunni Islam was the vague notion that they disagree on who the true chosen heir of the prophet Muhammad. Baer touched on much more important distinctions that have vast implications on how different countries are organized and those countries relationships with Western and Eastern countries.
This is an excellent ‘primer’ book. This book has drawn me into the desire to understand the differences between the residents of the Middle East (Persian vs. Arab, Shia vs. Sunni) and the effectiveness of our allies (Baer explains that we are aligning ourselves with the weakest countries in the region). It was useful to read near a computer so that I could jump on-line to get better understanding of events (Israel / Lebanon war).
All in all, I highly recommend it.
His view of Iran and how the US should deal with it is alarming, then insightful, then so obvious I wanted to write my congressman AND senator to share my 'new' opinion on Iran. I'm looking forward to more books on Iran and Shia Islam to help me formulate my own opinion and better understand the region.
My understanding of the difference e between Shia and Sunni Islam was the vague notion that they disagree on who the true chosen heir of the prophet Muhammad. Baer touched on much more important distinctions that have vast implications on how different countries are organized and those countries relationships with Western and Eastern countries.
This is an excellent ‘primer’ book. This book has drawn me into the desire to understand the differences between the residents of the Middle East (Persian vs. Arab, Shia vs. Sunni) and the effectiveness of our allies (Baer explains that we are aligning ourselves with the weakest countries in the region). It was useful to read near a computer so that I could jump on-line to get better understanding of events (Israel / Lebanon war).
All in all, I highly recommend it.
September 20, 2017
Very interesting. Detailed history of Iran from the 1980's - 2008.
Argues that in the middle east, the US would be best served geopolitically by exchanging our unreliable Saudi Arabian allies for Iranian allies, similar to when we shifted our relations between Taiwan and Mainland China.
However, the US agreed it would guarantee the survival of the House of Saud, provide military security for the Saudi oil fields, as well as sell arms weapons to the Saudi government.
In return, Saudi Arabia would use its leverage in OPEC to ensure all oil transactions would be in USD, invest its own Dollars generated from oil sales in US investment vehicles, maintain influence over price levels and prevent another oil embargo.
With the complex financial relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US, sounds like alliance with Iran could be difficult. Could we convince Iran to continue on with the Petrodollar system when Iran itself is obviously in need of so much investment?
Argues that in the middle east, the US would be best served geopolitically by exchanging our unreliable Saudi Arabian allies for Iranian allies, similar to when we shifted our relations between Taiwan and Mainland China.
However, the US agreed it would guarantee the survival of the House of Saud, provide military security for the Saudi oil fields, as well as sell arms weapons to the Saudi government.
In return, Saudi Arabia would use its leverage in OPEC to ensure all oil transactions would be in USD, invest its own Dollars generated from oil sales in US investment vehicles, maintain influence over price levels and prevent another oil embargo.
With the complex financial relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US, sounds like alliance with Iran could be difficult. Could we convince Iran to continue on with the Petrodollar system when Iran itself is obviously in need of so much investment?
August 30, 2024
This is an interesting situation where I think the book was written fairly well for its time and takes in to account a lot of things, but given the modern politics and economic situation, especially with the wide movement to renewable energy, the arguments the author made in 2008 really rust in the light of modern politics. In addition to this, I feel as if even though Iran’s political ideology is roughly the same today as it was in 2008 at a glance, even that isn’t similar enough to warrant the exact same reaction, my main dislike of this book was its reliance of using “current” events (events from around when it was written) to guess what will happen in the future which generally is a recipe for inaccuracy in the future as no one can predict what will happen, especially in the Middle East.
Again I thought the book was quite well written for its time, but it was Only well written for It’s time and not any others…
Again I thought the book was quite well written for its time, but it was Only well written for It’s time and not any others…
November 4, 2017
Baer, a retired CIA Middle East operator, explains the secretive motives and actions of Iran. He highlights their regional goals, strategy and standard operating procedures. He also points out that unlike Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Jordan... Iran has been a country for thousands of years and has the history and power to be a stable partner in our Middle East policy.
Why I started this book: It never rains but it pours. I received 4 library holds this week, and I need to work thru them... I don't want to go back on the hold list.
Why I finished it: Compelling read and interesting facts and perspective. I think that Obama's administration tried to test Baer's recommendations and the Congressional Republicans lead by Tom Cotton freaked out.
Why I started this book: It never rains but it pours. I received 4 library holds this week, and I need to work thru them... I don't want to go back on the hold list.
Why I finished it: Compelling read and interesting facts and perspective. I think that Obama's administration tried to test Baer's recommendations and the Congressional Republicans lead by Tom Cotton freaked out.
December 6, 2008
I can't say enough about this book. I would recommend this to anyone who even remotely cares about politics, foreign policy, anthropology, sociology, etc. Baer is a former CIA agent, and one of the foremost authorities on the middle-east. The author does a remarkable job of dispelling a whole slew of misconceptions that most Americans have been led to believe regarding Iran.
November 23, 2019
A foundational book for the understanding of Iran and current geopolitics in the Middle East. I wish I had read this 10 years and 6 deployments ago. I will no doubt reread this book and recommend it to others.
March 31, 2020
I am from that region and I love all Baer's books, I can connect to events and amazed how correct and precise he is to portrait the political and geographical picture of region. I find myself learning more from a CIA agent regarding my homeland than any other history book
April 6, 2021
Insightful analysis of Iran. Granted, it's 9 years old, but it provides some deep background and history of the country from an ex-CIA officer. If you like Baer’s other books, you'll like this one.
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