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Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History
The goal of war is to defeat the enemy's will to fight. But how this can be accomplished is a thorny issue. "Nothing Less than Victory" provocatively shows that aggressive, strategic military offenses can win wars and establish lasting peace, while defensive maneuvers have often led to prolonged carnage, indecision, and stalemate. Taking an ambitious and sweeping look at six major wars, from antiquity to World War II, John David Lewis shows how victorious military commanders have achieved long-term peace by identifying the core of the enemy's ideological, political, and social support for a war, fiercely striking at this objective, and demanding that the enemy acknowledges its defeat.
Lewis examines the Greco-Persian and Theban wars, the Second Punic War, Aurelian's wars to reunify Rome, the American Civil War, and the Second World War. He considers successful examples of overwhelming force, such as the Greek mutilation of Xerxes' army and navy, the Theban-led invasion of the Spartan homeland, and Hannibal's attack against Italy--as well as failed tactics of defense, including Fabius's policy of delay, McClellan's retreat from Richmond, and Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler. Lewis shows that a war's endurance rests in each side's reasoning, moral purpose, and commitment to fight, and why an effectively aimed, well-planned, and quickly executed offense can end a conflict and create the conditions needed for long-term peace.
Recognizing the human motivations behind military conflicts, "Nothing Less than Victory" makes a powerful case for offensive actions in pursuit of peace.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2010
14 people are currently reading
170 people want to read
About the author
John David Lewis
14 books5 followersJohn David Lewis was a political scientist, historian and Objectivist scholar.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
August 10, 2018
This is an excellent, clearly written, "superb appraisal of how ancient and modern wars start and finish." Goodreads gives these words: "Lewis examines the Greco-Persian and Theban wars, the Second Punic War, Aurelian's wars to reunify Rome, the American Civil War, and the Second World War. He considers successful examples of overwhelming force, such as the Greek mutilation of Xerxes' army and navy, the Theban-led invasion of the Spartan homeland, and Hannibal's attack against Italy--as well as failed tactics of defense, including Fabius' policy of delay, McClellan's retreat from Richmond, and Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler. Lewis shows that a war's endurance rests in each side's reasoning, moral purpose, and commitment to fight, and why an effectively aimed, well-planned, and quickly executed offense can end a conflict and create the conditions needed for long-term peace."
I especially liked understanding why it was crucial to drop the A-bomb on Japan. The cost of American lives against the Japanese in the Pacific conflict was 92-96. Most telling though, was "that many Japanese officers were obsessed with the idea of a "final battle" against an American invasion. They . . . issued the "Decisive Defensive Plan for the Homeland." . . . All that was needed to force a negotiated settlement was for millions of Japanese civilians (old men, women, children armed with sticks, stones) to throw their bodies at the Americans in a last charge. . . One hundred million deaths rather than surrender."
Chapter 7, "Gifts From Heaven" details how a nation of 70 million people would sacrifice their lives to an emperor-god. It gives the readers a grasp of what we were up against and why the "occupation" was successful. Lewis writes a valuable book.
I especially liked understanding why it was crucial to drop the A-bomb on Japan. The cost of American lives against the Japanese in the Pacific conflict was 92-96. Most telling though, was "that many Japanese officers were obsessed with the idea of a "final battle" against an American invasion. They . . . issued the "Decisive Defensive Plan for the Homeland." . . . All that was needed to force a negotiated settlement was for millions of Japanese civilians (old men, women, children armed with sticks, stones) to throw their bodies at the Americans in a last charge. . . One hundred million deaths rather than surrender."
Chapter 7, "Gifts From Heaven" details how a nation of 70 million people would sacrifice their lives to an emperor-god. It gives the readers a grasp of what we were up against and why the "occupation" was successful. Lewis writes a valuable book.
July 31, 2024
Reasonably good
This wasn’t quite what I expected. Moreover, there is a substantial amount of sloppiness with regards to historical facts. Nevertheless, an interesting book which is worth reading.
This wasn’t quite what I expected. Moreover, there is a substantial amount of sloppiness with regards to historical facts. Nevertheless, an interesting book which is worth reading.
March 22, 2017
The thesis is sound and relevant to our times. There are certainly cases where the constant "management" of crises has been bad. There are a few where "peace" has resulted in genocide where one side couldn't shoot back.
A few quibbles. The thesis of the chapter on the Versailles Treaty is muddled. On the one hand, the author is very critical of British policy in the interwar years and sympathetic to the French position of wanting to punish Germany. (Recent scholarship has conclusively proved that Germany provoked World War I fearing that it wouldn't be able to maintain its edge much past 1914.) But then it turns into a history of the appeasement policy. So was the problem that the Versailles Treaty was inadequate? that the Entente should have occupied Germany? or that the League of Nations should have enforced it?
It would seem to fit better with the thesis of the book that the Entente should have pressed for a stronger victory in 1918. There's some reason to think this might have been possible. The German feelers for an armistice were fueled by a French breakthrough on their southeastern flank and their inability to hold it off and the western front at the same time.
But here's the thing, and I think this reveals the flaw in the thesis of the book: the Entente's refusal to push forward and occupy Germany was no more a betrayal than the German government looking for the armistice. The Entente countries were exhausted and often on the brink of their own collapses. Indeed, Russia had collapsed. The UK and France had seen changes of government in the middle of the war. How do we know that the Entente had the ability to completely defeat Germany in 1918 or 1919?
The countries that were democracies—and this includes France and the UK—might have not been able to sustain a policy of occupation of Germany at the time. Their publics had no appetite for more war. Even the United States who suffered comparatively little in World War II tried very hard to stay out of the next war.
Policy makers are often constrained by what their publics can tolerate. This is part of the price of democracy. The problem with the alternative is that there's no constraint on launching wars, and they do in fact usually come from less than democratic regimes. Men like Lloyd George, Neville Chamberlain, or even Kissinger, have to play with the hand their dealt.
Lewis makes a point of this in the Versailles chapter, showing that the German public (and Hitler) had conviction in their cause of rearmament and national unification. But didn't the Allies have a conviction as well that another disastrous war should be avoided? Why should it have been taken for granted that the British should fight for Austria? Lewis thinks an intervention at that point would have caused Hitler's downfall and avoided the entire larger war.
This is so much Monday-morning quarterbacking. It very well could have gone differently. Britain was far behind in rearmament also—if they suffered a defeat then what?
In the end, when the public accepted that Hitler had to be defeated, he was defeated. They had to be convinced.
To me this means that while we need to understand the value of real victory, we can't just tell the public "you need total victory" and expect them to endure long conflicts. They need to understand both the cause for the need to fight at the beginning and the reasons to persist.
A few quibbles. The thesis of the chapter on the Versailles Treaty is muddled. On the one hand, the author is very critical of British policy in the interwar years and sympathetic to the French position of wanting to punish Germany. (Recent scholarship has conclusively proved that Germany provoked World War I fearing that it wouldn't be able to maintain its edge much past 1914.) But then it turns into a history of the appeasement policy. So was the problem that the Versailles Treaty was inadequate? that the Entente should have occupied Germany? or that the League of Nations should have enforced it?
It would seem to fit better with the thesis of the book that the Entente should have pressed for a stronger victory in 1918. There's some reason to think this might have been possible. The German feelers for an armistice were fueled by a French breakthrough on their southeastern flank and their inability to hold it off and the western front at the same time.
But here's the thing, and I think this reveals the flaw in the thesis of the book: the Entente's refusal to push forward and occupy Germany was no more a betrayal than the German government looking for the armistice. The Entente countries were exhausted and often on the brink of their own collapses. Indeed, Russia had collapsed. The UK and France had seen changes of government in the middle of the war. How do we know that the Entente had the ability to completely defeat Germany in 1918 or 1919?
The countries that were democracies—and this includes France and the UK—might have not been able to sustain a policy of occupation of Germany at the time. Their publics had no appetite for more war. Even the United States who suffered comparatively little in World War II tried very hard to stay out of the next war.
Policy makers are often constrained by what their publics can tolerate. This is part of the price of democracy. The problem with the alternative is that there's no constraint on launching wars, and they do in fact usually come from less than democratic regimes. Men like Lloyd George, Neville Chamberlain, or even Kissinger, have to play with the hand their dealt.
Lewis makes a point of this in the Versailles chapter, showing that the German public (and Hitler) had conviction in their cause of rearmament and national unification. But didn't the Allies have a conviction as well that another disastrous war should be avoided? Why should it have been taken for granted that the British should fight for Austria? Lewis thinks an intervention at that point would have caused Hitler's downfall and avoided the entire larger war.
This is so much Monday-morning quarterbacking. It very well could have gone differently. Britain was far behind in rearmament also—if they suffered a defeat then what?
In the end, when the public accepted that Hitler had to be defeated, he was defeated. They had to be convinced.
To me this means that while we need to understand the value of real victory, we can't just tell the public "you need total victory" and expect them to endure long conflicts. They need to understand both the cause for the need to fight at the beginning and the reasons to persist.
September 8, 2012
I great look at wars, and how they were conducted, throughout history, and how the proper ideas and actions can result in triumph. With the United States currently in a war that seems to have no end, "Nothing Less than Victory" makes good reading for those interesting in how certain actions can prolong war and/or result in defeat, and how other actions have resulted in decisive victory against an aggressor.
January 18, 2016
This book is exceptionally well written and reasoned. Lewis leads the reader to understand the fundamental causal factors of war, and what is required for war to turn into a lasting peace.
July 20, 2014
Not as interesting as I hoped it to be.
September 17, 2014
This is a philosophically integrated, compelling, moral, grand-scale vision of and for the ages that (like most of today's best books) will likely have its greatest impact in the distant future.
October 20, 2012
History always repeats, in every generation it seems.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews