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The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 #1-2
نشوء وسقوط القوى العظمى
يعرج هذا الكتاب على مناقشة القوى الإقليمية والدولية لعصر ما بعد النهضة الأوروبية ساعياً إلى تعقب ومن ثم شرح كيفية نشوء وسقوط القوى العظمى باختلاف ضروبها وعلاقاتها النسبية على مدى القرون الخمسة الماضية بعد تشكيل دول (المماليك الجديدة) في أوروبا الغربية وقيام الدول التي انتهجت النظام العالمي.
وحتمية هذا الكتاب أنه أولى اهتماماً كبيراً بالحروب سيما الحروب الكبرى وطويلة الأمد التي خاضت غمارها تحالفات من دول عظمى كان لها وقعها على النظام الدولي. على أن الكتاب ليس بسجل تاريخي عسكري فحسب بل هو قد تعقب التغيرات التي طرأت على الاقتصاد العالمي منذ عام 1500، لكنه أيضاً ليس بسجل تاريخي اقتصادي. إنه حصيلة (تفاعل) بين الاقتصاد والاستراتيجية بعد أن استنتج أن جميع دول الطليعة للنظام العالمي لم تأل جهداً كي تعزز ثروتها وقوتها العسكرية حتى تغدو (أو تبقى) ثرية وقوية مرة واحدة. وعليه آثر الكتاب الإشارة إلى (الصراع العسكري) في عناوينه الفرعية بـ(التغير الاقتصادي). فالنصر الذي حققته أي من القوى العظمى خلال تلك الحقبة أو الهزيمة التي لحقت بقوى عظمى أخرى قد كان في غالبهما ثمرة أو عاقبة لحرب طويلة كانت هذه الدول أو تلك طرفاً فيها. بيد أن هذا النصر أو تلك الهزيمة كانتا أيضاً حصيلة للاستثمار الكفء بشكل أو بآخر لمصادر الإنتاج الاقتصادي لهذا البلد إبان حربه وأبعد من هذا أنها حصيلة للطريقة التي كانت فيها اقتصاد ذلك البلد ينمو أو ينهار مقارنة بدول الطليعة الأخرى وقبل أن تدخل تلك الدول أوار الحرب. وعليه-أو لهذا السبب تحديداً-تولي هذه الدراسة اهتماماً بالتغيير الذي يشهده موقع الدولة العظمى في عصر السلم لا يقل بشيء عن الاهتمام الذي توليه الحروب التي تخوضها تلك الدولة.
وحتمية هذا الكتاب أنه أولى اهتماماً كبيراً بالحروب سيما الحروب الكبرى وطويلة الأمد التي خاضت غمارها تحالفات من دول عظمى كان لها وقعها على النظام الدولي. على أن الكتاب ليس بسجل تاريخي عسكري فحسب بل هو قد تعقب التغيرات التي طرأت على الاقتصاد العالمي منذ عام 1500، لكنه أيضاً ليس بسجل تاريخي اقتصادي. إنه حصيلة (تفاعل) بين الاقتصاد والاستراتيجية بعد أن استنتج أن جميع دول الطليعة للنظام العالمي لم تأل جهداً كي تعزز ثروتها وقوتها العسكرية حتى تغدو (أو تبقى) ثرية وقوية مرة واحدة. وعليه آثر الكتاب الإشارة إلى (الصراع العسكري) في عناوينه الفرعية بـ(التغير الاقتصادي). فالنصر الذي حققته أي من القوى العظمى خلال تلك الحقبة أو الهزيمة التي لحقت بقوى عظمى أخرى قد كان في غالبهما ثمرة أو عاقبة لحرب طويلة كانت هذه الدول أو تلك طرفاً فيها. بيد أن هذا النصر أو تلك الهزيمة كانتا أيضاً حصيلة للاستثمار الكفء بشكل أو بآخر لمصادر الإنتاج الاقتصادي لهذا البلد إبان حربه وأبعد من هذا أنها حصيلة للطريقة التي كانت فيها اقتصاد ذلك البلد ينمو أو ينهار مقارنة بدول الطليعة الأخرى وقبل أن تدخل تلك الدول أوار الحرب. وعليه-أو لهذا السبب تحديداً-تولي هذه الدراسة اهتماماً بالتغيير الذي يشهده موقع الدولة العظمى في عصر السلم لا يقل بشيء عن الاهتمام الذي توليه الحروب التي تخوضها تلك الدولة.
824 pages, Paperback
First published December 12, 1987
1640 people are currently reading
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About the author
Paul Kennedy
151 books277 followersPaul Michael Kennedy is a British historian specialising in the history of international relations, economic power and grand strategy. He has published prominent books on the history of British foreign policy and Great Power struggles.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 372 reviews
December 4, 2013
Back when I was in college, I felt the need for a course that looked at how economics, politics and warfare all combined to form statecraft. I never got to take that non-existent course, but got what I wanted in "Rise and Fall of Great Powers."
Paul Kennedy wrote a 500-year history of grand strategy in world history, as first one European empire followed by another tried to achieve the perfect synthesis of absolute security and prosperity, and in the process scaring the hell out of smaller states who would combine to bring down the threatening giant. As such state/empires reached their peak, they would be beset by a plethora of competing priorities. If left alone, each threat would impeach the empire's raison d'etre, showing a weakness that others could exploit. That leads to "imperial overstretch," as the empire strains to resolve every crisis, and in the end go broke, its bankruptcy leading to decline.
"Rise and Fall of Great Powers" came out towards the end of the Cold War, when American economic supremacy was questioned by the expensive military need to contain the Soviet Union worldwide. Japan was rising economically, perhaps moving into a position where it could overtake the US. Recent history proved otherwise, but Kennedy should be given credit for daring to "swing for the fences", even though he got the forecast wrong.
In the end, the book is still a useful guide that explains how states work to increase their economic and military power, trying to build on their strengths while masking their weaknesses. Kennedy's prose can be quite dense at times, but the reader is encouraged to hack their way through the thicket. The facts do come together in the end.
Paul Kennedy wrote a 500-year history of grand strategy in world history, as first one European empire followed by another tried to achieve the perfect synthesis of absolute security and prosperity, and in the process scaring the hell out of smaller states who would combine to bring down the threatening giant. As such state/empires reached their peak, they would be beset by a plethora of competing priorities. If left alone, each threat would impeach the empire's raison d'etre, showing a weakness that others could exploit. That leads to "imperial overstretch," as the empire strains to resolve every crisis, and in the end go broke, its bankruptcy leading to decline.
"Rise and Fall of Great Powers" came out towards the end of the Cold War, when American economic supremacy was questioned by the expensive military need to contain the Soviet Union worldwide. Japan was rising economically, perhaps moving into a position where it could overtake the US. Recent history proved otherwise, but Kennedy should be given credit for daring to "swing for the fences", even though he got the forecast wrong.
In the end, the book is still a useful guide that explains how states work to increase their economic and military power, trying to build on their strengths while masking their weaknesses. Kennedy's prose can be quite dense at times, but the reader is encouraged to hack their way through the thicket. The facts do come together in the end.
December 4, 2013
Kennedy is the man. There's not much else to say. Sure, the thesis is "simplistic" or "schematic" or "deterministic" or whatever other bombastic term pseudo-intellectuals (and legitimate intellectuals alike) choose to use, but one has to understand that the project of this book is to make some sort of reasonably defensible generalization about what leads to the fall of great powers throughout history. That's not exactly easy. No single explanation will be perfect. But his thesis about imperial overstretch is instructive and a useful lens through which to view the powers over the years.
His predictions, as we have seen, have proven far from true, but, hey, he's a historian, not a clairvoyant. If masterful analysis of the past meant accurate prediction of the future, things would be very different.
The real strength of this book is not even in its overarching argument but in the sheer synthesis and presentation of so much useful data about great powers from 1500-2000. It's not easy to find a one-stop book for economic and military data on 16th-century imperial Portugal and 1950s USSR, but this book has it. It made his career, and he surely deserved it.
His predictions, as we have seen, have proven far from true, but, hey, he's a historian, not a clairvoyant. If masterful analysis of the past meant accurate prediction of the future, things would be very different.
The real strength of this book is not even in its overarching argument but in the sheer synthesis and presentation of so much useful data about great powers from 1500-2000. It's not easy to find a one-stop book for economic and military data on 16th-century imperial Portugal and 1950s USSR, but this book has it. It made his career, and he surely deserved it.
January 4, 2023
What a disappointment this book is. Can you imagine a book that purports to explain the rise of European wealth and domination over the rest of the world that not once mentions slavery? That spends all of two pages skimming over colonialism (without ever using the word) and only a handful of brief mentions in passing thereafter? Incredible, but there it is.
So what accounts for Europe's rise to dominance? Why, it's the "free enterprise" system! Yep, Paul Kennedy gets its completely backward. Capitalism — or "economic laissez-faire" and "intellectual liberty" as the author puts it on page 30 — miraculously guides Europe to its destiny. After that, it becomes a matter of who has the better military and better access to credit that determines which European powers rise and which fall.
Most of the book is a tedious stringing together of endless army statistics and weaponry comparisons, augmented by data on the financial conditions of the contenting countries. Useful for someone purely interested in military history but not so much for anybody else.
Obviously, modern capitalism, "economic laissez-faire" and "intellectual liberty" did not exist in 16th century Europe, when Kennedy begins his study and is already, in his book, lifting Europe above the world's other regions. In reality, it was the plunder of the Americas and elsewhere that provided the material wealth that proceeded the gradual development of capitalism.
Capitalism has its roots in the rise of trade relations between England and what are now the Benelux countries, but the eventual Industrial Revolution, and development of industry that enabled the technology that in turn enabled conquering of lands around the world, was boot-strapped by the wealth accumulated from slavery, colonialism and imperial plunder. Horrendous exploitation of peasants forced off their land and forced into the new factories at starvation wages through draconian laws enabled the accumulation of capital that could be taxed to create large armies and fund weaponry development. None of this is mentioned in Kennedy's book.
The sad aspect of this is that Kennedy clearly did not set out to write a piece of propaganda and cites an impressive list of sources; his is a work of a well-read professor conversant in historical scholarship. We can only speculate as to why he produced such a limited work. The only realistic answer is that he had to have been a prisoner of ideology — i.e., we Europeans are superior to the rest of the world so let's find out how our superior attributes arose. Such beginnings result in a myopic waste. It is no surprise, nonetheless, that the book enjoys its strong (although unwarranted) reputation as it nicely confirms Eurocentric biases while conveniently omitting almost all mention of the slavery, imperialism, plunder and genocide that accompanied its rise.
I ordinarily make it a point to only review books I like and avoid giving low scores, but given this book's undeserved reputation, I thought I would make an exception here so that perhaps others might avoid wasting their time as I did.
So what accounts for Europe's rise to dominance? Why, it's the "free enterprise" system! Yep, Paul Kennedy gets its completely backward. Capitalism — or "economic laissez-faire" and "intellectual liberty" as the author puts it on page 30 — miraculously guides Europe to its destiny. After that, it becomes a matter of who has the better military and better access to credit that determines which European powers rise and which fall.
Most of the book is a tedious stringing together of endless army statistics and weaponry comparisons, augmented by data on the financial conditions of the contenting countries. Useful for someone purely interested in military history but not so much for anybody else.
Obviously, modern capitalism, "economic laissez-faire" and "intellectual liberty" did not exist in 16th century Europe, when Kennedy begins his study and is already, in his book, lifting Europe above the world's other regions. In reality, it was the plunder of the Americas and elsewhere that provided the material wealth that proceeded the gradual development of capitalism.
Capitalism has its roots in the rise of trade relations between England and what are now the Benelux countries, but the eventual Industrial Revolution, and development of industry that enabled the technology that in turn enabled conquering of lands around the world, was boot-strapped by the wealth accumulated from slavery, colonialism and imperial plunder. Horrendous exploitation of peasants forced off their land and forced into the new factories at starvation wages through draconian laws enabled the accumulation of capital that could be taxed to create large armies and fund weaponry development. None of this is mentioned in Kennedy's book.
The sad aspect of this is that Kennedy clearly did not set out to write a piece of propaganda and cites an impressive list of sources; his is a work of a well-read professor conversant in historical scholarship. We can only speculate as to why he produced such a limited work. The only realistic answer is that he had to have been a prisoner of ideology — i.e., we Europeans are superior to the rest of the world so let's find out how our superior attributes arose. Such beginnings result in a myopic waste. It is no surprise, nonetheless, that the book enjoys its strong (although unwarranted) reputation as it nicely confirms Eurocentric biases while conveniently omitting almost all mention of the slavery, imperialism, plunder and genocide that accompanied its rise.
I ordinarily make it a point to only review books I like and avoid giving low scores, but given this book's undeserved reputation, I thought I would make an exception here so that perhaps others might avoid wasting their time as I did.
January 17, 2022
17.01.2022:
Още един камък по Кенеди и изчетените 15-18-ти век - той гордо нарича англичаните “нация на търговци”. Тъй като си играе с генерализации, явно има предвид Източноиндийската Компсния с нейните 200,000 частнокорпоративни войници (през 1803 г.), които надхвърлят два пъти армията на Короната, но дори не са споменати в книгата?
28.12.2021:
С Наполеон имаме нещо общо - и аз няма да мога да се справя след Ватерло и порядъчно безславно напускам послесражението с това заглавие. Индустриалната революция и следващите епохи в изложението на Кенеди или ще си останат мистерия, или ще ги захапя в някой по-борбен момент.
В началото с Пол Кенеди се разбирахме почти безаварийно. Стилът му се отличава със замах, широта и въображение. Сухото изреждане на факти, равнозначно на мрънкане под нос, определено не е неговото амплоа. Той буквално лети. В рамките на само две изречения читателят може да се сблъска с три държави, двама крале и четирима главнокомандващи и поне една битка, както и някоя интрига, която няма връзка с предходното.
Идеята, че именно фрагментираността на държавите в Европа и честите им конфликти, както и невъзможността само една да надделее над всички останали, е онзи генератор на постоянен неконформизъм и иновации с натрупващ се ефект, предопределил задаващото се влияние на континента над световната история, заслужава изострено внимание. Определено и факти като този, че и испанската, и френската корона обявяват банкрут през 16-ти век по военни съображения, забравили за икономиките си, и че точно в този банкрут се пропилява голяма част от испанските потоци сребро от Западните Индии, е повече от окриляващ въображението, и отваря жажда за още и още. Също “още” настоява и наистина увлекателната история на европейските битки на испанските и австрийските Хабсбурги - връзката със съвременния изглед на Европа е потресаваща. Само дето това "още" в един момент за мен се превърна в какафония.
Пол Кенеди определено не обича линейната структура (което е чудесно, защото точно това мразех едно време в учебниците), но освен това има и проблем със структурата като цяло (а това вече е лошо). От заглавието на книгата тръгнах с очаквания, че великите сили, като колониални метрополии, ще бъдат обхванати с техните приходящи (и изходящи) територии. Е, тук, поне до Ватерло, се оказах излъгана. Читателят получава единствено Европа, и някое и друго бегло споменаване на колония - ей тъй, за разкош. Китай липсва, тъй като не отговаря на определението, но пък Русия я има. Единствено САЩ като колония правят изключение, но там пък е обяснено, че загубата им при отцепването им за Англия де факто е несъществена. На моя въпрос "защо", останах с впечатление, че причината е невъзможността да се обхване логистично за военни цели такава огромна територия поради бавните сухопътни комуникации. Добре, но това май намирисва на нещо военно, и комай няма връзка с икономиката.
Тук стигаме до втория ми генерален проблем - подзаглавието "Икономически промени и военни конфликти XV-XX век". За военните конфликти получих изобилие от детайли - по две битки в изречение, без обаче да се изясни от коя война са. А ако е посочено - е чак в следващата под-глава/под-секция. Всъщност може да е било и в предходната. Ясна и проста връзка. Стигаме до конкретната война - е, драги читателю, да си си чел учебниците. Ако не си, си е за твоя сметка - подобно на сериала "Ало-Ало" Кенеди не смята да повтаря. Обаче ще разкаже увлекателно за новия вид открита пушка.
Конфликти в изложението има много. Икономика - не. Да, споменават се термини като "пазари" и "стоки". Какво обаче стои зад тях, какви конкретно стоки, какви са основните изходящи и входящи потоци, за целия 18-ти век ми остана тотално неясно. А връзките метрополии-колонии останаха в сферата на беглото споменаване - да, колониите са способствали растежа на метрополиите. Е, това го знам и без господин Кенеди. Златният триъгълник на търговията роби (Африка) - захар/тютюн/руда (Новият свят) - завършени продукти с добавена стойност (Европа) липсва. Робите са споменати срамежливо (Ла Рошел като пристанище със специализация в тази сфера, както и под линия за едно популярно сред инвеститорите на 18-ти век английско акционерно дружество, претърпяло фалит). Може в следващите глави да е по-застъпено, но липсата в целия 18-ти век е, меко казано, странна. Като цяло икономиката е разгледана точно така - като един единствен термин. Кенеди се запалва само, когато коментира влиянията от и към флота и - по-неохотно - пехотата (все пак Великобритания е кралица на моретата, не на сушата).
И тук стигаме до хубавата английска думичка bias. Преводът и като предубеденост не ми се струва достатъчно точен, но не съм специалист. Пол Кенеди е англичанин. Разкошно! Те са едни такива интелигентни fellows, с неизменно добри обноски и яко чувство за хумор, пък и не е да не са видели свят! С две думи, създават огромни очаквания, когато започнат да пишат такива книги. (Това е моят bias). Е, в добавка разбрах доста изрично, че французите са едни доста неприятни типове. Направо ужасни - интриганти и подмолни, а по времето на Наполеон - просто нетърпими. Как да не се изнерви един истински англи...пардон, читател.
В заключение: Пол Кенеди вероятно ще представлява интерес за запалените предимно по военна история, и то с отлично познаване на детайлната хронология, защото линейна последователност в отделните под-секции няма да видят, добре, че поне главите са хронологични. Също така определени факти са адски интересни и крайно любопитни в рамките на цял параграф, ако читателят познава рамката. И да, Кенеди има размах!
⭐️2,5 звезди⭐️
Още един камък по Кенеди и изчетените 15-18-ти век - той гордо нарича англичаните “нация на търговци”. Тъй като си играе с генерализации, явно има предвид Източноиндийската Компсния с нейните 200,000 частнокорпоративни войници (през 1803 г.), които надхвърлят два пъти армията на Короната, но дори не са споменати в книгата?
28.12.2021:
С Наполеон имаме нещо общо - и аз няма да мога да се справя след Ватерло и порядъчно безславно напускам послесражението с това заглавие. Индустриалната революция и следващите епохи в изложението на Кенеди или ще си останат мистерия, или ще ги захапя в някой по-борбен момент.
В началото с Пол Кенеди се разбирахме почти безаварийно. Стилът му се отличава със замах, широта и въображение. Сухото изреждане на факти, равнозначно на мрънкане под нос, определено не е неговото амплоа. Той буквално лети. В рамките на само две изречения читателят може да се сблъска с три държави, двама крале и четирима главнокомандващи и поне една битка, както и някоя интрига, която няма връзка с предходното.
Идеята, че именно фрагментираността на държавите в Европа и честите им конфликти, както и невъзможността само една да надделее над всички останали, е онзи генератор на постоянен неконформизъм и иновации с натрупващ се ефект, предопределил задаващото се влияние на континента над световната история, заслужава изострено внимание. Определено и факти като този, че и испанската, и френската корона обявяват банкрут през 16-ти век по военни съображения, забравили за икономиките си, и че точно в този банкрут се пропилява голяма част от испанските потоци сребро от Западните Индии, е повече от окриляващ въображението, и отваря жажда за още и още. Също “още” настоява и наистина увлекателната история на европейските битки на испанските и австрийските Хабсбурги - връзката със съвременния изглед на Европа е потресаваща. Само дето това "още" в един момент за мен се превърна в какафония.
Пол Кенеди определено не обича линейната структура (което е чудесно, защото точно това мразех едно време в учебниците), но освен това има и проблем със структурата като цяло (а това вече е лошо). От заглавието на книгата тръгнах с очаквания, че великите сили, като колониални метрополии, ще бъдат обхванати с техните приходящи (и изходящи) територии. Е, тук, поне до Ватерло, се оказах излъгана. Читателят получава единствено Европа, и някое и друго бегло споменаване на колония - ей тъй, за разкош. Китай липсва, тъй като не отговаря на определението, но пък Русия я има. Единствено САЩ като колония правят изключение, но там пък е обяснено, че загубата им при отцепването им за Англия де факто е несъществена. На моя въпрос "защо", останах с впечатление, че причината е невъзможността да се обхване логистично за военни цели такава огромна територия поради бавните сухопътни комуникации. Добре, но това май намирисва на нещо военно, и комай няма връзка с икономиката.
Тук стигаме до втория ми генерален проблем - подзаглавието "Икономически промени и военни конфликти XV-XX век". За военните конфликти получих изобилие от детайли - по две битки в изречение, без обаче да се изясни от коя война са. А ако е посочено - е чак в следващата под-глава/под-секция. Всъщност може да е било и в предходната. Ясна и проста връзка. Стигаме до конкретната война - е, драги читателю, да си си чел учебниците. Ако не си, си е за твоя сметка - подобно на сериала "Ало-Ало" Кенеди не смята да повтаря. Обаче ще разкаже увлекателно за новия вид открита пушка.
Конфликти в изложението има много. Икономика - не. Да, споменават се термини като "пазари" и "стоки". Какво обаче стои зад тях, какви конкретно стоки, какви са основните изходящи и входящи потоци, за целия 18-ти век ми остана тотално неясно. А връзките метрополии-колонии останаха в сферата на беглото споменаване - да, колониите са способствали растежа на метрополиите. Е, това го знам и без господин Кенеди. Златният триъгълник на търговията роби (Африка) - захар/тютюн/руда (Новият свят) - завършени продукти с добавена стойност (Европа) липсва. Робите са споменати срамежливо (Ла Рошел като пристанище със специализация в тази сфера, както и под линия за едно популярно сред инвеститорите на 18-ти век английско акционерно дружество, претърпяло фалит). Може в следващите глави да е по-застъпено, но липсата в целия 18-ти век е, меко казано, странна. Като цяло икономиката е разгледана точно така - като един единствен термин. Кенеди се запалва само, когато коментира влиянията от и към флота и - по-неохотно - пехотата (все пак Великобритания е кралица на моретата, не на сушата).
И тук стигаме до хубавата английска думичка bias. Преводът и като предубеденост не ми се струва достатъчно точен, но не съм специалист. Пол Кенеди е англичанин. Разкошно! Те са едни такива интелигентни fellows, с неизменно добри обноски и яко чувство за хумор, пък и не е да не са видели свят! С две думи, създават огромни очаквания, когато започнат да пишат такива книги. (Това е моят bias). Е, в добавка разбрах доста изрично, че французите са едни доста неприятни типове. Направо ужасни - интриганти и подмолни, а по времето на Наполеон - просто нетърпими. Как да не се изнерви един истински англи...пардон, читател.
В заключение: Пол Кенеди вероятно ще представлява интерес за запалените предимно по военна история, и то с отлично познаване на детайлната хронология, защото линейна последователност в отделните под-секции няма да видят, добре, че поне главите са хронологични. Също така определени факти са адски интересни и крайно любопитни в рамките на цял параграф, ако читателят познава рамката. И да, Кенеди има размах!
⭐️2,5 звезди⭐️
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October 21, 2024In 1987 this was a real blockbuster in history and international politics. Kennedy seemed to have written the definitive analysis on the strength and weaknesses of empires and countries. But only two years later Kennedy's reputation was gone, because he had not predicted the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union. How unjust! This book can still be read for its breadth and erudition, and it certainly contains some very useful insights into the world of today.
February 28, 2017
This is one of the preeminent books on imperial overreach. Paul Kennedy charts over a 500 year period how great powers rise and fall. Economic resources fuel rises in power that lead to military buildups to protect that power. However, over time, more and more military resources are needed to maintain empires. Great powers invest more in their military and neglect domestic investments to strengthen their economy, leading to atrophy and decline.
A corollary idea has to do with differencing growth rates. Because economic growth rates differ from country to country, depending on where they are in their economic development, demographic trends, and their susceptibility to technological adaptation and innovation, the relative power of states always fluctuate relative to one another. This is important for IR theory because it means that balancing through alliances and internal balancing through defense buildups may not be enough to overcome a rising powers with exaggerated rates of economic growth.
It seems to me that there is a third element that needs to be addressed, which is the role of nation-building in economic development. Nation-building and overcoming civil strife were important aspects of the rise of the U.S., Germany, Japan, the USSR, and Italy. Prolonged conflict hurt China. I think there is a case to be made for this being an important third rung in Kennedy’s argument.
In the final chapter, we see exactly why power politics is so hard to predict. We know that economic growth will be uneven, but we don’t know the particulars of that uneveness -- which countries will grow faster and when, when others may slow down.
I was a little disappointed. Not by the history, but rather by the lack of exploration of ideas. As I was reading this book, I thought to myself that this couldn’t have been the origin of the idea of imperial overreach. Afterall, Thucydides talked about imperial overreach. Thus, I would have liked to have seen some of archeology of the idea of overreach and a situation of the author’s own idea within the larger landscape about ideas of imperial overreach.
I have no problem with a history book being detail-rich and theory-neglectful. In a sense, that is the role of history. However, as I was reading this book I couldn’t but think that there was a wealth of insights on the idea of imperial overreach just outside this book’s purview.
A corollary idea has to do with differencing growth rates. Because economic growth rates differ from country to country, depending on where they are in their economic development, demographic trends, and their susceptibility to technological adaptation and innovation, the relative power of states always fluctuate relative to one another. This is important for IR theory because it means that balancing through alliances and internal balancing through defense buildups may not be enough to overcome a rising powers with exaggerated rates of economic growth.
It seems to me that there is a third element that needs to be addressed, which is the role of nation-building in economic development. Nation-building and overcoming civil strife were important aspects of the rise of the U.S., Germany, Japan, the USSR, and Italy. Prolonged conflict hurt China. I think there is a case to be made for this being an important third rung in Kennedy’s argument.
In the final chapter, we see exactly why power politics is so hard to predict. We know that economic growth will be uneven, but we don’t know the particulars of that uneveness -- which countries will grow faster and when, when others may slow down.
I was a little disappointed. Not by the history, but rather by the lack of exploration of ideas. As I was reading this book, I thought to myself that this couldn’t have been the origin of the idea of imperial overreach. Afterall, Thucydides talked about imperial overreach. Thus, I would have liked to have seen some of archeology of the idea of overreach and a situation of the author’s own idea within the larger landscape about ideas of imperial overreach.
I have no problem with a history book being detail-rich and theory-neglectful. In a sense, that is the role of history. However, as I was reading this book I couldn’t but think that there was a wealth of insights on the idea of imperial overreach just outside this book’s purview.
December 16, 2023
A jelző, ami eszembe jut, a "tárgyszerű". Tárgyszerű fizikai értelemben, a maga hatszáz sűrűn szedett oldalával, a bő száz oldalas jegyzettel a végén, egyszóval: egész böszme testi valójában. És tárgyszerű mint szöveg is, mondhatni, semmi extra, csak épp összefoglalása a komplett emberi történelemnek a XVI. századtól napjainkig. Kennedy tulajdonképpen a birodalmak életciklusait írja meg - ahogy egyszer csak kinőnek a földből, mint a gomba, burjánzanak picit, aztán idővel összeasznak oly apróra, hogy az első szél elsodorja őket a semmibe. Honnan jön hatalmuk és hová megy, ez itt a kérdés.
Hogy honnan jön, az egyszerű, és rég tudjuk: a pénzből, a pénzből és a pénzből. Amivel Kennedy felspécizte ezt a gondolatot, az "csupán" eme felhajtóerő komplex volta: annak leírása, hogy nem elég, ha egy állam pusztán meggazdagszik, hanem gazdaságát megfelelően kell hatalommá alakítania - döntenie kell, hogy akkor ágyú vagy vaj, azaz védelembe, fogyasztásba esetleg befektetésbe forgatja vissza termelékenységét. És az, hogy melyik mellett dönt egy adott történelmi kontextusban, jövőjét határozza meg.
A kötet külön értéke, hogy a szerző a birodalmakat nem külön-külön, hanem együtt, egymással való viszonyukon keresztül vizsgálja. Így aztán észreveszi azt, ami mások számára talán nem nyilvánvaló: hogy egy hatalmi gócpont nem akkor kezd el veszíteni jelentőségéből, amikor termelékenysége abszolút értékben csökken, hanem ezt mindig megelőzi egy relatív, a feltörekvő hatalmi gócpontokhoz viszonyított csökkenés. Ez így belegondolva talán nyilvánvalónak tűnik, de ezért tudja Kennedy még a Szovjetunió (és ezzel a kétpólusú világrend) összeomlása előtt prognosztizálni az ázsiai óriás, Kína felemelkedését.
Adnék én rá öt csillagot is, mert szaglik a könyvről saját jelentősége, és az, hogy Kennedy beleadott apait-anyait. De valahogy olyan érzésem van - bizonytalan és homályos érzület, bevallom -, hogy ezeket a dolgokat valahol már hallottam. Bizonyára ez pont a könyv jelentőségének tudható be: annyira fontos, hogy legfőbb állításai evidenciaként beépültek utód-könyveibe, és ettől nemzőatyjuk (ez a könyv) valahogy idejétmúlttá vált. Talán ezért, talán másért, de nem érzem, hogy máshogy látnám elolvasása után a világot.
Hogy honnan jön, az egyszerű, és rég tudjuk: a pénzből, a pénzből és a pénzből. Amivel Kennedy felspécizte ezt a gondolatot, az "csupán" eme felhajtóerő komplex volta: annak leírása, hogy nem elég, ha egy állam pusztán meggazdagszik, hanem gazdaságát megfelelően kell hatalommá alakítania - döntenie kell, hogy akkor ágyú vagy vaj, azaz védelembe, fogyasztásba esetleg befektetésbe forgatja vissza termelékenységét. És az, hogy melyik mellett dönt egy adott történelmi kontextusban, jövőjét határozza meg.
A kötet külön értéke, hogy a szerző a birodalmakat nem külön-külön, hanem együtt, egymással való viszonyukon keresztül vizsgálja. Így aztán észreveszi azt, ami mások számára talán nem nyilvánvaló: hogy egy hatalmi gócpont nem akkor kezd el veszíteni jelentőségéből, amikor termelékenysége abszolút értékben csökken, hanem ezt mindig megelőzi egy relatív, a feltörekvő hatalmi gócpontokhoz viszonyított csökkenés. Ez így belegondolva talán nyilvánvalónak tűnik, de ezért tudja Kennedy még a Szovjetunió (és ezzel a kétpólusú világrend) összeomlása előtt prognosztizálni az ázsiai óriás, Kína felemelkedését.
Adnék én rá öt csillagot is, mert szaglik a könyvről saját jelentősége, és az, hogy Kennedy beleadott apait-anyait. De valahogy olyan érzésem van - bizonytalan és homályos érzület, bevallom -, hogy ezeket a dolgokat valahol már hallottam. Bizonyára ez pont a könyv jelentőségének tudható be: annyira fontos, hogy legfőbb állításai evidenciaként beépültek utód-könyveibe, és ettől nemzőatyjuk (ez a könyv) valahogy idejétmúlttá vált. Talán ezért, talán másért, de nem érzem, hogy máshogy látnám elolvasása után a világot.
December 17, 2021
Възход и падение на Великите сили, историята като вечен конфликт: http://knigolandia.info/book-review/v...
Ясно си спомням как си купих предишното издание на “Възход и падение на Великите сили” на Пол Кенеди, което понастоящем е една оръфана баница, защото бе надлежно огъвано, мачкано, драскано пак и пак по време на не една сесия в Университета. Изключително полезна книга се оказа тогава, пълна с ясна, структурирана информация, без излишни отклонения и фокус върху важните държави и техните отношения, преимуществено враждебни и бурни. Сетне през годините прочетох още безброй исторически книги, но тази остави в мен силен спомен – затова и съм толкова щастлив, че най-после мечтата ми да бъде преиздадена в достоен вид е реалност. Още повече че ми съсипа цели две ваканции с безбройните си дребни корекции, особено в бележките, където хвърлих десетки часове работа буквално, че и до очен лекар ме докараха. Но това вече е в миналото, книгата вече заема почетно място в библиотеката ми, редом с “Под различни небеса” на Норман Дейвис, един друг дълго мечтан левиатан. Надолу не анализирам книгата в детайли, това е невъзможно, но се спирам на някои интересни епизоди, които ми направиха впечатление.
CIELA Books
http://knigolandia.info/book-review/v...
Ясно си спомням как си купих предишното издание на “Възход и падение на Великите сили” на Пол Кенеди, което понастоящем е една оръфана баница, защото бе надлежно огъвано, мачкано, драскано пак и пак по време на не една сесия в Университета. Изключително полезна книга се оказа тогава, пълна с ясна, структурирана информация, без излишни отклонения и фокус върху важните държави и техните отношения, преимуществено враждебни и бурни. Сетне през годините прочетох още безброй исторически книги, но тази остави в мен силен спомен – затова и съм толкова щастлив, че най-после мечтата ми да бъде преиздадена в достоен вид е реалност. Още повече че ми съсипа цели две ваканции с безбройните си дребни корекции, особено в бележките, където хвърлих десетки часове работа буквално, че и до очен лекар ме докараха. Но това вече е в миналото, книгата вече заема почетно място в библиотеката ми, редом с “Под различни небеса” на Норман Дейвис, един друг дълго мечтан левиатан. Надолу не анализирам книгата в детайли, това е невъзможно, но се спирам на някои интересни епизоди, които ми направиха впечатление.
CIELA Books
http://knigolandia.info/book-review/v...
June 6, 2018
An incredibly detailed and complex read, I would only recommend this to the history buff who is not only endlessly curious, but has some prior knowledge of Great Power history in the last 5 centuries. The amount of detail discussed upon is insane, and the author manages to paint the economic, social, military and political aspects of the powers in broad strokes, while using tables, graphs and good ol' quotations. But this book is more than just a narrative description - it is an analysis, and a very good one at that. The writing is clear, non-adorned and very easily understood in general.
Bear in mind that this was published in 1987. Why do I say that? Well, because one of the Great Powers discussed at length is Russia - which at the time of writing this book, the author knew better as the USSR. At that point in time, the communist bloc was still in force, so the 1989 Autumn of the Nations (communist breakaway of Poland, Hungary, Checkoslovakia and Romania), the fall of the Berlin Wall (and thus the unification of West and East Germany, the latter once again breaking from communism) and finally, the big bad boy of 1991 and the fracturing of the Soviet Union into fifteen different states - these were all still a few years away. Just as well, while discussing European powers, within the 20th Century the author refers to them as EEC countries - because the creation of the European Union (which was going to absorb EEC and become sort of a continuation) was still some time away. When it comes to economy, the book discussed at length various different budgets and coinage, but it does not (and could not) discuss the Euro, which was only introduced in 1999. While it would have been fascinating to know the author's opinion on these changes, do know that his analysis ends in 1987 and thus does not address these monumental shifts. However,
if you're interested in Great Power play (that sounds kinky) in the last 500 years, this is certainly the book for you.
Bear in mind that this was published in 1987. Why do I say that? Well, because one of the Great Powers discussed at length is Russia - which at the time of writing this book, the author knew better as the USSR. At that point in time, the communist bloc was still in force, so the 1989 Autumn of the Nations (communist breakaway of Poland, Hungary, Checkoslovakia and Romania), the fall of the Berlin Wall (and thus the unification of West and East Germany, the latter once again breaking from communism) and finally, the big bad boy of 1991 and the fracturing of the Soviet Union into fifteen different states - these were all still a few years away. Just as well, while discussing European powers, within the 20th Century the author refers to them as EEC countries - because the creation of the European Union (which was going to absorb EEC and become sort of a continuation) was still some time away. When it comes to economy, the book discussed at length various different budgets and coinage, but it does not (and could not) discuss the Euro, which was only introduced in 1999. While it would have been fascinating to know the author's opinion on these changes, do know that his analysis ends in 1987 and thus does not address these monumental shifts. However,
if you're interested in Great Power play (that sounds kinky) in the last 500 years, this is certainly the book for you.
December 11, 2024
This is a big serious brick of a book so make sure you're willing to invest the time and brainpower needed before you begin reading it. Having said that it is fairly reader friendly and almost "populist" in tone but it's still a big book with a lot of big ideas and loads of data to digest.
The author's main idea (or least as much as i was able to digest of it) is this: to be a great power a nation needs military power, to get military power it needs economic power, to get economic power it needs the right combination of raw materials, economic policy and business friendly government plus an educated population able to participate in a modern economy. If even one of these things is missing the results can be fatal for a nation's power and military performance.
Certain historical conclusions follow from this and the author is not shy of pointing them out: both the central powers in WWI and the Axis powers in WWII were doomed from the start having neither the resources nor the economic base from which to wage a sustained war. Also China and Russia have and will continue to fail due to bad economic policy.
Having read this book and thought about it a little i'm coming around to the idea that my country (Australia) is also doomed. We have offshored all our manufacturing, we build almost nothing anymore, our education system is basically a visa scam for Indians and Chinese and our entire economy is based on digging up minerals and a real estate ponzi scheme that's well overdue for collapse. Add to this the fact that we're governed by the dregs of our middle class and i see no good future for Australia.
Anyway this is a big ideas book and a book to make you think if you're willing to invest the time and effort into it.
The author's main idea (or least as much as i was able to digest of it) is this: to be a great power a nation needs military power, to get military power it needs economic power, to get economic power it needs the right combination of raw materials, economic policy and business friendly government plus an educated population able to participate in a modern economy. If even one of these things is missing the results can be fatal for a nation's power and military performance.
Certain historical conclusions follow from this and the author is not shy of pointing them out: both the central powers in WWI and the Axis powers in WWII were doomed from the start having neither the resources nor the economic base from which to wage a sustained war. Also China and Russia have and will continue to fail due to bad economic policy.
Having read this book and thought about it a little i'm coming around to the idea that my country (Australia) is also doomed. We have offshored all our manufacturing, we build almost nothing anymore, our education system is basically a visa scam for Indians and Chinese and our entire economy is based on digging up minerals and a real estate ponzi scheme that's well overdue for collapse. Add to this the fact that we're governed by the dregs of our middle class and i see no good future for Australia.
Anyway this is a big ideas book and a book to make you think if you're willing to invest the time and effort into it.
November 30, 2018
I was pretty impressed when I read this, back in 1989, when it was just published. It contains great overviews of the great empires in the last 500 years. A few months later the Iron Curtain went down and the Eastern European Communist empire vanished. And for Paul Kennedy, it also was a great shock for his reputation because he hadn't seen it coming. Another illustration of how historians better look at the past and don't risk predicting the future.
November 4, 2009
As Kennedy puts it in his "Introduction," "This is a book about national and international power in the "modern"--that is, post-Renaissance--period. It seeks to trace and to explain how the various great powers have risen and fallen. . . ." And, on the same page:
"The `military conflict' referred to in the book's subtitle is therefore always examined in the context of `economic change.' The triumph of any one Great Power in this period, or the collapse of another, has usually been the consequence of lengthy fighting by its armed forces; but it has also been the consequence of the more or less efficient utilization of the state's productive resources in wartime, and, further in the background, of the way in which that state's economy has been rising or falling, relative to the other leading nations. . . ."
He examines a variety of historical instances in which empires or countries spend more on their empires or expansion than they can afford. Too much expenditure on defense and the military drains the national treasure and wealth and can lead to an erosion in the vitality and power of that society.
Earlier examples of imperial overreach or overstretch include the Hapsburg Empire (1519-1659). From 1660-1815, other examples are adduced. So, too, periods such as 1815-1885, 1885-1918, 1919-1942.
He goes on to examine the bipolar world after World War II (the United States versus the Soviet Union) and the time there following. He is pessimistic about the United States maintaining its dominance. Two decades after the book was written, that fear has not come about. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did suffer from its "overreach" and has not survived as a major power in a bipolar system. Today's Russia is simply not a superpower anymore. Thus, his fear for the American future has not yet come about. Will it? If he is right and the United States overreaches, then we would expect decline. If his view is correct, there is a challenge to American decision makers to make sure that this does not happen. Are they up to the task? As historians might note, we must wait until the future to know.
Thus, while some of his forecasts clearly have not yet come about, he does produce a rich historical analysis of the relationship between the internal characteristics of a society, the international context, and ultimate success or failure. This book is well worth grappling with. . . .
"The `military conflict' referred to in the book's subtitle is therefore always examined in the context of `economic change.' The triumph of any one Great Power in this period, or the collapse of another, has usually been the consequence of lengthy fighting by its armed forces; but it has also been the consequence of the more or less efficient utilization of the state's productive resources in wartime, and, further in the background, of the way in which that state's economy has been rising or falling, relative to the other leading nations. . . ."
He examines a variety of historical instances in which empires or countries spend more on their empires or expansion than they can afford. Too much expenditure on defense and the military drains the national treasure and wealth and can lead to an erosion in the vitality and power of that society.
Earlier examples of imperial overreach or overstretch include the Hapsburg Empire (1519-1659). From 1660-1815, other examples are adduced. So, too, periods such as 1815-1885, 1885-1918, 1919-1942.
He goes on to examine the bipolar world after World War II (the United States versus the Soviet Union) and the time there following. He is pessimistic about the United States maintaining its dominance. Two decades after the book was written, that fear has not come about. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did suffer from its "overreach" and has not survived as a major power in a bipolar system. Today's Russia is simply not a superpower anymore. Thus, his fear for the American future has not yet come about. Will it? If he is right and the United States overreaches, then we would expect decline. If his view is correct, there is a challenge to American decision makers to make sure that this does not happen. Are they up to the task? As historians might note, we must wait until the future to know.
Thus, while some of his forecasts clearly have not yet come about, he does produce a rich historical analysis of the relationship between the internal characteristics of a society, the international context, and ultimate success or failure. This book is well worth grappling with. . . .
January 18, 2019
Her ne kadar Berlin Duvarı yıkılmadan, SSCB çözülmeden, Avrupa Birliği henüz Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu aşamasındayken yazılmış olsa da, günümüz dünyasını - 500 yıllık perspektiften - kavrayabilmek için okunması gereken başyapıtlardan biri. 21. yüzyılın ilk çeyreğinde yaşanan olayların cevabı da kitabın satır aralarında: 9/11, ABD'nin Büyük Ortadoğu seferi, iki büyük finansal kriz, Arap Baharı ve vekalet savaşları...
October 2, 2019
Published in 1987, this is a must-have reference for anyone interested in European history over the last 500 years and American history in the international context up until the late 20th century. It is a comparative anatomy of nations.
Kennedy is erudite. The depth and breadth of his knowledge are on display throughout the book. In order to analyze national power, one must be familiar with the many factors that make it up, among them geography, economics, the characteristics of the citizenry, education, the quality of leadership, military technology and tactics, all probed thoroughly here.
Statistics make for boring reading, so Kennedy has wisely kept numbers to a minimum. Rise and Fall keeps your interest because the insights the author provides always provoke thought.
Repeatedly, Kennedy sets the international stage and then moves through an examination of each of the powers of a certain period in detail before arriving at the next period to begin with a new overview. I've read many historical accounts and have often wished for an overview to allow me to see the place and time in relation to the larger world. Rise and Fall is written is a way that makes it easy to go to a particular point since 1500 and take in the overall situation. Though Europe is the focus of most of the book, acting aggressively over the globe throughout, Japan and China are not excluded.
Kennedy's coverage of the last part of the 20th century is no letdown from his account of earlier times, made all the more interesting because the reader knows exactly what has happened since. A grim picture is painted of the Soviet Union of 1985, but Kennedy warns more than once that it should not be assumed that it will collapse. He points out that over the 500 years he has covered, no great power went down suddenly except through war, yet in only two years time such a precedent was set.
Power is relative and the great powers of any period are only judged in relation to each other. Strength of the national economy is a must, yet over time we see one power after another over-extend itself, squander its wealth, and finally come face to face with too many obligations and not enough resources to cover them all. At the height of power, it is difficult to see the loss of it, but inevitably it happens. The United States is no exception. Compared to the height of its power relative to the rest of the world at the end of WW2, the United States has definitely declined, remaining supreme only in the costly area of military power.
As for the U.S. economy, it's almost humorous when Kennedy estimates that if the trend continues, the U.S. will have a national debt of $13 trillion by the year 2000, intending to shock the reader. Well, here we are in 2015 and the national debt is $18 trillion, with the one-time creditor to the world being deeply in dept to both China and Japan.
If you want to eliminate the confusion that can come from reading many unrelated histories, here is the book to put all in context.
Kennedy is erudite. The depth and breadth of his knowledge are on display throughout the book. In order to analyze national power, one must be familiar with the many factors that make it up, among them geography, economics, the characteristics of the citizenry, education, the quality of leadership, military technology and tactics, all probed thoroughly here.
Statistics make for boring reading, so Kennedy has wisely kept numbers to a minimum. Rise and Fall keeps your interest because the insights the author provides always provoke thought.
Repeatedly, Kennedy sets the international stage and then moves through an examination of each of the powers of a certain period in detail before arriving at the next period to begin with a new overview. I've read many historical accounts and have often wished for an overview to allow me to see the place and time in relation to the larger world. Rise and Fall is written is a way that makes it easy to go to a particular point since 1500 and take in the overall situation. Though Europe is the focus of most of the book, acting aggressively over the globe throughout, Japan and China are not excluded.
Kennedy's coverage of the last part of the 20th century is no letdown from his account of earlier times, made all the more interesting because the reader knows exactly what has happened since. A grim picture is painted of the Soviet Union of 1985, but Kennedy warns more than once that it should not be assumed that it will collapse. He points out that over the 500 years he has covered, no great power went down suddenly except through war, yet in only two years time such a precedent was set.
Power is relative and the great powers of any period are only judged in relation to each other. Strength of the national economy is a must, yet over time we see one power after another over-extend itself, squander its wealth, and finally come face to face with too many obligations and not enough resources to cover them all. At the height of power, it is difficult to see the loss of it, but inevitably it happens. The United States is no exception. Compared to the height of its power relative to the rest of the world at the end of WW2, the United States has definitely declined, remaining supreme only in the costly area of military power.
As for the U.S. economy, it's almost humorous when Kennedy estimates that if the trend continues, the U.S. will have a national debt of $13 trillion by the year 2000, intending to shock the reader. Well, here we are in 2015 and the national debt is $18 trillion, with the one-time creditor to the world being deeply in dept to both China and Japan.
If you want to eliminate the confusion that can come from reading many unrelated histories, here is the book to put all in context.
August 13, 2016
This was an endeavor. Starting from the Reformation to the late 80's this book covers the reasons for the rise and fall of the great powers. The Bourbon Monarchies, Hapsburgs, Napoleon, Holy Roman Empire/Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German Empire, Britain, Nazi Germany, Japan, and the United States are all covered. I believe this book is on the level of Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy. A monumental undertaking that examines in-depth all aspects that make an empire and then subsequently lead to its demise. This book did something different than what I am used to though. Economic power was examined thoroughly. The author did a fantastic job of linking economic power to the ability to fund military power. Those powers with a strong economy and powerful national infrastructure were able to fund and develop powerful militaries. The use of colonies, the Industrial Revolution, the General Staff system, Bismarckian alliances, and much more were also discussed.
The book did end with a discussion on how the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Japan, China, and the United States would progress beyond the 80's. Deficit spending by the United States was covered in detail. It was eerie to read how the projections of the 80's became truths through the 90's, became ominous in the early 2000's, and now keep us up at night in 2016. How are infrastructure and manufacturing capability is being traded for a service society. How the cheaper third world is easily taking our manufacturing capabilities (economic power) so we can enjoy cheap commodities. Without an economic power base, we cannot develop our military power...we will eventually need to buy from someone else. Another subject was spiraling weapons development costs. The time period again was the 80's with a glance at the future. Eerie again on how the author peered into the future and predicted the infatuation with highly technical, therefore highly expensive, weapons systems. Can a multi-billion dollar death machine truly project military power when we can only afford three of them? Projections of a fleet of new jets or ships are later truncated to only a few after numerous development delays and cost 0verruns.
I thoroughly enjoyed this book. It takes quite some time to read due to the length and depth of the periods covered. The author did a marvelous job of research into the economic and military histories of the aforementioned subjects. A welcome addition to any study of world history.
The book did end with a discussion on how the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Japan, China, and the United States would progress beyond the 80's. Deficit spending by the United States was covered in detail. It was eerie to read how the projections of the 80's became truths through the 90's, became ominous in the early 2000's, and now keep us up at night in 2016. How are infrastructure and manufacturing capability is being traded for a service society. How the cheaper third world is easily taking our manufacturing capabilities (economic power) so we can enjoy cheap commodities. Without an economic power base, we cannot develop our military power...we will eventually need to buy from someone else. Another subject was spiraling weapons development costs. The time period again was the 80's with a glance at the future. Eerie again on how the author peered into the future and predicted the infatuation with highly technical, therefore highly expensive, weapons systems. Can a multi-billion dollar death machine truly project military power when we can only afford three of them? Projections of a fleet of new jets or ships are later truncated to only a few after numerous development delays and cost 0verruns.
I thoroughly enjoyed this book. It takes quite some time to read due to the length and depth of the periods covered. The author did a marvelous job of research into the economic and military histories of the aforementioned subjects. A welcome addition to any study of world history.
January 2, 2019
A totally useless book until we get closer to WWI. Full of generalities and no figures. And while the book does eventually begin, at a historical point where the author is more familiar, the early deficiencies continue to infect the remaining chapters. For example, how were the wars financed? The money system gets set up long before WWI, and Kennedy basically has nothing to say about it. It's a shame, especially because his beautiful manufacturing numbers can't be understood without debt. Germany can't be understood without debt.
I. Chernev gives some details in House of Morgan and House of Warburg, but those are side chapters and don't fully address Kennedy's theme. The numbers he needed were rates of interest and who was lending what. We needed to talk about financial centers. How were the Soviets borrowing?
I. Chernev gives some details in House of Morgan and House of Warburg, but those are side chapters and don't fully address Kennedy's theme. The numbers he needed were rates of interest and who was lending what. We needed to talk about financial centers. How were the Soviets borrowing?
October 17, 2019
Too long for my liking,and goes into a bit too much detail about ancient empires like Ming China.Didn't really hold my interest.
October 12, 2019
This book by Paul Kennedy proposes a very interesting review of the politics and economics of the Great Powers of the last 5 centuries since 1500. It reviews our history, by analysing, one by one, the Great Powers of the time, their strengths and weaknesses, and the challenges that caused them to lose their supremacy in favour of other upcoming Great Powers.
Some of the main arguments of Paul Kennedy to explain the rise and fall of Great Powers are first that the strength of any Great Power is measured only by comparison to others, and second, that relative strength depends to a large extent on the availability of available resources. History has shown that Great Powers tend to lose their dominance whenever their military needs and ambitions started to exceed their available, economic resources.
The book starts with the Renaissance and the rise of European Powers, and examines the relative dominance of the Habsburgs over significant parts of Europe until the first half of the 17th century.
It then shows the increasing importance of finance to distinguish those nations who fund their wars to a significant extent with the wealth they generate - especially Great Britain - from those who struggle to do so.
The upcoming industrial revolution translates into additional power driven from the relative importance of industrial production to explain the dominance of industrial powerhouses over others.
The analysis of the 20th century will add to that new or increasingly important other resources like iron, steel, coal, etc. and other factors like the size of the population and its urbanisation driving the strength of Great Powers.
Here, to my view, Paul Kennedy could have insisted much more on the importance of access to oil to determine the strength of any nation throughout the 20th century. Control of oil production has been one of the key determining factors in my opinion of the rise and fall of Great Powers throughout the last century.
The book finishes with the biggest question mark of our era: how long can the Great Powers of our time, and especially the United States, continue to dominate the world? And I would add to that: if and when the US stop being the world's only superpower, who will be next and what will that mean for all of us?
Paul Kennedy rightly points out that continued deficit spending in the US, caused in part by increased military spending to fund (sometimes unnecessary, to my view) wars and the presence of US troops across the globe, may be one of the most important reasons for the relative decline of the US.
A must read!
Review by Bruno Gremez
Some of the main arguments of Paul Kennedy to explain the rise and fall of Great Powers are first that the strength of any Great Power is measured only by comparison to others, and second, that relative strength depends to a large extent on the availability of available resources. History has shown that Great Powers tend to lose their dominance whenever their military needs and ambitions started to exceed their available, economic resources.
The book starts with the Renaissance and the rise of European Powers, and examines the relative dominance of the Habsburgs over significant parts of Europe until the first half of the 17th century.
It then shows the increasing importance of finance to distinguish those nations who fund their wars to a significant extent with the wealth they generate - especially Great Britain - from those who struggle to do so.
The upcoming industrial revolution translates into additional power driven from the relative importance of industrial production to explain the dominance of industrial powerhouses over others.
The analysis of the 20th century will add to that new or increasingly important other resources like iron, steel, coal, etc. and other factors like the size of the population and its urbanisation driving the strength of Great Powers.
Here, to my view, Paul Kennedy could have insisted much more on the importance of access to oil to determine the strength of any nation throughout the 20th century. Control of oil production has been one of the key determining factors in my opinion of the rise and fall of Great Powers throughout the last century.
The book finishes with the biggest question mark of our era: how long can the Great Powers of our time, and especially the United States, continue to dominate the world? And I would add to that: if and when the US stop being the world's only superpower, who will be next and what will that mean for all of us?
Paul Kennedy rightly points out that continued deficit spending in the US, caused in part by increased military spending to fund (sometimes unnecessary, to my view) wars and the presence of US troops across the globe, may be one of the most important reasons for the relative decline of the US.
A must read!
Review by Bruno Gremez
May 9, 2021
It is classic and very much worth reading.
Nations rise and fall. This is a complex process and not a single recipe for sure, but Acemoglu & Robinson explain their views in their book Why Nations Fail which is a very impressive book, based on inclusive and exclusive institutions. Although very reasonable explanation these concepts are quite abstract and this book fills the gaps. I believe, Why Nations Fail? This book and Guns Germs & Steel by Jared Diomond trio give a very good perspective to the rise and fall of the nations.
Nations rise and fall. This is a complex process and not a single recipe for sure, but Acemoglu & Robinson explain their views in their book Why Nations Fail which is a very impressive book, based on inclusive and exclusive institutions. Although very reasonable explanation these concepts are quite abstract and this book fills the gaps. I believe, Why Nations Fail? This book and Guns Germs & Steel by Jared Diomond trio give a very good perspective to the rise and fall of the nations.
November 21, 2022
I did it; I DID IT! I forced myself to finish this torturously, agonizingly boring book. It took months, and so, so many hours that I could've spent reading something good, but I finished it. This may be the most boring book I have ever read in my life. I'm convinced that 90% of my college textbooks were better reads than this. I read it because I wanted to understand how civilizations rose to the top and then fell (mainly because I believe the U.S. peaked a long time ago and is well into its inevitable fall, and I was just curious to see how quickly it can be predicted to slide into irrelevance). I also wanted to improve my understanding of history. This book begins with the assumption that the reader already knows a lot about world history, by referring to people and events that I had never heard of casually. I would have expected some kind of explanation, but no. Also, according to this book, the very early Great Powers were nowhere near as important or interesting as the ones that have become important from the twentieth century on, since the early ones merited only passing mention as opposed to the in-depth (but still terribly dull) discussions of China, Japan, the USSR, the U.S., and the European countries. This is a book entirely devoid of personality, fun, and humor. I cannot imagine where all the 5-star reviews came from. I'm left with the vague idea that nations who reach #1 status lose it because they're not able to make enough money to support the military to protect their status -- that's all I'm left with other than a massive feeling of relief that IT'S OVER. Now I want to go cleanse my palate with a Harlequin romance or something.
April 24, 2013
This is a really important book to read for students of diplomacy, military history, and grand strategy. It covers the economic and military reasons for the rise and fall of great powers. It is Eurocentric and covers the rise of Elizabethan England, the decline of Spain, the rise of Napoleon, the rise of Germany, the decline of the Austrian and Ottoman Empires, the rise of the United States and Japan, and the Decline of the British Empire. The final chapter on the bipolar world of the USSR and US has been eclipsed by events, but the earlier chapters are a must read. Far from being a geographic determinist like Mackinder and Jared Diamond, Kennedy does deal effectively with the contributions of culture and polity to the rise and fall of nations without descending to a Gibbon-style rant on decadence.
Want to read
June 28, 2024Скоро ще се върна към тази книга. Просто преди нея трябва да се прочетат поне няколко други, за да имам поне базова подготовка за анализа на Кенеди...XVI и XVII век са ми все още мъгляви, а с тях започва "Възход и падние на Великите сили". Стойността на подобни книги може да се оцени само от читатели с предварителна подготовка, иначе просто в съзнанието остават генералните заключения на автора, без да можем да ги осмислим критично.
May 31, 2018
One of those magisterial overviews of five centuries of world history. Paul Kennedy does a very good job with a quasi-Marxian approach to this, in that economics do in large part determine the trajectory of nations (e.g., a materialist explanation).
While Kennedy admits that earlier history is not his area of expertise, he does a decent job explaining how the "east" fell behind, given the increasing insularity of Ming China and the internecine struggles in South and East Asia that consumed resources and attention. It's not a wholly convincing explanation but other historians have done a fairly good job examining this; I am reminded mainly of Kenneth Pomeranz's counterfactual essay in Unmaking the West , "Without Coal? Colonies? Calculus?: Counterfactuals and Industrialization in Europe and China."
But to return to Kennedy, he has written a remarkable qualitative history based on ballpark quantitative statistics, which is an approach I can very much get behind. Relative national "incomes" in the seventeenth century, for instance, are exceedingly difficult to find data for, much less calculate. And yet Kennedy manages to paint a convincing picture of ebbs and flows in currencies and commodities, in relative power balances and military expenditures, tracing continuities in national approaches towards almost the present day.
It is here that perhaps reviewers have, with the benefit of hindsight, come to blame Kennedy for his failure of prescience. Indeed, he comes close to an accurate prediction in terms of the overall trajectory of Russia, but in the specifics (i.e., the collapse of the Soviet Union), he just misses the mark:
Kennedy was writing in 1987, just two years before the overthrow of Communism in much of eastern Europe, and four before the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. But despite failing to predict its collapse, he nevertheless successfully identified a downwards socioeconomic and geopolitical trajectory for Russia that has since been proven accurate. Similarly, Kennedy's prognosis for the United States seems, especially now, to have been borne out, almost frighteningly so:
And though he never quite describes it as a future strategic competitor (and, to be fair, it is only in the past fifteen years that the contours of Sino-American relations have really begun to solidify), it is clear to Kennedy that the eventual rise of China is perpetually lurking in the background. "The most decisive" international fissure of the Cold War, he writes, "was the split between the USSR and Communist China," which served to make even that era less of a totally bipolar system than is typically conceived of. China is one of five extant or emerging power centers he identifies, and sees a gradually strengthening power with some of the highest growth rates on Earth - this towards the tail end of Deng's rule, before it really took off.
And so, what then for the United States? In keeping with his theme of "imperial overstretch," Kennedy points out that the United States in 1987 had "roughly the same massive array of military obligations across the globe as it had a quarter-century [prior], when its shares of world GNP, manufacturing production, military spending, and armed forces personnel were so much larger." All the military services will inevitably demand more resources and cry poverty, yes, but that is because what passes for American "statecraft" in the 21st century manages to avoid any hard decisions, any downscaling of commitments, and any meaningful reassessment of available ways and means - with an eye towards determining commensurate ends.
Here again, Kennedy is prescient: "an American polity which responds to external challenges by increasing defense expenditures and reacts to the budgetary crisis by slashing the existing social expenditures, may run the risk of provoking an eventual political backlash." We've almost certainly watched that unfold in the years since 2001. In keeping with the rest of Rise and Fall, the United States is in fact headed for decline, but in a relative sense, one that is manageable if approached reasonably. This doesn't single out the country; instead it might be seen (and is by Kennedy) as a reversion to the mean:
Kennedy also offers a warning: "the task facing American statesmen over the next decades, therefore...is a need to 'manage' affairs to that the relative erosion of the United States' position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage." This is wise counsel for the years ahead, as the unipolar moment continues to rapidly fade. But if this is the predominant challenge to the United States in the 21st century - a superpower in decline - than so far we have surely failed to meet it.
While Kennedy admits that earlier history is not his area of expertise, he does a decent job explaining how the "east" fell behind, given the increasing insularity of Ming China and the internecine struggles in South and East Asia that consumed resources and attention. It's not a wholly convincing explanation but other historians have done a fairly good job examining this; I am reminded mainly of Kenneth Pomeranz's counterfactual essay in Unmaking the West , "Without Coal? Colonies? Calculus?: Counterfactuals and Industrialization in Europe and China."
But to return to Kennedy, he has written a remarkable qualitative history based on ballpark quantitative statistics, which is an approach I can very much get behind. Relative national "incomes" in the seventeenth century, for instance, are exceedingly difficult to find data for, much less calculate. And yet Kennedy manages to paint a convincing picture of ebbs and flows in currencies and commodities, in relative power balances and military expenditures, tracing continuities in national approaches towards almost the present day.
It is here that perhaps reviewers have, with the benefit of hindsight, come to blame Kennedy for his failure of prescience. Indeed, he comes close to an accurate prediction in terms of the overall trajectory of Russia, but in the specifics (i.e., the collapse of the Soviet Union), he just misses the mark:
On the other hand, the Soviet war machine also has its own weaknesses and problems ... Since the dilemmas which face the strategy-makers of the other large Powers of the globe are also being pointed out in this chapter, it is only proper to draw attention to the great variety of difficulties confronting Russia's military-political leadership - without, however, jumpting to the opposite conclusion that the Soviet Union is therefore unlikely to 'survive' for very long. [Emphasis in original]
Kennedy was writing in 1987, just two years before the overthrow of Communism in much of eastern Europe, and four before the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. But despite failing to predict its collapse, he nevertheless successfully identified a downwards socioeconomic and geopolitical trajectory for Russia that has since been proven accurate. Similarly, Kennedy's prognosis for the United States seems, especially now, to have been borne out, almost frighteningly so:
Although the United States is at present still in a class of its own economically and perhaps even militarily, it cannot avoid confronting the two great tests which challenge the longevity of every major power that occupies the 'number one' problem in world affairs: whether, in the military/strategical realm, it can preserve a reasonable balance between the nation's perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments; and whether, as an intimately related point, it can preserve the technological and economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of the ever-shifting patterns of global production. This test of American abilities will be the greater because it...is the inheritor of a vast array of strategical commitments had been made decades earlier ... In consequence, the United States now runs the risk, so familiar to historians of the rise and fall of previous Great Powers, of what roughly might be called 'imperial overstretch'.
And though he never quite describes it as a future strategic competitor (and, to be fair, it is only in the past fifteen years that the contours of Sino-American relations have really begun to solidify), it is clear to Kennedy that the eventual rise of China is perpetually lurking in the background. "The most decisive" international fissure of the Cold War, he writes, "was the split between the USSR and Communist China," which served to make even that era less of a totally bipolar system than is typically conceived of. China is one of five extant or emerging power centers he identifies, and sees a gradually strengthening power with some of the highest growth rates on Earth - this towards the tail end of Deng's rule, before it really took off.
And so, what then for the United States? In keeping with his theme of "imperial overstretch," Kennedy points out that the United States in 1987 had "roughly the same massive array of military obligations across the globe as it had a quarter-century [prior], when its shares of world GNP, manufacturing production, military spending, and armed forces personnel were so much larger." All the military services will inevitably demand more resources and cry poverty, yes, but that is because what passes for American "statecraft" in the 21st century manages to avoid any hard decisions, any downscaling of commitments, and any meaningful reassessment of available ways and means - with an eye towards determining commensurate ends.
Here again, Kennedy is prescient: "an American polity which responds to external challenges by increasing defense expenditures and reacts to the budgetary crisis by slashing the existing social expenditures, may run the risk of provoking an eventual political backlash." We've almost certainly watched that unfold in the years since 2001. In keeping with the rest of Rise and Fall, the United States is in fact headed for decline, but in a relative sense, one that is manageable if approached reasonably. This doesn't single out the country; instead it might be seen (and is by Kennedy) as a reversion to the mean:
It may be argued that the geographical extent, population, and resources of the United States suggest that it ought to possess perhaps 16 or 18 percent of the world's wealth and power, but because of historical and technical circumstances favorable to it, that share rose to 40 percent or more by 1945; and what we are witnessing at the moment is the early decades of the ebbing away from that extraordinarily high figure to a more 'natural' share.
Kennedy also offers a warning: "the task facing American statesmen over the next decades, therefore...is a need to 'manage' affairs to that the relative erosion of the United States' position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage." This is wise counsel for the years ahead, as the unipolar moment continues to rapidly fade. But if this is the predominant challenge to the United States in the 21st century - a superpower in decline - than so far we have surely failed to meet it.
July 18, 2023
17/07/2023 (****)
Testo celebre, estremamente interessante - soprattutto nei primi due terzi, in cui l'autore analizza i vari periodi storici dal Cinquecento in avanti, fino agli anni Ottanta del Novecento, e rileva i fattori economici, culturali o militari che hanno portato all'ascesa e al declino delle grandi potenze mondiali.
La tesi del libro è che l'eccessiva, o l'eccessivamente squilibrata, spesa degli stati verso ambiti militari - notoriamente costosissimi e totalmente improduttivi - distogliendo risorse e investimenti da ambiti produttivi, porta invariabilmente al collasso della potenza nel lungo periodo.
L'esempio classico, che Kennedy non fa solo perché il libro venne scritto a metà anni ottanta, è la caduta dell'URSS, travolta da una crisi alimentare e da un collasso repentino e imprevedibile - a tutti - a causa delle enormi spese in ambito militare effettuate nella forsennata corsa a due con gli Stati Uniti. Altro esempio, classico, l'impero spagnolo del Cinque e Seicento, travolto dall'eccessiva esposizione militare e declinato a causa dell'assenza assoluta di un tessuto produttivo adeguato.
Gli USA per il momento sembrano tenere botta, mentre la Cina sale a ritmi veritiginosi e l'Europa, come sempre, sembra sempre sul punto di collassare su sé stessa. Tutte cose che Kennedy, bene o male, aveva previsto.
Più interessante come detto l'analisi storica dei prima due terzi, mentre l'ultimo terzo - più denso di tecnicismi macroeconomici - mi ha francamente interessato meno. L'opera si ferma al 1985, e forse è meglio così: Chernobyl, il crollo dell'URSS e la caduta del Muro di Berlino, la nascita dell'UE, le Torri Gemelle e le disastrose avventure americane in Medio Oriente, Internet e la new economy della Silicon Valley, l'ascesa verticale cinese (e, forse, indiana) e la stagnazione giapponese erano tutte cose di là da venire e non pronosticabili.
Lettura interessante, abbastanza ostica e sicuramente non rilassante.
Testo celebre, estremamente interessante - soprattutto nei primi due terzi, in cui l'autore analizza i vari periodi storici dal Cinquecento in avanti, fino agli anni Ottanta del Novecento, e rileva i fattori economici, culturali o militari che hanno portato all'ascesa e al declino delle grandi potenze mondiali.
La tesi del libro è che l'eccessiva, o l'eccessivamente squilibrata, spesa degli stati verso ambiti militari - notoriamente costosissimi e totalmente improduttivi - distogliendo risorse e investimenti da ambiti produttivi, porta invariabilmente al collasso della potenza nel lungo periodo.
L'esempio classico, che Kennedy non fa solo perché il libro venne scritto a metà anni ottanta, è la caduta dell'URSS, travolta da una crisi alimentare e da un collasso repentino e imprevedibile - a tutti - a causa delle enormi spese in ambito militare effettuate nella forsennata corsa a due con gli Stati Uniti. Altro esempio, classico, l'impero spagnolo del Cinque e Seicento, travolto dall'eccessiva esposizione militare e declinato a causa dell'assenza assoluta di un tessuto produttivo adeguato.
Gli USA per il momento sembrano tenere botta, mentre la Cina sale a ritmi veritiginosi e l'Europa, come sempre, sembra sempre sul punto di collassare su sé stessa. Tutte cose che Kennedy, bene o male, aveva previsto.
Più interessante come detto l'analisi storica dei prima due terzi, mentre l'ultimo terzo - più denso di tecnicismi macroeconomici - mi ha francamente interessato meno. L'opera si ferma al 1985, e forse è meglio così: Chernobyl, il crollo dell'URSS e la caduta del Muro di Berlino, la nascita dell'UE, le Torri Gemelle e le disastrose avventure americane in Medio Oriente, Internet e la new economy della Silicon Valley, l'ascesa verticale cinese (e, forse, indiana) e la stagnazione giapponese erano tutte cose di là da venire e non pronosticabili.
Lettura interessante, abbastanza ostica e sicuramente non rilassante.
April 24, 2009
The key determinant (@ Kennedy) is relative, not absolute decline). British GDP grew, in absolute terms, while it declined relative to the US and others. Thus do great powers ebb...
The US peaked in early 2000, though a debt bubble managed to keep things aloft for another few years.
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story...
When China meets the US, China will be poorer on a per capita basis, but will FEEL richer as it is ascending; while the US, with a small population, will be richer on a per capita basis, but will FEEL poorer, as it is descending.
The markets have already started to discount this process -- as markets anticipate....
The US peaked in early 2000, though a debt bubble managed to keep things aloft for another few years.
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story...
When China meets the US, China will be poorer on a per capita basis, but will FEEL richer as it is ascending; while the US, with a small population, will be richer on a per capita basis, but will FEEL poorer, as it is descending.
The markets have already started to discount this process -- as markets anticipate....
October 28, 2021
Pretty dense lol
June 29, 2022
Giving it only 3 stars.It took me a lot of time to comprehend it.So, here is crux :
The states cannot remain stable in relation to one another because of differential growth patterns and when a state becomes especially powerful at a given point .It is more likely to be confronted by coalition of other powers.So, the war between these major great powers will occur and the one with great military resources win.So, we get a lesson
Wealth is usually needed to underpin military powers and military power is needed to acquire and protect wealth.It is somehow justifies Frederich Engel's idea that nothing is more dependent on economic conditions than precisely army and navy.
He also mentions that fall of USA will not fit the earlier patterns of rise and fall of nations because it has forged a system of military and economic alliances globally.
The states cannot remain stable in relation to one another because of differential growth patterns and when a state becomes especially powerful at a given point .It is more likely to be confronted by coalition of other powers.So, the war between these major great powers will occur and the one with great military resources win.So, we get a lesson
Wealth is usually needed to underpin military powers and military power is needed to acquire and protect wealth.It is somehow justifies Frederich Engel's idea that nothing is more dependent on economic conditions than precisely army and navy.
He also mentions that fall of USA will not fit the earlier patterns of rise and fall of nations because it has forged a system of military and economic alliances globally.
January 6, 2022
Very dry but it was a history so I don’t know what I expected. A good, material breakdown of the last 500 years.
July 26, 2022
A go-to for 500 years of geopolitical history, with many lessons to be learned for the 21st century.
October 6, 2022
This book is outstanding! With prose as scintillating as the title and subtitle suggest, Kennedy takes the reader through a survey of global civilizations over the last 500 years. Hang in there! This read is well worth the work.
'Rise and Fall' is an outstanding synthesis of Kennedy's argument that, over time, civilizations that manage to balance consumption against investment, along with military expenditures - grow their economies faster than other civilizations. Over time, this growth leads to power, both economic and military.
I read this in 2022 after Kennedy's analysis sat on my shelves since its pub date in the last 80s.
When R&FGP was cited in another title that I read this year (On Grand Strategy, also good), I was embarrased into getting back to this volume. Am very very glad that I did. Reading a 1987 book about the inevitability of the US/USSR bipolar world - from my perch in 2022 -is hilarious and remains insightful.
Strong recommend.
'Rise and Fall' is an outstanding synthesis of Kennedy's argument that, over time, civilizations that manage to balance consumption against investment, along with military expenditures - grow their economies faster than other civilizations. Over time, this growth leads to power, both economic and military.
I read this in 2022 after Kennedy's analysis sat on my shelves since its pub date in the last 80s.
When R&FGP was cited in another title that I read this year (On Grand Strategy, also good), I was embarrased into getting back to this volume. Am very very glad that I did. Reading a 1987 book about the inevitability of the US/USSR bipolar world - from my perch in 2022 -is hilarious and remains insightful.
Strong recommend.
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