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War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals
A Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and the author of 17 books, David Halberstam has a gift for bringing current events alive and putting them into historical perspective in an engaging way. In many respects, War in a Time of Peace serves as a sequel to his classic The Best and the Brightest in its examination of how the lessons of Vietnam have influenced American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Beginning with the Persian Gulf War, Halberstam discusses the political shift in emphasis from foreign to domestic issues that ushered in the first Clinton administration. Despite the fact that Clinton, along with much of the country, preferred to focus on the home front, the U.S. nonetheless found itself drawn into conflicts in Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans--events that reflected American discomfort with the use of its military forces abroad while at the same time acknowledging that much of the world is dependent upon the U.S. for both guidance and support. The book also highlights the many nonpolitical factors that have influenced these political changes, including a generational shift in national leadership, the modern media's emphasis on entertainment over foreign news, a leap in military technology, and American economic prosperity that has rendered foreign policy largely irrelevant to many citizens.
Halberstam is a master at presenting well-rounded portraits and telling anecdotes of the personalities that have created U.S. policy, casting new light on well-known figures such as Clinton, Colin Powell, and George H.W. Bush, as well as supporting players such as Anthony Lake, Richard Holbrooke, James Baker, Madeleine Albright, General Wesley Clark, Al Gore, and many other influential American leaders of the past decade. Having covered many aspects of American history and foreign policy since the early 1960s, Halberstam is uniquely qualified to report on an era in which the U.S., and the world, has changed so dramatically. --Shawn Carkonen
557 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 2001
About the author
David Halberstam
107 books912 followersDavid Halberstam was an American journalist and historian, known for his work on the Vietnam War, politics, history, the Civil Rights Movement, business, media, American culture, and later, sports journalism. He was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting in 1964.
Halberstam graduated from Harvard University with a degree in journalism in 1955 and started his career writing for the Daily Times Leader in West Point, Mississippi. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, writing for The Tennessean in Nashville, Tennessee, he covered the beginnings of the American Civil Rights Movement.
In the mid 1960s, Halberstam covered the Vietnam War for The New York Times. While there, he gathered material for his book The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. In 1963, he received a George Polk Award for his reporting at the New York Times. At the age of 30, he won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on the war. He is interviewed in the 1968 documentary film on the Vietnam War entitled In the Year of the Pig.
Halberstam's most well known work is The Best and the Brightest. Halberstam focused on the paradox that those who shaped the U.S. war effort in Vietnam were some of the most intelligent, well-connected and self-confident men in America—"the best and the brightest"—and yet those same individuals were responsible for the failure of the United States Vientnam policy.
After publication of The Best and the Brightest in 1972, Halberstam plunged right into another book and in 1979 published The Powers That Be. The book provided profiles of men like William Paley of CBS, Henry Luce of Time magazine, Phil Graham of The Washington Post—and many others.
Later in his career, Halberstam turned to the subjects of sports, publishing The Breaks of the Game, an inside look at the Bill Walton and the 1978 Portland Trailblazers basketball team; an ambitious book on Michael Jordan in 1999 called Playing for Keeps; and on the pennant race battle between the Yankees and Red Sox called Summer of '49.
Halberstam published two books in the 1960s, three books in the 1970s, four books in the 1980s, and six books in the 1990s. He published four books in the 2000s and was on a pace to publish six or more books in that decade before his death.
David Halberstam was killed in a car crash on April 23, 2007 in Menlo Park, California.
Halberstam graduated from Harvard University with a degree in journalism in 1955 and started his career writing for the Daily Times Leader in West Point, Mississippi. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, writing for The Tennessean in Nashville, Tennessee, he covered the beginnings of the American Civil Rights Movement.
In the mid 1960s, Halberstam covered the Vietnam War for The New York Times. While there, he gathered material for his book The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. In 1963, he received a George Polk Award for his reporting at the New York Times. At the age of 30, he won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on the war. He is interviewed in the 1968 documentary film on the Vietnam War entitled In the Year of the Pig.
Halberstam's most well known work is The Best and the Brightest. Halberstam focused on the paradox that those who shaped the U.S. war effort in Vietnam were some of the most intelligent, well-connected and self-confident men in America—"the best and the brightest"—and yet those same individuals were responsible for the failure of the United States Vientnam policy.
After publication of The Best and the Brightest in 1972, Halberstam plunged right into another book and in 1979 published The Powers That Be. The book provided profiles of men like William Paley of CBS, Henry Luce of Time magazine, Phil Graham of The Washington Post—and many others.
Later in his career, Halberstam turned to the subjects of sports, publishing The Breaks of the Game, an inside look at the Bill Walton and the 1978 Portland Trailblazers basketball team; an ambitious book on Michael Jordan in 1999 called Playing for Keeps; and on the pennant race battle between the Yankees and Red Sox called Summer of '49.
Halberstam published two books in the 1960s, three books in the 1970s, four books in the 1980s, and six books in the 1990s. He published four books in the 2000s and was on a pace to publish six or more books in that decade before his death.
David Halberstam was killed in a car crash on April 23, 2007 in Menlo Park, California.
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March 7, 2021
Simply stated, another great book from the late David Halberstam. "War In A Time Of Peace," deals primarily with the Clinton Administration's response to the wars in the Balkans (the old Yugoslavia) and the genocide committed by the Serb and the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic against the Muslim population in Bosnia and then the Albanian Muslim population in Kosovo.
Candidate Clinton ran his campaign against President Bush in 1992 on the premise that the President was more interested in foreign affairs than domestic, and it worked and he won the election and the phase, "It's the economy, stupid," was made famous.
Once President Clinton took office, he was literally obsessed with domestic policies, and his Intelligence and military advisors were lucky to get in to see him. The polls told him that the American people were interested in domestic affairs, and not fighting foreign wars. But, as many politicians and historians would tell him, eventually foreign affairs will intrude and take up sixty percent of your time.
After nearly three years into his first term, and millions of Muslims killed in Bosnia his disinterest in foreign affairs came back to haunt him, as reporters started telling the stories, with horrifying pictures and videos of the slaughter. With American military power and the advanced technological accuracy of our airforce we brought the Serbs to the bargaining table and the Dayton Accords were signed and to some extent ended the genocide in Bosnia.
But Milosevic was not finished, and after a couple of more years passed, he went after the prize he always wanted and that was Kosova, and just like that nearly a million Albanians were displaced and hundreds of thousands killed. Once again, The Clinton Administration was caught off guard and once again didn't want to get involved in this new blood bath. After much back and forth between NATO and the US, the Americans finally put together a bombing campaign with unbelievable accuracy that brought the Serbs, once again, to their knees.
This book is so much more than just about the Balkans. It shows that nearly thirty years after Vietnam the Joint Chiefs and the president, and much of his staff, feared getting involved in this humanitarian crisis in the heart of Europe because of the fear of another Vietnam. Mr. Halberstam, as brilliant as any historian I have ever read, is able to go back and forth in such situations and analyze both the military and political side of military operations. He is truly a gem. I highly, highly recommend.
Candidate Clinton ran his campaign against President Bush in 1992 on the premise that the President was more interested in foreign affairs than domestic, and it worked and he won the election and the phase, "It's the economy, stupid," was made famous.
Once President Clinton took office, he was literally obsessed with domestic policies, and his Intelligence and military advisors were lucky to get in to see him. The polls told him that the American people were interested in domestic affairs, and not fighting foreign wars. But, as many politicians and historians would tell him, eventually foreign affairs will intrude and take up sixty percent of your time.
After nearly three years into his first term, and millions of Muslims killed in Bosnia his disinterest in foreign affairs came back to haunt him, as reporters started telling the stories, with horrifying pictures and videos of the slaughter. With American military power and the advanced technological accuracy of our airforce we brought the Serbs to the bargaining table and the Dayton Accords were signed and to some extent ended the genocide in Bosnia.
But Milosevic was not finished, and after a couple of more years passed, he went after the prize he always wanted and that was Kosova, and just like that nearly a million Albanians were displaced and hundreds of thousands killed. Once again, The Clinton Administration was caught off guard and once again didn't want to get involved in this new blood bath. After much back and forth between NATO and the US, the Americans finally put together a bombing campaign with unbelievable accuracy that brought the Serbs, once again, to their knees.
This book is so much more than just about the Balkans. It shows that nearly thirty years after Vietnam the Joint Chiefs and the president, and much of his staff, feared getting involved in this humanitarian crisis in the heart of Europe because of the fear of another Vietnam. Mr. Halberstam, as brilliant as any historian I have ever read, is able to go back and forth in such situations and analyze both the military and political side of military operations. He is truly a gem. I highly, highly recommend.
June 28, 2021
War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals by David Halberstam is a successor to his #1 national bestseller "The Best & the Brightest," in which Halberstam describes in fascinating human detail how the shadow of the Cold War still hangs over American foreign policy & how domestic politics have determined our role as a world power. More than 25 years ago he told the story of the men who conceived & executed the Vietnam War. Now the Pulitzer Prize-winning author has written another chronicle of Washington politics, this time exploring the complex dynamics of foreign policy in post-Cold War America. Halberstam evokes the internecine conflicts, the untrammeled egos & the struggles for dominance among the key figures in the White House, the State Department & the military. He shows how the decisions of men who served in the Vietnam War--such as Gen. Colin Powell & presidential advisers Richard Holbrooke & Anthony Lake--& those who didn't have shaped American politics & policy makers (perhaps most notably, President Clinton's placing, for the 1st time in 50 years, domestic issues over foreign policy). With his ability to find the real story behind the headlines, the author shows how current events in the Balkans, Somalia & Haiti reflect American politics & foreign policy. He discusses the repercussions in Washington on policy makers from two different administrations; the wariness of the American military to become caught again in an inconclusive ground war; the frustrations of civilian advisers, most of whom have never served in the military; & the effects these conflicting forces have on the American commander in Kosovo, Gen. Wes Clark. Sweeping & deep, "War in a Time of Peace" provides portraits of Clinton, Bush, Reagan, Kissinger, James Baker, Dick Cheney, Madeleine Albright & others, to reveal modern political America. Another well-researched and thought out book by one of America's premier authors.
August 6, 2016
David Halberstam produces here a useful historical document, as an experienced journalist who undertook many primary source interviews to get some sense of the conflicts between the military and the political leadership over policy and power that took place under Bush I and Clinton (I).
The narrative is dominated by the crisis in Yugoslavia. This helped to define the new liberal internationalism that emerged in subsequent years (although Halberstam was not to know this). The book might be seen an ur-source for evaluating the seeds of the mess we are now in.
Completed just before 9/11, the book is remarkable for not mentioning the Middle East, bar one passing reference to the Peace Process, and relations with Russia are only considered indirectly. Fortunately, the collapse of the Soviet Union was not a matter for the generals as imminent war.
This all gives a slightly skewed picture but only if we do not understand what Halberstam is doing here. He is not writing a history of foreign policy or of national defence but only one about a dialectic - that between military realism and political short-termism and ideology.
Evaluating the lessons of this book might result in a very long and detailed essay so I will only pull out some themes and let the reader explore them himself based on the facts that Halberstam lays out in his book. You can judge whether his (and my) interpretations are correct on those facts.
I rather trust Halberstam within the limited territory he is exploring. He usefully understands the historic pull of past wars on American politics and on military thinking and he is an 'insider' insofar as an intellectual journalist can be one in a relatively free society.
The first theme is the importance of a President who actually understands the world he is dealing with. George H. Bush comes across as sophisticated, surrounded by people of judgement and experience. Clinton horrifies somewhat as clever and shallow, vacillating, almost 'feminine'.
Nor is Clinton's team particularly impressive. I do not think that Halberstam is showing any partisan bias (unusually for American political writing). They really are unable to cohere around clear macro-analyses and decisive effective planning with some notion of consequences.
I refuse to draw easy conclusions about the competence of Hillary Clinton who may soon be leader of the largest military empire the world has ever seen. She now has significant experience and she is not her husband but the historic conduct of Democrat foreign policy might reasonably worry us.
The second theme is the conservatism of the military. One leading figure is quoted as saying that the Democrats want a small military and to use it everywhere and the Republicans a large army and never use it all. This is borne out by the book (though things change with Bush II's neo-cons).
Surprisingly, one comes to the conclusion that, all things being equal, the US military and the Republicans to whom they tend are America's Peace Party and the Democrats, in opposition to traditional European 'Leftism', are the War Party.
Self-evidently, the American military were still in super-war mode, against the threat of a major world war, and adjusted only slowly to the collapse of the Soviet military threat. They also had no illusions about the massive costs of ground war operations (and remain cautious today).
The Gulf War under Bush certainly restored the American military's sense of what was possible against a second rank traditional state power but it told the military nothing about the costs of mountainous guerrilla war or managing failed states
Former Yugoslavia and Somalia taught them what the later Iraq War was to teach them. Destroying a formal state power is one thing and, if you are prepared to accept the body count, possible but reconstruction and policing are another thing. George C. Marshall was very much an army man.
To win is not to hold or settle. Body bags where the public cannot see their essential interest in the game (after all, America needed Pearl Harbour to undertake its mission against the rise of national socialism) implied a repetition of Vietnam's undermining of trust in the system.
Could liberal internationalism have gone ape around the world if 9/11 had not happened? We doubt it. And the strike against Iraq (unconnected to 9/11) mirrors the decision to go for Germany first instead of Japan after 1941 because of decisions already made elsewhere.
What strikes one here is that, until George W. Bush decided to invade a country on spurious grounds, the military and political establishment were both consistently nervous of taking any armed actions but for different reasons. How that changed is the story of the last third of the book.
For the military it was the justifiable fear of the costs of failure and concern at the inability of the civilians to come up with any plan for consequences (which was to prove fatal in Iraq). For civilians it was fear of domestic electoral consequences and simple ignorance of strategy.
What triggered interventionist strategies was ideological sentiment - mostly Democrat excitability about humanitarian issues in countries they scarcely understood. They certainly had no serious plan about what to do if the aggressor was beaten. It was "Something must be done!"
The blundering around in Clinton's first term is embarrassing - whether it be Somalia, Haiti or Bosnia. The sensible Vance-Owen proposals were sidelined by political half wits only to be returned to in essence and in a weaker version after much misery later.
Allies play scarcely any rule in the deliberations except as dead weights on action (early Clinton) or agents provocateurs (later Clinton). Speaking as a Brit, the US has often been manipulable by foreign powers from the British Empire through to Israel. This period was no exception.
By the second term we are moving into legacy time, that point where a narcissistic President starts to think about how he will be seen by history and realises that he is going to be seen as a middle ranker unless he solves some big question.
The Middle East Peace Process was the obvious solution but that all falls apart on the stunning obduracy of Yasser Arafat so the crisis in Yugoslavia emerges as the constant sore that is high risk but also high reward if something can be done - yet it is not the President who really drives this.
Where Halberstam is particularly good is on the personal dynamics that are the essence of the American State at the highest level - who is up, who is down, who is respected and who is not, what personal histories dictated what ideological presupposition.
We see the emergence or rather convergence of activist liberal internationalists genuinely concerned about the condition of the peoples of former Yugoslavia but also activists for the use of US power to order the world (a theme to be taken up by the neo-cons with more aggression later).
There are State Department officials and policy wonks but these are buttressed by two new forces - Wesley Clark as SACEUR and the arrival in London of the 'hawk' Tony Blair who seems to have had a ready-made model of global military intervention to hand.
The story of Wes Clark is most instructive for two reasons. He was clearly hated by the US military establishment but his role as SACEUR allowed him to push the envelope in using military resources to pursue a war that they saw no reason for. The second reason was air power.
The eternal conflict within the US military over the value and role of air power was not quite resolved by the Gulf War but it was arguable now that a state could be brought low simply with aggressive targeting by a new stock of precision-guided weaponry.
The radicals wanted to show that air power alone was sufficient to bring a tyrant to heel. Wes Clark (an army man) drove this tactic as far as he could against Milosevic despite European doubts and divisions in NATO and Pentagon attempts to deny him any ground support resources.
In fact, it worked but not in the simple way that liberal intellectuals have presented to the world since. It worked because the US was actually backing gangsters as bad as Milosevic in the KLA (just as it had earlier backed the quasi-fascists of Tudjman's Croatia) and the Serb people revolted.
As Halberstam points out, the Serb internal revolt was enabled because Yugoslavia precisely was not the total dictatorship of myth - Former Yugoslavia was a hybrid of single party secret police control and relative intellectual and civil society freedom. Milosevic pushed the people too far.
At the same time, Serbia lost its negotiating position because Russia, economically-dependent on the West under the corrupt Yeltsin, simply and overtly withdrew support from its old ally. This was from weakness and another seed of the future - Putin would reverse this within a few years.
Air power 'worked' but it could not be said to have done so without cost. The US was never tested with a ground invasion (the US military clearly did everything it could not to allow SACEUR that option) and the humanitarian mission was actually as much in support of gangsters as victims.
What Halberstam does not write about is the medium term and long term consequences of the flaccidity of a Clinton looking for a legacy, whose wife clearly has inherited that legacy not as short term fix but as an ideology - which may makes her as dangerous as her rival, more so perhaps.
The discovery of air power under conditions where the old superpower Russia could be treated with contempt and China was still rising but without skin in the game - and monomaniacs like Tony Blair could offer unstinting support - created a new mentality of 'possibility'.
It was not the humanitarian Democrats who took things to the next stage (although Al Gore is likely to have been a strong interventionist) but Bush II with a determined model of using humanitarian rhetoric to take out states that challenged US authority to set the global agenda.
Well, we know how that turned out - but equally interesting is the trajectory of non-US liberal internationalists into an ideology that abandoned over a century of Leftist aversion to the use of war and the effect of the Yugoslav warlets on a revived and aggressive NATO.
The first created Left claques for criminal operations against Iraq but also for an acceptance that military forces could legitimately be used to enforce Western liberal standards. Blair led the US by the nose after the apparently successful Sierra Leone campaign and then was led by the nose.
The second used the humanitarian model as cover for the expansion of liberal values by what had been hitherto an essentially defensive alliance, turning it into a force for potential aggression against anything that might prove a threat in the future - Russia being the most obvious.
The realist 'sphere of influence' understanding that reached its high point at Yalta gave priority to global peace over human rights. The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed liberals to switch the emphasis from global peace and the nation state to human rights (inherent in the Atlantic Charter).
Despite the Cold War, the superpowers maintained a sort of balance in which spheres of influence and ideas were contested short of direct military conflict until one of them collapsed. At that point, the beaten power could have been respected or treated as defeated - the West chose the latter.
Such triumphalism might have worked if the world carried on along the same trajectory but Russia revived with reason to be distrustful and not grateful, China watched how the US behaved and learned lessons and Political Islam and failed states started to grind down the American Empire.
Rights sound noble especially to intellectual leader writers in the West, easily seduced by ideas, but it meant that NATO started to move into every political vacuum presented to it, backed up by trade promises that could not be safely fulfilled, especially in relation to free movement of labour.
It then participated in the slow degradation of the European West's borderlands by interventions that pushed it right up to the borders of Russia itself and destabilised regimes such as Libya's that were brutal but which also acted as defensive lines against migration, terror and organised crime.
None of this could be known by the actors in Halberstam's book, completed in 2001 as contemporary history, but the crisis of our time cannot just be put down to the exploitation of new powers by George W. Bush and the Cheney Gang - that is all too easy.
It comes ultimately down to the narcissism and foreign policy ignorance of his predecessor whose weakness included an inability to engage with his foreign policy staffs and listen with care and respect to his military - and to allow men like Blair and Clark to drive the agenda.
The competent one, George H. Bush, turned out to be the one who could not win an election because, understandably, the American people are and should be most concerned with domestic prosperity and the theatre that is American politics. Democracy is problematic for empire.
We are coming up to another decisive election in a few months and there is an unusual intensity in this one regarding foreign policy. The foreign policy estasblishment that has locked itself into power since Kosovo is clearly terrified of a Trump who asks too many difficult questions.
The question is whether Hillary is better than her husband - that is a question for Americans to answer but insofar as her time at State was a continuation of the last days of her husband's rule under a more moderate, apparently competent and sensible Democrat President, doubts are normal.
As for Halberstam's book, it remains worth reading even if he could have done with a bit of sub-editing at times in the first third where he repeats himself a bit. His analyses are always plausible. His insight into the micro-politics of American statecraft genuinely enlightening.
It is worth reading the very short post-9/11 introduction after rather than before the rest of the book. Its tone is at variance with the main text and it reminds us that Americans really were shocked into counter-aggression by the Islamist aggression - and confused by what had happened.
But, finally, what really strikes me about his text is that it is part of a non-reflexive culture that finds it very difficult to ask more fundamental questions about its own imperial conduct - what does the nation actually want and do its people have much informed say in that decision?
January 26, 2020
Summary: A history of the post-Cold War conflicts of the first Bush and the Clinton administrations, with extensive coverage of the Balkan conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.
David Halberstam wrote one of the first major accounts of how the United States became bogged down in the Vietnam War in The Best and the Brightest, studying the various persons involved in U.S. decision-making. There, Halberstam offered at once a meticulous and riveting account of the succession of events and decisions that both led into the war, and led to the concealing of the full implications of those decisions from the American public.
Halberstam accomplished a similar feat in this work, nominated for a Pulitzer in 2002. He takes us through the succession of events from fall of Communist rule, the brilliantly executed Gulf War, a triumph of American technology, and the simmering "teacup" wars in Somalia and the Balkans, the human rights implications of which could not be ignored by one administration tired of war, and another administration preferring to focus on domestic issues.
Halberstam gives us an account thick with all the personalities -- the presidents, the policy makers, the military leaders. We meet Larry Eagleburger, on the ground as Yugoslavia breaks up into its ethnic components, watching the rise of Milosevic and warning of the trouble to come with an administration fighting to meet an unexpectedly tough electoral challenge from Bill Clinton. There is a new administration, not particularly interested in foreign policy with a competent bureaucrat but not visionary Warren Christopher, the aloof Tony Lake, Richard Holbrooke, facing the diplomatic challenge of a lifetime.
The abject failure of leadership in Somalia leaves the Clinton administration all the more reticent to assert itself in the Balkans, hoping for European leadership instead. Meanwhile the situation degenerates into genocide in Bosnia. We see a military conflicted with the memories of Vietnam, and the accomplishments of its forces in the Gulf War, and its rapidly improving aerial technology. Around them are hawks like Al Gore and Madeleine Albright, deeply disturbed by the human rights violations, while others from Christopher to Clinton struggle to define an American interests, and Colin Powell from another Vietnam. Eventually, the use of American airpower brought Milosevic to Dayton and Holbrooke's shining hour negotiating the Dayton Peace accords.
Halberstam's account does not paint a favorable picture of Clinton. He identifies a key concern of the military--a president who will remain loyal to them and give them what they need to do what he has asked of them as commander-in-chief. Perhaps nowhere is this so evident as the case of General Wes Clark, who brilliantly led the subsequent conflict against Milosevic and the Serbs in Kosovo, working with European allies, and cajoling a cautious president into sufficient use of their air and ground forces to give a growing Kosovar resistance a chance. For his successes, he was shunted aside by Defense Secretary Cohen, who never liked him.
The book also raises questions, particularly in its closing epilogue, written after 9/11, of the changes in American society from a resilient and resolute one of the post Depression years to an indulgent society, glutted on entertainment, accustomed to wars without casualties that are over in a matter of weeks. Little did Halberstam envision at the time the conflicts going on two decades in both Afghanistan and Iraq for which the conflicts of the Nineties were just rehearsals. What Halberstam understood is the growing consensus in political circles that these wars are fine as long as the American people could continue to live on an untroubled peacetime footing, apart from the occasionally troubling news of another soldier from one's local community lost in a distant part of the world in a conflict no one really understood. He also recognizes the short-sightedness of planners who did not see the threat from terrorist in their obsession with great, or even regional power conflicts.
Writing close to the events gave Halberstam access to all the key players. Clinton was one of the few he did not personally interview. Yet closeness to the events did not obscure for Halberstam the big issues. No administration has the luxury to ignore foreign policy--it will seek you out. Political pragmatism without overarching principle will lead to betrayal of loyalties and America's best interests.
Like every decade, the decisions of the Nineties shaped those that followed. Halberstam gives us a rich and readable account of this important period when some of today's leaders were coming of age.
David Halberstam wrote one of the first major accounts of how the United States became bogged down in the Vietnam War in The Best and the Brightest, studying the various persons involved in U.S. decision-making. There, Halberstam offered at once a meticulous and riveting account of the succession of events and decisions that both led into the war, and led to the concealing of the full implications of those decisions from the American public.
Halberstam accomplished a similar feat in this work, nominated for a Pulitzer in 2002. He takes us through the succession of events from fall of Communist rule, the brilliantly executed Gulf War, a triumph of American technology, and the simmering "teacup" wars in Somalia and the Balkans, the human rights implications of which could not be ignored by one administration tired of war, and another administration preferring to focus on domestic issues.
Halberstam gives us an account thick with all the personalities -- the presidents, the policy makers, the military leaders. We meet Larry Eagleburger, on the ground as Yugoslavia breaks up into its ethnic components, watching the rise of Milosevic and warning of the trouble to come with an administration fighting to meet an unexpectedly tough electoral challenge from Bill Clinton. There is a new administration, not particularly interested in foreign policy with a competent bureaucrat but not visionary Warren Christopher, the aloof Tony Lake, Richard Holbrooke, facing the diplomatic challenge of a lifetime.
The abject failure of leadership in Somalia leaves the Clinton administration all the more reticent to assert itself in the Balkans, hoping for European leadership instead. Meanwhile the situation degenerates into genocide in Bosnia. We see a military conflicted with the memories of Vietnam, and the accomplishments of its forces in the Gulf War, and its rapidly improving aerial technology. Around them are hawks like Al Gore and Madeleine Albright, deeply disturbed by the human rights violations, while others from Christopher to Clinton struggle to define an American interests, and Colin Powell from another Vietnam. Eventually, the use of American airpower brought Milosevic to Dayton and Holbrooke's shining hour negotiating the Dayton Peace accords.
Halberstam's account does not paint a favorable picture of Clinton. He identifies a key concern of the military--a president who will remain loyal to them and give them what they need to do what he has asked of them as commander-in-chief. Perhaps nowhere is this so evident as the case of General Wes Clark, who brilliantly led the subsequent conflict against Milosevic and the Serbs in Kosovo, working with European allies, and cajoling a cautious president into sufficient use of their air and ground forces to give a growing Kosovar resistance a chance. For his successes, he was shunted aside by Defense Secretary Cohen, who never liked him.
The book also raises questions, particularly in its closing epilogue, written after 9/11, of the changes in American society from a resilient and resolute one of the post Depression years to an indulgent society, glutted on entertainment, accustomed to wars without casualties that are over in a matter of weeks. Little did Halberstam envision at the time the conflicts going on two decades in both Afghanistan and Iraq for which the conflicts of the Nineties were just rehearsals. What Halberstam understood is the growing consensus in political circles that these wars are fine as long as the American people could continue to live on an untroubled peacetime footing, apart from the occasionally troubling news of another soldier from one's local community lost in a distant part of the world in a conflict no one really understood. He also recognizes the short-sightedness of planners who did not see the threat from terrorist in their obsession with great, or even regional power conflicts.
Writing close to the events gave Halberstam access to all the key players. Clinton was one of the few he did not personally interview. Yet closeness to the events did not obscure for Halberstam the big issues. No administration has the luxury to ignore foreign policy--it will seek you out. Political pragmatism without overarching principle will lead to betrayal of loyalties and America's best interests.
Like every decade, the decisions of the Nineties shaped those that followed. Halberstam gives us a rich and readable account of this important period when some of today's leaders were coming of age.
April 18, 2017
In some ways very useful and interesting, in others frustrating and unoriginal. Halberstam is obviously a tremendous writer, and his flair and imagination come across strongly in this book. He covers the history of US foreign intervention, especially the debate over humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti. Halberstam does a great job explaining conflicts between and within civilian authorities and the military. In general, it was the military that was most hesitant to get involved in these countries, although Clinton and most of his advisors didn't want to either. The back and forth between civilians and the military (and within each "branch") makes this book compelling reading for any scholars of recent US foreign policy. Unfortunately, Halberstam is quite unclear on his sources (interviews, mostly), which means that you have to be careful using him for more scholarly purposes. The book also has fascinating mini-bios of key FP figures in the 1990's; I especially enjoyed those of Wes Clark, Warren Christopher, and Madeline Albright.
I left the book with an equivocal feeling about humanitarian intervention. On one hand, it seemed that the US could have done something (bomb Serbian artillery positions around Sarajevo, open the arms blockade on the former Yugoslavia) to alleviate human misery there even if they couldn't solve the political crisis. When the US started to really push on the gears of this thing (largely because it grew into a political liability), they were painstakingly able to create and maintain peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. On the other hand, I totally understand the hesitance of the military to get involved in these murky, deep-rooted conflicts, their fear of a renewed guerrilla war, and their suspicion that the civilians and the country weren't paying attention and didn't care. In sum, this book suggests to me that the US can exercise power for good in some situations in the world, but that we will always have a conflict between our universalist and humanitarian tendencies against our reasonable unwillingness to sacrifice lives for non-vital interests. The same tension, I think, shapes our Syria policy today.
I left the book with an equivocal feeling about humanitarian intervention. On one hand, it seemed that the US could have done something (bomb Serbian artillery positions around Sarajevo, open the arms blockade on the former Yugoslavia) to alleviate human misery there even if they couldn't solve the political crisis. When the US started to really push on the gears of this thing (largely because it grew into a political liability), they were painstakingly able to create and maintain peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. On the other hand, I totally understand the hesitance of the military to get involved in these murky, deep-rooted conflicts, their fear of a renewed guerrilla war, and their suspicion that the civilians and the country weren't paying attention and didn't care. In sum, this book suggests to me that the US can exercise power for good in some situations in the world, but that we will always have a conflict between our universalist and humanitarian tendencies against our reasonable unwillingness to sacrifice lives for non-vital interests. The same tension, I think, shapes our Syria policy today.
December 18, 2025
War in a Time of Peace
Halberstam can really write as is well-documented. He doesn’t need my endorsement. The inside look at an era I lived through and appreciating how different it ways behind the scenes than it appeared was fascinating. Excellent.
Halberstam can really write as is well-documented. He doesn’t need my endorsement. The inside look at an era I lived through and appreciating how different it ways behind the scenes than it appeared was fascinating. Excellent.
June 12, 2022
Halberstram was a great writer. Although he was a Democrat, he was a moderate. He aligned himself most often with Bobby Kennedy. However he shows little bias in his works. This book is about the U.S. failure to have a good policy after the break up of Yugoslavia. The Serbs ethnic cleansing of the Albanian Muslims. Clinton’s failure to have a consistent policy is clear. It is also clear, the author was critical of the Administration . Halberstram uses oral histories as his source material. Great book, no wonder it was considered for a Pulitzer.
November 19, 2012
Another solid effort by Halberstam. He does a good job of fleshing out the various competing factions within the Bush and Clinton administrations, primarily concerning whether (and how) to utilize the military to put an end to Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaings in Bosnia and Kosovo. Both administrations featured doves and hawks. Added to that, the Joint Chiefs of Staff usually seemed to be at odds with the White House, and even at odds with some of its own field commanders.
Halberstam discusses how Bush was slow to grasp the seriousness of the situation, and never really did act on it prior to leaving office. He then details how Clinton, at the beginning of his term, had virtually no interest whatsoever in foreign policy, and was excessively concerned with his legacy and how to win the next campaign. Almost nobody comes out looking like roses here: neither President, none of their highly-qualified secretaries or other administrators, the various JCS chairmen, the high command of the Army, the media, and of course Milosevic. The shadow of Vietnam hangs over the decision-making process like a dark cloud, and helps to paralyze potential action plans.
The only thing that I think Halberstam overlooks here, is when he talks about Clinton not being interested in foreign policy and not having many accomplishments in that area. Clinton's critical role in forging peace in Northern Ireland was a great show of leadership, yet it is not even mentioned in passing in the book.
Halberstam discusses how Bush was slow to grasp the seriousness of the situation, and never really did act on it prior to leaving office. He then details how Clinton, at the beginning of his term, had virtually no interest whatsoever in foreign policy, and was excessively concerned with his legacy and how to win the next campaign. Almost nobody comes out looking like roses here: neither President, none of their highly-qualified secretaries or other administrators, the various JCS chairmen, the high command of the Army, the media, and of course Milosevic. The shadow of Vietnam hangs over the decision-making process like a dark cloud, and helps to paralyze potential action plans.
The only thing that I think Halberstam overlooks here, is when he talks about Clinton not being interested in foreign policy and not having many accomplishments in that area. Clinton's critical role in forging peace in Northern Ireland was a great show of leadership, yet it is not even mentioned in passing in the book.
June 28, 2025
2.5 I generally love Halberstam. But this book is kind of an odd slice of a very specific time. The jacket summary presents it as a comprehensive review of how America’s post Cold War foreign policy developed. It’s not really that. It is a more comprehensive summary of the Balkan conflicts in the former Yugoslavia with very brief forays into Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, etc. It felt like the book tried to do too much and too little at the same time. If it wanted to offer a comprehensive look into foreign policy during this era, it feels too short and cursory. But as a summary of the Balkan conflicts, it also felt out of place because it went down endless rabbit holes without diving in-depth into a true history of the region and conflict. In other words the level of detail felt odd for this kind of book, especially given the short treatment of other conflicts, but was too little to stand alone as an independent construction of the various Balkan wars. Not his best work.
December 6, 2011
Another masterpiece by a master of investigative reporting. This is a must read for anyone interested in how America was dealing with the rest of the world from the fall of the Berlin wall to the 2000 election. The best compliments I can give to this book are that he gives fresh incite into a decade that I grew up in yet knew so little about. He gives a balanced perspective on the Clinton presidency, which has been nearly mythologized, for both good and ill, due to the poor decisions of the Bush II administration. Also, his epilogue added to the 2002 paperback edition is both poetic and endearing. His epilogue can best be described as the passing on of the torch to a new generation of Americans, reminding us to remain engaged with forces outside of our country. Hopefully, we won't let him down.
August 31, 2012
In this detailed look at American foreign policy during the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations, David Halberstam focuses his attention on three primary areas of foreign policy crises for the United States--ethnic warfare in the Balkans, the continuing tensions in the Middle East, and bloody confrontations in Africa. And in developing his narrative, Halberstam creates detailed word portraits of the primary players in both the political and military spheres including Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, Henry Kissinger, Dick Cheney, James Baker, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell, Wesley Clark and a host of others. Halberstam makes it clear that decision making at the upper levels of the government is clearly influenced by the personalities and relative power relationships that exist among the chief decision makers. A fascinating study.
July 14, 2013
This is an excellent book about foreign policy issues that faced the United States after the fall of the soviet empire. No longer were issues black and white but now were often humanitarian issues or peace keeping. In these situations the countries involved often were not sympathetic situations. Bosnia, Kosovo , Somalia and Haiti were all situations where neither side were very likable
The book details the characters involved in the issues from both sides. Also halberstam follows the internal struggles within our society that complicated our responses to each situation.
The book relates how complicated foreign policy issues are in the world today.
The book details the characters involved in the issues from both sides. Also halberstam follows the internal struggles within our society that complicated our responses to each situation.
The book relates how complicated foreign policy issues are in the world today.
October 26, 2008
The relationship of generals
March 25, 2016
Thorough explanation of the U.S. involvement in Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia, and Rwanda during the Bush and Clinton presidencies
September 29, 2018
I entered the military just before the Gulf War, so--25 years later--I appreciated this in-depth evaluation of what was happening in the 1990s at the top levels of the U.S. national security apparatus. I bought this book at a Borders in Sand City, California, back in 2005, and I'm kind of glad it has awaited me in a box through three moves and tours at the UN and NATO. It has clarified a lot of detail of the Bush 41 and Clinton years for me--to include the deployment I did to support the air war over Serbia. One of the first phenomena Halberstam tackles is the 1992 Clinton victory--the take-down of a super-capable national security administration in favor of 'It's the economy, Stupid.' He likens it to the British election in 1945--where 'they had believed that Churchill's primary passion was defense and foreign policy, not domestic affairs, and they wanted someone who they thought would pay more attention to their postwar needs.' Only a journalist like Halberstam, who went into the elephant grass of Vietnam to cover that war, and spilled a lot of ink on the postwar evolution to an American superpower, could make this end-of-Cold-War comparison in such an apt manner, I think. Here Vietnam is constantly lurking behind the scenes as he discusses controversial figures like Merrill McPeak and the first 'Boomer POTUS' flirting with an ROTC slot to avoid joining men like Colin Powell and Halberstam in the rice paddies. He delves into the class of American angry a55holes that popped up like mushrooms during the Clinton administration (he mentions Rush Limbaugh by name on p.210) to look for enemies amongst our own populace when the Soviet monolith disappeared. On the next page, to be fair, Halberstam points out that Clinton's presidency, 'already so attuned to every drop or rise in the national political temperature or the polls, to pay too much attention to the daily responses to presidential actions was catastrophic.' The Clintons do not get off light in this account of the Cold War's aftermath; the Lewinski affair is of course described in objective but painful detail and linked to the looming humanitarian disaster in southeastern Europe, but so is the aftermath of Mogadishu, where the remaining superpower seemed to believe that Rwanda was a fire that would burn itself out as people hacked each other to death with Machetes and the UN mission in the middle of it pleaded for its assistance. Halberstam tees up 9/11 nicely in this edition--everyone knows that Rumsfeld was obsessed with going to Iraq to finish the job, but Halberstam also points out Rummy's obsession with the 'high-tech Maginot Line' known as Star Wars when al Qaeda was infiltrating U.S. flight schools. He also speaks of the attitudes (I write this 11 years after the author's untimely death in a car accident) that have led us to the current situation. 'Our instinct,' he writes, 'born of geography, is to be apart.' It is a mindset that coped fairly well when the republic was surrounded by friendly neighbors and 2 wide oceans. Unfortunately, after the arrival of ICBMs and the internet, America can't count on its geography for security; and I think that 'War in a Time of Peace' makes the case that not only is isolationism a non-option, but abdicating our leadership position amongst pretty-dependable allies is a disastrous idea.
October 16, 2022
I decided to read this because I was not very informed about the foreign policy decisions around the Balkans, Somalia, or Haiti. I have learned so much, but if I was unsettled about the state of our world before I read this, I am even more concerned now. I came away worried about the power and personality conflicts between all the people making our foreign policy decisions. As we pour money into hot spots around the world, I pray the people making these decisions are more in synch than they were during the Bush and Clinton administrations….although I doubt they are. The parts about the rise of the conservation elements of the Republican Party sure were spot on….oh dear! Oh dear….I will hope that as seems to be the strength of our country, the pendulum does go back and forth and the center does move us in the right direction most of the time.
August 12, 2021
5/10
I have to admit that I expected more from Halberstam. Essentially, he argues convincingly that America entered many military engagements after the Cold War with Cold War era policies in toe, failing to update their lines of thinking to new realities. This is probably true. The problem is its not very original, and there wasn't much that separated this book from just being a retelling of some relatively minor conflicts the US jumped into in the 90's, and a look at military policies abroad. Halberstam is a decent enough writer here, and his brevity is certainly a skill, but I'm not sure that his vision of this book was translated sufficiently well to reality.
I have to admit that I expected more from Halberstam. Essentially, he argues convincingly that America entered many military engagements after the Cold War with Cold War era policies in toe, failing to update their lines of thinking to new realities. This is probably true. The problem is its not very original, and there wasn't much that separated this book from just being a retelling of some relatively minor conflicts the US jumped into in the 90's, and a look at military policies abroad. Halberstam is a decent enough writer here, and his brevity is certainly a skill, but I'm not sure that his vision of this book was translated sufficiently well to reality.
May 3, 2025
I picked up this book as I enjoy Halberstam’s writing style and topics. Wasn’t really sure what this book would cover and was pleasantly surprised that it covered the Bosnian conflict, a topic I was interested in but had not come across a book that peaked my interest.
Not only did this book cover this conflict in the right amount of detail from my perspective but also shone a light on the lack of foreign policy leadership in the Clinton administration. I thought Halberstam covered this very well.
Not only did this book cover this conflict in the right amount of detail from my perspective but also shone a light on the lack of foreign policy leadership in the Clinton administration. I thought Halberstam covered this very well.
February 1, 2021
I've always enjoyed David Halberstam's work,. This book did not disappoint me in the slightest. I learned a great deal about people, politics, the military, and how they all work "together". For those who enjoy history, this is a wonderful book, well written and believe it or not, entertaining as it provides insight into the working of our various institutions.
October 24, 2021
suuuuper interested in everything this book is about but David Halberstam did not come through with his writing for this one. Took me literally 1.5 years to read it back in high school because the writing was just that dry and boring. Still, it provides very interesting historic facts about the post- Cold War US and the relationship between the Pentagon and the government.
September 8, 2018
Inside view of how we came to be in (former) Yugoslavia
It was an interesting look into the struggle to formulate a foreign policy to deal with the breakup of Yugoslavia. It illustrates the inevitable link between domestic and international policy, regardless of who is in office.
It was an interesting look into the struggle to formulate a foreign policy to deal with the breakup of Yugoslavia. It illustrates the inevitable link between domestic and international policy, regardless of who is in office.
July 5, 2022
One of the best books outlining the messy Balkans policy of the US during the 90s. Comprehensive, with good references for further reading, this one should be a must for anyone who wants to understand the decision making process that was behind America’s involvement in this region.
March 16, 2011
I think I have tried reading this book on 5 separate occasions, and, for whatever reason, it loses my interest pretty quickly.
Read
February 12, 2020Insightful how powerful nations control the destiny of other countries.
July 26, 2020
Everything you would want to know about Balkan troubles in 90s and Clinton WH involvement
August 14, 2020
3 Stars. Pedestrian. Weird passages on Lewinsky. Too profile/sketch heavy for me.
Read
December 3, 2020Great insight into Bill Clinton with his finger wet & in the air getting a feel for public opinion. Very good description of how the US fell into its current role as policeman of the world.
August 31, 2023
Take a shot every time someone’s described as a hawk
October 18, 2023
Very interesting subject but it's 200 pages too long because every person profiled has their biography and personality run through a thesaurus.
February 21, 2024
Later I will write a review.
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