Geoffrey Wawro approaches America's role in the Middle East in a fundamentally new way-by encompassing the last century of the entire region, rather than focusing narrowly on a particular country or era. The result is a definitive and revelatory history whose drama, tragedy, and rich irony he relates with unprecedented verve. Wawro combed archives in the United States and Europe and traveled the Middle East to unearth new insights into the hidden motivations, backroom dealing, and outright espionage that shaped some of the most tumultuous events of the last one hundred years. Wawro offers piercing analysis of iconic events from the birth of Israel to the death of Sadat, from the Suez crisis to the energy crisis, from the Six-Day War to Desert One, from Iran-contra to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the rise of al- Qaeda. Throughout, he draws telling parallels between America's past mistakes and its current quandaries, proving that we're in today's muddle not just because of our old errors, but because we keep repeating those errors.
America has juggled multiple commitments and conflicting priorities in the Middle East for nearly a century. Strands of idealism and ruthless practicality have alternated- and sometimes run together-in our policy. Quicksand untangles these strands as no history has done before by showing how our strategies unfolded over the entire century and across the entire region. We've persistently misread the intentions and motivations of every major player in the region because we've insisted on viewing them through the lens of our own culture, hopes, and fears. Most administrations since Eisenhower's have adopted their own "doctrine" for the Middle East, and almost every doctrine has failed precisely because it's a doctrine-a template into which events on the ground refuse to fit. Geoffrey Wawro's peerless and remarkably lively history is key to understanding our errors and the Middle East-at last- on its own terms.
Geoffrey Wawro is the General Olinto Mark Barsanti Professor of Military History at the University of North Texas, and Director of the UNT Military History Center. His primary area of emphasis is modern and contemporary military history, from the French Revolution to the present.
This is a history of our foreign policy in the Middle East during the last 100 years. While those relations aren't always smooth, Wawro's history does demonstrate that largely our goals and actions have reflected the pressures of the times. Following World War II, 2 common threads knitted their way through the fabric of the region: the need to forge alliances to counter Soviet ambitions toward warm water ports and the persistent coercion of Israeli security concerns. And oil. I'd heard before, and Wawro confirms, that 3/4s of the known U.S. reserves in the ground were used to power the Allied militaries during the war. So securing the Saudi oil fields for strategic interests was vital to our Cold War policy. That obviously continues today. One of the interesting things the author does is compare the events of the present to the past to show how little things have changed. To me the book was shaped like a cornucopia, Wawro's narration narrow at the beginning of the 20th century but widening out as it nears the present until it spills a rich harvest of fact, analysis, and detail about the last 2 decades of turmoil during 2 Iraq wars, 9/11, and the war in Afghanistan. The lessons are as current and immediate as your daily paper. But Wawro is more historian than reporter and is able to follow the story down the long decades to relate it with insight and to explain with honesty how weaknesses of leadership or overreach or strength displayed by the many personalities involved--Arab, American, and European--have lent weight to the picture of influences and conflict we see in the Middle East today. His conclusions are grim.
Quicksand is highly uneven book. Its first half has plenty of original analysis based on painstaking archival research; but the quality declines from the chapter on the June war onwards. The book is finally redeemed only by a couple of good chapters on the Iraq war. So why the four stars? Because, despite its flaws, this is a remarkable book, which is engagingly written, peppered with interesting anecdotal detail, and spiced up with some wray humour. Wawro confirms that US middle east policy has been driven less by a coherent strategy than by consisten politics. It has always been a clash between strategic imperatives and domestic political concerns, which is a euphemism for the Israel lobby. The US wants the regions oil and access to its rich markets; but it has been constrained for nearly a century by the electoral concerns of its leaders who have to rely on Jewish votes and campaign contributions. Its this failure to resolve the tension between the two that has doomed the region to a permanent state of crisis.
Although I felt the author was somewhat biased, this book is an excellent review of Middle-east history, foibles and questionable diplomacy. It helped me better understand why so much of the current diplomatic efforts are so complicated and often fruitless. Good read!
This review is from: Quicksand: America's Pursuit of Power in the Middle East (Hardcover) Incredibly poor research. On the little things..."Ben-Gurion came from Russia". Wrong, he came from Poland. And on the big things...."the Jews turned down the Peel Commission proposal for partition of Palestine in 1937". While this is true, Wawro states it's because the Jews would not compromise. What he leaves out is that the Peel commission only allowed the Jews the area immediately around Haifa and nothing more. Such a state would have never been viable. He also forgets to mention that the Palestinians turned it down because any Jewish presence in the area at all was unaccptable to them. The book continues to rant against Israel claiming that (paraphrase)"following Israeli aggression in starting the Six Day War of 1967 Arab lands were annexed". No lands were annexed other than the Old City of Jerusalem. As to Israeli aggression, he conveniently forgets that the blockade of the Israeli port of Eilat was the opening salvo of that war in addition to the massing of troops in Sinai. This book is as worthless as the garbage written by Mearscheimer of the University of Chicago several years ago...he of course critiques this on the back cover and loves it. DON'T BUY UNLESS YOU WANT TO READ FICTION.
Balfour declaration - Chaim Weizmann, increased migration to Palestine by Jews, who considered themselves the vanguard of a 15 million Jewish population. America did not support Jewish migration at the time as the influential Jews in the country, including persons such as Solomon Loeb, believed that such a migration would imply that all Jews should move to Palestine - they themselves will no longer be welcome in the countries that they have built their empires. Because of this America's policy at the time can best be said to be of ambivalence. The reasons for Balfour declaration, made during Peace time were to improve relations with the Bolshevik party which had suffered anti-Jewish measures by the Tsar and was dominated by Jews, to undermine German efforts to win Jewish support by promising Palestine themselves, and to ensure that the Suez canal did not fall into the enemy hands. The Jewish people, who started displacing Arab families from their ancestral homes, forcing them into poverty, were the target of riots and pogroms by Arabs, which included the Jaffa riots in 1920.
Aptly named and somewhat depressing in the cynical, self serving and short sighted pursuit and abuse of power by just about everyone involved. None of the parties in the Middle East come off looking good for the past 100 years and I do mean none. The Israelis have committed just as many acts of overt terrorism and the Arabs and the Americans have been just as willing as the Russians or the British to stage anti-democratic coups when it suited them while the real king is named Oil. And we are all hostages to it.
This book is a stellar read. I think its strength is that its analysis is right down the middle. The book is able to give enough historical background while bringing analysis to current conditions. The author does have some criticisms of Israel, and American policy, but not in a manner that I would find problematic as I suspect some other reviewers here do.